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Myths & Facts U.S. Policy

By Mitchell Bard

The creation of Israel resulted solely from U.S. pressure.
The U.S. supported creating a Jewish state because of the “Jewish lobby.”
The U.S. and Israel have nothing in common.
Most Americans oppose a close U.S. relationship with Israel.
U.S. policy has always been hostile toward the Arabs.
The U.S. always supports Israel.
U.S. aid to the Middle East has always favored Israel.
Israel doesn’t need U.S. military assistance.
Israel has no strategic value to the U.S.
The U.S. has the formula to achieve peace between Israelis and Palestinians.


The creation of Israel resulted solely from U.S. pressure.


When the UN took up the question of Palestine, President Harry Truman explicitly said the United States should not “use threats or improper pressure of any kind on other delegations.”1 Nevertheless, some pressure was exerted, and the United States played a crucial role in securing support for the partition resolution. U.S. influence was limited, however, as became clear when American dependents such as Cuba and Greece voted against partition, and El Salvador and Honduras abstained.

Many members of the Truman administration opposed partition and tried to undermine U.S. support for establishing a Jewish state. Defense Secretary James Forrestal, for example, believed Zionist aims threatened American oil supplies and its strategic position in the region. The joint chiefs of staff worried Arab states might align themselves with the Soviets. The State Department tried to sabotage partition, fearing its negative impact on U.S.-Arab relations.2

Meanwhile, the Soviet Union supported partition—primarily to evict the British—the first foreign policy issue on which the soon-to-be Cold War rivals agreed.

Much has been written about the tactics of the supporters of partition, while the behavior of the Arab lobby has been largely ignored. Arab states and their supporters were no less active in arm-twisting at the UN to scuttle partition.3


The U.S. supported creating a Jewish state because of the “Jewish lobby.”


President Harry Truman supported the Zionist movement because he believed the international community was obligated to fulfill the promise of the Balfour Declaration and that alleviating the plight of the Jewish survivors of the Holocaust was the humanitarian thing to do. A sense of his attitude can be gleaned from a remark he made regarding negotiations over the boundaries of a Jewish state:

The whole region waits to be developed, and if it were handled the way we developed the Tennessee River basin, it could support from 20 to 30 million people more. To open the door to this kind of future would indeed be the constructive and humanitarian thing to do, and it would also redeem the pledges that were given at the time of World War I.4

The American public supported the president’s policy. According to public opinion polls, 65% of Americans supported the creation of a Jewish state.5 This public support was reflected in Congress, where a resolution approving the Balfour Declaration was adopted in 1922. In 1944, both national parties called for the Jewish Commonwealth’s restoration; in 1945, Congress adopted a similar resolution.

Rather than caving to pressure, Truman reacted negatively to the “Jewish lobby.” He repeatedly complained about being lobbied and talked about putting propaganda from the Jews in a pile and striking a match to it. In a letter to Rep. Claude Pepper, Truman wrote, “Had it not been for the unwarranted interference of the Zionists; we would have had the matter settled a year and a half ago.”6

This was hardly the attitude of a politician concerned with Jewish voters.


The U.S. and Israel have nothing in common.


The U.S.-Israel relationship is based on the twin pillars of shared values and mutual interests. Given this commonality of interests and beliefs, it should not be surprising that support for Israel is one of the American people’s most pronounced and consistent foreign policy values.

Americans have long admired Israelis, at least partly because they see much of themselves in their pioneering spirit and struggle for independence. Like the United States, Israel is a nation of immigrants. A multicultural society with people from more than 100 nations, nearly half of all Israelis are Eastern or Oriental Jews who trace their origins to the ancient Jewish communities of the Islamic countries of North Africa and the Middle East.

Israel has emerged in less than 80 years as an advanced nation with the characteristics of Western society. This is a function of the common Judeo-Christian heritage and the political and cultural norms European and North American immigrants brought to Israel.

While they live in a region characterized by autocracies, Israelis’ commitment to democracy is no less passionate than that of Americans. All citizens of Israel, regardless of race, religion, or sex, are guaranteed equality before the law and full democratic rights. Freedom of speech, assembly, and press are embodied in the country’s laws and traditions. Israel’s independent judiciary vigorously upholds these rights.

The political system differs from America’s—Israel’s is a parliamentary democracy—but it is still based on free elections with divergent parties. Israel does not have a constitution but has adopted “Basic Laws” that establish similar legal guarantees.

Initially, Israel had a mixed economy, combining capitalism with socialism like the British model. After experiencing severe economic difficulties, mainly attributable to the 1973 Yom Kippur War and the need to spend a disproportionate share of its gross national product on defense, Israel gradually adopted reforms that reduced the role of the state and shifted the country closer to the free market system of the United States. America has been a partner in this evolution.

The special relationship is also reflected in various shared value initiatives, which cover a broad range of common interests, such as the environment, energy, space, education, occupational safety, and health. More than 400 American institutions in 47 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico have received funds from binational programs with Israel. Israel has direct ties with 50 states, the District of Columbia, and Puerto Rico. In addition, the Free Trade Agreement, Co-operative Development Research Program, Middle East Regional Cooperation Program, and various memoranda of understanding with virtually every U.S. governmental agency demonstrate the depth of the bond between countries.

In the 1980s, attention increasingly focused on shared interests. The Reagan administration saw the Soviet Union as a threat to American Middle East interests and Israel as a bulwark of democracy in the region. Reagan formally recognized Israel’s role through strategic cooperation agreements. The United States knows it can count on Israel to help protect American interests.


Most Americans oppose a close U.S. relationship with Israel.


Support for Israel is not restricted to the Jewish community. Americans of all ages, races, and religions sympathize with Israel. This support is also nonpartisan.

The best indication of Americans’ attitude toward Israel is the response to the most consistently asked question about the Middle East: “In the Middle East situation, are your sympathies more with Israel or with the Arab nations?”

In 91 Gallup polls dating to 1967, Israel has had the support of an average of 49% of the American people compared to 13% for the Arab states/Palestinians. In 38 Gallup polls conducted since 1996, when “Arab nations” was replaced with “Palestinians,” Israel is favored 53%-16%.

Some people have the misperception that sympathy for Israel was once much higher. Before the Gulf War, the peak had been 56%, reached just after the Six-Day War. Since then, support for Israel has reached as high as 64%, most recently in 2018.

Gallup also takes regular polls on world affairs. In 2022, 71% of Americans rated Israel favorably compared to 27% for the Palestinian Authority.


U.S. policy has always been hostile toward the Arabs.


Arabs rarely acknowledge the American role in helping the Arab states achieve independence. President Wilson’s stand for self-determination for all nations, and the U.S. entry into World War I, contributed to the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire and stimulated the move toward independence in the Arab world.

In the past, Arab leaders saw U.S. policy as a zero-sum game whereby support for their enemy, Israel, necessarily disadvantaged them. Arab states tried to force the United States to choose between support for them or Israel and blamed America for their defeats in wars they initiated with Israel.7 Over time, the alliance with Israel has not harmed relations with Arab states.

The United States has long sought friendly relations with Arab leaders and has, at one time or another, been on good terms with most Arab states. In the 1930s, the discovery of oil led U.S. companies to become closely involved with the Gulf Arabs. In the 1950s, U.S. strategic objectives stimulated an effort to ally with pro-Western Arab states. Countries such as Iraq and Libya were friends of the United States before radical leaders took over those governments. Egypt, hostile toward the United States under Gamal Abdel Nasser, shifted to the pro-Western camp under Anwar Sadat.

Since World War II, the United States has poured economic and military assistance into the region. Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Morocco, Egypt,and the Gulf sheikdoms are under its security umbrella. Tensions over U.S. policy toward Israel have dissipated since the signing of the Abraham Accords, apart from Iraq and Syria, which remain technically at war with Israel.


The U.S. always supports Israel.


America has been Israel’s closest ally; nevertheless, the United States has repeatedly acted against the Jewish State’s wishes.

The U.S. effort to balance support for Israel with placating Arab leaders began in 1948 when President Truman wavered on partition. After the Arab states invaded Israel, the United States instituted an arms embargo that severely restricted the Jews’ ability to defend themselves.

In October 1953, the United States halted economic aid to Israel for three weeks to protest an Israeli project on the Jordan River in the demilitarized zone.

The United States has been unwilling to insist on projects to resettle Arab refugees. It has also been reluctant to challenge Arab violations of the UN Charter and resolutions. The United States also opposes Israel at the UN more often than not and did not use its Security Council veto to block an anti-Israel resolution until 1972.

Perhaps the most dramatic example of American policy diverging from Israel’s occurred when President Dwight Eisenhower opposed the Suez War and pressured Israel to withdraw from the territory it captured.

American presidents have sometimes punished Israel. For example, Ronald Reagan suspended a strategic cooperation agreement after Israel annexed the Golan Heights and held up the delivery of fighter planes because of unhappiness over an Israeli raid in Lebanon.

In 1991, President George H.W. Bush delayed approving Israel’s request for loan guarantees to help absorb Soviet and Ethiopian Jews because he disagreed with Israel’s settlement policy.

Bill Clinton and George W. Bush were considered pro-Israel but criticized Israel numerous times. During the first year of the al-Aqsa intifada, while Bush was president, the United States imposed an arms embargo on spare parts for helicopters because of anger over using U.S.-made helicopters in targeted killings. The Bush administration also punished Israel for agreeing to sell military equipment to China in 2005.8

Barack Obama was extremely critical of Israeli policy and publicly demanded a freeze on settlement construction. Several other confrontations occurred publicly and privately, along with threats of punitive measures if Israel did not accede to the president’s ultimatums. The two countries also bitterly disagreed on how to stop Iran’s nuclear program. Because of his approach to Israel and broader Middle East policy, polls in Israel found unprecedented distrust of the president’s commitment to Israel. In one 2016 poll, 63% of Israelis rated Obama the worst president for Israel in the last thirty years; Jimmy Carter was a distant second at 16%.9

Donald Trump did not criticize Israel publicly, but disputes arose over Israeli commercial contracts with China (which were also a cause of tension with his predecessors).

At the outset of his administration, Joe Biden refrained from public criticism of Israel but was at odds with Israel over several issues, including settlement construction, reopening the Jerusalem consulate, and his desire to return to the nuclear agreement with Iran.

Our society is illuminated by the spiritual insights of the Hebrew prophets. America and Israel have a common love of human freedom, and they have a common faith in a democratic way of life.

—President Lyndon Johnson10


U.S. aid to the Middle East has always favored Israel.


After Israel’s victory in its War of Independence, the United States responded to an appeal for economic aid to help absorb immigrants by approving a $135 million Export-Import Bank loan and the sale of surplus commodities. In those early years of Israel’s statehood (also today), U.S. aid was seen as a means of promoting peace.

In 1951, Congress voted to help Israel cope with the economic burdens imposed by the influx of Jewish refugees from the displaced persons camps in Europe and the Arab world. Arab leaders complained the United States was neglecting them, though they had no interest in or use for American aid. In 1951, Syria rejected offers of U.S. aid. Oil-rich Iraq and Saudi Arabia did not need assistance (yet the Saudis have received aid), and Jordan was, until the late 1950s, the ward of Great Britain. After 1957, when the United States began supporting Jordan and resumed economic aid to Egypt, assistance to the Arab states soared. Additionally, the United States has been the biggest contributor of aid to the Palestinians through the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA).

Before 1971, Israel received only $277 million in military aid, all in the form of loans. The bulk of the economic aid was also lent to Israel. By comparison, the Arab states received nearly three times as much aid before 1971, $4.4 billion, or $170 million per year. Moreover, unlike Israel, which received nearly all its aid from the United States, Arab nations have obtained assistance from Asia, Eastern Europe, Russia, and the European Community.

Israel did not begin to receive large amounts of assistance until 1974, following the 1973 War, and the sums increased dramatically after the Camp David agreements. Since 1949, Israel has received more than $150 billion in assistance.

In 1998, Israel voluntarily offered to reduce its dependence on U.S. aid, and economic assistance was phased out over the next ten years. Israel subsequently signed a ten-year deal for $30 billion in military assistance, and, in 2016, a new ten-year agreement was signed worth $38 billion.

Arab states that have signed peace agreements with Israel have also been rewarded. Since the peace treaty with Israel, Egypt has been the second largest recipient of U.S. foreign aid ($1.5 billion annually, mostly military aid, compared to Israel’s $3.1 billion). Jordan has also benefited from higher aid levels since it signed a treaty with Israel. The multibillion-dollar debts to the United States of both Arab nations were also forgiven. Signatories to the Abraham Accords also received economic and military inducements.

After the Oslo agreements, the United States began providing aid to the Palestinian Authority. Since the mid-1990s, the Palestinians, among the largest per capita recipients of foreign aid worldwide, have received nearly $6 billion in U.S. economic assistance.11


Israel doesn’t need U.S. military assistance.


Israel’s security has improved dramatically thanks to the Abraham Accords. Previously, Israel had peace treaties with only Egypt and Jordan. Still, enemies along its borders and beyond remain a threat.

In the Gaza Strip, Iran supports Hamas terrorists who have bombarded Israel with thousands of rockets since Israel evacuated the area. Thanks to the lifesaving Iron Dome missile defense system developed with American funding, it has minimized the threat. The U.S. has also paid to replenish the supply of interceptors used to shoot down incoming projectiles.

Israel also faces danger from Hezbollah, which has amassed more than 100,000 rockets and, with Iran’s help, is improving their range and accuracy.

Syria remains technically at war with Israel but has been preoccupied with its civil war. The instability created opportunities for the infiltration of forces from Hezbollah and Iran allied with Bashar Assad. Iran wants to establish a bridgehead in Syria to launch attacks against Israel.

Iran’s development of nuclear weapons poses the most serious threat to Israel. Despite assurances by President Barack Obama that the nuclear deal he negotiated would stop Iran from developing a weapon, Tehran violated the agreement’s terms and moved closer to having the capability to build a bomb. Since the U.S. withdrew from the deal in 2018, Iran has openly flouted the agreement and was estimated in 2022 to have enough uranium, if enriched to a higher level of purity, to build several nuclear bombs.12

Israel must prepare for the worst. It is conceivable that enemies will band together, as they have in the past, to endanger its security. Therefore, Israel must rely on its qualitative advantage to ensure it can defeat its enemies, which can only be guaranteed by the continued purchase of the latest weapons. New tanks, missiles, and planes carry high price tags, but Israel cannot afford what it needs on its own, so continued aid from the United States is vital to its security.


Israel has no strategic value to the U.S.


In 1952, Gen. Omar Bradley, head of the joint chiefs of staff, believed Israel could supply two of the 19 divisions needed to defend the Middle East. He also expected only three states to provide the West power in Middle Eastern defense by 1955: Great Britain, Turkey, and Israel. Bradley’s analysis was rejected because the political echelon decided it was more important for the United States to work with Egypt and, later, Iraq It was feared that integrating Israeli forces into Western strategy would alienate Arab leaders.13

After trying unsuccessfully to build an alliance with Arab states, the National Security Council Planning Board concluded in 1958 that “if we choose to combat radical Arab nationalism and to hold Persian Gulf oil by force if necessary, then a logical corollary would be to support Israel as the only pro-West power left in the Near East.”14

Israel’s crushing victory over the combined Arab forces in 1967 reinforced this view. The following year, the United States sold Israel sophisticated planes for the first time. Washington shifted its Middle East policy from seeking a balance of forces to ensuring that Israel enjoyed a qualitative edge over its enemies.

Israel proved its value in 1970 when the United States asked for help bolstering King Hussein’s regime. Israel’s willingness to aid Amman, and the movement of troops to the Jordanian border, persuaded Syria to withdraw the tanks it had sent into Jordan to support PLO forces challenging the king during “Black September.”15

By the early 1970s, no Arab state could or would contribute to Western defense in the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact had long ago expired, and the regimes friendly to the United States were weak compared to the anti-Western forces in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Even after Egypt’s reorientation following the signing of its peace treaty with Israel, the United States did not count on any Arab governments for military assistance.

The Carter administration began to implement a form of strategic cooperation (it was not referred to as such) by making Israel eligible to sell military equipment to the United States. The willingness to engage in limited, joint military endeavors was viewed by President Jimmy Carter as a means of rewarding Israel for “good behavior” in peace talks with Egypt.

Though reluctant to formalize the relationship, strategic cooperation became a significant focus of the U.S.-Israel relationship when Ronald Reagan entered office. Before his election, Reagan had written, “Only by full appreciation of the critical role the State of Israel plays in our strategic calculus can we build the foundation for thwarting Moscow’s designs on territories and resources vital to our security and our national well-being.”16

Reagan’s view culminated in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on “strategic cooperation” in 1981. In 1983, a new agreement was signed creating the Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) and a group to oversee security assistance, the Joint Security Assistance Planning Group (JSAP).

In 1987, Congress designated Israel as a major non-NATO ally. This law formally established Israel as an ally. It allowed its industries to compete equally with NATO countries and other close U.S. allies for contracts to produce a substantial number of defense items.

Since the rebirth of the State of Israel, there has been an ironclad bond between that democracy and this one.

—President Ronald Reagan17

By the end of President Reagan’s term, the United States had prepositioned equipment in Israel, regularly held joint training exercises, began co-development of the Arrow Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile, and was engaged in a host of other cooperative military endeavors. In 1988, Reagan signed another MOU encompassing all prior agreements. This agreement institutionalized the strategic relationship.

U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation has continued to evolve. Israel now regularly engages in joint training exercises with U.S. forces, and in 2005, for the first time, also trained and exercised with NATO forces.

The United States often adopts Israeli-developed weapons systems and enhancements. These include a laser range finder to assist marines in concealed positions with imaging, range finding, and navigation through combat areas; the Iron Fist Light Configuration active protection system for armored personnel carriers; tunnel detection equipment; and Reactive Armor Tiles that protect tanks and the soldiers within them.

In 2007, the United States and Israel signed an MOU formalizing cooperation in homeland security. Even before that, Israel routinely hosted U.S. law enforcement officers and first responders to share knowledge about the prevention of terror attacks and response to emergencies.

The U.S. Central Command incorporated Israel under its coverage during the Trump adminn. Subsequently, the U.S. began working to build a regional alliance including Israel and its Arab allies, which was impossible before the Abraham Accords.18

Today, strategic ties are stronger than ever, and Israel has become a de facto ally of the United States. America purchases innovative and advanced Israeli weapons systems works with Israeli defense companies, and shares intelligence.

Most important, Israel remains America’s most dependable ally in the region.


The U.S. has the formula to achieve peace between Israelis and Palestinians.


The European Union, Russia, and the UN have pursued largely one-sided policies in the Middle East that are detrimental to Israel, disqualifying them as honest brokers. The United States is the only country with the trust of the Israelis and the Arabs, making it the only third party that can play a constructive role in the peace process. Historically, however, American peace initiatives always fail.

The Eisenhower administration tried to ease tensions by proposing the joint Arab-Israeli use of the Jordan River. The plan would have helped the Arab refugees by producing more irrigated land and reducing Israel’s need for more water resources. Israel cautiously accepted the project; the Arab League rejected it.

President Lyndon Johnson outlined five principles for peace. “The first and greatest principle,” Johnson said, “is that every nation in the area has a fundamental right to live and to have this right respected by its neighbors.” The Arab response came a few weeks later: “no peace with Israel, no recognition of Israel, no negotiations with it.”

President Richard Nixon’s secretary of state, William Rogers, offered a plan to “balance” U.S. policy but leaned on the Israelis to withdraw to the pre-1967 borders, accept many Palestinian refugees, and allow Jordan a role in Jerusalem. The plan was unacceptable to Israel and, even though it tilted toward the Arab position, was rejected by Arab leaders.

President Gerald Ford’s secretary of state, Henry Kissinger, had a little more success in his shuttle diplomacy, arranging the disengagement of forces after the 1973 War. He never put forward a peace plan, however, and failed to move the parties beyond the cessation of hostilities to normalization.

President Jimmy Carter was the model for presidential engagement in the conflict. His mediation helped finalize the Israeli-Egyptian peace agreement, but he had wanted to convene an international conference in Geneva to produce a comprehensive peace deal. Egypt and Israel conducted secret negotiations that laid the foundation for a deal. Egyptian President Anwar Sadat believed Carter’s policy was so misguided he bypassed the Americans to speak directly to the Israeli people at the Knesset. By doing so, he broke a psychological barrier to peace. That, combined with Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin’s willingness to compromise, allowed Carter to seal the deal at Camp David.

The United States was the first country to recognize Israel in 1948, minutes after its declaration of independence, and the deep bonds of friendship between the U.S. and Israel remain as strong and as unshakeable as ever.

—President Barack Obama19

In 1982, President Reagan announced a peace initiative that called for allowing the Palestinians self-rule in the territories in association with Jordan. The plan rejected both Israeli annexation and the creation of a Palestinian state. Israel denounced the plan as endangering Israeli security. The plan had been formulated to pacify the Arab states, which had been angered by the expulsion of the PLO from Beirut, but they also rejected the Reagan Plan.

George H.W. Bush’s administration succeeded in convening a historic regional conference in Madrid in 1991, but it ended without any agreements. Moreover, Bush’s perceived hostility toward Israel eroded trust and made it difficult to convince Israelis to take risks for peace.

President Bill Clinton barely had time to get his vision of peace together when he discovered the Israelis had secretly negotiated an agreement with the Palestinians in Oslo. The United States had nothing to do with the breakthrough at Oslo and little influence on the immediate aftermath. The peace process became increasingly muddled as the United States got more involved.

Peace with Jordan also required no real American involvement. The Israelis and Jordanians already agreed on the main terms of peace. The obstacle had been King Hussein’s unwillingness to sign a treaty before Israel reached an agreement with the Palestinians. After Oslo, he felt safe to move forward, and no American plan was needed.

In a last-ditch effort to save his presidential legacy, Clinton put forward a peace plan to establish a Palestinian state. In this case, Prime Minister Ehud Barak’s willingness to offer dramatic concessions raised the prospects for an agreement rather than the president’s initiative. Even after Barak agreed to Clinton’s “parameters” that would have created a Palestinian state in virtually all the West Bank and Gaza, with East Jerusalem as its capital, the Palestinians rejected the deal.

President George W. Bush also offered a plan, but it was undercut by Yasser Arafat, who obstructed the required reforms of the Palestinian Authority and refused to prevent terrorism. Bush’s plan morphed into the Road Map, which was never implemented because of continuing Palestinian violence.

The peace process only began to move again when Prime Minister Ariel Sharon made his disengagement proposal, a unilateral approach the State Department opposed. Rather than try to capitalize on the momentum created by Israel’s evacuation of the Gaza Strip; however, the Bush administration remained wedded to the Road Map that led nowhere.

In his first term, President Barack Obama’s initiatives resulted in losing Arab and Israeli confidence in the United States and enabled Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas to avoid negotiations. Ultimately, officials conceded a peace agreement was “not in the cards.”20

President Donald Trump was confident he could barter a deal between the Israelis and Palestinians. His administration had little contact with the Palestinians due to mutual distrust, so no one was surprised when Abbas rejected the “deal of the century” Trump proposed. Trump did, however, achieve a breakthrough by persuading the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain to abandon their longstanding refusal to normalize relations with Israel until a deal with the Palestinians was reached. The Abraham Accords that emerged were later joined by Sudan and Morocco. All but Sudan had informal relations before Trump got involved.

Joe Biden came into office intent on restoring relations with the Palestinians and committing to pursuing a two-state solution. He recognized, however, that neither side was interested in resuming negotiations and was reluctant to put forward yet another U.S. proposal with no chance of success.

The United States can play a valuable role as a mediator, but the parties themselves must resolve their differences. The obstacle to Israeli-Palestinian peace is not the absence of an American framework, a lack of U.S. commitment, or the failure to sufficiently pressure Israel. The impediments have not changed since the first two-state solution was proposed in 1937, namely, the unwillingness of the Palestinians to agree to live in peace in their own state beside a Jewish state and the refusal of radical Muslims to accept Jews ruling over Muslims or “Islamic land.”

1Foreign Relations of the United States, 1947, (DC: GPO, 1948), pp. 1173–74, 1198–99, 1248, 1284 [Henceforth FRUS 1947].

2 Mitchell Bard, The Water’s Edge and Beyond, (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 1991), p. 132.

3 FRUS, pp. 1947, 1313; see also, Mitchell Bard, The Arab Lobby: The Invisible Alliance That Undermines America’s Interest in the Middle East, (NY: HarperCollins, 2010), pp. 17–36.

4 Harry Truman, Years of Trial and Hope, Vol. 2, (NY: Doubleday, 1956), p. 156.

5 John Snetsinger, Truman, the Jewish Vote, and the Creation of Israel, (Palo Alto, CA: Hoover Institution Press, 1974), pp. 9–10; David Schoenbaum, “The United States and the Birth of Israel,” Wiener Library Bulletin, (1978), p. 144n.

6 Michael Cohen, Truman and Israel, (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1990), p. 157.

7 See Bard, The Arab Lobby, pp. 41–65.

8 Nathan Guttman, “U.S. Stopped Parts Sales during Intifada,” Jerusalem Post, (September 22, 2005); Ze’ev Schiff, “U.S. Sanctions Still in Place, Despite Deal over Security Exports,” Haaretz, (August 28, 2005).

9 Shmuel Rosner, “How Bad Do Israelis Think Obama Is? As Bad as a U.S. President Can Get,” Jewish Journal, (April 28, 2015).

10 “Remarks at the 125th Anniversary Meeting of B’nai B’rith, September 10, 1968,” Public Papers of the Presidents of the USA— Lyndon Johnson,” (Washington, DC: GPO, 1970), p. 947.

11 Jim Zanotti, “The Palestinians: Overview and Key Issues for U.S. Policy,” Congressional Research Service, (January 28, 2021).

12 Laurence Norman, “U.N. Says Iran Has Enough Uranium to Produce Nuclear Weapon,” Wall Street Journal, (May 30, 2022).

13 Dore Gold, America, the Gulf, and Israel, (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1988), p. 84.

14 “Issues Arising out of the Situation in the Near East,” (July 29, 1958), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958–1960, Vol. XII, (“Near East Region; Iraq; Iran; Arabian Peninsula”), (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1993), pp. 114–124.

15 “Black September plea to Israel,” BBC, (January 1, 2001).

16 Reagan Address to B’nai B’rith, cited in Mitchell Bard, “U.S.-Israel Relations: Looking to the Year 2000,” AIPAC Papers on U.S.-Israel Relations, p. 6.

17 Ibid.

18 Michael R. Gordon and David S. Cloud, “U.S. Held Secret Meeting With Israeli, Arab Military Chiefs to Counter Iran Air Threat,” Wall Street Journal, (June 26, 2022).

19 President Barrack Obama, Statement on the 61st Anniversary of Israel’s Independence, The White House (Washington, DC, April 28, 2009).

20 Laura Rozen, “White House Says Israel- Palestine Peace ‘Not in the Cards’ for Obama,” Al-Monitor (November 6, 2015).