The Jarring Mission
(January 4, 1971)
Security Council Resolution 242 of 22 November 1967 called upon the Secretary-General
to appoint a special representative to proceed to the Middle East and
help to promote agreement and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and
accepted settlement based on the provisions of Resolution 242. Dr. Gunnar
Jarring, Sweden's Ambassador to the Soviet Union, a country which had
broken off its diplomatic relations with Israel, was appointed, retaining
his ambassadorial assignment to Moscow. In early 1968, he arrived in
the Middle East and met with the leaders of Israel and of the Arab States. Israel saw his mission as that of
bringing the parties together for talks. The Arab States refused direct
or even indirect contact with Israel. The evolution of the first phase
of the Jarring Mission is described in a report submitted to the Security
Council by U Thant on January 4, 1971, excerpts of which follow:
1. On November 22, 1967, the Security Council adopted
resolution 242 (1967) which reads as follows:
"The Security Council,
"Expressing its continuing concern with the grave
situation in the Middle East,
Emphasizing the inadmissibility of the acquisition of
territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which
every State in the area can live in security,
"Emphasising further that all Member States in
their acceptance of the Charter of the United Nations have undertaken a
commitment to act in accordance with Article 2 of the Charter,
"(1) Affirms that the fulfilment of Charter
principles requires the establishment of a just and lasting peace in the
Middle East which should include the application of both the following
principles:
(i) Withdrawal of Israel armed forces from territories
occupied in the recent conflict;
(ii) Termination of all claims or states of belligerency
and respect for and acknowledgement of the sovereignty, territorial
integrity and political independence of every State in the area and their
right to live in peace within secure and recognised boundaries free from
threats or acts of force;
"(2) Affirms further the necessity
(a) For guaranteeing freedom of navigation through
international waterways in the area; (b) For achieving a just settlement of
the refugee problem;
(c) For guaranteeing the territorial inviolability and
political independence of every State in the area, through measures
including the establishment of demilitarised zones;
"(3) Requests the Secretary-General to designate a
Special Representative to proceed to the Middle East to establish and
maintain contacts with the States concerned in order to promote agreement
and assist efforts to achieve a peaceful and accepted settlement in
accordance with the provisions and principles in this resolution;
"(4) Requests the Secretary-General to report to
the Security Council on the progress of the efforts of the Special
Representative as soon as possible".
2. On November 23, 1967, I reported to the Council
(S/8259) that I had invited Ambassador Gunnar V. Jarring of Sweden to
accept the designation as the Special Representative mentioned in paragraph
3...
Activities of the Special
Representative During the Period December 9, 1967 to November 26, 1968
4. When the Special Representative first met with the
parties in December 1967, he found that the Israeli Government was of the
firm view that a settlement of the Middle East question could be reached
only through direct negotiations between the parties culminating in a peace
treaty and that there could be no question of withdrawal of their forces
prior to such a settlement. On December 27, the Minister for Foreign
Affairs of Israel, Mr. Abba Eban, communicated to the Special
Representative a proposal that Israel and the United Arab Republic
representatives should, as a first step, discuss an agenda for peace. The
Israeli proposals for such an agenda were:
"(1) Political and juridical problems: The
replacement of cease-fire arrangements by peace treaties ending the state
of belligerency, ending all hostile acts and threats and embodying a
permanent undertaking of mutual non-aggression.
"(2) Territorial and security problems: The
determination of agreed territorial boundaries and security arrangements.
Agreement on this measure would determine the deployment of armed forces
after the cease-fire.
"(3) Navigation problems: Practical methods
should be discussed for ensuring free navigation for all States including
Israel in the Suez Canal and the Gulf of Aqaba when the cease-fire is
replaced by peace. In the light of tragic experience, it is evident that
international declarations cannot by themselves solve this problem Concrete
measures and guarantees are required.
"(4) Economic problems: Proposals for
terminating boycott practices and instituting normal economic
relations."
5. The United Arab Republic and Jordan, for their part,
insisted that there could be no question of discussions between the parties
until the Israeli forces had been withdrawn to the positions occupied by
them prior to 5 June 1967. Reacting specifically to the Israeli proposals
for discussing an agenda for peace, the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the
United Arab Republic, Mr. Mahmoud Riad, stated that the withdrawal of
Israel's forces to the positions held prior to June 1967 was a basic and
preliminary step to a peaceful settlement in the Middle East.
6. An Israeli proposal for discussions on an agenda for
peace with Jordan was submitted to the Special Representative on 7 January
1968. It followed the same general lines as the proposal for the United
Arab Republic but contained more detailed suggestions for economic
co-operation, as well as the following new topics;
"Humanitarian problems: In the
proposed negotiations, high priority should be given to a solution of the
refugee problem with international and regional cooperation.
"Religious and historical sites: Access to
sites of special religious significance should be discussed. The Government
of Israel clarified its views on this subject in several verbal and written
communications to the United Nations."
It was also stated:
"In the meantime, it is urgent that breaches of
the cease-fire and activities by El Fatah and other such organisations
should be suppressed and every effort made on both sides to avoid exchanges
of fire."
7. The proposals, when communicated to the Jordanian
authorities by the Special Representative, were objected to in the same way
as the proposals to the United Arab Republic had been.
8. Faced with these conflicting positions, the Special
Representative sought to obtain from the parties an assurance that they
would implement Security Council resolution 242 (1967), in the hope that
such a declaration would be regarded as a basis for subsequent discussions
between the parties. The Special Representative received from Foreign
Minister Eban a number of formulations of Israel's position on the Security
Council resolution, of which the last, dated 19 February 1968, read as
follows:
"(1) The Government of Israel, out of respect for
the Security Council's resolution of 22 November 1967 and responding
affirmatively thereto, assures you of its full co-operation in your efforts
with the States concerned to promote agreement and to achieve an accepted
settlement for the establishment of a just and lasting peace, in accordance
with your mandate under the resolution.
"(2) Israel's position has throughout been that the
best way to achieve the objective of the Security Council resolution is
through direct negotiations. However, as a further indication of Israel's
co-operation, we are willing that this be done in a meeting convened by the
Special Representative of the Secretary-General.
"(3) On 12 February 1968, I informed you of
Israel's acceptance of the Security Council's call, in its resolution of 22
November 1967, for the promotion of agreement on the establishment of
peace. The United Arab Republic is also aware of Israel's willingness as
explained on 1 February to negotiate on all nutters included in the
Security Council's resolution. We accept the sponsor's view that the
principles recommended for inclusion in the peace settlement are integrally
linked and interdependent.
"(4) We have noted the United Arab Republic's
willingness to 'implement' the Security Council's resolution and fulfil its
obligations thereunder. It is a matter of concern that the United Arab
Republic statements, unlike those of Israel, do not specifically use the
precise terms of the resolution in such crucial matters as 'agreement' and
the 'establishment of a just and lasting peace', and that the United Arab
Republic has not yet agreed to a process of negotiation without which, of
course, a declaration Of willingness to fulfil the resolution is of no
substantive effect. The resolution is a framework for agreement.
"It cannot be fulfilled without a direct exchange
of views and proposals leading to bilateral contractual commitments. The
United Arab Republic position is, therefore, still deficient in important
respects. We are, however, conscious of the importance of the fact that the
United Arab Republic and Israel have both responded affirmatively to the
call for co-operating with you in the mission laid upon you by the Security
Council.
"At the same time, it would be unrealistic to
ignore that there have been sharp differences of interpretation of what the
resolution entails. To subscribe to similar declarations does not in itself
solve practical issues at stake.
"(5) It is accordingly urgent to move forward to a
more substantive stage and to embark on a meaningful negotiation for
achieving the just and lasting peace called for by the Security
Council."
In discussions with the Special Representative, Foreign
Minister Eban stated that Israel would not object to an indirect approach
to negotiations provided that it was designed to lead to a later stage of
direct negotiations and agreement.
9. The United Arab Republic Foreign Minister gave
repeated assurances that the United Arab Republic was ready to implement
the Security Council resolution as a whole and to fulfil its obligations
under it, but stated that it would not accept direct negotiations. The
United Arab Republic accepted indirect negotiations; however, the first
step must be an Israeli declaration "in clear language" that it
would implement the Security Council resolution.
10. The Jordanian authorities expressed a similar point
of view to the Special Representative.
11. The Special Representative then proceeded to United
Nations Headquarters for consultations with the Secretary-General.
Returning to the area at the beginning of March, he informally presented to
the parties, to ascertain their reactions, a draft letter from himself to
the Secretary-General, which would be worded as follows:
'The Governments of Israel and the United Arab Republic
(Jordan) have both indicated to me that they accept Security Council
resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 for achieving a peaceful and
accepted settlement of the Middle East question and intend to devise
arrangements, under my auspices, for the implementation of the provisions
of the resolution.
"The two Governments have expressed their
willingness to co-operate with me in my capacity as Special Representative
of the Secretary-General in the discharge of my tasks of promoting
agreement and achieving such a settlement.
"In view of the urgency of the situation and with a
view to expediting efforts to reach settlement, I have invited the two
Governments to meet with me, for conferences within the framework of the
Security Council resolution, in Nicosia. I have pleasure in informing you
that the two Governments have responded favourably to this
invitation."
12. When Ambassador Jarring presented this text to the
United Arab Republic Foreign Minister on 7 March 1968, the latter stated
that recent statements by Israeli leaders showed that they were following
an expansionist line. It was no longer sufficient to have Israel give an
assurance of intent to implement the resolution; the Arabs had to be
satisfied that the Israelis were going to "implement if for
action". If the Israelis withdrew completely from the occupied
territories, peace could be arrived at by the implementation of the other
provisions of the Security Council resolution under the Council's guidance.
13. In a meeting on 10 March, the Special Represnetative
informed the Israeli Foreign Minister of the United Arab Republic attitude.
He then informally showed his draft letter to the Foreign Minister, who
expressed the personal view that it would be fully acceptable to the
Israeli authorities if it was also accepted by the other side and led to
contact between them. Subsequently the Special Representative was informed
of Israel's official acceptance, without conditions, of the text.
14. In a meeting on 14 March, the Jordanian authorities
stated that they were ready to accept the proposed meeting in principle
provided that the text was modified to read that the parties had
"declared their readiness to implement the resolution".
15. During the following weeks, Ambassador Jarring paid
repeated visits to the countries concerned in an endeavour to obtain from
the Israelis a more precise formulation of their acceptance of the
resolution and from the two Arab States acceptance of the idea of meetings
between the parties under his auspices.
16. At a meeting in Amman on 16 April 1968, the
Jordanian authorities stated that they were prepared to accept the text of
the Special Representative's draft letter provided that the third paragraph
was amended to read as follows:
"In view of the urgency of the situation and
with a view to expediting efforts to reach settlements, I will meet with
representatives of Israel and Jordan for conferences within the framework
of the Security Council resolution, in New York. I have pleasure in
informing you that the two Governments have responded favourably
hereto."
The acceptance was based on the assumption that the
United Arab Republic would accept an identical text.
17. The Israeli authorities found difficulties in the
Jordanian amended text. They had accepted meetings at Nicosia, on the
understanding that the Special Representative's invitation would lead to
joint meetings. The new text appeared to give the impression that only
meetings between the parties and the Special Representative were intended.
The change of venue, while not objectionable in principle, tended to create
the impression that only discussions with the permanent missions in the
scope of normal United Nations activities would take place; a change from
Nicosia to a European city would be acceptable.
18. The United Arab Republic Foreign Minister at first
continued to insist on a prior declaration by Israel of its intention to
implement the Security Council resolution. Finally, however, on 9 May, on
the eve of the Special Representative's departure from the area (see
following paragraph), he replied to the Special Representative's proposed
invitation in the form amended by Jordan in the following written
statement:
"With reference to your indication to me today
of your desire to meet with a representative of the United Arab Republic in
New York, I wish to reaffirm the readiness of our Permanent Representative
to the United Nations in New York to meet with you to continue the contacts
which you have been conducting with the parties concerned in accordance
with Security Council resolution 242 (1967) of 22 November 1967 for the
implementation of that resolution.
"I have referred in the course of our previous
meetings to the importance of the setting of a timetable for the
implementation of the resolution of the Security Council, and offered you
several alternatives towards that end, one of which, that you present a
time-table prepared by yourself for the implementation of the resolution.
These suggestions emanate from the United Arab Republic's indication to you
of its acceptance and readiness to implement the above-mentioned
resolution.
"I wish to express anew our willingness to
co-operate with you in your capacity as Special Representative of the
Secretary-General in the discharge of your tasks as defined in the
Council's resolution of 22 November 1967. "
The United Arab Republic Foreign Minister repeated that
the United Arab Republic was ready to implement the resolution as a whole
and as a "package deal". It insisted, however, that Israel should
do likewise, including complete withdrawal.
19. Ambassador Jarring was faced with a position where
there was now agreement, though clearly with considerable differences of
interpretation, on the first two paragraphs of his proposed invitation, but
where there was disagreement on the third paragraph containing the actual
invitation. Further journeying backwards and forwards between the various
countries was unlikely to bee productive. In consultations with me, he
considered issuing a formal invitation along the lines of his proposal, but
with the venue at New York, but it was felt that a forced acceptance
obtained by such an invitation would not be helpful.
Instead it was decided that the talks in New York should
begin without a formal invitation by the Special Representative or a letter
from the Special Representative to the Secretary-General, but on the basis
of a short statement to the press in which it would be announced that the
Special Representative was arriving in New York for consultations in
continuation of his mission...
22. In the five weeks following his arrival in New York,
Ambassador Jarring pursued actively his contacts with the permanent
representatives of the parties at both a formal and informal level.
Unfortunately these contacts did not serve in any way to break the
dead-lock between the parties concerning the interpretation of the Security
Council resolution and the manner in which it should be implemented. In
that regard, the Permanent Representative of Israel had stated in the
Security Council on I May 1968:
"In declarations and statements made publicly
and to Mr. Jarring, my Government has indicated its acceptance of the
Security Council resolution for the promotion of agreement on the
establishment of a just and durable peace. I am also authorized to reaffirm
that we are willing to seek agreement with each Arab State on all the
matters included in that resolution. "
This statement was not regarded as acceptable by the
Arab representatives.
23. Returning to New York on 22 July after a short stay
in Europe during which he had met, in various capitals, the Foreign
Ministers of the United Arab Republic, Israel and Jordan, Ambassador
Jarring decided, with my approval, to return to the Middle East and resume
his direct contacts with the parties.
This second round of discussions, which began on 16
August 1968, took the form of an exchange of questions and of comments
between the parties through the Special Representative ...
Those written statements were in amplification of the
positions of the parties as publicly stated in the General Assembly and
made clear the essential differences between them. On the one hand, Israel
regarded the Security Council resolution as a statement of principles in
the light of which the parties should negotiate peace and, on the other
hand, the United Arab Republic considered that the resolution provided a
plan for settlement of the Middle East dispute to be implemented by the
parties according to modalities to be established by the Special
Representative.
It was also abundantly clear that there was a crucial
difference of opinion over the meaning to be attached to the withdrawal
provisions of the Security Council resolution, which according to the Arab
States, applied to all territories occupied since 5 June 1967 and,
according to Israel applied only to the extent required when agreement had
been reached between the parties on secure and recognized borders between
them ...
Sources: Israeli
Foreign Ministry |