The United States and Israel are joined in a de facto alliance, with each nation sharing intelligence with the other, and both cooperating in joint military exercises. In Fiscal 1997, Israel received from the United States more economic aid $1.2 billion than any other nation, and more military assistance $1.8 billion than any other non-NATO nation.
Contrary to conventional wisdom, the relationship has not always been so close. For most of Israels first two decades of independence, the United States was not a close ally and did not provide Israel with significant amounts of either financial or military aid. All that changed, however, with President Lyndon Johnson's decision to sell Phantom jets to Israel in 1968.
The U.S. Keeps Its Distance
Harry Truman is given much of the credit for the creation of Israel, but his unwillingness to supply arms to the Jews fighting for independence undermined the diplomatic support he gave to the UN-sponsored partition of Palestine. The United States continued its arms embargo, despite persistent pressure from Israel and her supporters, until the Kennedy Administration.
United States policy for denying American arms to Israel was based on the following arguments: 1) the country was strong enough to defend itself without U.S. arms; this belief was reinforced by Israel's success during the Suez campaign; 2) Israel had access to arms from other sources; 3) the United States did not want to appear to be starting an arms race in the Middle East; 4) the U.S. sales of arms to Israel would lead the Arabs to ask the Russians and Chinese for arms; 5) the U.S. did not want to risk a Middle East confrontation with the Soviet Union; and 6) U.S. military aid to Israel would alienate the Arabs.
Not until 1962 did Israel receive its first major weapons system from the United States when Kennedy agreed to sell HAWK anti-aircraft missiles to Israel. That sale was opposed by the State Department, but Kennedy felt justified in ordering its execution after he failed to dissuade Egyptian President Nasser from escalating the arms race and after he learned that the Soviet Union had supplied Nasser with long-range bombers. The HAWK sale was significant not only because it was the first major direct arms transfer to Israel but also because that system required that Israeli soldiers be given extensive training in the United States and that spare parts be supplied to Israel. These were the first steps on a path which made Israel increasingly dependent on U.S. arms.
From 1948 until the 1962 HAWK sale, the Israeli lobby (consisting of those individuals and organizations which attempt directly and indirectly to influence American policy to support Israel) was largely unaware of any U.S. military aid to Israel. (Actually, there had been a trickle of arms such as recoilless rifles.) There was nothing unusual about this since virtually all U. S. aid to the Middle East was secret. In 1956, Israel's Ambassador to the United States, Abba Eban, told the president of the American Jewish Committee, Irving Engel, that with the possible exception of jet fighters, Israel was receiving arms in fair amounts.(1) The main source of these weapons, according to Eban, was France. In fact, it was U.S. encouragement of third-party arms suppliers which had enabled Israel to meet its defense needs. In addition, the United States itself was supplying small amounts of weapons to Israel, apparently without the knowledge of the Israeli lobby.
Johnson Assumes Command
When Lyndon Johnson became President, the Israeli lobby was encouraged not only by the fact that he had pledged to carry on the work of John Kennedy but also by Johnson's own record of support for Israel which dated back to his leadership in the Senate during the Eisenhower Administration.
Like most U.S. presidents, Johnson's support for Israel was based on a combination of realism, romanticism, and cold political calculation. Viewed realistically, Israel was a relatively powerful, pro-Western democratic nation in a region of strategic importance where Communism and Pan-Arabism were seen as serious threats to U.S. interests. Although the United States did not yet perceive Israel as a strategic ally, it recognized that a strong Israel was a deterrent to the forces of radicalism in the Middle East.
Viewed romantically, Israel was the nation of pioneers who had turned malarial swamps into a land of milk and honey. "We live by the faith that what has been wrought there," Johnson wrote to one Jewish leader shortly after becoming President, "someday will be achieved in all the lands where men aspire to live in freedom, under peace, enjoying justice as a right and prosperity as a result of their labors."(2) Five years later, Johnson told a B'nai B'rith meeting about his biblical connection to Israel. "Most if not all of you," he said, "have very deep ties with the land and with the people of Israel, as I do, for my Christian faith sprang from yours." The President explained that "the Bible stories are woven into my childhood memories as the gallant struggle of modem Jews to be free of persecution is also woven into our souls."(3)
Also the consummate politician, Johnson recognized that Jews are a political force in this country. As a leader of the Democratic Party, he developed close associations with a number of influential Jewish leaders, several of whom were among his closest friends.
Johnson's dependability was tested immediately when the Israelis began to pressure the Administration to sell them tanks and planes. As early as January 1964, Deputy Secretary of State Robert Komer was complaining that Myer Feldman was badgering him about supplying Israel with tanks.(4) Feldman, the holder of the "Jewish portfolio" as an aide in the Administration, meanwhile wrote to the President in May that he had "rarely been exposed to as much pressure as I have had recently on the question of tanks for Israel." In the same memo, however, Feldman reveals how the White House successfully exerted its own pressure: "It has only been after considerable effort that members of Congress have been restrained against making speeches on the question, the Anglo-Jewish press has killed several articles and responsible leaders of the Jewish community have demonstrated their confidence in the Administration by keeping silent."(5)
The Administration had, in fact, begun to consider a tank sale to Israel in January of 1964, but the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported that Israel had no need for tanks, and that the United States should place highest priority on restraining the flow of arms to the Middle East. If the Administration decided nevertheless to sell tanks to Israel, then the Joint Chiefs recommended they be sold only as replacements for obsolete tanks and that they be supplied discreetly. This became impossible when it was revealed, in early 1965, that the United States had been indirectly supplying arms to Israel through West Germany since 1962 under the terms of a secret 1960 agreement. The Arab nations responded to this revelation by threatening to recognize East Germany and by pressuring the West German government to halt the sales. The United States then stepped in and fulfilled the remainder of the $80 million 1960 arms agreement.(6)
President Lyndon Johnson and Prime Minister Levi Eshkol negotiated a deal for Patton tanks based in Germany, which were to be transferred to Israel after being upgraded in Italy. This sale was consistent with the U.S. policy of evenhandedness since it was matched by a similar sale of tanks to Jordan. That policy was best explained by Peter Solbert, Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense. In a letter to Senator Len Jordan, Solbert wrote that the Administration refrained from supplying large amounts of arms to either the Arabs or Israel because it wished to remain impartial, but that the United States was willing to make limited sales to both sides to strengthen the ability of Middle Eastern countries to defend themselves. "In no case, however, will the U.S. contribute to providing one state in the area a military advantage against another" (emphasis added).(7) This statement is highlighted because it reveals a fundamental difference between U.S. policy prior to the Phantom sale and after. That is, the Phantom sale represented a shift in U.S. policy from maintaining a stance of neutrality to one of providing and maintaining Israel with the arms it needed to build and keep a qualitative advantage over its Arab neighbors.
In February 1966, the State Department announced the U.S. sale of 200 Patton tanks to Israel. In May, it announced a new agreement to provide Israel with Skyhawk jet bombers. Militarily, these sales dramatically improved Israel's offensive capability. The symbolic impact was also great, since this was not only the first major sale of offensive weapons to Israel, but also the first public acknowledgment that the U.S. was not only willing to sell; but was actually selling, the equipment Israel needed to maintain its defenses.
Still, the sales represented no more than U.S. willingness to counterbalance Soviet arms supplies to the region. The Johnson Administration was not yet willing to abandon its policy of not providing any nation in the region with a strategic advantage. This was evident when it was learned that about the same time the U.S. had decided to sell Israel Skyhawks, it had also concluded secret agreements to sell F-5 bombers to Morocco and Libya as well as to supply additional military equipment to Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, and Tunisia.
Meanwhile, Nasser continued to express a desire to develop good relations with the U.S. and therefore announced that Egypt was willing not only to accept nuclear safeguards if Israel did, but also to keep the Israel issue "in the icebox."(8) Thus, as long as Nasser wished to improve relations, hinting that it was not inevitable that Egypt would join the Soviet camp, U.S. officials were interested in preserving as much influence as they could in the region. In their view, this required that the U.S. not become too closely allied with Israel.
The Pressure Builds
Israel and her supporters were not satisfied with the U.S. arms supply agreements reached in 1966; still outstanding was their request for Phantom jets. This request took on greater urgency as the bellicose rhetoric of Nasser began to push the nations of the Middle East toward war. The Americans remained unconcerned, however, and Levi Eshkol told U.S. News and World Report (April 21, 1967) that the American attitude was: "Don't spend your money. We are here. The Sixth Fleet is here." But Eshkol, fearing that the U. S. fleet might not be available fast enough, preferred that Israel be strong enough to defend itself.
The pressure to provide Phantoms to Israel not only failed to move Johnson, but even had the opposite effect. He was particularly irritated because those exerting pressure for Israel were not willing to support his Vietnam policies. He was especially concerned about the opposition of the pro-Israel lobby since he counted on the support of American Jews in his campaign for reelection.
The U.S. unsuccessfully pursued diplomatic efforts to recruit Israel government support for its Vietnam policy. At the same time it mounted a similar effort at home to make Johnson's support for the Israel lobby's objectives conditional upon that lobby's support on Vietnam. On September 9, 1966, for example, the National Commander of the Jewish War Veterans, Malcolm A. Tarlov, paying his annual courtesy call to the President, was told that "Jews who seek U.S. support for coreligionists in Russia and for Israel should vigorously identify with Administration actions in Vietnam." The President could not understand why the American Jewish community was not supporting his Vietnam policy when he was improving U.S.-Israel relations.(9)
Although Administration officials denied that Johnson had made support for his Vietnam policy a condition for U.S. support for Israel, the President's obsession with protecting his own credibility led him to suspect Israel lobby demands were somehow responsible for the opposition to Vietnam. When it comes to Israel, he told Israeli Minister Evron, American Jews are interventionists, but when it comes to Vietnam, they want the United States to be a pacifist. Johnson could not understand the contradiction and believed that the Jewish community was too selective. Abba Eban recalled being told by Johnson how a group of rabbis who had come to visit him in May 1967, asked him to put the whole American fleet in the Gulf of Aqaba to show the U.S. flag in the Straits of Tiran. In the meantime, Johnson asserted, they didn't think he should send a screwdriver to Vietnam.(10)
The Aftermath of June 1967
Although American policy during the Six Day War is not an issue here, the one U.S. action relevant to this paper was the decision by Johnson to embargo the shipping of arms to the Middle East. Just as Truman believed that an embargo might avert bloodshed, so too apparently did Johnson. Johnson also was disappointed that Israel had ignored his admonition not to go to war; moreover, he remained committed to a policy of evenhandedness and was anxious not to alienate the Arabs who would surely blame the United States for Israel's "aggression."
Just as Truman's 1948 embargo had a one-sided impact, so too did Johnson's in 1967: the Soviet Union continued to supply the Arabs with weapons, while Israel's secondary military supplier, France, imposed an embargo of its own. After the war, the Administration failed once again to persuade the Soviets to join in limiting arms sales to the Middle East. Consequently, Johnson was under increasing pressure to end his embargo and sell military planes to Israel.
At the beginning of October 1967, Senator Stuart Symington informed the White House that the Israelis were anxious and bitter over U.S. arms policy and warned that he could easily get a bill through Congress supporting military aid to Israel. Walt Rostow, who had replaced Bundy as national security adviser, called the situation "political dynamite." Finally, in mid-October, after Egypt sank an Israeli ship (the destroyer Elath) the Administration leaked the news that the embargo was being lifted.
Soon after the embargo ended, the Israelis requested 27 more Skyhawks and 50 Phantoms. The State Department recommended selling the former, but preferred to put off a decision on the latter until the middle of the following year. The Joint Chiefs, on the other hand, opposed all arms sales whatsoever. The State Department opposition to selling the Phantoms was based not only on strategic grounds - that is, the Joint Chiefs' opinion that Israel did not need them - but also on State's persistent belief that the U.S. could prevent an escalation of the arms race by simply refusing to supply Israel with more sophisticated weapons; as a consequence, it was hoped, arms limitation would make it possible to reach a diplomatic solution to the Arab-Israeli conflict. No decision was reached during the remainder of the year despite a deluge of letters from Congressmen urging Johnson to sell the planes to Israel.
Another factor underlying the President's decision was the probable impact of his actions on his chances for reelection. Prior to the war, Johnson had received a memo titled "1968 -American Jewry and Israel" which observed that though the Administration enjoyed great support among Jews, they were upset by the United States' "overreaction" in joining the Security Council's censure of Israel the previous November for its retaliatory attack against Jordan; by State Department policies calling for the return of the Arab refugees; and by U.S. arms sales to the Arabs without counterbalancing sales to Israel. The memo also made it clear that the Vietnam policy remained a problem. If Vietnam persisted, it warned, "a special effort to hold the Jewish vote will be necessary."(11) Nevertheless, overall, Johnson seemed to be in good standing with Jewish voters.
The Last Big Push
The pressure to sell Phantoms to Israel mounted at the beginning of January 1968, as the Administration prepared for the visit of Israel's Prime Minister Levi Eshkol. In anticipation of Eshkol's renewed request for Phantoms, the various agencies prepared their assessments and without exception recommended against the sale. The Navy and Air Force were opposed to the sale not only of Phantoms but also of Skyhawks, fearing that reducing American stocks of these weapons would have "a serious effect on the operational forces" in Vietnam.(12) On the other hand, a briefing book prepared for the visit expressed the willingness to sell 27 Skyhawks to Israel but to keep that decision secret to avoid upsetting the peace negotiations then being pursued under the auspices of United Nations mediator Gunnar Jarring. The briefing book also noted, naively, that the sale of Skyhawks would reduce pressure for the Phantoms.(13)
When Johnson met with Eshkol, he promised to keep Israel's military needs under "active and sympathetic examination," but he made no commitment to sell Israel the needed Phantom jets. The President did say, however, that he would make a decision during the coming year. Johnson offered to provide 30 Skyhawks, and he agreed to sell 10 more if they were requested. Informally, the President was less tentative about the Phantoms as well. "Awh, Eppie," he is reported to have told the concerned Israeli Ambassador, "you know I'm going to give you the Phantoms ...."(14) In the meantime, no deal was made, but the speculation and publicity associated with the Eshkol visit helped stimulate further pressure for the sale.
Congress Steps In
Throughout Johnson's term, individual Congressmen lobbied on behalf of Israel but it was not until June 1968 that a legislative effort was made to force military sales to Israel. The first stage of that effort was initiated by Senator Stuart Symington. Johnson needed to get the Military Sales bill passed to complete arms transactions. Symington threatened to kill the bill if the President did not deliver the Phantoms. Besides the usual motivation provided by pro-Israel voters and public opinion, Symington was no doubt interested in the sale because the planes were built in his home state of Missouri.
The Administration took the threat seriously and began to discuss possible tradeoffs. State Department Near East expert Harold Saunders wrote to Rostow asking, "What are [the] advantages of holding off on Phantoms longer versus having no military sales bill? Would Phantoms insure passage? If F-4s are going to be sold anyway, might as well go ahead and get credit with Israel and Congress now. In exchange [we] might get [a] commitment to consult before acquiring missiles, [a] commitment to sign NPT, or some limited agreement regarding negotiations with Jordan and UAR."(15) The President, still unwilling to announce a decision, suggested that the decision had not yet been made.
The pressure was turned up another notch at the end of July 1968, when the Senate adopted a "Sense of Congress" resolution calling upon the President to sell an unspecified number of supersonic military planes that would provide Israel with a deterrent force. The resolution was subsequently approved by the House; nevertheless, the President remained unmoved. Johnson then began facing new pressures, however, from both inside and outside the White House.
While most Administration officials remained opposed to the sale on military grounds, they were becoming increasingly concerned over the political costs of delaying what they believed to be inevitable. On August 21, 1968, Ernest Goldstein wrote a revealing memo to the President in which he pointed out that he had avoided expressing his views relating to Israel throughout his service as an aide but warned that the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia provided evidence that the Soviets' lack of restraint "might find its counterpart in the Middle East." Therefore, he hoped that Johnson would provide Phantoms to Israel before the election.(16)
Johnson also faced pressure from the two political parties. In August, both national conventions adopted platform planks, which had been suggested by the American Israel Public Affairs Committee (AIPAC), calling for military aid to Israel. In addition, both presidential candidates made strong statements in support of the Phantom sale. At the B'nai B'rith convention in Washington on September 8, Hubert Humphrey warned that "Want of strength whets the appetite for war, for aggression .... Israel must have the means to defend itself, including such items as Phantoms." Richard Nixon told the same audience that the balance of power must be tipped in Israel's favor to deter Arab aggression; therefore, he said, he believed Israel must have "a technological military margin to more than offset her hostile neighbors' numerical superiority. If maintaining that margin should require that [the] U.S. supply Israel with supersonic Phantom F-4 jets - we should supply those Phantom jets."(17)
In his first major Middle East speech since June 1967, President Johnson told the same B'nai B'rith convention which just forty-eight hours earlier had heard the presidential candidates urge support for the Phantom sales that he had "no intention of allowing the balance of forces in the area to become an incentive for war .... We have proposed .... the urgent need now for an international understanding on arms limitations for the region."(18)
Once again, Johnson had returned to the leitmotif of arms control; meanwhile, he closed a $100 million deal with King Hussein for U.S. HAWK missiles and, two weeks after his speech, approved the sale of an additional 12 Skyhawks to Israel. The Skyhawk sale was not expected to eliminate the pressure for Phantoms, but rather to demonstrate that the Administration was not totally insensitive to Israel's security requirements. In addition, the Administration hoped that by holding the Phantoms hostage, the U.S. would gain the leverage needed to encourage the Israelis to cooperate with the Jarring peace talks. The Israelis argued, conversely, that they could not negotiate from weakness, and that they therefore needed the Phantoms before they could engage in serious negotiations.
Johnson had also hoped to arrange a summit meeting with the Soviets to discuss, among other things, a limitation on the sale of arms to the Middle East, but this option was effectively eliminated by the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia in August. As the election approached, Johnson was under almost constant pressure from a broad coalition of Israel's American supporters. Johnson also wanted to help Humphrey who, after the President's September speech, had reiterated his position that Israel should be sold Phantoms.
The only real opposition to the sale remained within the Administration, where the Defense and Intelligence departments were still unconvinced of Israel's need for Phantoms. Nevertheless, the Secretary of State concluded, after two days of fruitless discussions with the Soviet Foreign Minister, that the Phantom deal "is the most we can get away with in the light of the action of the Congress" (emphasis added).(19) The next day, October 9, President Johnson signed the Foreign Assistance Act of 1968 and announced that he had not only taken note of the section concerning the sale of planes to Israel but was also asking the Secretary of State to initiate negotiations with Israel.
The significance of the sale was explained by Assistant Secretary of Defense Paul Warnke in a discussion with Yitzhak Rabin. The United States had avoided becoming Israel's arms supplier, he said, because it wanted to reduce the risk of a U.S.-U.S.S.R. confrontation in the Middle East. The U.S., he said, would have preferred to continue that policy but could not because of the refusal of the Europeans, especially the French, to arm Israel. "We will henceforth become the principal arms supplier to Israel, involving us even more intimately with Israel's security situation and involving more directly the security of the United States" (emphasis added). It was not just the agreement to provide 50 Phantoms that was significant, he said, but also the sale of the Phantoms plus 100 Skyhawks and other equipment requested by Israel, which made the policy a distinct change from that of the past.(20)
The sale was announced on December 27. Israel was to receive 16 Phantoms in late 1969 and another 34 in 1970. It was the largest single arms deal signed to that point by Israel. The cost was $285 million and Israel paid in cash to avoid the need to pay interest on loans.(21)
In response, the Soviet Union reportedly began delivering 200 MIG 23s to Egypt. The MIGs were capable of carrying nuclear weapons and were more maneuverable than Phantoms.(22) With this decision the United States found itself enmeshed in the Middle East arms race.
The President's reluctance to sell Phantoms to Israel was based largely on the Pentagon's evaluation that Israel did not need supersonic jets; moreover, other governments had U.S. backing to provide the Israelis with sufficient weapons to balance the Arab threat. In addition, it was felt that the sale of Phantoms was likely to harm America's relations with the Arabs, particularly Nasser, whom the U.S. was still trying to court. Johnson was also intent on reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union to limit arms sales to the Middle East. For all these reasons, Johnson could argue that the national interest would not be served by the sale of Phantoms to Israel.
Of course, the Israeli lobby and its supporters in Congress saw the national interest from a different perspective. The lobby was less sanguine about Israel's strength vis-a-vis the Arabs, not only because its members were not aware of the amount of arms aid Israel was actually receiving, but primarily because the lobby would not consider the possibility that Israel might not need the arms it requested. Moreover, the lobby asserted that U.S. -Arab relations would not be hurt by the sale of arms to Israel since the Arabs already considered U.S. policy unbalanced, and since repeated efforts to bring Nasser into the Western camp had failed. Finally, the notion that supplying Phantoms to Israel would undermine efforts to limit arms sales to the region was rejected as hypocritical because both the Soviet Union and the United States were pouring weapons into the Arab states.
Johnson consented to the sale after the position of the Israel lobby was proven correct by subsequent events. Nasser continued to defy the West and then provoked the Six Day War; the Russians refused to limit their shipments to the region; and third countries France and West Germany that the U.S. had relied upon to arm Israel stopped the flow of weapons. Thus, the national interest in supporting Israel took precedence over the other American interests in the region. Moreover, it became clear that the interest of the United States no longer lay in seeking to maintain a balance of power in the region, but rather in seeking to insure that Israel enjoyed qualitative military superiority. This in itself does not explain the outcome; domestic politics did play a greater role.
Johnson complained to Lucius Battle, then the Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern Affairs, that "never in all his years of political life did he have such political pressure Jewish groups and congressional pressures."(23) Johnson was already pro-Israel when he assumed the Presidency. Throughout his long record of political service he had been subject to the influence of both the formal and the informal lobbies. He also had close friendships with influential Jewish leaders who used their frequent visits to put forward arguments for the Phantom sale. On the other hand, except for some input from the oil industry and occasional letters from members of the Arab lobby, there was little countervailing interest-group pressure.
One of the factors that enabled Johnson to resist the pressure of the lobbies was his strong domestic position. He had inherited from Kennedy a large congressional majority which became even larger after the 1964 elections. He was abetted in his opposition by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee Chairman, J. William Fulbright, and the Senate Majority Leader, Mike Mansfield, who were among the most anti-Israel members of the Congress. The sympathetic congressional majority, believing that the President had the final responsibility for making arms sales decisions, was content to let Johnson handle the issue. In addition, Johnson was extremely popular at the beginning of his term, averaging well over 60 percent public approval in the 1965 opinion polls.
The situation began to change, however, as the country became more deeply involved in Vietnam. Johnson's popularity plummeted to 45 percent in 1967. The Israel lobby's constituents, composed primarily of liberal Jews, became increasingly disenchanted with the President's Vietnam policy. Congress, following the mood of the nation, also became more active and, in 1968, introduced legislation to pressure Johnson into making the arms sales. In addition, when France embargoed arms sales to Israel, Johnson began to increase the U.S. commitment, as he had already done when West Germany stopped its sales.
By 1968, Johnson was under siege from Congress, the public, and the Israel lobby. The pressure generated by public opposition to his Vietnam policy led him to withdraw from the election campaign, but it did not relieve him of the demands to provide Israel with Phantom jets. "Johnson was too much of a politician," Spiegel notes, "to ignore the assistance the sale announcement could give Humphrey." Thus, the election played a role in the timing of the U.S. decision to sell Phantom jets to Israel.(24)
Sources: 1. Etta Z. Bick, "Ethnic Linkages and Foreign Policy: A Study of the Linkage Role of American Jews in Relations Between the United States and Israel, 1956-1968," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, City University of New York, 1983), p. 95.
2. Letter, LBJ to Louis Segal, 12/28/63, LBJ Library.
3. Speech on September 10, 1968, cited in Bernard Reich, Quest For Peace, (NJ: Transaction Books, Inc., 1977), p. 423n; Steven L. Spiegel, "Religious Components of U.S. Middle East Policy," Journal of international Affairs, (Fall/Winter 1982-83), pp. 241-242.
4. Memo, Robert Komer to McGeorge Bundy, 1/16/64, LBJ Library.
5. Memo, Myer Feldman to LBJ, 5/11/64, LBJ Library.
6. Memo, J.W. Davis, Deputy Director JCS, to Secretary of Defense, 1/18/64; Memo, Earle Wheeler, chairman of JCS, to Secretary of Defense, 3/12/64; Memo, David Klein to McGeorge Bundy, 2/17/65; Memo, Robert Komer to LBJ, 4/23/65, LBJ Library; Robert H. Trice, Jr., "Domestic Political Interests and American Policy in the Middle East: Pro-Israel, Pro-Arab and Corporate Non-governmental Actors and the Making of American Foreign Policy, 1966-1971, " (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Wisconsin-Madison, 1974), pp. 132 and 226.
7. Letter, Peter Solbert to Senator Len Jordan, 7/2/65, Gen CO 303 Box 75, LBJ Library.
8. Memo for the Record, Harold Saunders lunch with Ambassador Kamel, 8/10/66, Country File, UAR, Vol. IV, National Security File, Boxes 159 and 161.
9. Near East Report, (September 20, 1966), p. 74.
10. Bick, pp. 208-209.
11. Memo, unsigned but written by Dave Ginsberg for LBJ, "1968-American Jewry and Israel," Undated but approximately April 1967, LBJ Library.
12. Memo, Charles Baird to Assistant Secretary of Defense/ISA, 1/5/68, LBJ Library.
13. Briefing book for Eshkol visit, 1/3/68, LBJ Library.
14. Steven L. Spiegel, The Other Arab-Israeli Conflict, (University of Chicago Press, 1985), p. 160; Near East Report, (January 9, 1968), p. 1; Marshall A. Hershberg, "Ethnic Interest Groups and Foreign Policy: A Case Study of the Organized Jewish Community in Regard to the 1968 Decision to Sell Phantom Jets to Israel," (Unpublished Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Pittsburgh, 1973), pp. 27-28; Trice, pp. 231-232.
15. Memo, Harold Saunders to Walt Rostow, 6/19/68, LBJ Library.
16. Memo, Ernest Goldstein to LBJ, 8/21/68, LBJ Library.
17. New York Times, (September 9, 1968). Nixon's statement may be the first to call for Israel's military superiority.
18. Near East Report, (September 17, 1968); Hershberg, p. 35.
19. Memo, Walt Rostow to LBJ, 10/8/68, LBJ Library; Trice, pp. 238-239.
20. Memo of conversation between Yitzhak Rabin et al., and Paul Warnke et al., 11/4/68, LBJ Library.
21. Jerusalem Post, 4/23/99.
22. UPI dispatch, 11/30/68, Gen CO 304, UAR, Box 75, LBJ Library.
23. 22. Bick, op. cit., p. 165.
24. Spiegel, op. cit., p. 163.