Ultra-Orthodox Jewish Community in Israel:
Facts and Figures

Population
Employment
National Service
Education
Marriage
Poverty
Income and Expenditures
Housing
Car ownership
Technology
Health
Role in Society
Politics

Population

The natural growth of the ultra-Orthodox population over the past decade has remained steady. The ultra-Orthodox population is relatively young and numbered more than 1.39 million in 2024 (approximately 13.9% of Israel’s total). Ultra-Orthodox women marry at a younger age, and their fertility rates are more than double that of the general population. The ultra-Orthodox are also having their first child later. In 2004, an ultra-Orthodox woman aged 20-24 had an average of 1.7 children; today, they have one child.

Employment

Based on data for the first nine months of 2024, the employment rate among ultra-Orthodox now stands at 54%, a decline from 55.5% last year. This follows a renewed increase in the employment rate between 2022 and 2023, after a period of stagnation from 2016 to 2021. Looking back over the last decade (2014–2024), the relative increase in the number of ultra-Orthodox men in employment (69%) is lower than the rate of growth in the number of yeshiva and kollel students over the same period (83%). In 2014, the number of ultra-Orthodox men in employment was 62,930; in 2024, it was 106,200. The share of ultra-Orthodox women in employment remains almost unchanged at 80%, and is close to the employment rate among non-Haredi Jewish women (83%).

Among ultra-Orthodox women, non-final data for 2024 (Q1–Q3) indicate an employment rate of 80%, a slight decline from the previous peak. The employment rate among Haredi women has risen steadily over recent years, from 71% in 2015 to 81% in 2023, and now stands at less than 3 percentage points lower than the employment rate among non-Haredi Jewish women.

One obstacle to both employment and education is that roughly 26% of ultra-Orthodox men don’t know English at all, and an additional 28% rate their English as poor.

Ultra-Orthodox men work in different employment areas from other Jewish men: 30% of Haredi men work in education and 3.5% in high-tech, while the picture is reversed among non-Haredi Jewish men, of whom just 4.5% are employed in education, and fully 20% work in high-tech. The differences between ultra-Orthodox women and other Jewish women in terms of areas of employment are even larger than those between Haredi and non-Haredi men. The share of Haredi women working in education stands at 40%, versus just 4.5% in high-tech, while among non-Haredi Jewish women, just 16% work in education and 9% work in high-tech.

Another impediment is the law that exempts men from conscription if they do not hold a job and are full-time students. Shlomit Ravitsky Tur-Paz notes that because Haredi men marry at age 22 (on average) and are fathers by 24, they are rarely able to acquire a college education or vocational training, and the need to support their family pushes them into low-paying jobs. Israeli society loses twice – both in terms of military service and in integration into the workforce.

Tur-Paz quotes a survey of ultra-Orthodox men ages 18–30 conducted for the Israel Democracy Institute in 2020, which found that between 20% and 33% would leave the yeshiva and find a job if the exemption age were lowered.

National Service

Approximately 18% of the ultra-Orthodox community is of conscription age. Only 10% of those who graduate from Israeli state system schools enlist. The age of exemption – until a Haredi man must remain a full-time yeshiva student and not hold a job if he wishes to avoid conscription from service – is 26. Proposals have been floated to reduce the age to 21-23.

The IDF has not yet published its data for the 2023 enlistment year (which concluded in June 2024); however, data from the previous year indicate stagnation in the rate of Haredi enlistment: 1,266 Haredim enlisted that year, approximately two-thirds of the number who presented themselves for military service in 2013. Between 2013 and 2023, the relative number of Haredim enlisting in the IDF decreased by 36%. Over this decade, the number of Haredi enlistees dropped from 1,972 to 1,266.

A survey by the Truman Institute at Hebrew University revealed growing criticism among Religious Zionist Israelis toward ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) communities, particularly regarding military service exemptions. The poll released in March 2025 found that 78% of religious respondents now believe Haredim should share the military burden, up from 69% in July 2024. Meanwhile, appreciation for Haredi contributions to society declined, with 53% agreeing that the war highlighted their role, down from 65%, while those disagreeing rose from 35% to 47%.

The gap between religious respondents and the general Jewish public narrowed, with 82% of all Jewish respondents supporting Haredi enlistment and 43% recognizing their contributions. Among Haredim, 86% see their community as contributing to society, though only 24% support military enlistment, up from 19% in July. These shifts highlight a growing societal divide and potential internal changes within the Haredi community.

Education

In 2023–2024, there were some 401,000 students in Haredi education (up to the age of 18), constituting 20% of all school students in Israel, and more than a quarter (26%) of those in Jewish Israeli school systems. In elementary education, Haredim make up 28% of all students; in middle school, 25%; and in high school, 24%.

Just 16% of Haredi students met the eligibility criteria for a bagrut (matriculation) certificate in 2021–2022, compared to 85% of students in the state and state religious education systems in the same year.

Another interesting trend is the rise in the percentage of ultra-Orthodox who take the matriculation exams, from 23% in 2005 to 34% in 2019. This increase is particularly evident among ultra-Orthodox girls, 55% of whom are now taking the matriculation exams (2019), compared to only 31% in 2009. The figure for ultra-Orthodox boys has declined from 16% to 13%.

At the beginning of 2024, the number of ultra-Orthodox yeshivas and kollelim (religious seminaries) students in Israel was around 169,366. At the beginning of 2023, the Haredi parties returned to the governing coalition, and over the course of the year, there was a drastic rise of 8.5% in the number of yeshiva and kollel students, more than double the annual increase in the Haredi population as a whole. 

In 2023–2024, there were around 17,400 ultra-Orthodox students in higher education, constituting 5% of the total student population. This represented an increase of around 700 Haredi students relative to the previous year, or just 4%; this followed an average annual increase of 9% over the three previous years. The growth came mainly in advanced degree students (largely master’s degree students), where the increase was 17% (similar to previous years), compared to a growth of just 2% in the number of undergraduate students. Growth of female students was just 3%, compared to 5% among male students, seemingly due to the Iron Swords war, which led to a reduction in the overall number of students in Israeli higher education.

The distribution of undergraduate subjects studied by ultra-Orthodox students differs from that of the general student population. Ultra-Orthodox students seem to prefer practical subjects that will make it possible to work within the ultra-Orthodox community, such as education and teaching (31% of ultra-Orthodox students, compared with 15% of the general student population), and paramedical subjects (10% versus 5% respectively), as well as subjects considered relatively easy in terms of acceptance requirements, such as business administration (10% of ultra-Orthodox students compared with 8.5% of the general student population).

On the other hand, approximately 76% of ultra-Orthodox men drop out of higher education,

Belz is Israel’s second-largest Hasidic group. In 2022, for the first time, the sect agreed to teach the core curriculum in its elementary schools, including math, science, Hebrew, and English. Many schools refuse to teach the core curriculum and refuse state funds rather than accept what they regard as secular interference in religious studies.

According to MK Moshe Tur-Paz, “They said they came to their decision over the need to earn a living and the need to finance their institutions, with the understanding that without core curriculum they would not be able to progress and their students would remain barred from the job market.”

Budgets for ultra-Orthodox education institutions in 2022
(approximate dollar values)

Marriage

There has been a rise in age at marriage in recent years: in 2003-2004, 77% of ultra-Orthodox Israelis aged 20-29 were married, as compared with 73% in 2010-2011, and today stands at just 67%.

Poverty

The proportion of ultra-Orthodox families living below the poverty line stood at 34% in 2022, compared to 14% in the non-Haredi Jewish population. The share of ultra-Orthodox children living below the poverty line, after transfer payments, stood at 47% in 2022, much higher than the overall share in the general population (28%). Nonetheless, this is a sharp decrease, down from 58% in 2005, when government stipends were cut.

Income and Expenditures

On average, Haredi households ran a monthly deficit of NIS 400 in 2022 (that is, monthly expenses were higher than monthly income by NIS 400). It is possible that this deficit is not actual, due to unreported income; or it may be that the deficit is real, and many households are reliant on loans. Haredi households earned a gross monthly average of NIS 14,816, representing 67% of the gross monthly average income of non-Haredi Jewish households (NIS 24,466). On average, Haredi households spent NIS 15,190 per month, 16% less than the average monthly expenditure of non-Haredi Jewish households (NIS 18,096)—this, despite the fact that Haredi households have almost twice as many members on average.

Per capita income in ultra-Orthodox households was NIS 3,917, 52% of the equivalent for other Jewish households (NIS 7,531). This discrepancy can be explained by the high average size of ultra-Orthodox households (5.2 persons) relative to the average in other Jewish households (2.9 persons); the difference in the average number of income earners (1.3 in ultra-Orthodox households, compared with 1.5 in other Jewish households); and to lower income from employment (NIS 9,767 in ultra-Orthodox households, compared with NIS 18,191 in other Jewish households). The gaps in income may be smaller than would appear, however, due to higher levels of unreported income in the ultra-Orthodox sector.

The average monthly expenditure for an ultra-Orthodox household in 2018 was 16% lower than for other Jewish households (NIS 14,651 versus NIS 16,936), even though ultra-Orthodox households are larger. The average monthly tax expenditure for ultra-Orthodox households—on income tax, National Insurance payments, and health tax—is only around one-third (34%) of that for other Jewish households (NIS 1,524 versus NIS 4,461).

Housing

As of 2017, 74% of ultra-Orthodox owned an apartment, down from 79% a decade ago, while in the general Jewish population, there was no significant change during those years. The change is particularly dramatic among ultra-Orthodox aged 20-29. A decade ago, 60% owned their apartment, and 33% rented. Today, only 50% own the apartment they live in, and 47% are renting.

About 15% of the young ultra-Orthodox own housing they purchased as an investment, compared to 5% among the general Jewish population. This confirms the claim that many of the young ultra-Orthodox who marry are required to buy an apartment as a condition for approval of the wedding. They buy an apartment at a low price in the periphery, rent it out, and live in a rented apartment in more central areas.

Car ownership

Between 2003–2017 the number of ultra-Orthodox Israelis who own a car increased by 35% (up from 31% to 42%) as compared with 80% of the general Jewish population. However, only 29% of ultra-Orthodox women have a driving license, compared to 59% of ultra-Orthodox men.

Technology

Health

Most of the ultra-Orthodox report that they did not have to forgo medical treatment (92%), medications (95%), or hot meals (95%), despite the high poverty rates (45%) among this population. Accordingly, the ultra-Orthodox trust in the health system is high and stands at 76%, similar to the non-ultra-Orthodox Jewish population. 94% of the ultra-Orthodox have their children vaccinated, the same rate as that among the general Israeli population.

Role in Society

A poll of the Haredi sector conducted May 25-June 3, 2023, had the following results:

 In your opinion, do Haredis contribute more or less than the other sectors to the nation’s economy?

In your opinion, do Haredis receive more or less from the state than other sectors in terms of infrastructure, budgets and service to the citizen?

 In your opinion, do Haredis contribute more or less than other sectors to the security of the nation?

Politics

Israel has historically had religious parties. In 2023, the two main ultra-Orthodox parties are the  Sephardic Shas Party and United Torah Judaism. They hold 11 and 7 seats in the Thirty-Seventh Knesset, respectively. In 2020, a female ultra-Orthodox politician was given a cabinet post for the first time. Omer Yankelevich, from the non-religious Kahol Lavan Party, was appointed Diaspora Affairs Minister.

Sources: The 2018 Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel is conducted by Dr. Gilad Malach and Dr. Lee Cahaner from the Israel Democracy Institute and is based on data provided by the Central Bureau of Statistics, government agencies, the IDF and the National Insurance Institute.
Tom Gross, “First female Ethiopian-born and ultra-orthodox Israeli cabinet ministers sworn in, Mideast Dispatch, (May 18, 2020).
The Israel Democracy Institute’s 2020 Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel:  Ultra-Orthodoxy and Higher Education, Press Release, IDI, (December 31, 2020).
The Israel Democracy Institute’s 2020 Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox Society in Israel: Economic Overview, Press Release, IDI, (December 31, 2020).
David Hellerman, “Massive Hasidic sect to include secular curriculum in revolutionary shift,” The Jewish Voice, (January 30, 2022). 
Lior Dattel and Nati Tucker, “Israeli Education Ministry’s Unusual Offer to Haredi Schools,”  Haaretz (February 1, 2022).
Simcha Pasko, “Ultra-Orthodox education and Israel’s economic future,” i24 News, (July 2, 2022).
Employment figures for 2021 supplied by Aaron Lerner, IMRA, (December 12, 2022).
Shlomit Ravitsky Tur-Paz, “The Government Bill for the Exemption of Ultra-Orthodox (Haredi) Men from IDF Service: A Brief Guide,” Israel Democracy Institute, (May 18, 2023).
“Poll of Haredis: 8.3% think contribute less than others to the economy while 88.5% say get less from the State and 47.3% and think contribute more to nation’s security,” IMRA, (July 15, 2023).
Bethan McKernan and Quique Kierszenbaum, “‘A big shock’: the Israeli startup helping ultra-Orthodox Jews enter world of hi-tech work,” The Guardian, (September 4, 2023).
Rossella Tercatin, “Religious Zionist Israelis growing increasingly critical of Haredim, new survey shows,” Times of Israel, (March 26, 2025).
“The Israel Democracy Institute Releases its 2024 Statistical Report on Ultra-Orthodox Society,” Israel Democracy Institute, (February 19, 2024).