The Evolution of the U.S.-Israel Strategic Alliance

Ike Learns to Appreciate Israel
Israel Proves Its Strategic Value
Strategic Cooperation Formalized
Examples of Cooperation
Lessons From Gaza Wars
Cooperation Expands

In 1952, Gen. Omar Bradley, head of the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff, believed the West required 19 divisions to defend the Middle East and that Israel could supply two. He also expected only three states to provide the West air power in Middle Eastern defense by 1955: Great Britain, Turkey, and Israel. Bradley’s analysis was rejected because the political echelon decided it was more important for the United States to work with Egypt and, later, Iraq. It was feared that the integration of Israeli forces into Western strategy would alienate the Arabs. This was no doubt also a reason why NATO turned down Israel’s request for membership and the United States declined to sign a bilateral defense treaty that Israel hoped would counterbalance the Western alliance with Arab states that would eventually become the Baghdad Pact.

During his first term, President Dwight Eisenhower was hostile toward Israel. Eisenhower believed that the creation of a Jewish state was impractical. He did not think it could survive without substantial U.S. military involvement that he feared would destabilize the region, open the door to Soviet infiltration, and threaten oil supplies. He believed that Israel was one small piece on the global strategic chessboard that made his policies more difficult. The Suez War exacerbated those concerns.

Ike Learns to Appreciate Israel

In his second term, however, Eisenhower’s attitudes shifted dramatically because following the advice of the Arabists in his administration to distance America from Israel had backfired: relations with much of the Arab world worsened; the Soviets gained a foothold in the region; Egypt joined the Soviet camp and was working to weaken America’s allies; the Saudis failed to emerge as a reliable counterweight to promote U.S. interests; U.S. troops were forced to intervene to save pro-Western regimes in Lebanon and Jordan, and the pro-Western government of Iraq was overthrown.

Israel emerged as a potential asset for the first time in July 1958, after the pro-Western government in Iraq was overthrown and nationalist forces were threatening the regimes in Lebanon and Jordan. Just two years after condemning the nation’s allies for their intervention at Suez, Eisenhower sent U.S. troops to bolster the government in Lebanon. He also agreed to ship vital strategic materials to Jordan as part of a joint American-British airlift. Saudi Arabia, however, refused to allow either country to fly through their airspace and even denied the U.S. access to the American airfield at Dhahran. Instead, the supplies were flown through Israel, which was happy to cooperate.

In August 1958, a memorandum submitted to the National Security Council by the NSC Planning Board concluded:

It is doubtful whether any likely US pressure on Israel would cause Israel to make concessions which would do much to satisfy Arab demands, which, in the final analysis, may not be satisfied by anything short of the destruction of Israel. Moreover, if we choose to combat radical Arab nationalism and to hold Persian Gulf oil by force if necessary, then a logical corollary would be to support Israel as the only pro-West power left in the Near East.

Israel’s crushing victory over the combined Arab forces in 1967 reinforced the view that Israel was a power to be reckoned with and could help America achieve its strategic goals in the region. The following year, the United States sold Israel sophisticated planes (Phantom jets) for the first time. Washington shifted its Middle East policy from seeking a balance of forces to ensuring Israel enjoyed a qualitative edge over its enemies.

Israel Proves Its Strategic Value

Israel proved its value in 1970 when the United States asked for help in bolstering King Hussein’s regime. Israel’s willingness to aid Amman and the movement of troops to the Jordanian border persuaded Syria to withdraw the tanks it had sent into Jordan to support PLO forces during Black September. In addition, the Soviets knew that all the squadron leaders of the Sixth Fleet had landed in Israel to coordinate activities.

Also, by the early 1970s, it had become clear that no Arab state could or would contribute to Western defense in the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact had long ago expired, and the regimes friendly to the United States were weak reeds in the region compared to the anti-Western forces in Egypt, Syria, and Iraq. Even after Egypt’s reorientation following the signing of its peace treaty with Israel, the United States did not count on any Arab government for military assistance.

The Carter Administration began to implement a form of strategic cooperation (it was not referred to as such) by making Israel eligible to sell military equipment to the United States. President Carter viewed the willingness to engage in limited, joint military endeavors as a way to reward Israel for good behavior during peace talks with Egypt.

Though still reluctant to formalize the relationship, strategic cooperation became a major focus of the U.S.-Israel relationship when Ronald Reagan entered office. Before his election, Reagan had written: Only by full appreciation of the critical role the State of Israel plays in our strategic calculus can we build the foundation for thwarting Moscow’s designs on territories and resources vital to our security and our national well-being.

Strategic Cooperation Formalized

Reagan’s view culminated in the signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on strategic cooperation on November 30, 1981. On November 29, 1983, a new agreement was signed creating the Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) and a group to oversee security assistance, the Joint Security Assistance Planning Group (JSAP).

The JPMG was originally designed to discuss means of countering threats posed by increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East. It has placed increasing emphasis, however, on bilateral concerns about the proliferation of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles.

The JSAP was formed in response to Israel’s economic crisis in the mid1980s. It is a binational group that meets annually in Washington to examine Israel’s current and future military procurement requirements. It also formulates plans for allocating U.S. Foreign Military Sales credits in light of current threat assessments and U.S. budgetary capabilities.

An example of cooperation between the branches occurred on January 23, 1987, when Congress designated Israel as a major non-NATO ally. This law formally established Israel as an ally. It allowed its industries to compete equally with NATO countries and other close U.S. allies for contracts to produce a significant number of defense items.

In April 1988, President Reagan signed another Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) that encompassed all prior agreements. This agreement institutionalized the strategic relationship.

By the end of Reagan’s term, the U.S. had prepositioned equipment in Israel, regularly held joint training exercises, began co-development of the Arrow Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile, and was engaged in a host of other cooperative military endeavors.

Examples of Cooperation

The U.S.-Israel defense partnership has evolved into one of the most dynamic and impactful alliances in modern military history. Grounded in shared values, operational experience, and a common interest in maintaining technological superiority, this relationship has produced battlefield-tested innovations that save lives, strengthen joint force capabilities, and enhance strategic readiness across domains.

Battlefield Innovations That Saved Lives

Israeli-developed technologies have had a direct and measurable impact on American warfighters:

The Emergency Bandage, designed by an Israeli medic, has become a lifesaving staple in U.S. soldiers’ first aid kits, allowing one-handed application in battlefield trauma scenarios.
Armored D9 bulldozers, modified by the IDF for combat operations in Gaza, influenced U.S. urban warfare tactics in Iraq. These heavily protected engineering vehicles—possibly used in Fallujah—enabled forces to breach enemy fortifications with reduced risk.
The Trophy Active Protection System (APS), pioneered by Rafael, revolutionized armored vehicle survivability by neutralizing incoming rocket-propelled grenades (RPGs) and anti-tank missiles. The U.S. integrated Trophy onto M1 Abrams tanks, which have since been deployed to Europe. Rafael is now adapting the system to counter drones and loitering munitions.
IED Countermeasures: In response to the IED crisis in Iraq, the U.S. turned to Israeli technologies such as the Dragon Spike devices to jumpstart its counter-IED strategy.
Military Working Dogs: Inspired by Israeli off-leash K9 tactics developed by the IDF’s Oketz Unit, U.S. forces adopted independent canine operations for scouting tunnels and buildings in Iraq and Afghanistan.
Counter-Tunnel Technology: Facing subterranean threats from Hamas, Israel developed advanced tunnel detection and neutralization systems. Joint U.S.-Israel collaboration has translated these tools to protect the U.S.-Mexico border, backed by the Anti-Tunnel Cooperation Enhancement Act, which allocates $80 million annually.
Airpower and Precision Weapons: The Israeli-developed LITENING targeting pod, co-produced with Northrop Grumman, powers U.S. F-16s in drone defense missions. Paired with APKWS precision rockets, this system enables cost-effective engagement of airborne threats.
F-35 Enhancements: Israel’s F-35I “Adir” variant features customized sensors, electronic warfare (EW) suites, and external weapons carriage, which have influenced broader upgrades to the U.S. F-35 fleet.
Iron Beam: Israel’s new high-energy laser system, capable of intercepting drones and rockets at near-zero cost per shot, is under U.S. consideration as a response to swarming drone threats.
AI on the Battlefield: From Rafael’s Fire Weaver battle management system to IAI’s Harop loitering munitions, Israeli advances in AI-driven warfare are shaping U.S. programs. These range from drone defense to cyber intelligence, autonomous vehicles, and next-generation battlefield networks.

Strategic and Operational Defense Cooperation

Beyond specific technologies, U.S.-Israel military collaboration spans intelligence, joint training, defense contracting, and strategic logistics:

In March 2018, the U.S.S. Iwo Jima docked in Haifa following the Juniper Cobra joint exercise.
Joint exercises with U.S. Special Forces, naval training, and shared use of bombing ranges and medical facilities in Israel are routine. The Port of Haifa hosts around 40 U.S. Navy ships annually and is praised for cost-efficiency and operational access.
Real-time intelligence from Israel has protected U.S. troops, such as the October 2021 Iranian drone attack on a U.S. base in Syria, preempted by Israeli warnings.
Cybersecurity Cooperation: A U.S.-Israel working group was formed in 2017 to address cyber threats, further enhancing shared resilience.
Defense Procurement & Manufacturing:
- Elbit Systems received a $50 million U.S. Navy contract for MH-60S helmet displays in 2017.
- A $102 million mortar fire control system contract for the U.S. Army was awarded to Elbit in 2016.
- Roboteam, an Israeli startup, won a $25 million Pentagon contract for bomb-detecting robots now built in Maryland.
- Joint production with Raytheon and IMI on GPS-guided mortars, worth $98 million, highlights U.S.-Israeli industrial synergy.
Missile Defense Cooperation:
- U.S. investment in Israeli anti-tunnel systems totaled $120 million in 2016, tied to active border defense efforts.
- In August 2023, the U.S. Marine Corps committed to buying three Iron Dome batteries (44 launchers, 1,840 interceptors).
Missile Warning Integration: Israel is now linked to U.S. early warning satellites, improving national missile defense.
Terrorism and Homeland Security:
- The Joint Anti-Terrorism Working Group and direct Pentagon-IDF hotline streamline emergency coordination.
- U.S. Jewish security personnel have trained alongside Israeli police to adapt counterterror strategies domestically.
Intelligence Sharing:
- Since at least 2014, Israel has provided key intelligence on ISIS operatives, leveraging surveillance drones over the Middle East.
- Israel’s battlefield-tested tools for signals intelligence and cyber defense—many of which were developed by Unit 8200 veterans—are increasingly integrated into U.S. intelligence efforts.
Strategic Logistics:
- Israel is a critical node for U.S. prepositioned military stockpiles, ideal for rapid deployment in the region.
- More than 300 U.S. DoD personnel travel to Israel monthly to support joint operations and coordination.

A Shared Edge in 21st-Century Warfare

A 2021 Pentagon study identified 13 out of 21 critical military technologies in which Israel can make meaningful contributions to American defense. Whether in missile defense, artificial intelligence, loitering munitions, cyber warfare, or battlefield survivability, Israel has become an essential partner in advancing U.S. military readiness.

The U.S. continues to fund the research and development of Israeli weapons systems and military equipment, including the Arrow missile, the Tactical High Energy Laser, the Barak ship self-defense missile system, Reactive Armor Tiles, Crash-Attenuating Seats, the Have-Nap missile, and Unmanned Aerial Vehicles.

As the pace of innovation accelerates and threats evolve—from drones to digital warfare to underground battlespaces—the U.S.-Israel partnership stands as a model of strategic depth, operational integration, and technological collaboration.

The strategic cooperation agreements established Israel as a de facto ally of the United States, institutionalized military-to-military contacts, sent a message to the Arabs that America was not afraid to risk upsetting them, and shifted at least part of the focus of relations with Israel from Congress to the Executive Branch.

During a press conference following talks with Israeli Defense Minister Moshe Ya’alon in November 2015, U.S. Defense Secretary Ashton Carter stated, “I hesitate to make invidious comparisons, but if you’re making comparisons to, say, the European legacy arms (industry), the guys who have made the tanks and planes and ships in Europe, they’ve been very slow to come out of the industrial age. The Israelis you will find to be more clever and more innovative.” Carter referenced the Israeli solution to taking care of dangerous improvised explosive devices (IEDs) and said that there was “no question that lives were saved as a consequence of their (the Israelis) help.”

UCLA professor Steven Spiegel also noted at least six changes adopted by the U.S. military that were prompted by Israeli combat experiences: 1) decreased use of searchlights; 2) increased use of thermal sights for night fighting; 3) greater use of tanks and armored personnel carriers (APCs) in tandem; 4) improvements in command, control, and communications; 5) use of electronic warfare in reconnaissance units; and 6) enhanced air-to-air missiles and electronic countermeasures. Several of these were used with great success in Operation Desert Storm.

Lessons From Gaza Wars

A study by the Rand Corporation on Israel’s wars in Gaza noted that “Israel has been a source of vicarious learning for the U.S. military for decades, and these latest Gaza wars are no exception.” Specifically, the report said three broad lessons were that “public support for the conflict often hinges more on perceptions of the campaign’s success than it does on casualties—a rethinking about sensitivity to casualties,” “the U.S. military needs to be even more wary about misunderstanding the region,” and “modern democratic militaries must increasingly confront lawfare – using law as a substitute for traditional military means to achieve a warfighting objective – when combating irregular forces.”

The study also said the United States could learn four operational, tactical, and technological lessons:

Precision firepower has limitations, particularly in dense urban terrain.
Missile defense has potential.
There is value in armor and active protective systems that protect vehicles from rocket-propelled grenades and anti-tank-guided munitions.
Tunnel warfare needs to continue to develop.

The report concluded: “Today, the Army and the joint force need to continue to learn from IDF’s challenges and successes – and use those lessons to identify gaps in their own approaches.”

Cooperation Expands

One additional area of growing cooperation is the development of responses to the threat of drones, especially those used by Iran. In June 2021, teams led by White House National Security Council Coordinator for the Middle East and North Africa Brett McGurk and Israeli Deputy National Security Adviser Reuven Ezer reportedly met to discuss how to address the threat to Israel and other U.S. allies from Iranian drones and precision-guided missiles.

On March 1, 2023, the Israeli Defense Ministry and the U.S. Department of Defense signed a security of supply arrangement to ensure that both countries have special priority for purchasing security supplies in the event of a conflict.