Human Rights Report (2011) - Palestinian Territories

There were reports that the PA committed at least one unlawful killing during the year. On April 24, a PA security forces officer shot at a vehicle exiting Nablus, killing Ben Yosef Livnat, an Israeli citizen, and wounding four others who had attended prayer services at Joseph’s Tomb. The worshippers reportedly had failed to coordinate their visit with Israeli and PA authorities as required. PA security forces investigated the incident and found four officers at fault. The officer who killed Livnat was removed from duty.

Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas, committed unlawful killings in Israel, the West Bank, and the Gaza Strip.

For example, on March 11, 17-year-old Hakim and 19-year-old Amjad Awad, cousins affiliated with the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), stabbed and killed five members of the Israeli Fogel family, including two young children and an infant, in their home in the settlement of Itamar, near Nablus, in the West Bank. On September 13, Israel’s Samaria Military Court sentenced Hakim to 130 years in prison, which he began serving immediately. Amjad was convicted of five counts of murder on November 28 but had not been sentenced by year’s end.

On April 15, Salafist militants reportedly killed Vittorio Arrigoni, an Italian pro-Palestinian activist living in the Gaza Strip. After claiming to have captured two Salafist suspects shortly after the killing, the Hamas ministry of interior announced the capture of two additional suspects on April 19 following a raid by Hamas security forces in which another two Salafists were killed. During the first hearing in a military court in Gaza City in late September, the four suspects claimed their videotaped confessions had been extracted under torture. The trial was ongoing at year’s end.

Hamas and Palestinian armed groups in Gaza, including the armed wings of the Popular Resistance Committees, Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ), PFLP, and al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade, launched indiscriminate rocket attacks into Israel. According to Israeli government statistics, Palestinian terrorist acts emanating from the West Bank killed seven Israeli civilians and one foreign tourist. Eight Israeli civilians died in violence emanating from the Gaza Strip. Four of those who died were minors. During the year approximately 700 rockets, mortars, and Grad missiles were fired at southern Israel from the Gaza Strip, according to data compiled by the IDF’s Home Front Command.

According to local media and the Independent Commission for Human Rights (ICHR), a PA human rights institution, Hamas unlawfully executed at least five persons by hanging and gunfire in the Gaza Strip during the year. By law the PA president must ratify the death penalty, but Hamas did not contact the PA regarding the executions. For instance, on July 26, Hamas hanged Mahmoud and Rami Abu Qenas, reportedly convicted in 2004 of murder and collaborating with Israel.

The Israeli government killed Palestinian civilians as well as militants, mostly in the Gaza Strip, but also in the West Bank. Israeli security forces killed 105 Palestinians in Gaza and 10 in the West Bank during the year. Some of these killings were unlawful. Eighteen of those killed in the Gaza Strip were minors. The Israeli government launched missile, unmanned aerial vehicle, and fighter aircraft strikes in the Gaza Strip, killing 49 Palestinians whom the Israeli Information Center for Human Rights in the Occupied Territories (B'Tselem) described as participating in hostilities through their membership in Hamas’s military wing or the PIJ (a terrorist organization) and at least 40 of whom B'Tselem described as not participating in hostilities. The IDF used tanks and remote-controlled weapons stations to fire on Palestinians inside the Gaza Strip. IDF personnel maintained secure stations every several hundred yards along the border fence; each station contained machine guns with a nearly one-mile firing range. The IDF’s tanks also sometimes fired ammunition with “flechette” projectiles, which explode in midair, releasing thousands of 1.5-inch metal darts that disperse in an arc 328 yards wide.

On January 7, IDF troops from the Duvdevan elite counterterrorism unit entered the house of 66-year-old Omar Salim Suliman al-Qawasmeh in Hebron, in the West Bank, and shot and killed him in his bed during a nighttime raid. The IDF spokesman later stated that troops had entered the wrong house. On January 19, the IDF issued a statement saying that, while the initial shots were fired as a result of suspicious movement, a second soldier also fired at al-Qawasmeh in response to the first soldier’s shots. The IDF ended the second soldier’s military service.

The IDF killed a Palestinian demonstrator during the year. On December 9, during a weekly demonstration in Nabi Saleh, an IDF soldier fired a tear gas canister at close range toward a stone-throwing protester, Mustafa Tamimi, who died as a result of wounds after the canister directly struck his face. The IDF spokesperson stated that the incident was “exceptional” and was a result of the soldier’s inability to see the protester clearly. Nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) disputed this claim, pointing to photos and video coverage that showed the IDF soldier aiming directly at the protester’s face. The IDF launched an investigation into the incident.

There were also continued reports of Israeli forces killing Palestinians in restricted areas in the Gaza Strip. In September the UN Office for Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) reported that Israel aerially distributed leaflets across the Gaza Strip warning residents that their lives would be at risk if they approached within 300 meters of the “buffer zone” separating Gaza from Israeli territory. In practice Israel regularly enforced the buffer zone by firing toward Palestinians approaching at distances well beyond 330 yards, and UNOCHA reported several cases of civilians being shot at distances beyond 365 yards during the year.

The IDF also fired at minors working inside or near the Gaza Strip buffer zone. For example, on August 16, IDF fire killed 17-year-old Mahmoud al-Majdalawi, who reportedly suffered from a mental disability, at a distance of approximately 440 feet from the perimeter fence. Defense for Children International-Palestine Section (DCI-Palestine) reported six children shot by IDF fire during the year as far as 660 yards out from the Gaza buffer zone, noting that most of the children were shot in the leg while collecting gravel, without apparent intent to kill.

The IDF announced it opened investigations into some civilian deaths in Gaza and the West Bank. However, various human rights groups claimed that the Israeli government failed to investigate violence thoroughly, including that which resulted in Palestinian deaths, whether by the IDF or by Israeli settlers (for the latter, see section 6, National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities). According to B'Tselem, the Israeli government did not order criminal investigations into cases in which soldiers killed Palestinians who were not taking part in hostilities. In addition Israeli law restricts the ability of Palestinians who have been harmed by illegal acts by Israeli security forces to seek compensation in Israeli courts.

On September 25, the Jerusalem District Court ruled that the Israeli government pay NIS 1.6 million (approximately $420,000) to the family of Abir Aramin, a 10-year-old who was shot in the back of the head with an IDF rubber bullet in Jerusalem in 2007, according to press reports. A 2010 ruling from the same court determined that the state of Israel was responsible for her death, noting that the bullet was fired in violation of orders. Previously, on July 10, the Israeli High Court of Justice rejected a petition by Aramin’s family to indict the border police officers responsible for her death. However, the court’s decision was based on the fact that it was difficult to investigate the death four years later. The judges criticized the border police for not opening an investigation immediately, stating that an immediate investigation should follow any violent incident that causes severe injury or the death of a civilian.

The PA set up a commission that looked into the PA violations during the Operation Cast Lead conflict in 2008-09 and published a report on its findings. Since the principal Palestinian violations during Cast Lead were committed by Hamas in the Gaza Strip, the PA was unable to effectively hold perpetrators accountable. In previous years NGOs criticized Hamas for not pursuing investigations into violations during Operation Cast Lead.

During the year there were no new Israeli indictments related to violations by Israeli forces during Operation Cast Lead. Various human rights organizations stated that many of their requests for information about investigations went unanswered, but the military advocate general (MAG) responded to B'Tselem's inquiries about specific cases, reporting that four out of nine cited cases did not lead to investigations. In other cases where investigations were completed, the MAG’s reporting to B’Tselem documented that legal proceedings did not result for every case cited by the organization. NGOs such as B’Tselem pointed to such findings to protest what they considered a lack of serious investigation into alleged human rights violations and opined that insufficient attention was paid to responsibility related to the chain of command.

In the West Bank there were no reports of politically motivated disappearances in connection with internal Palestinian conflict, largely due to improved security conditions in recent years.

In the Gaza Strip, Hamas security operatives carried out extrajudicial detentions based on political affiliation during the year. Information concerning the whereabouts and welfare of those detained was not consistently or reliably available, and many of those detained were denied due process or access to family and legal counsel.

On October 18, Hamas released Gilad Shalit, an Israeli soldier abducted in 2006 in a cross-border attack from the Gaza Strip, as part of a prisoner exchange between Israel and Hamas.

The PA Basic Law prohibits torture or use of force against detainees; however, international human rights groups reported that abuse and torture remained a problem across the occupied territories.

Palestinian detainees held by PA security forces registered more than 816 complaints of abuse and torture with the ICHR during the year. Reported abuse by PA authorities in the West Bank included forcing prisoners to sit in a painful position for long periods, beating, punching, flogging, intimidation, and psychological pressure. Independent observers noted that abuse was not systematic or routinely practiced in PA prisons, although some prisoners experienced abuse during arrest or interrogation. The PA Corrections and Rehabilitation Centers Department (CRCD) reported no cases of inmate abuse by its staff. However, Human Rights Watch (HRW) reported that credible reports of torture by PA security services continued during the year. The PA General Administration for Reform and Rehabilitation Center, under the authority of the PA Ministry of Interior, operated a mechanism for reviewing complaints of prisoner abuse in civil prisons.

Detainees held by Hamas filed at least 304 claims of abuse and torture with the ICHR during the year. In the Gaza Strip, security elements under the Hamas ministry of interior tortured and abused purported security detainees, persons associated with the PA or the Fatah political party, those held on suspicion of “collaboration” with Israel, civil society activists, journalists, and those who had reportedly engaged in “immoral” activity. Hamas also reportedly deployed undercover officers to assault such persons. The Office of the UN High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) reported three deaths in detention as a result of Hamas torture between December 2010 and November 2011. The ICHR reported that complaints of abuse included being forced to stand in uncomfortable stress positions, flogging, hand binding, suspension, blindfolding, punching, and beatings with clubs or hoses. For example HRW reported that on February 28-29, Hamas police and plainclothes security officers detained, beat, and tortured Ahmad Arar, who had organized a demonstration in Gaza City calling for Palestinian unity. According to HRW, Hamas police beat Arar, forced him into stress positions, denied him medical care, threatened him with electrocution, and coerced him into confessing affiliation with the PA.

Hamas reportedly took little or no action to investigate reports of torture, and documentation of abuses was limited, due to victims’ fear of retribution and to lack of access to Gaza Strip prisoners by NGOs or PA officials.

Human rights organizations reported that “physical interrogation methods” permitted by Israeli law and used by Israeli security personnel could amount in practice to torture; these included beatings, forcing an individual to hold a stress position for long periods, and painful pressure from shackles or restraints applied to the forearms. Israeli and Palestinian NGOs continued to criticize these and other Israeli detention practices they termed abusive, including isolation, sleep deprivation, and psychological abuse, such as threats to interrogate spouses, siblings, or elderly parents, or demolish family homes.

Israeli authorities reportedly used similar tactics on Palestinian minors. DCI-Palestine claimed Israeli security services continued to abuse and in some cases torture minors who were frequently arrested on suspicion of stone throwing to coerce confessions. Tactics included beatings, long-term handcuffing, threats, and solitary confinement. DCI-Palestine reported in December that it had documented 34 cases of minors held in solitary confinement at al-Jalame facility between 2008 and 2011. For example, according to DCI-Palestine, on November 4, the IDF arrested 16-year-old R.S.J. in the West Bank settlement of Tzufin, interrogated him using threats, and held him for 13 days in a small cell with a light on 24 hours a day.

During the year the Public Committee Against Torture (PCATI), five other NGOs, and nine other complainants submitted a petition to the Israeli High Court of Justice demanding effective accountability mechanisms in complaints of torture; this petition was still pending at the end of the year. The PCATI also reported more than 700 complaints that had yet to lead to a criminal investigation at year’s end.

Palestinian law prohibits arbitrary arrest and detention; however, in practice the PA failed to charge detainees promptly. Hamas also charged that the PA detained individuals during the year solely on the basis of their Hamas affiliation.

Hamas reportedly practiced widespread arbitrary detention in the Gaza Strip, particularly against Fatah members, civil society activists, and others accused of publicly criticizing Hamas.

Israeli law provides safeguards against arbitrary arrest and detention, but key safeguards do not apply to security detainees. Palestinian security detainees are subject to the jurisdiction of Israeli military law, which permits eight days’ detention before appearing before a military court. There is no requirement that a detainee have access to a lawyer until after interrogation, a process that may last weeks. The maximum period for such a prevention order, according to military law, is 90 days; however, detention can be renewed if deemed necessary. Denial of family visits, outside medical professionals, or others outside of the ISA, the IDF, or the prison service occurred. NGOs reported that persons undergoing interrogations were often held incommunicado for several weeks.

The Palestinian Basic Law provides for an independent judiciary. In practice the PA generally respected judicial independence and the autonomy of the High Judicial Council and maintained authority over most court operations in the West Bank. PA-affiliated prosecutors and judges stated that IDF prohibitions on movement in the West Bank, including restrictions on the ability to transport detainees and collect witnesses, hampered their ability to dispense justice. In some cases involving investigations by PA intelligence services in the West Bank, civilian defendants appeared before the PA’s military court system, which until 2011 had jurisdiction over security personnel and crimes by civilians against security forces. After Palestinian NGOs criticized this practice, however, the PA mandated that civilians appear before civilian courts.

Hamas-appointed prosecutors and judges operated courts in the Gaza Strip, although the PA considered them illegal.

Israeli law provides for an independent judiciary, and the government generally respected civil court independence in practice. The IDF tried Palestinians accused of security offenses (ranging from rock throwing to membership in a terrorist organization to incitement) in military courts, which some NGOs claimed were inadequate and unfair. Israeli law defines security offenses to include a variety of different charges.

The PA required the attorney general to issue warrants for entry and searches of private property; however, Palestinian security services often ignored these requirements and entered homes without judicial authorization.

There was at least one example during the year of the PA harassing family members for an alleged offense by an individual. NGOs and the press reported that PA security forces arrested the brothers of Palestinian journalist Majdoleen Hassouneh reportedly in an attempt to pressure Hassouneh to turn herself into police after she covered a sit-in strike.

Hamas authorities in the Gaza Strip frequently interfered arbitrarily with personal privacy, family, and home, according to reporting from local media and NGO sources. NGOs reported numerous cases of home searches and property seizure without warrants targeting journalists, Fatah loyalists, civil society and youth activists, and those whom Hamas security forces accused of criminal activity. Hamas forces monitored private communications systems, including telephones, e‑mail traffic, and social media sites by demanding passwords, access to personal information, and seizure of personal electronic equipment of detainees. While Hamas membership did not appear to be a prerequisite for obtaining housing, education, or government services, employment in some government positions in Gaza, such as the security services, was commonly reserved for Hamas members only. In several instances, Hamas detained individuals for interrogation and harassment based on the purported actions of their family members, particularly prodemocracy youth activists.

Hamas enforced a policy of curbing activities that it deemed contrary to Islam or “immoral.” For example, during the week of February 21, Hamas police summoned five male hairdressers whose clients were primarily women and compelled them to sign pledges to “avoid sinful acts” and not to reenter their salons on penalty of a 20,000 NIS fine (approximately $5,500) or incarceration. In late December Hamas police officials reportedly demanded that 142 self-described fortune-tellers sign documents promising to discontinue their business operations, and Hamas also inspected several clothing vendors, warning against displays of nude mannequins, lingerie, or “indecent advertisements.”

There were no reports that Israeli security monitored private communications or movement of individuals without legal process. Under occupation orders only IDF officers of lieutenant colonel rank and above could authorize entry into Palestinian private homes and institutions in the West Bank without a warrant, based upon military necessity. There were no reported cases of IDF soldiers punished for acting contrary to this requirement. The PCATI reported that Israeli authorities threatened an East Jerusalem man arrested on November 2 at his home in Wadi Joz in East Jerusalem on unknown charges; they reportedly told him they would detain his wife if he did not confess. On November 15, Israeli officials summoned, arrested, and detained her until November 27, when she was released without indictment.

In the West Bank and East Jerusalem, the Israeli Civil Administration, part of Israel’s Ministry of Defense, continued to demolish homes, cisterns, and other buildings and property constructed by Palestinians in areas under Israeli civil control on the basis that these buildings lacked Israeli planning licenses. Compensation was generally not offered in these cases. Properties approximately 328 yards from the separation barrier or IDF military installations also remained subject to demolition or confiscation. NGOs expressed great concern over demolitions in Area C of the West Bank. For example, B’Tselem and UNOCHA reported that the Israeli Civil Administration informed approximately 250 Bedouin families in the Khan al-Ahmar area east of Jerusalem that they would be relocated. The rate of demolitions increased: UNOCHA reported that 222 residential structures and 400 other structures were demolished during the year, representing a 96 percent increase in residential demolition between 2009 and 2011 and a 153 percent increase in other (nonresidential) demolitions. Between 2010 and 2011 alone, there was a 62 percent increase in residential demolitions and a 36 percent increase in other demolitions. UNOCHA counted that demolitions displaced more than 1,000 individuals in East Jerusalem and “Area C” of the West Bank during the year.

Affected Palestinians and human rights NGOs reported that the IDF was largely unresponsive to Israeli settlers’ actions against Palestinians in the West Bank, including demolition of property (see section 6, National/Racial/Ethnic Minorities).

c. Freedom of Religion

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The PA Basic Law provides for freedom of movement, and the PA generally did not restrict freedom of movement. The Basic Law does not specify regulations regarding foreign travel, emigration, or repatriation.

Hamas authorities in the Gaza Strip restricted some foreign travel. Hamas decisions in June and August increased restrictions on the entry, exit, and stay of foreigners, including aid workers. Hamas also prevented the exit of some Palestinians from Gaza as a means to protest the purpose of their travel or coerce a behavior change, such as the payment of taxes and fines.

The IDF restricted Palestinians’ movement within the occupied territories and for foreign travel, and, citing military necessity, it increased these restrictions at times. Barriers to movement included checkpoints, a separation barrier between the West Bank and Israel, internal road closures, and restrictions on the entry of persons and goods into and out of the Gaza Strip. Restrictions on movement affected virtually all aspects of life, including access to places of worship, employment, agricultural lands, schools, and hospitals, as well as the conduct of journalistic, humanitarian, and NGO activities.

The PA, Hamas, and Israeli governments generally cooperated with the UNHCR and other humanitarian organizations in providing protection and assistance to internally displaced persons and refugees; however, both Hamas and Israeli officials constrained the UNRWA’s ability to operate freely in Gaza.

In-Country Movement: Hamas authorities did not appear to enforce routine restrictions on internal movement within the Gaza Strip, although there were some “no go” areas to which Hamas prohibited access.

According to UNOCHA, as of August, the Israeli government maintained more than 519 obstacles to movement inside the West Bank. For example, three roadblocks south of Hebron impeded movement for tens of thousands of residents of Palestinian villages, cutting direct access for businesses to the city’s commercial center. While there was some lifting of permanent checkpoints in recent years, Israeli authorities frequently prohibited travel between some or all West Bank towns and deployed “flying” (temporary) checkpoints. Palestinians who lived in affected villages stated that such “internal closures” continued to have negative economic effects. During periods of potential unrest and major Israeli, Jewish, and Muslim holidays, Israeli authorities enacted “comprehensive external closures,” which precluded Palestinians from leaving the West Bank. The IDF also imposed temporary curfews confining Palestinians to their homes during arrest operations.

The Israeli government resumed construction of a separation barrier, which ran along parts of the Green Line (the 1949 Armistice line) and inside the West Bank. If completed, the barrier would separate approximately 9.5 percent of the West Bank (135,000 acres inhabited by up to 50,000 Palestinians), including parts of Jerusalem, from the rest of the West Bank territory. By use of special permits, Israel continued to restrict movement and development within this area, including access by some international organizations. NGOs reported that many Palestinians who were separated from their land were only allowed access to their property a few days a year. There were reports that permits were not issued in the Bethlehem area, which resulted in Palestinian farmers’ being completely unable to access their lands for harvest season. Private security companies employed by the Israeli government controlled points of access through the barrier, and international organizations and local human rights groups claimed these companies did not respond to requests to move goods and officials through the barrier. The barrier affected the commute of children to school in Jerusalem and some farmers’ access to land and water resources. Operating hours of the accessible gates were limited and erratic, although usually announced. In April the Israeli High Court ruled against a 2003 petition by the NGO HaMoked that contested the legality of the permit system. A 2004 advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice advisory body deemed the barrier contrary to international law.

Israel continued to enforce restrictions on access to farmland in the Gaza Strip near the boundary with Israel and to fishing areas along the coast, with the stated intention of preventing attacks by Palestinian armed factions. Israel continued to enforce the “buffer zone” beyond the declared 300 yards from the separation fence, including directing live fire at Gazans at distances of more than 1,000 yards, according to UNOCHA (see also section 1.a.). The “buffer zone” encompassed approximately 24 square miles, representing 17 percent of the Gaza Strip’s total land mass. UNOCHA estimated that nearly 35 percent of the Gaza Strip’s cultivable land was located within the restricted area.

Eighty-five percent of Gaza’s fishing waters were completely or partially inaccessible to Palestinians due to Israeli restrictions. Israeli naval patrol boats strictly enforced a fishing limit at three nautical miles from the shore of the Gaza Strip, reduced from twenty nautical miles as designated under the 1994 Agreement on the Gaza Strip and Jericho Area (later incorporated into the 1995 “Interim Agreement”). In the northern Gaza Strip, Israel restricted Palestinians from accessing a 1.5-nautical-mile-wide strip along the maritime boundary with Israel, as well as a one-nautical-mile-wide strip in the South, which was poorly enforced, along the maritime boundary with Egypt, as established in the 1994 agreement. Israeli naval forces regularly fired warning shots at Palestinian fishermen entering the restricted sea areas, in some cases directly targeting the fishermen, according to UNOCHA. The Israeli military often confiscated fishing boats intercepted in these areas and detained the fishermen.

There were reports that Israeli authorities attempted to reduce the Palestinian population and limit its movement in areas under Israeli control. Military authorities severely restricted Palestinian vehicular and foot traffic in the commercial center of Hebron, citing a need to protect several hundred Israeli settler residents. Palestinians were prohibited from driving on most roads in downtown Hebron and from walking on Shuhada Street and other roads in the Old City; however, Israeli settlers were permitted free access to these roads. The prohibition, which began in 2000, had resulted in the closure of 1,829 businesses and 1,014 Palestinian housing units, according to B’Tselem; the IDF closed most shops on the street and sealed entrances to Palestinian houses. Demolition orders in and around Hebron also threatened single buildings, family homes, and other civilian structures; in some cases, entire villages such as Dkaika, southeast of Hebron, were subject to ongoing demolition orders.

Foreign Travel: Hamas authorities in the Gaza Strip enforced movement restrictions on Palestinians attempting to exit Gaza to Israel via the Erez Crossing and to Egypt via the Rafah Crossing, although they occasionally prevented Fatah members and youth activists from exiting through either crossing.

In June 2010 Israel partially eased the severe restrictions on movement and access for the Gaza Strip, imposed following Hamas’ rise to power in 2007, and imported goods increased during the year. Categories of individuals permitted to enter or exit the Gaza Strip at the Erez crossing point with Israel were largely limited to humanitarian cases; however, the Israeli government also permitted an increased number of businesspersons and some students to cross during the year. The approval rate for exit requests based on medical need during the year was 89.3 percent from January through November, a significant improvement from 2009 and 2010, when approval rates were 68.3 percent and 78.1 percent, respectively. The total numbers of medical patients crossing at Erez also increased, averaging 938 per month during the year, in comparison with 428 and 757 per month in 2009 and 2010, respectively. Israel allowed for increased movement through Erez for business purposes by increasing the validity (often three months) and number of permits issued for business travelers from the Gaza Strip, with approximately 500 permits valid by year’s end. Beginning in May the government of Egypt eased its restrictions on travelers allowed to cross through the Rafah crossing, allowing approximately 500-600 to travel each way.

Restricted access to East Jerusalem had a negative impact on patients and medical staff trying to reach the six Palestinian hospitals there that offered specialized care unavailable in the West Bank. IDF soldiers at checkpoints subjected Palestine Red Crescent Society (PRCS) ambulances from the West Bank to violence and delays, or refused entry into Jerusalem even in emergency cases. When ambulances lacked access, patients were moved across checkpoints from an ambulance on one side to a second ambulance (usually one of five East Jerusalem-based ambulances) or private vehicle on the other side. The PRCS reported hundreds of violations against its teams and humanitarian services during the year. Most incidents included blocking access to those in need, preventing their transport to specialized medical centers, or maintaining delays on checkpoints for periods sometimes lasting up to two hours. Most incidents took place at the Qalandiyah and Az-’Za’ayyem checkpoints leading to East Jerusalem, while the remainder took place at other checkpoints circling the West Bank. The PCRS reported that on June 30, Israeli forces at the Wadi al-Ghroos checkpoint in Hebron’s Old City stopped an ambulance en route to assist an unconscious Palestinian. After an hour, the PCRS team left their vehicle and began heading to the patient’s house on foot. The patient later went to the hospital in a private vehicle.

The IDF restricted Gazan students from studying in the West Bank or Israel and limited West Bank Palestinians from university study in East Jerusalem and Israel (see section 2.a.). Palestinians possessing Jerusalem identity cards issued by the Israeli government needed special documents to travel abroad. Upon the individual request of Palestinians, the Jordanian government issued them passports.

Residency restrictions affected family reunification, which did not qualify as a reason to enter the West Bank. For a child in the Gaza Strip, for example, access to a parent in the West Bank was permitted only if no other relative was resident in the Gaza Strip. Israeli authorities did not permit Palestinians who were abroad during the 1967 War, or whose residence permits the Israeli government subsequently withdrew, to reside permanently in the occupied territories. It was difficult for foreign-born spouses and children of Palestinians to obtain residency. Palestinian spouses of Jerusalem residents were required to obtain a residency permit and reported delays of several years in obtaining them.

Exile: Continued Israeli revocations of Jerusalem identity cards amounted to forced exile to the occupied territories or abroad. According to HaMoked, the Israeli Ministry of Interior renewed “temporary” orders authorizing the revocation of Jerusalem residency rights from legal residents. The Ministry of Interior revoked 191 permits in 2010. Reasons for revocation included having acquired residency or citizenship in a third country, living “abroad” (including in the West Bank or the Gaza Strip) for more than seven years, or, most commonly, being unable to prove a “center of life,” interpreted as full-time residency, in Jerusalem. Some Palestinians born in Jerusalem but who studied abroad reported losing their Jerusalem residency status.

On December 7, an Israeli court ordered Hamas-affiliated PLC member Ahmad Atoun expelled from Jerusalem to the West Bank. Atoun was one of three Hamas-affiliated politicians who took refuge in the ICRC mission in Jerusalem in July 2010 after the Israeli Ministry of Interior revoked their Jerusalem residency permits. Atoun stayed at the ICRC building until September 2011, when Israeli police arrested him at the compound’s gate.

Recent Elections: In 2006 the 132-member PLC was elected in a process under the Basic Law that international observers concluded generally met democratic standards in providing citizens the right to change their government peacefully. Hamas-backed candidates participated in the 2006 PLC elections as the “Reform and Change Movement” and won 74 of 132 seats. Fatah won 45 seats, and independents and candidates from third parties won the remaining seats. The PLC lacked a quorum and did not meet during the year. Although the Israeli government and the PA followed mutually agreed guidelines for Palestinians residing in Jerusalem to vote in 2005 and 2006, not all Palestinians were allowed to vote in East Jerusalem, and those who could vote were required to do so via post offices (of which there were few), thereby complicating their ability to vote. At the end of the year, municipal elections were put on hold indefinitely, and no date has been set for national elections.

Political Parties: Civil society organizations in the Gaza Strip claimed Hamas authorities and other conservative Islamist groups did not tolerate public dissent, opponents, civil activism, or the promotion of values that ran contrary to their political and religious ideology.

Participation of Women and Minorities: There were 17 women in the 132-member PLC and three women in the 16-member cabinet. There were seven Christians in the PLC and two in the cabinet.

Rape and Domestic Violence: Rape is illegal under PA law, but the legal definition does not address spousal rape; laws that apply in both the West Bank and the Gaza Strip relieve rapists who marry their victim of any criminal responsibility. Punishment for rape is five to 15 years in prison; however, societal norms limited the frequency of reporting. In addition there were reports that some accused rapists were released from custody after apologizing to victims. A 2011 survey by the Palestinian Authority’s Central Bureau of Statistics found that 37 percent of women (29.9 percent in the West Bank and 51.1 percent in Gaza) who were married reported exposure to violence.

PA law does not explicitly prohibit domestic violence, but assault and battery are crimes. NGOs reported that women were frequently unwilling to report cases of violence or abuse to the police because of fear of retribution, and HRW stated that few domestic violence cases were successfully prosecuted in recent years. Many women and girls stated they believed the legal system discriminated against women. According to the Palestinian Central Bureau of Statistics, violence against wives, especially psychological violence, was common in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip. Specifically, a 2009 survey by the Palestinian Women’s Information and Media Center found that 52 percent of Gazan women faced regular physical violence. According to a 2009 survey conducted by the UN Gender Task Force, 37 percent of women in the Gaza Strip cited domestic violence as the primary safety problem facing women and girls in their communities. The results also showed increases in domestic violence against women among households displaced by conflict.

Harmful Traditional Practices: The media reported on only one “honor” killing in the Palestinian territories during the year, but the Women’s Center for Legal Aid and Counseling reported three honor killings in the West Bank and one in Gaza. For a portion of the year, the Jordanian penal code, as applied in the West Bank by the PA, mitigated penalties for “honor” crimes. In the honor killing case of 20-year-old Aya Baradiya from the West Bank town of Surif, whose body was found in a well in May but who was reportedly killed in 2010, authorities arrested and charged four men in June, including her uncle Okab Baradiya, for her death. In response to Baradiya’s killing, on May 14, President Abbas issued a presidential decree changing the law so that “honor” no longer would be considered a mitigating circumstance.

Sexual Harassment: No law specifically relates to sexual harassment. The Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and other NGOs reported that for some women, cultural taboos and fear of stigma compelled them to remain silent about sexual harassment. Some young women claimed that they were held responsible for “provoking” men’s harassing behavior.

Reproductive Rights: Couples and individuals in the Gaza Strip, the West Bank, and East Jerusalem had access to contraception. Information regarding family planning was lacking, although the UNRWA continued holding workshops for Palestinian men underscoring their role in family planning. There were at least 147 family planning centers in the West Bank and at least 20 in the Gaza Strip, according to the PA Ministry of Health. High workload, poor compensation, and resource shortages across the occupied territories continued to affect skilled attendance during labor and postpartum care, much of which midwives provided. There were more deaths among mothers and newborns in the Gaza Strip; the PA Ministry of Health attributed continued increases in the number of home births to difficulties in reaching hospitals (see section 2.d.). While governmental authorities and community and international NGOs operated HIV/AIDS education, prevention, and screening programs, limited information was available about the equality of services provided for women.

Discrimination: The law provides for equality of the sexes, but personal status law and traditional practices discriminate against women. For Muslims in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, personal status law is derived from sharia, which includes inheritance and marriage laws. Women can inherit, but not as much as men. Men may take more than one wife, although they rarely did in urban areas (the practice was more common in small villages). Women may add conditions to marriage contracts to protect their interests in divorce and child custody but rarely did so. Societal pressure generally discouraged women from including divorce arrangements in a marriage contract. Cultural restrictions associated with marriage occasionally prevented women from completing mandatory schooling or attending college. Families sometimes disowned Muslim and Christian women who married outside their faith. Local officials sometimes advised such women to leave their communities to prevent harassment.

Hamas maintained control of the Gaza Strip and enforced a conservative interpretation of Islam on the Gaza Strip’s Muslim population that particularly discriminated against women. Authorities generally prohibited public mixing of the sexes. Plainclothes officers routinely stopped, separated, and questioned couples to determine if they were married; premarital sex is a crime punishable by imprisonment. Hamas’s “morality police” also punished women for riding motorcycles, smoking cigarettes or water pipes, leaving their hair uncovered, and dressing “inappropriately” (i.e., Western-style or close-fitting clothing, such as jeans or T-shirts). Women living in refugee camps in the Gaza Strip said they felt unsafe using a bathing or latrine facility and cited a lack of reliable sanitary materials.

Palestinian labor law states that work is the right of every capable citizen; however, it regulates the work of women, preventing them from taking employment in dangerous occupations. Women endured prejudice and, in some cases, repressive conditions at work. Additionally some employers reportedly provided preferential treatment to their male counterparts. According to Freedom House, women earned 65 percent of men’s wages in the West Bank and 77 percent in the Gaza Strip.

Female education rates were high, particularly in the West Bank, and women’s attendance at universities exceeded men’s, but female university students reported discrimination by university administrators, professors, and their male peers, according to the Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces. According to press and NGO reports, in some instances teachers sent home girls not wearing conservative attire in Hamas-run schools, although enforcement was not systematic.

The PA Ministry of Women’s Affairs existed to promote women’s rights. During the year, the ministry worked closely with the UN to develop a nine-year plan released in January to combat violence against women.

Birth Registration: The PA registers Palestinians born in the West Bank and the Gaza Strip, and Israel requires that the PA transmit this information to the Israeli Civil Administration. As the PA does not constitute a state, it does not determine “citizenship” alone. Children of Palestinian parents can receive a Palestinian identity card (issued by the Civil Administration) if they are born in the occupied territories to a parent who holds a Palestinian identity card. The PA Ministry of Interior and the Israeli Civil Administration both play a role in determining a person’s eligibility.

Israel registers the births of Palestinians in Jerusalem, although Arab residents of Jerusalem reported delays in the process.

Education: Education in PA-controlled areas is compulsory from age six through the ninth grade. Education is available to all Palestinians without cost through high school.

In the Gaza Strip, primary education was not universal. The UNRWA and Hamas provided educational instruction.

From January through November, UNICEF reported 34 attacks on schools in the West Bank (30) and Gaza (four), amounting to a denial of access to education. Twenty-two instances were perpetrated by Israeli authorities, eleven by Israeli settlers, and four by Palestinian armed groups.

In Israeli-administered East Jerusalem, Palestinian children did not have access to the same educational resources as Israeli children (see section 6, Minorities).

Child Abuse: Child abuse was reportedly a widespread problem. The law prohibits violence against children; however, PA authorities rarely punished perpetrators of familial violence. In a 2009 study by the UN Gender Task Force in the southern Gaza Strip, survey participants reported a high level of perceived domestic violence against children.

Israeli security forces also participated in violence against children in custody, during arrest (see section 1.c.), or working inside or near the Gaza Strip buffer zone, according to NGO and UN reports.

Doctors Without Borders (MSF) reported that the number of children with post-traumatic stress disorder and other anxiety disorders including depression increased in recent years. MSF attributed a majority of the cases to trauma experienced during Israeli military incursions or as a result of settler violence.

Child Marriage: Palestinian law defines the minimum age for marriage as 18; however, religious law allows for marriage as young as 15. Underage marriage did not appear to be widespread.

Sexual Exploitation of Children: The PA considers statutory rape a felony based on the Jordanian penal code of 1960, which also outlaws all forms of pornography. The minimum age for consensual sex is 18. Punishment for rape of a victim under the age of 15 includes a minimum sentence of seven years.

Displaced Children: Conflict and demolition orders (see also section 2.d.) displaced children in the occupied territories. UNOCHA reported that 618 children were displaced due to home demolitions in the West Bank and East Jerusalem during the year.

Child Soldiers: There were reports that Hamas trained children as combatants.

The size of the Jewish community in the West Bank was approximately 300,000. The Jewish population in Gaza, aside from foreign nationals, was nonexistent. There were an estimated 200,000 Jewish residents of East Jerusalem.

Rhetoric by several Palestinian groups included expressions of anti-Semitism, as did sermons by some Muslim religious leaders. In the Gaza Strip and the West Bank there were a few documented instances in which media outlets, particularly outlets controlled by Hamas, published and broadcast material that included anti-Semitic content, sometimes amounting to incitement. For example, in December Hamas’s al-Aqsa TV aired a sermon by a preacher who called for the killing of Jews. Unofficial Palestinian television broadcast content that sometimes advocated for holy war to expel the Jewish presence in the region. Some children’s programs shown on Hamas television legitimized the killing of Israelis and Jews via terrorist attacks. In February Zayzafouna, a Palestinian youth magazine, featured a story in which Hitler appeared as a teenage girl’s role model, making remarks about the killing of Jews on the grounds that they spread destruction.

See the Department of State’s Trafficking in Persons Report at www.state.gov/j/tip

There is no reference in PA law to disability. Access to buildings, information, or communications was not mandated. Palestinians with disabilities continued to receive uneven and poor-quality services and care. The PA depended on UN agencies and NGOs to care for persons with physical disabilities and offered substandard care for persons with mental disabilities. There were reports that Israeli authorities placed detainees deemed mentally ill or a threat to themselves or others in isolation without full medical evaluation. According to Physicians for Human Rights-Israel, isolation of prisoners with mental disabilities was common.

Familial and societal discrimination against persons with disabilities existed. Press reports indicated that some parents in the West Bank performed hysterectomies on mentally ill girls to prevent them from becoming pregnant; most of these parents stated they intended to protect their daughters from rape.

In August international media reported that an impoverished Palestinian family, unable to provide necessary care for two mentally ill daughters, Mohedeye Dawabsha, 25, and Nedaa Dawabsha, 21, had chained both in a room in the family house in Duma, citing concern about their vulnerability to sexual violence should either wander away.

Although not a numerical minority, Palestinians faced targeted violence and discrimination from Israeli actors in the occupied territories (see also sections 1.a., 1.c., 1.f., and 2.d.).

The Jerusalem Legal Aid Society and Human Rights Center and other NGOs reported an increase in attacks by Israeli settlers on Palestinians and their property in the West Bank. The attacks included direct violence against Palestinian residents. Unnamed settlers killed at least two Palestinians during the year, including 17-year-old Fakhri Yousef Akhlaiel, a resident of Khirbat Safa, on January 18. Akhlaiel was reportedly harvesting grapes on his family’s land at the time of the shooting. News reported that police investigated the incident, but there were no reports of arrests or indictments.

Some Israeli settlers reportedly used violence against Palestinians as a means of harassment and to keep them away from land that settlers sought to expropriate. In the Palestinian village of al-Baqa’a, NGOs reported that settler violence drove out significant portions of the Palestinian population, with no intervention from the IDF or the Israeli national police. On December 5, Israeli settlers from the Yitzhar settlement kidnapped and subsequently released Salim Jamil Shehadeh, a 60-year-old shepherd, from Orif village. The settlers also stole 50 of Shehadeh’s sheep. There was no information about an investigation at year’s end.

Other violence was in retaliation for killings of Israelis. On March 12 and 13, for example, following the killing of five Israeli settlers in Itamar (see section 1.a), settlers conducted widespread retaliatory attacks against Palestinians in the West Bank governorates of Nablus, Salfit, Qalqilya, Hebron, and Ramallah. Settlers threw stones at Palestinian vehicles at 16 separate locations in the West Bank, and there were multiple reports of settlers kidnapping and beating Palestinians before releasing them. Settlers also attacked PA emergency medical responders.

Various human rights groups continued to claim that settler violence was insufficiently investigated and rarely prosecuted. Some groups in part attributed this to the Israeli Ministry of Defense’s Civil Administration’s neglect of Palestinian complaints and also to Palestinian residents who were often reluctant to report incidents, fearing settler retaliation. The Israeli NGO Yesh Din reported in 2010 that more than 90 percent of investigations into offenses against Palestinians carried out by Israeli in the West Bank were unsuccessful.

Settlers also exploited religious tensions to harass Palestinian villages by vandalizing, breaking into, or burning 10 mosques. UNOCHA reported a 150 percent increase in attacks on mosques during the year.

Access to social and commercial services, including housing, education, and health care, in Israeli settlements in the West Bank was available only to Israelis. Israeli officials discriminated against Palestinians in the West Bank and Jerusalem regarding access to employment and legal housing by denying Palestinians access to registration paperwork. In both the West Bank and Jerusalem, Israeli authorities placed often insurmountable hurdles on Palestinian applicants for construction permits, including the requirement that they document land ownership in the absence of a uniform post-1967 land registration process, high application fees, and requirements that new housing be connected to often unavailable municipal works. According to B'Tselem, since 2000 Israel has curtailed the Palestinian population registry, denying paperwork to Palestinians and effectively declaring Palestinians illegal residents. Some Palestinians defined as illegal residents faced harassment, arrest, or deportation to the Gaza Strip.

The World Bank reported that Palestinians suffered water shortages, noting that approximately half of the domestic water supply for Palestinians was purchased from Israel. The Palestinian Water Authority claimed that Israel controls 90 percent of the shared water resources of the Mountain Aquifer, which underlies the West Bank and Israel. According to Amnesty International (AI), Palestinians received on average of 18.5 gallons of water per person per day, falling short of the World Health Organization’s standard of 26.5 gallons per person per day, the minimum daily amount required to maintain basic hygiene standards and food security. The PA’s ability to improve water network management and efficiency was limited by political constraints, including the requirement for Israeli approval to implement water-related projects and the PA’s lack of authority in Area C to prevent theft from the network, as well as by the PA’s own management challenges. Between January and July, according to the UN, the Israeli military destroyed 20 water cisterns, some of which were funded by donor countries for humanitarian purposes. The Israeli military also destroyed unlicensed Palestinian agricultural wells, claiming they depleted aquifer resources. During the year the two sides partially resolved a long-standing dispute on the rehabilitation of licensed Palestinian wells, with Israel allowing Palestinian farmers to rehabilitate 57 licensed wells in the Eastern Basin of the Mountain Aquifer, increasing water supply in the largely agricultural Jordan Valley of the West Bank.

In the West Bank, some NGOs reported an increase in settler expropriation of natural water springs located on privately owned Palestinian land. Yesh Din documented settler expropriation of 26 springs and their conversion into recreational “nature parks.” Palestinian residents reported that water supplies were intermittent, and settlers and their security guards denied Palestinians, including shepherds and farmers, access to the springs. AI estimated that the settler population in the West Bank used as much water as the entire Palestinian population.

NGOs claimed that Jerusalem municipal and Israeli national policies aimed at decreasing the number of Palestinian residents of East Jerusalem. Government-sponsored construction of new Israeli housing units continued, while building permits were difficult to obtain for Arab residents of East Jerusalem, and homes built by Arab residents without legal permit were subject to demolition. The Israeli NGOs Bimkom and Ir Amim claimed that Palestinians in East Jerusalem continued to face barriers to purchasing property or obtaining building permits. Land owned or populated by Arabs (including Palestinians and Israeli Arabs) was generally zoned for low residential growth. Approximately 30 percent of East Jerusalem was designated for Israeli residents. Palestinians were able in some cases to rent Israeli-owned property, but were generally unable to purchase property in an Israeli neighborhood. Israeli NGOs claimed that of all land designated for housing in West Jerusalem and in the Israeli neighborhoods of East Jerusalem, at least 79 percent was unavailable for Arab construction.

The Jerusalem Municipality and Jewish organizations in Jerusalem made efforts to increase Israeli property ownership or underscore Jewish history in predominately Arab neighborhoods of East Jerusalem. The Jerusalem Municipality advocated increased Israeli influence and property ownership in East Jerusalem’s Kidron Valley.

Although Israeli law entitles Arab residents of East Jerusalem to full and equal services provided by the municipality and other Israeli authorities, in practice the Jerusalem Municipality failed to provide sufficient social services, infrastructure, emergency planning, and postal service for Arab neighborhoods in East Jerusalem. Palestinian residents constituted 35 percent of Jerusalem’s population but received only 10-15 percent of municipal spending. The ACRI reported that this resulted in Palestinian residents’ lack of access to running water, crowded classrooms in substandard buildings, and poor sewage infrastructure, among other problems. Many Jerusalem municipal forms were not available in Arabic. Bus services in Jerusalem were largely segregated in practice.

Palestinian law, based on the 1960 Jordanian penal code, prohibits homosexual activity, although in practice the PA did not prosecute individuals suspected of such activity. Societal discrimination based on cultural and religious traditions was commonplace. Some Palestinians claimed that PA security officers and neighbors harassed, abused, and sometimes arrested lesbian, gay, bisexual, and transgender persons because of their sexual orientation. NGOs reported that Hamas also harassed and detained people due to sexual orientation.

While the PA Ministry of Health provided treatment and privacy protections for patients with HIV/AIDS, societal discrimination against affected individuals was common.

PA law permits workers to form and join independent unions and conduct legal strikes. The law requires collective bargaining to be conducted “without any pressure or influence” but does not explicitly state a right to collective bargaining. The PA labor code does not apply to civil or domestic servants, although the law allows civil servants to form their own unions.

The requirements for legal strikes are cumbersome, and strikers had little protection from retribution. Prospective strikers must provide written warning two weeks in advance of the strike (four weeks in the case of public utilities). The PA Ministry of Labor can impose arbitration; workers or their trade unions face disciplinary action if they reject the result. If the ministry cannot resolve a dispute, it can be referred to a committee chaired by a delegate from the ministry and composed of an equal number of members designated by the workers and employer, and finally to a specialized labor court.

Antiunion discrimination and employer interference in union functions are illegal; however, although the law gives workers the right to unionize, it does not specifically prohibit termination due to union activity.

In practice the PA generally respected freedom of association and the right to collective bargaining, with some exceptions. Labor unions reported that the PA’s 2000 labor law had not been fully implemented at year’s end and asserted that the current system benefitted employers. For example, the labor court provided for in the law had not been established. During the year the waiting time for court hearings was five to six years. The PA enforced the prohibitions on antiunion discrimination and employer interference in union functions; however, it inconsistently enforced laws regarding freedom of association, and there were reports that PA enforcement of collective bargaining rights for unions serving other than PA employees was limited. The right to strike remained weak in practice.

Two main labor unions in the West Bank competed for membership and political recognition. A leader of one of the unions is also the PA deputy labor minister. Otherwise, the unions were independent from the government, and there were no reports of politically motivated sackings of union leaders.

In 2007 Hamas replaced Fatah-affiliated union leaders with Hamas members or sympathizers in the Gaza Strip, and during the year it maintained restrictions on union membership.

Israeli law applies to Israeli settlements in the West Bank and Jerusalem but was not uniformly enforced. Most settlements apply to Palestinian workers Jordanian labor law as it existed prior to 1967, which provides for lower wages and fewer protections than Israeli law. Workers in Jerusalem often joined West Bank unions or the Israeli General Federation of Labor (Histadrut); however, they cannot vote in Histadrut elections.

PA law does not expressly forbid forced or compulsory labor. Children and women were vulnerable to forced labor conditions.

According to PA law, the minimum age for employment in the occupied territories is 15 years. The law classifies children as those under 18 years of age, and it restricts employment for those between 15 and 18. However, the law allows children younger than 15 to work for immediate family members under close supervision. Hiring of children ages 15-18 for certain types of employment is permitted under set conditions. The law prohibits children from working more than 40 hours per week, operating certain types of machines and equipment, performing work that might be unsafe or damage their health or education, and working at night, in hard labor, or in remote locations far from urban centers.

Due to inadequate resources and logistical difficulties, PA authorities did not effectively enforce the law. The PA estimated that 2.3 percent of children between the ages of 10 and 14 and 6.1 percent of children between the ages of 15 and 17 worked in the West Bank and Gaza during the year. According to the PA, more than 90 percent of child laborers lived in the West Bank; the smaller proportion for Gaza was due to the unavailability of jobs and high unemployment among adults in Gaza, according to the PA. Palestinian child laborers generally worked on family farms, in shops, as street vendors, in car washes, in factories, or in small manufacturing enterprises. They were vulnerable to forced labor. Conditions were especially poor for Palestinian children working as street vendors, many of whom worked all day without food or water and were subject to abuse, according to the PA Ministry of Labor. According to the ministry, children also continued to work smuggling goods--from food products to chemicals--through the tunnels between Egypt and the Gaza Strip. Children reportedly worked in the tunnels for 10-hour shifts, with one hour’s rest. From 2007 to 2010, at least 32 children died while working in the tunnels; common causes of death included tunnel collapse, electric shock, and Israeli shelling

During the year the PA Ministry of Labor employed six officers tasked with monitoring child labor conditions, a number it recognized as insufficient. Many reported cases of child labor violations took place in home environments, for example, on family farms, which were not open to labor ministry inspection. Child protection officers with the PA Ministry of Social Affairs were overburdened and also lacked the resources to follow up on such cases. The PA Ministry of Labor reported that only employers who hire children under 15 to work in dangerous conditions or hazardous jobs are referred to the attorney general for prosecution; between 2007 and 2011, the ministry referred 10 such cases. PA officials reported fining “numerous” people after it conducted successful investigations conducted by the PA Ministry of Labor in recent years. The ministry was unable to conduct investigations in the Gaza Strip, nor did it have access to Israeli-controlled Area C of the West Bank (nearly 60 percent of the West Bank) where child economic exploitation and labor were most likely to occur, according to PA officials.

The Israeli government stated that it did not issue permits for Palestinian West Bank residents younger than 18 years old to work in Israeli settlements, except in the Jordan Valley, where the law allows work permits for persons from the age of 16 and older; however, according to the PA, children entered the settlements or crossed into Israel to seek work. The PA reported that Palestinian children working in Israeli settlements in the West Bank without legal protection or labor inspectors faced security problems, exploitation, and harassment.

Also see the Department of Labor’s Findings on the Worst Forms of Child Labor at www.dol.gov/ilab/programs/ocft/tda.htm.

There was no minimum wage in Palestinian-controlled areas.

Palestinians working in Israeli settlements reported that they continued to receive wages lower than the Israeli minimum wage, despite a 2008 high court ruling that Israeli labor laws apply to relations between Palestinian workers and Israeli employers in settlements in the occupied territories. In November, the Ma’ale Adumim municipality became the first Israeli settlement to apply Israeli labor law to Palestinian workers, in response to a successful lawsuit filed by the workers who demanded Israeli minimum wage and labor protections. A three-month-long strike that began in July caused an Israeli quarry in the West Bank in Mishor Adumim to close. The strike was in response to the employer’s refusal to recognize the workers’ collective agreement. In December a court in Jerusalem approved the creditors’ disposition of the company, along with compensation to the workers.

According to PA law, the maximum official Sunday to Thursday workweek was 48 hours. The law also allows for paid official and religious holidays, which may not be deducted from annual leave. Workers must be paid time and a half for each hour worked beyond 45 hours per week and may not perform more than 12 hours of overtime work per week.

The PA Ministry of Labor was responsible for setting occupational health and safety standards, but its enforcement ability was limited, in part due to lack of staff. The ministry employed 45 labor inspectors during the year, but ministry contacts reported that they would need at least 150 inspectors to adequately enforce the labor law. Unions also stated that the PA did not effectively monitor smaller worksites, which were at times below legal standards for safety.

The PA was unable to monitor labor conditions in the Gaza Strip and has no authority to monitor labor safety in the 60 percent of the West Bank that is designated Area C, under the terms of Oslo-era agreements with Israel. The ministry cannot enforce Palestinian labor law in seam zones, Israel (where Palestinians were employed on permits or illegally), or in Israeli settlements in the West Bank. At the same time Israeli authorities did not conduct labor inspections in Israeli settlements, where, according to the International Labor Organization, the number of Palestinian workers constituted a significant part of the workforce. The lack of a competent labor authority in the settlements increased workers’ vulnerability to exploitation. NGOs like Kav LaOved asserted exploitative practices in the Israeli settlements were widespread. Israeli NGOs brought some cases in Israeli labor courts on behalf of Palestinian workers employed by enterprises in the settlements.

Informal sector work, especially in illegal smuggling tunnels between the Gaza Strip and Egypt and rubble and garbage collection, was often dangerous. In 2010, according to the Gaza-bases al-Mezan Centre for Human Rights, 46 workers died in the tunnels.