The Israel-Hamas War:
Operation Strength and Sword and Gideon’s Chariots

No Hostages, No Ceasefire
Rocket Fire Resumes
Tunnel Warfare
The IDF Admits Mistake
Gideon’s Chariots
Mohammed Sinwar Eliminated
A Military Revolution
Israel to Take Full Control of Gaza
Gideon’s Chariots II
Operation Judgment Day
Advances in Gaza City

No Hostages, No Ceasefire

After weeks of fruitless negotiations with Hamas to extend the ceasefire and release the remaining hostages, Israel received indications that Hamas was planning to carry out further terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians and IDF soldiers. Officials said Hamas was “reorganizing its battalions and brigades, using underground tunnels that were not discovered or building new ones, clearing IEDs placed by the terrorists from areas repopulated by civilians and placing new ones in anticipation of an incursion, and setting up rocket launchers and cameras.”

On March 18, 2025, the decision was made to launch a surprise preemptive attack on Hamas targets in Gaza. The IDF named this military operation “Strength and Sword.”

Just before 2:30 a.m. local time, as some Gazans slept and others were preparing a meal before the daily Ramadan fast, the Israeli military announced it had begun “extensive strikes” targeting Hamas military commanders, officials in Hamas’s leadership, and terrorist infrastructure.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared, “We have instructed the IDF to act forcefully against Hamas—the IDF is currently attacking targets throughout the entire Gaza Strip.”

Netanyahu subsequently emphasized Israel’s extensive efforts to secure the release of hostages, including extending the ceasefire and engaging in negotiations through mediators. Despite accepting multiple proposals, including one from U.S. envoy Steven Witkoff, Hamas rejected all offers. He declared that Israel would escalate military action, negotiate while fighting, and pursue its war objectives: freeing hostages, eliminating Hamas, and neutralizing Gaza as a threat.

Expressing solidarity with hostage families, Netanyahu assured them of ongoing efforts for their loved ones. He dismissed claims of political motivations, warning Hamas not to expect further ceasefires. Netanyahu stressed that past hostage releases were only achieved through military pressure. Calling the conflict a “war of resurgence” across seven fronts, he praised U.S. cooperation against Iran’s proxies and vowed victory, stating, “Together we will act, and together we will win.”

“The Trump administration and the White House were consulted by the Israelis on their attacks in Gaza tonight,” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said in a Fox News interview. “As President Trump has made it clear - Hamas, the Houthis, Iran, all those who seek to terrorize not just Israel, but also the United States of America, will see a price to pay. All hell will break loose.”

“The blame for the resumption of hostilities lies solely with Hamas,” acting U.S. ambassador to the UN Dorothy Shea said. “We support Israel in its next steps.”

Similarly, Witkoff said, “The Israelis going in, in some respects, is unfortunate but also falls into the ‘had-to-be’ bucket. It kind of had to be. Hamas was not responding, and their responses were unreasonable.”

Oded Ailam, a former head of the Counterterrorism Division in the Mossad, noted: “While this step does carry risks for the hostages, the alternative – giving Hamas more time to prepare and solidify its control – is far worse. Further delays could result in hostages dying in tunnels while the IDF is forced to fight a more fortified and emboldened enemy. Renewing the fighting is meant to exert real pressure, making Hamas leadership understand that it cannot continue to stall and dictate the rules of the game.”

Others believed the decision to resume fighting had less to do with Hamas or the hostages than Netanyahu’s political survival, a persistent theme almost from the start of the war. The argument was that by ending the ceasefire, Itamar Ben-Gvir would return to the government after leaving to protest the truce. Netanyahu needed the votes of Ben-Gvir’s party to pass the otherwise imperiled budget. Failure to adopt it would have led to elections and the possible removal of the prime minister.

Defense Minister Israel Katz warned Hamas, “If it does not immediately release all the hostages, the gates of hell will open, and it will find itself facing the full intensity of the IDF in the air, sea, and land, until its complete elimination.” Katz promised, “We will not stop fighting until all the hostages are returned home and all threats to the southern residents are removed.”

Terrorists who had emerged from their hiding places and donned uniforms for the hostage release spectacles have taken them off to blend with civilians and gone back into underground bunkers. Still, several high-level Hamas officials were killed in targeted strikes. These included:

• Abu Hamza – the military spokesman for Palestine Islamic Jihad.
• Mahmoud Abu Watfa – Deputy head of Hamas’s Interior Ministry, responsible for internal security operations.
• Essam Daalis – Member of Hamas’s political bureau, overseeing governance and coordination between Hamas leadership and its military wing.
• Abu Obaida al-Jamazi – Senior member of Hamas’s political bureau, involved in strategic decision-making.
• Liwaa Mahmoud Abu Watfa – Hamas’s Minister of Interior, controlling the terror group’s security mechanisms and enforcement units.
• Bahjat Abu Sultan – Head of Hamas’s Internal Security, one of the most critical figures in Hamas’s intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.
• Ahmed al-Hatta (Abu Omar) – Hamas’s Minister of Justice, responsible for implementing Sharia-based legal rulings under Hamas’s rule.
• Yasser Mohammed Harb Musa – a member of Hamas’s politburo who headed the defense portfolio and the ministry of development.
• Mohammed Jamasi – the chief of Hamas’s emergency committee.
• Osama Tabash – head of Hamas’s surveillance and targets unit and director of the southern Gaza intelligence unit.

Hamas claimed that an Israeli hostage was killed and several others wounded in an airstrike. However, this claim remains unverified and may be part of Hamas’s psychological warfare strategy.

Netanyahu did not immediately order a ground invasion, but troops backed by tanks were sent to reoccupy the Netzarim Corridor. As part of the ceasefire, the IDF had withdrawn from the area. Small numbers of soldiers were also deployed in the southern Gaza Strip.

Katz said, “The Air Force strikes against Hamas terrorists were just the first step. It will become much more difficult and you will pay the full price,” adding, “The evacuation of the population from combat zones will soon begin again.” 

Israel planned to escalate in stages to allow Hamas to accept the U.S. ceasefire proposal.

Rocket Fire Resumes

On March 20, Hamas launched three rockets at Israel for the first time in months. They were either intercepted or fell in open areas. 

Following the rocket fire, the IDF issued an evacuation warning for Palestinians in the Beit Lahiya and Beit Hanoun areas, from which two projectiles were fired. Gazans were also told to leave Jabalia, where the rocket originated.

Katz reiterated, “We will intensify the military campaign against Hamas, including through the expansion of the ground maneuver until the hostages are released and Hamas is defeated.”

Katz also threatened to annex part of the Gaza Strip if Hamas did not release the remaining hostages. “As long as Hamas continues its refusal, it will lose more and more land that will be added to Israel.”

IDF air strikes destroyed over 100 pickup trucks, including those believed used on October 7. More than 150 terrorists were eliminated in the first week of renewed fighting. Targeted killings also continued as the IDF eliminated Ismail Barhoum, who was in charge of Hamas finances and had succeeded Issam Da’alis, the de facto prime minister of Gaza, who was killed the week before. Israel appeared to be focusing more on the political leadership of Hamas, and now had eliminated 11 of the 20 members of Hamas’s political bureau elected in 2021. Most, if not all, of the others were believed to be outside Gaza.

In March 2025, a rare protest against Hamas was staged spontaneously in Beit Lahia. Some shouted, “Hamas, get out!” and “The Gazan people do not want war.” One resident told Haaretz, “We demonstrated today to declare that we do not want to die. Eventually, it is Israel that attacks and bombs, but Hamas also bears direct responsibility, as do all who define themselves as Arab and Palestinian leaders.”

Protests grew the next day, spreading to Gaza City’s Shejaiya and Sabra neighborhoods, the Nuseirat refugee camp, and the central city of Deir al-Balah. Demonstrations continued for a third day despite warnings from Hamas that participants would be treated as collaborators, which usually means execution. A day later, a protester was kidnapped, tortured, and executed by Hamas.

A few days later, a Gazan family in Deir al-Balah executed a Hamas operative, accusing him of killing their relative while waiting for flour, highlighting growing discontent with Hamas among civilians. The Abu Samra clan, like other powerful Gaza-based families, operates independently of Hamas and wields significant influence through its control of businesses and loyalty to its armed forces. Clashes between Hamas and such clans are not new, with a recent conflict involving the Doghmush family over aid distribution and post-war governance speculation. 

As Israel intensified its bombing campaign in Gaza, ostensibly to pressure Hamas to release the hostages, the terrorists said, “Every time the occupation attempts to retrieve its captives by force, it ends up bringing them back in coffins” and that while it was “doing everything possible to keep the occupation’s captives alive,...the random Zionist bombardment is endangering their lives.”

The IDF expanded ground operations and was reportedly planning to seize one-quarter of Gaza over the succeeding two to three weeks. Evacuation orders were issued for Rafah and, later, for areas in northern Gaza after a rocket was fired from the Strip toward Sderot.

On April 2, 2025, Israel expanded its military operations in Gaza, with Defense Minister Israel Katz announcing an intensified offensive following heavy overnight strikes in the south. Additional IDF forces were deployed to clear terrorist infrastructure and capture territory for security purposes. Strikes in Rafah and Khan Younis reportedly killed 21 people, while an IDF-Shin Bet operation targeted Hamas operatives in Jabalia. Israel stated that the strike hit a UNRWA clinic used as a terror compound. The expansion follows recent evacuation orders in Rafah, the largest since the ceasefire ended in March.

On April 7, Trump spoke with the leaders of Egypt, France, and Jordan. They emphasized the need “to urgently secure a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip,” resume delivery of humanitarian aid, and “the release of all the hostages.” The trio “emphasize[d] the need to create conducive conditions for a genuine political horizon and mobilize international efforts to end the suffering of the Palestinian people, restore security and peace for all, and implement the two-state solution.”

The IDF said on April 16 that it had not yet begun a major offensive, hoping that the ongoing operation would pressure Hamas into an agreement to free the hostages. Since fighting resumed, the IDF said it killed at least 350 members of terror groups, including 40 senior Hamas political officials and mid-level military wing commanders, and other prominent terrorists, including some who participated in the October 7 attack. Hamas has put up little resistance as it has focused on rearming.

Nearly one-third of Gaza along the border was established as buffer zones. The IDF planned to expand the zone from the Egyptian border to Khan Yunis — more than 3 miles away — and include the entire city of Rafah within it.

Tunnel Warfare

John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, explained the continuing challenge of fighting Hamas’s tunnel infrastructure. At the start of the war, he observed, the IDF struck Hamas tunnels with precision munitions guided by intelligence on “locations of tunnels, their purpose and value to the enemy, their contents.” Once ground forces entered Gaza, elite teams investigated shafts, but booby traps, some embedded “into the walls,” made even identification deadly, killing five soldiers in one incident.

The IDF initially relied on drones, robots, and camera-equipped dogs, with limited success. Flooding tunnels proved ineffective: “it took two weeks for a small Hamas tunnel to fill,” and water often drained out. To speed operations, the IDF trained regular troops in tunnel detection and developed a typology: tactical (e.g., building-to-building), operational (e.g., between units), and strategic (e.g., cross-border smuggling). Understanding the tunnel type helped prioritize targets.

Still, Hamas retained the initiative until Brig. Gen. Dan Goldfus led a “rapid learning initiative,” employed “all-source intelligence,” and launched simultaneous attacks above and below ground. For the first time, the IDF used tunnels offensively, turning them into “maneuver corridors.” This tactic, also used against Hezbollah in Lebanon, “changes everything,” according to Spencer.

But destruction remains difficult. Eighteen months into the war, the IDF had destroyed only about 25% of Hamas’ tunnel network. The slow progress stemmed from the technical challenge of demolishing deep underground infrastructure, the risk of causing mass civilian casualties through extensive bombing, and the fear that more aggressive operations could endanger the lives of Israeli hostages still believed to be held underground. “The harsh reality is that there is likely not enough supply of explosives or enough time to destroy all the tunnels in Gaza. To find all the tunnels and then destroy them would potentially take years,” Spencer concluded.

The IDF Admits Mistake

The IDF dismissed the deputy commander of the Golani Brigade’s reconnaissance unit after his troops mistakenly opened fire on ambulances in Rafah on March 23, killing 15 rescue workers. He was removed for his role in the incident and for giving a “partial and inaccurate” report.

An investigation found no ethical violations but cited “professional errors” and protocol breaches. The commander of the overseeing 14th Reserve Armored Brigade was also censured.

The troops misidentified vehicles as Hamas targets and opened fire for three minutes. A UN vehicle was also mistakenly hit, killing an employee. The IDF later admitted to errors and stated that guidelines on engaging rescue personnel had been “sharpened and clarified.”

The IDF later identified six of the 15 killed as Hamas operatives — a claim disputed by the Palestine Red Crescent, which called the IDF report “full of lies.” The Red Cross called it the deadliest attack on its personnel since 2017.

Gideon’s Chariots

In May 2025, Israel’s security cabinet unanimously approved a plan, codenamed Gideon’s Chariots, to significantly expand the military offensive against Hamas in Gaza, including a full-scale ground operation to conquer and indefinitely retain the territory. The plan was expected to be implemented after President Trump’s visit to the Gulf if no hostage and ceasefire deal was reached by May 15. It calls for gradually seizing areas of Gaza, flattening remaining buildings, relocating nearly all two million civilians to a designated humanitarian area, and targeting Hamas infrastructure while preventing the group from commandeering humanitarian aid. The only alternative offered to Gazans would be emigration in line with Trump’s vision for the enclave. While some Israeli officials viewed this plan as a last resort, many preferred a negotiated deal to avoid what they describe as a “nuclear option.

On May 13, an Israeli airstrike targeting an underground command center beneath the European Hospital killed Muhammad Sinwar, who had taken over leadership of Hamas from his brother, along with other senior figures, including Rafah Brigade commander Mohammad Shabana. Izz al-Din Haddad, previously in charge of operations in northern Gaza, was believed to have assumed leadership of the organization.

Following the release of Israeli-American soldier Edan Alexander by Hamas, Netanyahu stated that Israel would not stop its war in Gaza, even if a deal is reached to release more hostages, complicating U.S.-led ceasefire efforts. Netanyahu emphasized that any ceasefire would be temporary and reiterated his commitment to destroy Hamas and promote voluntary emigration from Gaza, in coordination with President Trump. Still, the plan to send in more ground troops was delayed to allow more time for hostage negotiations.

In his first press conference since December 2024, Netanyahu declared on May 21, 2025, that the entire Gaza Strip would remain under Israeli military control after the war, his most definitive statement on Israel’s post-war vision. The ongoing operation, dubbed Gideon’s Chariots, is intended to “complete the war,” he said, emphasizing the necessity of continued military dominance for security purposes.

Media publicity of the destruction and civilian casualties in the operation attracted growing criticism, even from allies. Notably, German Chancellor Friedrich Merz issued a rare public rebuke of Israel. “What the Israeli army is doing in the Gaza Strip, I no longer understand, frankly, what its objective is. To cause such suffering to the civilian population, as has increasingly been the case in recent days, can no longer be justified as a fight against Hamas terrorism,” Merz said. “When lines are crossed where international humanitarian law is now really being violated, the German chancellor must also say something about it.”

The chancellor’s remarks came a few days after Canada, France, and the United Kingdom issued a joint condemnation of Israel’s expansion of the war that called for an immediate ceasefire. They demanded the unrestricted flow of aid into the territory. While reiterating Israel’s right to self-defense after the October 7 attacks, the statement deemed the current response disproportionate and warned of concrete consequences if hostilities and aid restrictions continue.

Khalil Abed al-Nasser Mohammad Hatib, commander of the January 2024 attack that killed 21 reservists, the deadliest attack on IDF soldiers during the war, was eliminated in a drone strike on June 1, 2025. On January 22, 2024, a cell commanded by Hatib in Hamas’s Maghazi Battalion fired RPGs that hit a tank guarding the forces and two buildings that had been rigged for detonation.

The IDF also continued to find and destroy tunnels. In Khan Younis, the IDF demolished a nearly half-mile tunnel 98 feet underground.

Mohammed Sinwar Eliminated

The IDF announced progress in its military campaign to dismantle Hamas during operations at the site where former senior Hamas leader Mohammed Sinwar was killed. Brig.-Gen. Effie Defrin, IDF spokesman, visited the underground Hamas command center beneath the European Hospital in Khan Yunis. This location had served as one of the key hubs for planning Hamas’s October 7 invasion of Israel and coordinating subsequent wartime operations.

Footage and materials released by the IDF confirmed that the facility contained well-equipped rooms used by Hamas leadership. Defrin confirmed that Sinwar’s body was recovered from a tunnel at the site, along with at least ten other Hamas operatives. The bodies were transported to Israel for identification. This announcement marks the IDF’s formal public confirmation of Sinwar’s death, although Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and Defense Minister Israel Katz had already previously disclosed much of this information.

Sinwar was killed in an Israeli airstrike on May 13 in Khan Yunis. The announcement of the operation and the release of supporting photos and video are being presented by the IDF as evidence of the broader campaign’s momentum toward the goal of overthrowing Hamas’s governance and military capabilities in Gaza.

During an IDF and Shin Bet operation beneath the European Hospital in Khan Younis, where Sinwar was eliminated, Israeli forces uncovered documents revealing that Hamas’ military leadership had maintained recent ties with Saeed Izadi, a Quds Force commander who was eliminated the night before. The documents detail communications between Sinwar and Izadi, outlining “Plan Tufan 1,” through which Izadi facilitated approximately $21 million worth of weapons transfers to Hamas, as well as preparations for “Tufan 2,” intended to transfer an additional $25 million in arms.

Operations throughout the Strip continued as new tunnels were discovered and destroyed. The military considered the area sufficiently under control to reopen civilian areas as of July 2, 2025, in the Western Negev region.

The day before, Trump announced that Israel agreed to a 60-day ceasefire. “We will work with all parties to end the war,” Trump said. “I hope, for the good of the Middle East, that Hamas takes this deal because it will not get better — it will only get worse,” Trump wrote on Truth Social. He later said, “We want to get the hostages back,” and that he would be “very firm” with  Netanyahu on the need to end the war during the premier’s planned visit to Washington. 

The terms were not announced, but Israel has previously insisted on the removal of Hamas from power, the dismantling of its military wing, and the exile of its senior commanders. Israel also wants Gaza to be administered by local Palestinian officials unaffiliated with either Hamas or the Palestinian Authority, with the assistance of Arab states.

In July 2025, a senior Hamas official told the BBC that Hamas lost around 80% of its control over the Gaza Strip due to months of Israeli airstrikes that decimated its political, military, and security leadership, reportedly killing about 95% of its top figures. The official described a complete collapse of the group’s command structure, with no functioning security, leadership, or communication, and salaries barely being delivered. The Israel Defense Forces confirmed Hamas’s weakening grip, stating their ongoing operations and humanitarian aid efforts are undermining Hamas’s authority and preventing terrorists from hijacking food distributions to civilians.

After months of delay by the Biden administration, Israel received dozens of D9 bulldozers, which are used as combat engineering vehicles.

On July 17, an Israeli shell or shrapnel hit the only Catholic church in Gaza, killing three and injuring ten. Hundreds of Palestinians were sheltering in the Holy Family Catholic Church at the time. The incident drew international condemnation. Pope Leo XIV called Netanyahu and renewed his appeal for a ceasefire, negotiations, and an end to the war.

President Trump called Netanyahu, demanding an explanation, forcing Israel to release an apology: “Israel deeply regrets that a stray ammunition hit Gaza’s Holy Family Church. Every innocent life lost is a tragedy. We share the grief of the families and the faithful. We are grateful to Pope Leo for his words of comfort. Israel is investigating the incident and remains committed to protecting civilians and holy sites.”

Days later, Trump said, “Hamas didn't really want to make a deal. I think they want to die, and it's very bad. It got to a point where you have to finish the job.” He added that he thought Hamas would keep the remaining hostages as a “bargaining chip” and “their protection” but “now they are going to be hunted down.”

At the beginning of August, Haaretz published an estimate of the cost of Operation Gideon’s Chariots – 25 billion shekels (about $7.5 billion). The KKL-JNF Jewish National Fund announced a special rehabilitation budget of $220 million to help restore and develop communities in northern Israel and the Gaza border affected by the war.

A Military Revolution

The IDF revealed a major shift in Gaza combat tactics: suicide drones now account for most Hamas casualties. The locally developed Atalef (“bat”) drone is deployed directly by ground units, eliminating reliance on the air force.

Each platoon now fields its own drones for intelligence, surveillance, and targeting, including suicide drones to strike Hamas fighters, recon drones to scout buildings for boobytraps and tunnels, and lookout drones to scan terrain and prevent ambushes.

The IDF described this as a military revolution, transforming how soldiers fight Hamas at close range.

Israel to Take Full Control of Gaza

On August 8, 2025, Israel’s security cabinet approved Prime Minister Netanyahu’s plan to seize Gaza City by October 7, 2025, despite IDF warnings that it endangers hostages and could trigger a humanitarian crisis. Around 800,000 residents will be given two months to evacuate south before the IDF launches a siege to target remaining Hamas fighters. 

The cabinet’s decision limits the current operation to Gaza City, falling short of Netanyahu’s earlier stated goal of occupying the entire Strip. The wording avoided “occupy” for legal reasons, instead using “take over,” though a senior official said the distinction was superficial and amounted to full military rule.

The move is part of a broader, phased strategy that may later extend to other parts of Gaza. The plan could take seven months and require 200,000 reservists. Ministers also set five conditions for ending the war: Hamas disarmament, return of all hostages, Gaza’s demilitarization, continued Israeli security control, and a new civilian authority excluding Hamas and the Palestinian Authority.

IDF Chief Lt. Gen. Eyal Zamir opposed the plan, citing risks to hostages, worn-out forces, and humanitarian concerns, but was overruled. Hostage families and protestors have condemned the decision, saying military pressure hasn’t worked. Netanyahu says operations could stop if Hamas accepts Israel’s demands, but far-right ministers want the offensive to continue without negotiation.

Netanyahu said the Gaza City offensive will stop immediately if Hamas accepts Israel’s demands: disarmament, return of all hostages, and Gaza’s demilitarization under Israeli security control with a new civilian authority. He framed the operation as essential to defeating Hamas, but stressed it is “not a war for war’s sake” and could end without further fighting if Hamas complies.

Netanyahu said he spoke to President Trump on August 10 and “discussed Israel’s plans for taking control of the remaining Hamas strongholds in Gaza in order to bring about the end of the war, the release of the hostages and the defeat of Hamas.”

Trump stopped short of endorsing Israel’s planned offensive on Gaza City but made clear he won’t intervene. In an August 11 interview with Axios, Trump signaled sympathy for Netanyahu’s approach, stating that it was always going to be “very rough to get them,” because Hamas “are not going to let the hostages out in the current situation.”

While declining to back the operation outright, Trump aligned with Netanyahu’s view that Hamas must be defeated, saying that Israel has to decide what to do next and whether to allow Hamas to remain in Gaza. Trump said Hamas “can’t stay there.” He added, “I have one thing to say: remember October 7, remember October 7.”

Journalist Dan Perry noted opposition to the plan went beyond the IDF. “The public largely wants the war to be over, while Netanyahu’s desired expansion will indefinitely prolong it. (Israeli forces already control much of Gaza, but a full occupation would extend to the last Hamas-held areas — densely populated zones still believed to house hostages and hardened militants.)

Meanwhile, a movement to pressure Israel over its policies in Gaza was growing. The IDF was condemned when an Israeli strike killed Al Jazeera reporter Anas al-Sharif on August 10. According to the IDF, intelligence and seized Hamas records confirm that al-Sharif had been a member of Hamas’s military wing since 2013, serving as a commander of a rocket-launching squad and later appearing in the elite Nukhba Force’s internal registry. Despite his journalistic role, al-Sharif continued to receive a Hamas salary and actively participated in coordinating rocket attacks on Israeli civilians and soldiers.

Under the Law of Armed Conflict (LOAC), journalists are protected civilians only if they refrain from direct participation in hostilities. That participation does not require a rifle; serving as an intelligence asset or producing propaganda that shapes battlefield conditions qualifies. Israel maintains that Al Jazeera has long functioned as Hamas’s strategic communications arm—amplifying its narratives, covering up its atrocities, and shaping global opinion in ways that impede IDF operations. Such participation forfeits protection under LOAC.

Al Jazeera replaced al-Sharif with Shadi Shamiya, a former head of correspondents at Hamas’s propaganda channel Al-Aqsa TV—reinforcing concerns about the network’s integration with Hamas’s information warfare.

Israel found itself in another public relations disaster after a tank shell fired at Nasser Hospital killed at least 18 people, including several journalists. The IDF said that Hamas had installed a surveillance camera on hospital grounds and that six of the dead were terrorists. Reportedly, the IDF had authorized a drone strike but not the tank fire.

Another consequence of Western anger toward Israel was the decision by several leaders to recognize a Palestinian state or threaten to do so. France was first, followed by Great Britain, prompting Trump to criticize them for what he called a “reward” for Hamas. Trump even threatened Canada after it announced it would take a similar step. “Wow! Canada has just announced that it is backing statehood for Palestine. That will make it very hard for us to make a Trade Deal with them,” Trump posted on Truth Social.

Canadian Prime Minister Mark Carney, like some other leaders, placed a caveat on the decision. He said his country would recognize a Palestinian state in September if the Palestinian Authority undertook several reforms.

Gideon’s Chariots II

During an August 31 cabinet meeting, Israeli security chiefs again unsuccessfully urged ministers to accept the ceasefire proposal and hostage deal. The government moved forward with the plan to take Gaza City despite broad domestic and international opposition, in part because of the support of the United States. Netanyahu reportedly believed that Trump would only back military action for a limited period. Israel’s Channel 12 reported that Trump wanted a quick and decisive operation.

The IDF has reportedly told the security cabinet that the takeover of Gaza City alone will last four to five months. The operation would have to be methodical because of the expectation that Hamas had planted IEDs and set other traps in the dense urban environment of the city. 

In the initial stage, the IDF hopes to prompt some 800,000 civilians to move out of Gaza City into the Al-Mawasi region on the southern beach area of the Strip, where temporary accommodation is to be provided. The Hamas-run Interior Ministry told residents “not to yield to the occupation's threats and intimidation” and to remain in their homes.

Michael Milshtein, a former Israeli military intelligence official, told the Washington Post that Israel could end up fighting an insurgency that could become “like the U.S. in Iraq.” He said if only 5% of the civilians leave, “We will find that there is a dramatic gap between our very nice plans and reality.”

The IDF called up 60,000 reservists ahead of the planned ground offensive, with most reporting for duty on September 2. Still, turnout was lower than expected, and the army has refused to disclose the number of absentees. Reservists who declined to serve gave varied reasons: opposition to the Gaza City operation and support for a ceasefire, suspicions that Netanyahu is dragging out the war for political gain and to delay his criminal trials, exhaustion from repeated deployments and strain on family life and employment, and frustration over the continued exemptions for Haredim. Roughly 80,000 ultra-Orthodox men between 18 and 24 remain eligible for service but have not enlisted. Meanwhile, many reservists are seeking exemptions on personal or financial grounds, leaving units short-staffed compared to past mobilizations. Hundreds have signed a letter pledging not to report, with one signatory denouncing the Gaza City campaign as “patently illegal.”

Most of the reservists were expected to relieve regular soldiers in the West Bank and along the northern border, who would be sent to Gaza. IDF Chief of Staff Zamir told them, “We are going to increase and enhance the strikes of our operation, and that is why we called you. The IDF does not offer anything less than decisive victory. We will not stop the war until we defeat this enemy.”

As preparations for the invasion of Gaza City proceeded, the IDF continued to destroy tunnels and neutralize senior Hamas officials and terrorists who participated in the massacre and taking of hostages. On August 28, for example, Hazem Awni Naeem was killed. He had held in captivity three female Israeli hostages: Emily Damari, Romi Gonen, and Naama Levy. On August 30, the IDF eliminated the highest-ranking ISIS official in the Gaza Strip, Muhammad Abd al-Aziz Abu Zubaida. The following day, Israel killed the longtime spokesperson for Hamas’s armed wing, Hudayfa Samir Abdallah al-Kahlout, alias Abu Obeida, in an airstrike. For the past decade, Israeli officials said, Abu Obeida led Hamas’s military propaganda wing, overseeing spokesperson operations and coordinating with political media. The IDF said his unit distributed footage of the October 7 massacre, videos inciting terror across the Arab world, and hostage videos from Gaza.

Despite crippling losses after nearly two years of war, the BBC reported in August 2025, Hamas still pays about 30,000 civil servants $7 million in token salaries every 10 weeks through a covert cash system, with workers receiving encrypted instructions to collect envelopes at secret locations. These payments, only 20% of pre-war wages, have fueled resentment amid soaring inflation. Hamas reportedly stockpiled $700 million in cash and hundreds of millions of shekels in tunnels before the October 7 attack, supplemented by Muslim Brotherhood funds, wartime taxes, and cigarette sales inflated 100-fold. To maintain loyalty, the group also distributes food parcels via rotating local committees.

On the 699th day of the war, the IDF announced it controls about 40% of Gaza City and is pushing deeper into neighborhoods such as Zeitoun, Sheikh Radwan, and Shuja’iyya, ahead of the planned full-scale takeover. Brig. Gen. Effie Defrin said Israeli forces had also recovered the bodies of 10 hostages on the city’s eastern outskirts.

On September 5, Israel warned people to leave a high-rise building in Gaza City shortly before it destroyed it in a military strike. Announcing the evacuation order  on social media, Katz said: “The gates of Hell are being unlocked in Gaza City.” After the strike, Katz posted a video of the tower collapsing along with the words: “We started.”

A few days later, Katz left a message for Hamas on X:

Initial airstrikes focused on hundreds of surveillance cameras, anti-tank firing positions, and sniping positions on the upper floors of high-rise buildings in the center and west of the city. A secondary objective of targeting the high-rise buildings (deliberately in broad daylight) is to encourage the civilian population to leave the city.

The IDF believes it can seize Gaza City within weeks, but warns the whole campaign could take a year because of the vast tunnel system and the presence of live hostages. Roughly 10,000 Hamas fighters are thought to be inside, though many are expected to flee with civilians, making screening challenging. A key target still at large is brigade commander Izz al-Din Haddad, who has rebuilt Hamas’s command network—centered in tunnels in western Gaza City—since its partial destruction in late 2023.

Israel announced it had killed Mahmoud Afana, a terrorist who participated in the October 7 massacre. A recording was made of a phone call he placed from Kibbutz Mefalsim to his family, boasting that he had personally murdered ten Israelis. 

On September 16, Israel launched a major ground operation in Gaza City, with two divisions already inside and more expected to join. The campaign follows heavy airstrikes and aims to dismantle Hamas’s remaining stronghold, focusing on its tunnels and urban defenses. The IDF says roughly 350,000 residents have evacuated, though Hamas is accused of blocking further departures. Israeli officials stress their determination to free hostages and defeat Hamas, while Defense Minister Israel Katz declared, “Gaza is burning.” 

The IDF advanced deeper into Gaza City with two divisions from different directions. The IDF disclosed that in the week leading up to the ground push, 850 targets were struck, including about 50 in Gaza City the night before the assault, reflecting an intensified aerial campaign. By the eve of the operation, the IDF already controlled roughly 40% of Gaza City, after operations in Jabaliya, Sheikh Radwan, and Zeitoun. Updated estimates suggest that while 350,000 residents have evacuated, between 100,000 and 300,000 civilians are expected to remain, even with a new inland evacuation route along Salah a-Din road opened to supplement the coastal corridor.

Operation Judgment Day

Israel conducted a strike against senior Hamas leaders in Doha, Qatar, on September 9, 2025. Operation Judgment Day targeted Khalil al-Hayya, Hamas’s chief negotiator in hostage and ceasefire talks. The Wall Street Journal reported that Israeli jets fired missiles from outside Qatari airspace without breaching the airspace of Saudi Arabia or the United Arab Emirates. The paper said Israel informed the U.S. of the attack minutes before the launch, and did not disclose the target.

Since the U.S. has its largest base in the Middle East in Qatar, it would have detected the incoming aircraft. White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said that Trump learned of the strike from the Pentagon, not Jerusalem. Trump said he did not decide to launch the attack. He criticized Israel and reassured Qatar that it would not happen again:

“I’m just, I’m not thrilled about the whole situation,” Trump told reporters. “We want the hostages back, but we are not thrilled about the way that went down today.” Trump said much the same in what the Wall Street Journal said was a “heated call” with Netanyahu.

To shield Trump from charges of aiding Israel, Netanyahu declared, “Today’s action against the top terrorist chieftains of Hamas was a wholly independent Israeli operation. Israel initiated it, Israel conducted it, and Israel takes full responsibility.”

Trump had a second call with Netanyahu that the Journal said was “cordial,” but quoted a senior administration official who claimed Trump “is increasingly frustrated with Netanyahu, who continually boxes him in with aggressive moves taken without U.S. input that clash with Trump’s own Middle East goals.”

Qatar condemned the attack, which Majed al-Ansari, the spokesman for the Qatari foreign ministry, said targeted the “residential headquarters” where several senior Hamas politicians lived.

The UN Secretary-General and European leaders joined in the chorus of condemnation of what Secretary General Antonio Guterres said was  “a flagrant violation of sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Qatar.”

In response to criticism, “Israel’s security doctrine is clear — its long arm will act against its enemies everywhere,” Katz said. “There’s nowhere they can hide.” Netanyahu made a similar statement. “The days are over when terror leaders will enjoy immunity in a particular place,” he said.

Later, as global criticism intensified, Netanyahu insisted that Qatar expel the Hamas officials or “bring them to justice, because if you don’t, we will.” Calling out the hypocrisy of critics, he noted that the United States promised to hunt down the terrorists responsible for the 9/11 attacks and that the Security Council passed a resolution that said governments cannot give harbor to terrorists. “We did exactly what America did when it went after the al-Qaeda terrorists in Afghanistan and after they went and killed Osama bin Laden in Pakistan,” argued Netanyahu.

“The negotiations were always held in an official and transparent manner, with international support and in the presence of U.S. and Israeli delegations,” Qatar responded. “Netanyahu’s insinuation that Qatar secretly harbored the Hamas delegation is a desperate attempt to justify a crime condemned by the entire world.”

Israel had said from the beginning of the war that it would hunt down all the terrorists responsible for the massacre. The Wall Street Journal reported that Hamas leaders had received warnings from Egypt and Turkey to tighten security around their meetings.

Initially, it was believed Israel had eliminated senior Hamas leaders during a meeting, but a day later, sources questioned whether the strike had been successful. Hamas said its top leaders survived, but al-Hayya’s son, three bodyguards, and a Qatari security officer were killed.

Earlier in the day, Israel dropped leaflets into Gaza City warning residents to evacuate as the IDF prepared to mount a ground operation.

Advances in Gaza City

Israeli forces slowly advanced into the heart of Gaza City as the Air Force flattened buildings used by snipers and spotters. By mid-September, more than half a million civilians had left the city.

Meanwhile, in southern Gaza, Hossam al-Astal, a 50-year-old former Palestinian Authority officer, formed a new militia called Strike Force Against Terror in a village near Khan Younis, aiming to provide an alternative to Hamas rule. With quiet backing from Israel and Western countries, he offers displaced Gazans food, shelter, protection, and freedom from Hamas, claiming daily contact from families seeking refuge.

Operating from Kizan al-Najjar, al-Astal is building a tent community, conducting security checks to exclude Hamas affiliates. He asserts that all supplies — including food, water, and military gear — come from Israel, and suggests support from the U.S., EU, and unnamed Arab countries. His group is reportedly coordinating with another clan-based militia led by Yasser Abu Shabab in Rafah, aiming to form a protective “belt” across southern Gaza under Israeli coordination.

These groups reflect a growing trend in Gaza: clan-based militias filling the vacuum left by Hamas’s retreat amid the ongoing Israeli campaign. Israel has not officially confirmed its involvement, but Prime Minister Netanyahu acknowledged in June that Israel was supporting anti-Hamas clans.

Al-Astal, a longtime opponent of Hamas and former prisoner of the group, says most Gazans want Hamas gone but fear retaliation. Despite threats from Hamas and accusations of collaboration, he remains defiant, calling on peace-seeking Palestinians to join his enclave.

Table of Contents for the Israel-Hamas War
Bibliography and Photo Credits

About Mitchell Bard