The Israel-Hamas War:
Operation Strength and Sword

No Hostages, No Ceasefire
Rocket Fire Resumes
Tunnel Warfare​​​​​​
The IDF Admits Mistake

No Hostages, No Ceasefire

After weeks of fruitless negotiations with Hamas to extend the ceasefire and release the remaining hostages, Israel received indications that Hamas was planning to carry out further terrorist attacks against Israeli civilians and IDF soldiers. Officials said Hamas was “reorganizing its battalions and brigades, using underground tunnels that were not discovered or building new ones, clearing IEDs placed by the terrorists from areas repopulated by civilians and placing new ones in anticipation of an incursion, and setting up rocket launchers and cameras.”

On March 18, 2025, the decision was made to launch a surprise preemptive attack on Hamas targets in Gaza. The IDF named this military operation “Strength and Sword.”

Just before 2:30 a.m. local time, as some Gazans slept and others were preparing a meal before the daily Ramadan fast, the Israeli military announced it had begun “extensive strikes” targeting Hamas military commanders, officials in Hamas’s leadership, and terrorist infrastructure.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu declared: “We have instructed the IDF to act forcefully against Hamas—the IDF is currently attacking targets throughout the entire Gaza Strip.”

Netanyahu subsequently emphasized Israel’s extensive efforts to secure the release of hostages, including extending the ceasefire and engaging in negotiations through mediators. Despite accepting multiple proposals, including one from U.S. envoy Steven Witkoff, Hamas rejected all offers. He declared that Israel would escalate military action, negotiate while fighting, and pursue its war objectives: freeing hostages, eliminating Hamas, and neutralizing Gaza as a threat.

Expressing solidarity with hostage families, Netanyahu assured them of ongoing efforts for their loved ones. He dismissed claims of political motivations, warning Hamas not to expect further ceasefires. Netanyahu stressed that past hostage releases were only achieved through military pressure. Calling the conflict a “war of resurgence” across seven fronts, he praised U.S. cooperation against Iran’s proxies and vowed victory, stating, “Together we will act, and together we will win.”

“The Trump administration and the White House were consulted by the Israelis on their attacks in Gaza tonight,” White House press secretary Karoline Leavitt said in a Fox News interview. “As President Trump has made it clear - Hamas, the Houthis, Iran, all those who seek to terrorize not just Israel, but also the United States of America, will see a price to pay. All hell will break loose.”

“The blame for the resumption of hostilities lies solely with Hamas,” acting U.S. ambassador to the UN Dorothy Shea said. “We support Israel in its next steps.”

Similarly, Witkoff said, “The Israelis going in, in some respects, is unfortunate but also falls into the ‘had-to-be’ bucket. It kind of had to be. Hamas was not responding, and their responses were unreasonable.”

Oded Ailam, a former head of the Counterterrorism Division in the Mossad, noted: “While this step does carry risks for the hostages, the alternative – giving Hamas more time to prepare and solidify its control – is far worse. Further delays could result in hostages dying in tunnels while the IDF is forced to fight a more fortified and emboldened enemy. Renewing the fighting is meant to exert real pressure, making Hamas leadership understand that it cannot continue to stall and dictate the rules of the game.”

Others believed the decision to resume fighting had less to do with Hamas or the hostages than Netanyahu’s political survival, a persistent theme almost from the start of the war. The argument was that by ending the ceasefire, Itamar Ben-Gvir would return to the government after leaving to protest the truce. Netanyahu needed the votes of Ben-Gvir’s party to pass the otherwise imperiled budget. Failure to adopt it would have led to elections and the possible removal of the prime minister.

Defense Minister Israel Katz warned Hamas, “If it does not immediately release all the hostages, the gates of hell will open, and it will find itself facing the full intensity of the IDF in the air, sea, and land, until its complete elimination.” Katz promised, “We will not stop fighting until all the hostages are returned home and all threats to the southern residents are removed.”

Terrorists who had emerged from their hiding places and donned uniforms for the hostage release spectacles have taken them off to blend with civilians and gone back into underground bunkers. Still, several high-level Hamas officials were killed in targeted strikes. These included:

• Abu Hamza – the military spokesman for Palestine Islamic Jihad.
• Mahmoud Abu Watfa – Deputy head of Hamas’s Interior Ministry, responsible for internal security operations.
• Essam Daalis – Member of Hamas’s political bureau, overseeing governance and coordination between Hamas leadership and its military wing.
• Abu Obaida al-Jamazi – Senior member of Hamas’s political bureau, involved in strategic decision-making.
• Liwaa Mahmoud Abu Watfa – Hamas’s Minister of Interior, controlling the terror group’s security mechanisms and enforcement units.
• Bahjat Abu Sultan – Head of Hamas’s Internal Security, one of the most critical figures in Hamas’s intelligence and counter-intelligence operations.
• Ahmed al-Hatta (Abu Omar) – Hamas’s Minister of Justice, responsible for implementing Sharia-based legal rulings under Hamas’s rule.
• Yasser Mohammed Harb Musa – a member of Hamas’s politburo who headed the defense portfolio and the ministry of development.
• Mohammed Jamasi – the chief of Hamas’s emergency committee.
• Osama Tabash – head of Hamas’s surveillance and targets unit and director of the southern Gaza intelligence unit.

Hamas claimed that an Israeli hostage was killed and several others wounded in an airstrike. However, this claim remains unverified and may be part of Hamas’s psychological warfare strategy.

Netanyahu did not immediately order a ground invasion, but troops backed by tanks were sent to reoccupy the Netzarim Corridor. As part of the ceasefire, the IDF had withdrawn from the area. Small numbers of soldiers were also deployed in the southern Gaza Strip.

Katz said, “The Air Force strikes against Hamas terrorists were just the first step. It will become much more difficult and you will pay the full price,” adding, “The evacuation of the population from combat zones will soon begin again.” 

Israel planned to escalate in stages to allow Hamas to accept the U.S. ceasefire proposal.

Rocket Fire Resumes

On March 20, Hamas launched three rockets at Israel for the first time in months. They were either intercepted or fell in open areas. 

Following the rocket fire, the IDF issued an evacuation warning for Palestinians in the Beit Lahiya and Beit Hanoun areas, from which two projectiles were fired. Gazans were also told to leave Jabalia, where the rocket originated.

Katz reiterated, “We will intensify the military campaign against Hamas, including through the expansion of the ground maneuver until the hostages are released and Hamas is defeated.”

Katz also threatened to annex part of the Gaza Strip if Hamas did not release the remaining hostages. “As long as Hamas continues its refusal, it will lose more and more land that will be added to Israel.”

IDF air strikes destroyed over 100 pickup trucks, including those believed used on October 7. More than 150 terrorists were eliminated in the first week of renewed fighting. Targeted killings also continued as the IDF eliminated Ismail Barhoum, who was in charge of Hamas finances and had succeeded Issam Da’alis, the de facto prime minister of Gaza, who was killed the week before. Israel appeared to be focusing more on the political leadership of Hamas, and now had eliminated 11 of the 20 members of Hamas’s political bureau elected in 2021. Most, if not all, of the others were believed to be outside Gaza.

In March 2025, a rare protest against Hamas was staged spontaneously in Beit Lahia. Some shouted, “Hamas, get out!” and “The Gazan people do not want war.” One resident told Haaretz, “We demonstrated today to declare that we do not want to die. Eventually, it is Israel that attacks and bombs, but Hamas also bears direct responsibility, as do all who define themselves as Arab and Palestinian leaders.”

Protests grew the next day, spreading to Gaza City’s Shejaiya and Sabra neighborhoods, the Nuseirat refugee camp, and the central city of Deir al-Balah. Demonstrations continued for a third day despite warnings from Hamas that participants would be treated as collaborators, which usually means execution. A day later, a protester was kidnapped, tortured, and executed by Hamas.

A few days later, a Gazan family in Deir al-Balah executed a Hamas operative, accusing him of killing their relative while waiting for flour, highlighting growing discontent with Hamas among civilians. The Abu Samra clan, like other powerful Gazan families, operates independently of Hamas and wields significant influence through business control and armed loyalty. Clashes between Hamas and such clans are not new, with a recent conflict involving the Doghmush family over aid distribution and post-war governance speculation. 

As Israel intensified its bombing campaign in Gaza, ostensibly to pressure Hamas to release the hostages, the terrorists said, “Every time the occupation attempts to retrieve its captives by force, it ends up bringing them back in coffins” and that while it was “doing everything possible to keep the occupation’s captives alive,...the random Zionist bombardment is endangering their lives.”

The IDF expanded ground operations and was reportedly planning to seize one-quarter of Gaza over the succeeding two to three weeks. Evacuation orders were issued for Rafah and, later, for areas in northern Gaza after a rocket was fired from the Strip toward Sderot.

On April 2, 2025, Israel expanded its military operations in Gaza, with Defense Minister Israel Katz announcing an intensified offensive following heavy overnight strikes in the south. Additional IDF forces were deployed to clear terrorist infrastructure and capture territory for security purposes. Strikes in Rafah and Khan Younis reportedly killed 21 people, while an IDF-Shin Bet operation targeted Hamas operatives in Jabalia. Israel stated that the strike hit a UNRWA clinic used as a terror compound. The expansion follows recent evacuation orders in Rafah, the largest since the ceasefire ended in March.

Trump spoke to the leaders of Egypt, France, and Jordan on April 7. They emphasized the need “to urgently secure a ceasefire in the Gaza Strip,” resume delivery of humanitarian aid, and “the release of all the hostages.” The trio “emphasize[d] the need to create conducive conditions for a genuine political horizon and mobilize international efforts to end the suffering of the Palestinian people, restore security and peace for all, and implement the two-state solution.”

The IDF said on April 16 that it had not yet begun a major offensive, hoping that the ongoing operation would pressure Hamas into an agreement to free the hostages. Since fighting resumed, the IDF said it killed at least 350 members of terror groups, including 40 senior Hamas political officials and mid-level military wing commanders, and other prominent terrorists, including some who participated in the October 7 attack. Hamas has put up little resistance as it has focused on rearming.

Nearly one-third of Gaza along the border was established as buffer zones. The IDF planned to expand the zone from the Egyptian border to Khan Yunis — more than 3 miles away — and include the entire city of Rafah within it.

Tunnel Warfare

John Spencer, chair of urban warfare studies at the Modern War Institute, explained the continuing challenge of fighting Hamas’s tunnel infrastructure. At the start of the war, he observed, the IDF struck Hamas tunnels with precision munitions guided by intelligence on “locations of tunnels, their purpose and value to the enemy, their contents.” Once ground forces entered Gaza, elite teams investigated shafts, but booby traps, some embedded “into the walls,” made even identification deadly, killing five soldiers in one incident.

The IDF initially relied on drones, robots, and camera-equipped dogs, with limited success. Flooding tunnels proved ineffective: “it took two weeks for a small Hamas tunnel to fill,” and water often drained out. To speed operations, the IDF trained regular troops in tunnel detection and developed a typology: tactical (e.g., building-to-building), operational (e.g., between units), and strategic (e.g., cross-border smuggling). Understanding the tunnel type helped prioritize targets.

Still, Hamas retained the initiative until Brig. Gen. Dan Goldfus led a “rapid learning initiative,” employed “all-source intelligence,” and launched simultaneous attacks above and below ground. For the first time, the IDF used tunnels offensively, turning them into “maneuver corridors.” This tactic, also used against Hezbollah in Lebanon, “changes everything,” according to Spencer.

But destruction remains difficult. Eighteen months into the war, the IDF had destroyed only about 25% of Hamas’ tunnel network. The slow progress stemmed from the technical challenge of demolishing deep underground infrastructure, the risk of causing mass civilian casualties through extensive bombing, and the fear that more aggressive operations could endanger the lives of Israeli hostages still believed to be held underground. “The harsh reality is that there is likely not enough supply of explosives or enough time to destroy all the tunnels in Gaza. To find all the tunnels and then destroy them would potentially take years,” Spencer concluded.

The IDF Admits Mistake

The IDF dismissed the deputy commander of the Golani Brigade’s reconnaissance unit after his troops mistakenly opened fire on ambulances in Rafah on March 23, killing 15 rescue workers. He was removed for his role in the incident and for giving a “partial and inaccurate” report.

An investigation found no ethical violations but cited “professional errors” and protocol breaches. The commander of the overseeing 14th Reserve Armored Brigade was also censured.

The troops misidentified vehicles as Hamas targets and opened fire for three minutes. A UN vehicle was also mistakenly hit, killing an employee. The IDF later admitted errors and said guidelines on engaging rescue personnel were “sharpened and clarified.”

Six of the 15 killed were later identified by the IDF as Hamas operatives — a claim disputed by the Palestine Red Crescent, which called the IDF report “full of lies.” The Red Cross called it the deadliest attack on its personnel since 2017.

Table of Contents for the Israel-Hamas War
Bibliography and Photo Credits

About Mitchell Bard