History of Modern Syria
by Mitchell G. Bard
France has a longstanding interest in the areas that are today Lebanon and Syria, dating back to the Crusades. Great Britain acknowledged this special relationship when it agreed under the Sykes-Picot agreement that France would control the area after World War I. Syria and Lebanon did not exist as separate states. They, too, had been districts in the Ottoman Empire. When the French were awarded the mandates for the area, they divided it up into four areas: Great Lebanon, the state of Damascus, the state of Aleppo, and the territory of Latakia. In 1925, Aleppo and Damascus became unified under the title of the State of Syria. A government was elected to carry on most functions while remaining under the umbrella of the French mandate. As in other places controlled by foreign powers, the native population was divided among those who chafed at imperialist intervention and those willing to cooperate with their foreign masters. Growing resentment toward French rule and a desire for independence resulted in the signing of a treaty in 1936 in which France agreed to grant Syria independence within three years in exchange for a military alliance that allowed the French to protect their regional interests. France never ratified the treaty, however, and took direct control of the country again on the eve of World War II. Promises, Promises Promises, PromisesWhen Germany defeated France, the mandates came under the control of the Vichy government. In 1941, British troops, accompanied by Free French forces, invaded Syria and ultimately occupied the area along with Lebanon. Both the British and French promised to support independence for Syria and Lebanon. Not surprisingly, the pledges had little to do with satisfying Arab nationalist interests and everything to do with imperial interests. Britain was interested in improving its standing with the Arabs, which was viewed as suffering because of its policy toward Palestine, and also hoped to minimize French influence in the area. The French wanted to protect their privileged position in the area and hoped to delay independence. Nevertheless, in 1941, France agreed to allow Syria to declare its independence. Formal independence would come after the war five years later when the last French troops were withdrawn. The first election was held after the war, and Syria’s emancipation brought longtime nationalist Shukri el-Quwatli to power. At the time, the principal concern was maintaining Syria’s newly won independence, which was now threatened primarily by the Hashemite kings in Transjordan and Iraq, who hoped to unite the three nations, along with Lebanon and Palestine, under their banner. Tumultuous TimesThe war over Palestine in 1948 once again was a catalyst for change as the Syrians joined the invading forces seeking to destroy Israel and were defeated. The public was angry at the humiliation. The government and army blamed each other for what was popularly viewed as a catastrophe for the Arabs. The head of the army, Colonel Husni Zaim, responded by seizing government control. Zaim alienated many of his supporters, however, by retreating from his support for closer ties with the Hashemites and seeking alliances with Egypt and Saudi Arabia instead. This decision, along with other missteps, provoked another military coup in August 1949 in which Zaim was executed. The new military leader, Colonel Sami Hinnawi, agreed to create a new civilian government, which began again to express interest in close ties with Iraq and Jordan. Another army leader, Lieutenant-Colonel Adib Shishakli, deposed Hinnawi to prevent the unionist movement. Three governments in less than a year, and we’re not done yet. Shishakli initially allowed a civilian government to function but grew dissatisfied with its direction and took total control of the country in late 1951. His despotic rule provoked increasing opposition, and the military finally forced him to resign just three years later. The old president, Hashim el-Atassi, was reinstated. Moving to the Dark SideOpposition to the Baghdad Pact, Western support for Israel, and the Anglo-French conspiracy with Israel in the Sinai campaign all contributed to the growing popularity of socialism, communism, and pan-Arabism in Syria. When Egypt signed an arms deal with the Soviet Union, Syria followed suit, and the Syrians gradually became close allies of both governments. This culminated in February 1958 with the announcement that Egypt and Syria were uniting. This marked a temporary end of Syrian independence as it became the northern province of the United Arab Republic. The marriage lasted barely three years. The two countries had vastly different histories, economies, and foreign policies. The bottom line for the Syrians, especially the army, was that they resented Egypt’s effort to dominate them. From Egypt’s perspective, it was not a union of equals, and Nasser left no doubt who was calling the shots. In 1961, a group of army officers led a successful coup that resulted in a divorce from Egypt. A civilian government was again elected to rule Syria in December 1961, but the army was not content with the results and seized control again the following March. Less than a year later, the regime changed again as the Syrian branch of the Baath party, backed by members of the army, established a dictatorship following the Baath’s ascendancy in Iraq by a month. The two nations subsequently concluded agreements to unify their military and economies while remaining separate. Musical GovernmentsThe revolving door turned again in February 1966 when another coup brought Nureddin Atassi to power. Syria subsequently became increasingly close to the Soviet Union and hostile toward the United States. Syria also took a more belligerent posture toward Israel, and cross-border incidents became more frequent, leading ultimately to the 1967 War. Syrian forces were routed in the war. The humiliating defeat did not prompt Syria to negotiate peace with Israel; rather, it stimulated even greater hostility that manifested itself in increased support for terrorist organizations. Several of the major Palestinian groups set up headquarters in Damascus, and Syria sponsored its own terrorist organization, al-Saiqa. Syria was careful, however, to maintain tight control over the terrorists and not to allow them to mount operations from Syrian territory. Doing so helped spare Syria the problems that Jordan and Lebanon faced, namely, provoking Israeli counterattacks on its territory and allowing the terrorists to create their own state within the state. This last point played a key role in the future of Syria. In September 1970, King Hussein decided to go to war against the Palestinian terrorists in Jordan because they had created what amounted to a state within Jordan and threatened the Hashemite regime. Syria decided to intervene on behalf of the Palestinians and sent tanks into Jordan. The Syrian minister of defense — the former commander of the air force, Hafez Assad — opposed the move and refused to use the air force to support the incursion. This allowed King Hussein’s air force the freedom to attack the Syrian forces and ultimately rout them. Assad Takes CommandHafez Assad* claimed the debacle resulted from the government’s failure to coordinate its actions with the military and that it had strengthened Israel. Assad and his allies then forced Attasi to resign, and within a few weeks, the defense minister assumed control of the country. In the succeeding years, Assad skillfully solidified his power by a combination of popular moves, such as announcing that a new constitution would require that the president of the Republic be a Muslim and by ruthless suppression of his enemies. Under Assad, Syria became one of the Soviet Union’s closest allies and received large amounts of military and economic assistance. In October 1973, Syria joined Egypt in the surprise attack against Israel. Although it initially reclaimed the Golan Heights, Israel successfully repulsed the Syrian forces and was ultimately in a position to threaten Damascus. Despite suffering a defeat, Syria emerged from the war with a sense of accomplishment at having demonstrated the vulnerability of the Israelis. While Anwar Sadat used this restoration of Arab honor as the basis for entering peace negotiations with Israel, Assad took the exact opposite approach and became a leader of the Rejectionist Front. Although Assad’s principal obsession was with Israel, he was also committed to the policy of creating a Greater Syria that would include Lebanon. He got his chance to achieve his ambition when the civil war broke out in Lebanon, and Assad ordered his troops to invade in April 1976 under the pretext of acting as peacekeepers. The troops have never left, which has enabled Syria to control the Lebanese government ever since. This also brought the Syrians into conflict, however, with Israel. Except for a few instances, such as the air battles during the Lebanon War in 1982, Syria has been very careful not to directly take any action against Israel that might provoke retaliation, preferring to use terrorist groups in Lebanon as proxies to make mischief along Israel’s northern border. Hama RulesAlthough he ruled with absolute power, Assad was not without his domestic opponents. In 1982, he decided to take care of his rivals and to do so in a way that would send the message to anyone else with thoughts of challenging his rule that he would brook no dissent. On February 2, Assad sent thousands of troops to the city of Hama to crush an uprising led by the Muslim Brotherhood (more about this group in the next chapter). As many as 20,000 people may have been killed. Journalist Thomas Friedman refers to this tactic as "Hama Rules." These tactics were applied again in October 1990 while the world was distracted by events in Kuwait. To end Christian-led opposition to Syria’s occupation of Lebanon, Syrian troops overran the Beirut stronghold of Phalangist leader General Michel Aoun. Approximately 700 people were massacred in the fighting, which eliminated the last remaining threat to Syrian dominance of Lebanon. A few months later, the Lebanese president went to Damascus to sign a treaty that allowed Syria to keep its troops in his country. Unlike what happened after the Sabra and Shatila massacre, no international outcry was heard after the Syrian massacres in Hama or in Beirut. The United Nations did not condemn Syria’s actions, no investigations were called for, and no Arab leaders came forward to condemn Assad’s actions. Syria Loses Its PartonA turning point for Syria occurred with the collapse of the Soviet Union. The Syrians had relied on the Soviets for more than two decades to provide financial assistance to keep their economy afloat and military hardware to threaten Israel. Syria’s economy deteriorated once the money and arms stopped flowing, and its military strength declined. It remained strong enough to control Lebanon but not to seriously threaten Israel. Syria tried to compensate for the loss of Soviet support by seeking aid from the former Soviet Union and by building alliances with other radical regimes — in particular, the Iranians who used Damascus as the transit point for arms to Hezbollah in Lebanon. Also, to offset the growing imbalance in its conventional capability vis-a-vis Israel, the Syrians have been more actively building a nonconventional arsenal of chemical and biological weapons. Hafez Assad maintained control over Syria until his death on June 10, 2000. As he grew old and sick, he groomed his son, Bashar, as his successor. His son has subsequently worked to consolidate his power and has, to date, pursued policies consistent with those of his father. Civil WarAt the height of the Arab Spring in 2011, pro-democracy demonstrators took to the streets in Syria, calling for the ouster of Bashar al-Assad. Collapse of Assad’s RegimeOn November 27, 2024, a coalition of Syrian rebel forces, led by Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) and supported by Turkish-backed factions, successfully recaptured Aleppo from the Assad regime. This marked the first significant shift in Syria’s battle lines since the regime had reclaimed Aleppo in 2016. The rebels’ success revealed the vulnerabilities of the Syrian regime, exacerbated by declining military readiness, a fragile economy, and distracted key allies—Russia and Iran, focused on Ukraine and Israel, respectively.
On November 29, 2024, rebels launched a surprise offensive from Idlib, swiftly pushing government forces out of key areas of Aleppo. HTS members symbolically removed the regime flag from a statue of Assad’s deceased brother, marking the fall of Assad’s grip on the city. The following day, Syria’s military announced its withdrawal from Aleppo, with Assad’s forces regrouping to defend Hama, located 120 km south. On December 2, Russian and Syrian jets launched airstrikes on rebel-held Idlib in a desperate attempt to halt the momentum, but the rebels continued their advance, capturing key strategic locations. By December 4, they had seized a military base in Hama, and the next day, they captured Hama city and freed prisoners from its notorious prison. On December 6, the rebels captured Deir el-Zor and seized positions in Daraa, intensifying pressure on Damascus from the south. On December 7, they declared the capture of Homs, moving closer to Damascus, the heart of Assad’s power. Finally, on December 8, 2024, rebels broke through the Muhajreen Presidential Palace. Assad’s posters were torn down from public institutions, signaling the end of the Assad family regime’s 54-year rule. On the same day, a Kremlin official confirmed that Assad had fled to Moscow, seeking political asylum along with his family. The new Syrian flag, often referred to as the “Independence Flag,” has deep historical roots dating back to 1932 during Syria’s fight for independence under the French Mandate. It features three horizontal stripes in green, white, and black, with three red stars on the white stripe, symbolizing key regions: Damascus, Aleppo, and Deir ez-Zor. Initially flown after World War I, it resurfaced in 2011 as a symbol of the opposition during the Syrian Civil War, representing resistance against the Assad regime. Following the fall of Bashar al-Assad’s government, the flag has been reinstated as Syria’s national symbol, signifying a return to the country’s earlier ideals of independence and sovereignty. “Operation Bashan Arrow”Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu hailed the fall of Assad’s regime, attributing it to Israeli actions against Iran and Hezbollah, Assad’s key allies. He acknowledged the collapse as a historic moment but warned of potential dangers. Netanyahu emphasized Israel’s readiness to defend itself while expressing a desire for peaceful relations with Syrians, including Druze, Kurds, Christians, and Muslims seeking peace with Israel. Western leaders, including France, the United Kingdom, and Germany, celebrated the demise of the Assad regime. President Biden said: “At long last, the Assad regime has fallen. This regime brutalized, tortured, and killed nearly hundreds and thousands of innocent Syrians. The fall of the regime is a fundamental act of justice; it’s a moment of historic opportunity for the long-suffering people of Syria to build a future for their country.” He added: “For years, the main backers of Assad had been Iran, Hezbollah, and Russia. But over the last week, their support collapsed. All three of them are far weaker today than when I took office. And let’s remember why: after Hamas attacked Israel on October 7th, 2023, when much of the world responded with horror, Iran and its proxies chose to launch a multi-front war against Israel. That was a historic mistake on Iran’s part.” To further protect the nation from the possibility of the fighting in Syria spreading to Israel, the IDF sent additional troops to the Golan Heights and declared closed military zones near agricultural areas. Netanyahu also ordered the IDF on December 8, 2024, to seize control of the buffer zone between Israel and Syria, located in Syrian territory, that was demilitarized under the 1974 Disengagement Agreement. “This agreement has collapsed, Syrian soldiers abandoned their positions,” Netanyahu said. “We will not allow any hostile forces to establish themselves at our border.” The United States also took the opportunity to strike over 75 targets, including ISIS camps and operatives in Syria. “T.here should be no doubt - we will not allow ISIS to reconstitute and take advantage of the current situation in Syria,” said U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM)’s General Michael Erik Kurilla, “All organizations in Syria should know that we will hold them accountable if they partner with or support ISIS in any way.” On December 10, 2024, it was reported that Syrian opposition leader Ahmed al-Sharaa met outgoing Prime Minister Mohammed al-Jalali, who agreed to transfer power to Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)’s Syrian Salvation Government (SSG). Mohammed al-Bashir, who is close to HTS and heads their Idlib-based SSG, is set to lead the transitional administration. The new government aims to consolidate control, rebuild institutions, and address displacement. HTS has offered amnesty for conscripts and pledged justice for war crimes, though concerns about security and political fragmentation persist. While the removal of Assad was universally cheered, some analysts cautioned against quickly embracing the rebels or taking their word that they would implement a more democratic regime. HTS is a jihadist group with origins in al-Qaeda. Other factions are also radical Sunni Muslims. Taking a page from the Taliban playbook, the leaders want everyone to believe they have abandoned their more extreme views, but, as Col. (ret.) Richard Kemp cautioned, “In 2021, the Taliban tried to convince the world that they had changed from the group that inflicted such brutality on the country before being ejected 20 years earlier. Their spokesman said they would not seek revenge on those who had collaborated with Coalition forces and the U.S.-backed government and would even respect women’s rights and press freedom. We know how that worked out.” The United States said it would keep troops in Syria and set terms for recognizing the new regime. Secretary of State Antony Blinken said, “The transition process and new government must also uphold clear commitments to fully respect the rights of minorities, facilitate the flow of humanitarian assistance to all in need, prevent Syria from being used as a base for terrorism or posing a threat to its neighbors, and ensure that any chemical or biological weapons stockpiles are secured and safely destroyed.” On December 14, 2024, Syrian rebel leader Abu Mohammad al-Jolani declared that his forces have no intention of engaging in conflict with Israel, emphasizing that Israeli intervention excuses are invalid now that the Iranian troops have left Syria. Two days later, he stated that Syria under his control would not be used as a launchpad for attacks on Israel or any other state. He urged Israel to end its airstrikes and withdraw from territories taken after the fall of Bashar al-Assad. He also expressed willingness to honor the 1974 disengagement agreement and allow the return of United Nations monitors. At the same time, Syria’s transitional government called on the United Nations to stop Israeli strikes and withdraw from occupied areas, claiming Israel violated the disengagement agreement. Al-Jolani’s group claims to ensure minority rights and avoid military confrontations. It also plans Syria’s future governance through presidential or parliamentary systems discussions. On December 17, 2024, Netanyahu visited the Syrian side of Mount Hermon, stating that Israel would retain its presence in the area until a security arrangement guaranteeing Israel’s safety is established. Highlighting the site’s strategic importance, Netanyahu emphasized that its significance to Israel’s security has only increased in recent years, particularly in light of recent events in Syria, and affirmed that Israel will determine the arrangement that best ensures its security. A week later, al-Jolani has announced an agreement to dissolve all former rebel factions and consolidate them under the defense ministry. This move, part of a restructuring plan that integrates former rebels and defected Assad officers, aims to prevent clashes among diverse groups. The new interim government has appointed Murhaf Abu Qasra, a key figure in the insurgency, as defense minister. Al-Jolani has assured Western officials that his Islamist-led administration will avoid retaliation and protect the rights of ethnic and religious minorities, such as Kurds, Shi’ites, Christians, and Druze, addressing fears of persecution under Sunni Islamist rule. In February 2025, during a two-day conference in Damascus, Syria’s interim president, al-Jolani, called for unity and national rebuilding to shape the country’s future after decades of dictatorship. The conference, which included religious and community leaders but excluded the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), released 18 nonbinding recommendations, including drafting a new constitution and unifying armed forces under state control. It also condemned Israel’s military presence in southern Syria. Al-Shara’s government demands the SDF disarm and integrate into a national military before joining the dialogue, further straining relations with Syria’s Kurdish population. Many Syrians remain skeptical of the conference’s inclusivity, as al-Shara’s Islamist group, Hayat Tahrir al-Sham, has prioritized its loyalists in government positions. While the dialogue is promoted as a step toward constitutional reform, it remains unclear how much impact it will have in Syria’s deeply divided landscape. The following month, Syrian security forces and affiliated gunmen killed hundreds of civilians, mainly from the Alawite minority, in the past two days, though other sources report casualties between 180-200. Since Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) took control in December under Ahmed al-Sharaa, concerns have risen about potential minority persecution despite al-Jolani’s efforts to present HTS as tolerant. However, HTS has known jihadist roots, with al-Sharaa previously linked to al-Qaeda and ISIS. In response, the IDF began operations in Syria to preemptively counter potential jihadist threats following HTS’s rise to power. Al-Jolani condemned the mass killings of Alawites and vowed to punish those responsible, including his allies. Acknowledging revenge attacks, he blamed pro-Assad elements and a foreign power for inciting the bloodshed. He urged the U.S. to lift sanctions but has had no direct contact with Washington, while Moscow remains engaged in negotiations over its military presence. Amid economic struggles, Kurdish tensions, and Israeli threats—including territorial seizures, airstrikes, and accusations of terrorism— al-Jolani dismissed Israeli criticism as hypocrisy, citing Israel’s actions in Gaza and Lebanon. The violence posed a significant challenge to his legitimacy as he sought to consolidate power in a war-torn Syria. The Syrian presidency announced a deal with the head of the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) to integrate the institutions of the semi-autonomous Kurdish administration in northeastern Syria into the national government. The agreement covers both civilian and military institutions and includes integrating border posts, the airport, and oil and gas fields into the Syrian state’s administration. The following day, the Syrian government reportedly reached an agreement with Druze leaders in Sweida to integrate the region into state institutions, placing its security forces under the Interior Ministry. The deal stipulates that local police officers will be recruited from Sweida, but the Syrian government will appoint the governor and police chief. Additionally, 300 security forces from Damascus will be deployed, while hundreds of locals will join a newly formed police force. This agreement signals a shift in Sweida’s autonomy, aligning it more closely with Damascus, potentially reducing the need for external protection, including from Israel, which had previously expressed support for the Druze. Syria’s interim President al-Jolani decreed the formation of a national security council to address the country’s security challenges. The council will be responsible for making key decisions related to national security and safeguarding the state. Al-Jolani also signed a constitutional declaration stating that Islamic jurisprudence will remain the primary basis of law while ensuring freedom of opinion and expression. The declaration, drafted by experts, consists of 44 articles. Syria’s new government has clashed with Hezbollah. The confrontation follows Hezbollah’s opposition to the new regime after the fall of Assad in December 2024. After several Hezbollah attacks, the Syrian army responded by shelling Hezbollah positions, leading to further casualties, including journalists caught in the crossfire. The Syrian government has vowed to curb Hezbollah’s incursions. The United States has presented Syria with a list of conditions for partial sanctions relief, including eliminating remaining chemical weapons, cooperating on counter-terrorism, preventing foreigners from holding senior government roles, and assisting in locating missing American journalist Austin Tice. The demands were delivered by U.S. Deputy Assistant Secretary Natasha Franceschi to Syrian Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shibani during a Brussels conference on March 18, 2025, marking the first high-level U.S.-Syria contact since Trump’s presidency. Syria, struggling under years of sanctions and a collapsed economy, has called for the complete removal of sanctions. The administration’s policy on Syria remains uncertain, with internal debates over engagement versus a hardline stance, especially as Israel continues to lobby against U.S. support for Syria’s new leadership. In late March 2025, Lebanon and Syria have signed a border demarcation agreement to enhance security coordination along their tense frontier following the fall of the Assad regime and recent deadly clashes. The deal, brokered in Saudi Arabia, comes amid ongoing regional instability, including Hezbollah’s role in Syria’s conflict and its recent weakening due to a prolonged war with Israel. The agreement aims to curb smuggling activities and stabilize the nearly 400-kilometer border, which has been a hotspot for Hezbollah’s operations and cross-border violence. In April 2025, Syrian Kurdish factions formally demanded a federal system in post-Assad Syria, aiming for regional autonomy, local governance, and security forces, according to senior Kurdish official Badran Jia Kurd. This unified Kurdish political vision, developed in response to rising sectarian violence and concerns over the Islamist-led interim government’s centralization of power, advocates a pluralistic, democratic parliamentary framework. While Kurdish groups stress they seek autonomy—not independence—the interim president, Ahmed al-Sharaa, opposes federalism, favoring a centralized system. The proposal has gained traction amid attacks on minorities and concerns over inclusivity. Syrian interim President al-Jolani’s recent visits to Turkey and the UAE highlight his efforts to position himself as a key regional leader. By engaging with countries that have historically backed opposing sides in regional conflicts—such as Turkey, which supports Hamas and Libya’s Tripoli government, and the UAE, which opposes both—Jolani is showcasing his diplomatic agility and striving to balance relations without appearing aligned with any single power. These trips, which follow earlier visits to Saudi Arabia and Egypt, also reflect his aim to gain investment for Syria’s reconstruction and build support for a “new Syria.” His meetings with UAE leaders and businesspeople and the presence of Foreign Minister Asaad al-Shaibani signal a deepening of ties. The UAE praised Sharaa’s leadership and reaffirmed its commitment to Syria’s stability, marking a new phase in Damascus’s regional reintegration. Future visits to countries like Qatar and Iraq, and eventually beyond the Middle East, are expected as Jolani continues consolidating Syria’s diplomatic revival. Later that month, President al-Jolani allegedly expressed conditional interest in joining the Abraham Accords, signaling a potential shift in Syria-Israel relations. In a 90-minute meeting with U.S. Congressman Cory Mills, Sharaa conveyed that Syria’s participation depends on lifting U.S. economic sanctions and addressing key American demands. These include dismantling remaining chemical weapons, dealing with foreign fighters, and cooperating on counterterrorism efforts with U.S. allies. While Jolani is open to addressing U.S. concerns, he reiterated Syria’s long-standing demand for the full return of the Golan Heights. However, days later, Syria TV revealed that the Syrian government sent a letter to the U.S. rejecting normalization with Israel, citing “Israel’s occupation of Syrian land.” The letter emphasized that, unlike other countries in the Accords, Syria has territory under Israeli control, making it ineligible to join. Nonetheless, Syria affirmed its commitment to building a peaceful state. Trump Lifts Sanctions on SyriaDuring his visit to the Gulf in May 2025, President Trump announced at the GCC-U.S. Summit that the United States would lift sanctions on Syria. The following day, at the invitation of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman, Trump met with Syrian President Ahmad al-Sharaa in Riyadh, with Turkish President Erdogan joining by phone. In the meeting, Trump urged al-Sharaa to capitalize on the moment by joining the Abraham Accords, expelling foreign and Palestinian terrorists, preventing the resurgence of ISIS, and taking responsibility for ISIS detention centers in northeast Syria. Al-Sharaa expressed gratitude to Trump, the Crown Prince, and Erdogan, highlighted the strategic opportunity created by Iran’s departure from Syria, reaffirmed Syria’s 1974 disengagement agreement with Israel, and invited American companies to invest in the country’s oil and gas sector. The leaders also discussed the ongoing conflict in Gaza. *One sensitive aspect of Hafez Assad’s rule is that he was a member of the minority Alawi religion, which was not accepted by the majority of the population, which is Sunni. Sources: Mitchell G. Bard, The Complete Idiot’s Guide to Middle East Conflict. 4th Edition. NY: Alpha Books, 2008. |
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