Designation of Foreign Terrorist Organizations

Designations of Foreign Terrorist Organizations (FTOs) expose and isolate the designated terrorist organizations, deny them access to the U.S. financial system, and create significant criminal and immigration consequences for their members and supporters.  Moreover, designations can facilitate or complement the law enforcement actions of other U.S. agencies and governments.  Section 219 of the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) mandates that the Department of State review FTO designations every five years to determine whether an FTO still meets the relevant criteria.  The law requires that the Secretary of State revoke a designation if the Secretary finds the circumstances that were the basis of the designation have changed in such a manner as to warrant a revocation.  There were no revocations in 2023.

Designated Foreign Terrorist Organizations - The Middle East and North Africa

Abdallah Azzam Brigades

Aka Abdullah Azzam Brigades; Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Yusuf al-’Uyayri Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigades; Marwan Hadid Brigade.

Description:  Abdallah Azzam Brigades (AAB) was designated as an FTO on May 30, 2012.  AAB formally announced its establishment in a 2009 video statement claiming responsibility for a rocket attack against Israel earlier that year.  The Lebanon-based group’s full name is Ziyad al-Jarrah Battalions of the Abdallah Azzam Brigades, named after Lebanese citizen Ziad al-Jarrah, one of the planners of and participants in the September 11, 2001, attacks on the United States.

Activities:  After its initial formation, AAB relied primarily on rocket attacks against Israeli civilians.  It is responsible for numerous rockets fired into Israeli territory from Lebanon, often targeting population centers.  In 2017, AAB called for jihad by Muslims against the United States and Israel after the U.S. announcement recognizing Jerusalem as Israel’s capital.

Beginning in 2013, AAB began targeting Hizballah for the organization’s involvement in the Syrian conflict and support for Syrian regime forces.  In subsequent years, AAB claimed responsibility for several suicide bombings, including the 2013 bombing outside the Iranian embassy in Beirut, Lebanon, that killed 23 people; the 2014 twin suicide bomb attacks against the Iranian cultural center in Beirut that killed four persons; and the 2014 AAB-blamed suicide bombing in Beirut that killed a security officer.  From 2016 through 2018, AAB continued its involvement in the Syrian conflict and was active in Lebanon’s Ain al-Hilweh refugee camp.  AAB announced its dissolution in 2019 and did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2023.

Strength:  AAB’s precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation:  Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid:  Sources of AAB’s funding are unknown.

Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade

Aka al-Aqsa Martyrs Battalion.

Description:  Al-Aqsa Martyrs Brigade (AAMB) was designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002.  AAMB is composed of small cells of Fatah-affiliated activists who emerged at the outset of the al-Aqsa Intifada in 2000.  AAMB strives to expel the Israeli military and settlers from the West Bank and establish a Palestinian state loyal to Fatah.

Activities:  During the Second Palestinian Intifada in 2000, AAMB primarily carried out small-arms attacks against Israeli military personnel and settlers.  By 2002 the group was striking at Israeli civilians inside Israel and claimed responsibility for the first female suicide bombing in the country.  In 2015, AAMB declared open war against Israel and asked Iran to help fund its efforts in a televised broadcast.  Since 2010, AAMB has claimed responsibility for multiple rocket attacks on Israel from the West Bank, including at least 36 rockets launched in 2021.

In 2023, AAMB claimed responsibility for the shooting of an Israeli man near a settlement in the northern West Bank.  AAMB has also reportedly fought against Israeli forces in Gaza following the October 7 attacks.

Strength:  AAMB is estimated to have a few hundred members.

Location/Area of Operation:  Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank. AAMB may have members in Palestinian refugee camps in Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid:  AAMB receives funds and guidance from Iran, primarily through Hizballah facilitators.

Al-Ashtar Brigades

Aka Saraya al-Ashtar; AAB.

Description:  Al-Ashtar Brigades (AAB) was designated as an FTO on July 11, 2018.  AAB is an Iran-backed terrorist organization established in 2013 with the goal of violently overthrowing the ruling family in Bahrain.  In 2018, AAB adopted Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps branding and reaffirmed its loyalty to Tehran to reflect its role in an Iranian network of state and nonstate actors that operates against the United States and its allies in the region.

Activities:  Since 2013, AAB has claimed responsibility for more than 20 terrorist attacks against police and security targets in Bahrain, including a 2014 bomb attack that killed two Bahraini police officers and a police officer from the United Arab Emirates and the 2017 killing of another local Bahraini police officer.  AAB also has promoted violent activity against the British, Saudi Arabian, and U.S. governments over social media.  In 2019, AAB released a video statement promising more attacks in Bahrain to mark the anniversary of Bahrain’s Arab Uprising-inspired political uprising.  AAB did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2023.

Strength:  AAB’s precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation:  Bahrain, Iran, and Iraq.

Funding and External Aid:  AAB receives funding and support from Iran.

Al-Nusrah Front

Aka Jabhat al-Nusrah; Jabhet al-Nusrah; the Victory Front; al-Nusrah Front for the People of the Levant; al-Nusrah Front in Lebanon; Jabhat al-Nusra li-Ahl al-Sham min Mujahedi al-Sham fi Sahat al-Jihad; Support Front for the People of the Levant; Jabhat Fath al-Sham; Jabhat Fath al Sham; Jabhat Fatah al-Sham; Jabhat Fateh al-Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria; the Front for Liberation of al Sham; Front for the Conquest of Syria/the Levant; Front for the Liberation of the Levant; Conquest of the Levant Front; Fatah al-Sham Front; Fateh al-Sham Front; Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham; Hay’et Tahrir al-Sham; Hayat Tahrir al-Sham; HTS; Assembly for the Liberation of Syria; Assembly for Liberation of the Levant; Liberation of al-Sham Commission; Liberation of the Levant Organization; Tahrir al-Sham; Tahrir al-Sham Hay’at.

Description:  Al-Nusrah Front (ANF) was designated as an FTO on May 15, 2014.  It is led by Abu Muhammad al-Jawlani.  The group formed in 2011 when then-al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI) – now ISIS – then-leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi sent al-Jawlani to Syria to organize terrorist cells.  In 2013 the group split from AQI and became an independent entity.  ANF’s stated goal is to oust Syria’s Assad regime and replace it with a Sunni Islamic state.  The group is concentrated in and controls a portion of territory in northwest Syria, where it is active as an opposition force and exerts varying degrees of influence over local governance and external plotting.  In 2017, ANF joined with four smaller Syrian factions and created Hay’at Tahrir al-Sham (or HTS) as a vehicle to advance its position in the Syrian insurgency.

Activities:  ANF has been active in operations against other factions in the Syrian conflict.  In 2016 the group carried out attacks in Aleppo and other parts of Syria controlled by the Syrian Army, killing both military officials and civilians.  ANF took control of significant portions of Idlib from 2017 to 2019, exerting severe military pressure over other local groups. In 2022, ANF remained the largest and most-dominant militant faction in northwest Syria’s Idlib province.  ANF took full control of the strategic city of Afrin and at least 26 towns and villages to the Southwest.  After several days of fighting between ANF and Turkish-backed rebel groups, an intervention by Türkiye stopped ANF’s expansion and the group withdrew from the Afrin region.  The clashes killed least 58 people, including 10 civilians, and forced thousands to flee homes or refugee camps.

Throughout 2023 the group continued to attack Syrian regime positions across the frontline held by al-Nusra-aligned fighters.  In August the group killed 11 soldiers in an attack that involved detonating explosives in a tunnel under their position.  In September the group infiltrated regime-held positions in Latakia and killed nine soldiers.  In October, at least 89 soldiers were killed at a military academy in Homs by a drone that likely launched from territory held by al-Nusra and allied factions.

Strength:  ANF is assessed to have as many as 10,000 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation:  Syria, headquartered in Syria’s Idlib province; operationally active in northwest Syria.

Funding and External Aid:  ANF receives funding from a variety of sources, including kidnapping-for-ransom payments, taxes and fees on border crossings it controls, and donations from external Persian Gulf-based donors.  The group also generates revenue by collecting fees from commercial traffic entering and exiting Idlib.

Al-Qa’ida

Aka al-Qa’eda; al Qaida, al Qaeda, Islamic Army; Islamic Salvation Foundation; the Base; the Group for the Preservation of the Holy Sites; the Islamic Army for the Liberation of the Holy Places; the World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders; Usama Bin Laden Network; Usama Bin Laden Organization; al-Jihad; the Jihad Group; Egyptian al-Jihad; Egyptian Islamic Jihad; New Jihad; International Front for Fighting Jews and Crusades; Islamic Army for the Liberation of Holy Sites.

Description:  Al-Qa’ida was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1999.  Established in 1988, al-Qa’ida helped finance, recruit, transport, and train fighters for the Afghan resistance against the former Soviet Union.  Al-Qa’ida strives to eliminate western influence from the Muslim world, topple “apostate” governments of Muslim countries, and establish a pan-Islamic caliphate governed by its own interpretation of Sharia that would ultimately be at the center of a new international order.  These goals remain essentially unchanged since the group’s 1996 public declaration of war against the United States.  Al-Qa’ida leaders issued a statement in 1998 under the banner of “The World Islamic Front for Jihad Against Jews and Crusaders,” saying it was the duty of all Muslims to kill U.S. citizens – civilian and military – and their allies everywhere.  Al-Qa’ida merged with al-Jihad (Egyptian Islamic Jihad) in 2001.  Although numerous al-Qa’ida leaders have been killed in recent years, including Usama bin Laden in 2011 and Ayman al-Zawahiri in 2022, al-Qa’ida senior leader Saif al-Adel remains at large in Iran.

Activities:  In the 1990s, al-Qa’ida conducted three bombings targeting U.S. troops in Aden, Yemen; claimed responsibility for shooting down U.S. helicopters and killing U.S. soldiers in Somalia; and carried out the 1998 bombings of the U.S. Embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania, killing up to 300 people and injuring more than 5,000.  Two of the individuals wanted for the embassy bombings, Saif al-Adel and Abu Mohammed al-Masri, were released from Iranian custody in 2015 in exchange for an Iranian diplomat who had been kidnapped in Yemen.  In 2000, al-Qa’ida conducted a suicide attack on the USS Cole in the Port of Aden with an explosive-laden boat, killing 17 U.S. Navy sailors and injuring 39 others.

On September 11, 2001, 19 al-Qa’ida members hijacked and crashed four U.S. commercial jets – two into the World Trade Center in New York City, one into the Pentagon, and the last into a field in Shanksville, Pennsylvania.  Nearly 3,000 civilians, police, and first responders were killed.  The dead included U.S. and foreign citizens from at least 77 countries.

In a 2011 video, al-Zawahiri claimed al-Qa’ida was behind the kidnapping of U.S. aid worker Warren Weinstein in Pakistan.  Weinstein was held captive until his death in 2015.  In 2017, al-Zawahiri released a video calling for jihadists around the world to conduct attacks against the United States.  Al-Zawahiri also released multiple recordings and videos in 2018 in which he continued to call for jihad against the United States after the U.S. Embassy in Israel moved from Tel Aviv to Jerusalem.  In 2019, Zawahiri called for extremists in the Indian Union Territory of Jammu and Kashmir to attack Indian forces and appealed to Muslims to attack U.S., European, Israeli, and Russian military targets in a video recording.

Several individuals supporting or inspired by al-Qa’ida have been convicted or arrested.  In 2017 a U.S. citizen was convicted in New York of charges related to abetting al-Qa’ida’s 2009 attack on a U.S. military base in Afghanistan using two truck bombs.  In 2019 a man from Cleveland, Ohio, was arrested for allegedly making plans for an al-Qa’ida-inspired bomb attack on the city’s downtown Independence Day parade.

In 2022 the United States conducted a counterterrorism operation in Kabul, Afghanistan, that killed Ayman al-Zawahiri.  Al-Qa’ida did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2023.

Strength:  Al-Qa’ida is estimated to have several dozen members in Afghanistan or Iran.  The deaths or arrests of dozens of mid- and senior-level al-Qa’ida operatives, including Usama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawahiri, have disrupted communication, financial support, facilitation nodes, and several terrorist plots.  Al-Qa’ida leaders, including those located in Iran, oversee a network of affiliated groups.  In addition, supporters and associates worldwide who are motivated by the group’s ideology may operate without direction from al-Qa’ida central leadership.

Location/Area of Operation:  Afghanistan, Iran, North Africa, West Africa, Pakistan, Somalia, Syria, Yemen.

Funding and External Aid:  Al-Qa’ida depends primarily on donations from likeminded supporters, and from individuals who believe their money is supporting a humanitarian cause.  Some funds are diverted from Islamic charitable organizations.

Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula

Aka al-Qa’ida in the South Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida in Yemen; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; al-Qa’ida Organization in the Arabian Peninsula; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Jazirat al-Arab; AQAP; AQY; Ansar al-Shari’a; Ansar al-Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah; Ansar al Shariah; Partisans of Islamic Law; Sons of Abyan; Sons of Hadramawt; Sons of Hadramawt Committee; Civil Council of Hadramawt; and National Hadramawt Council.

Description:  Al-Qa’ida in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) was designated as an FTO on January 19, 2010.  In 2009 the now-deceased leader of al-Qa’ida in Yemen, Nasir al-Wahishi, publicly announced that Yemeni and Saudi al-Qa’ida operatives were working together under the banner of AQAP.  The announcement signaled the rebirth of an al-Qa’ida franchise that previously carried out attacks in Saudi Arabia.  AQAP’s stated goals include establishing a caliphate and implementing Sharia in the Arabian Peninsula and the wider Middle East.

Activities:  AQAP has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist acts against both local and foreign targets since its inception in 2009, including a 2009 attempted attack on Northwest Airlines Flight 253 from Amsterdam to Detroit, Michigan; a 2010 foiled plot to send explosive-laden packages to the United States on cargo planes; and the 2015 attack by brothers Cherif and Said Kouachi at the Paris headquarters of satirical newspaper Charlie Hebdo, killing 12 people.  One of the brothers, who had traveled to Yemen in 2011 and met with now-deceased Anwar al-Aulaqi, claimed responsibility for the attack on behalf of AQAP.

In 2017 a U.S. Navy SEAL was killed in a raid against AQAP leaders in Yemen.  That same year, AQAP attacked a Yemeni Army camp, killing at least two soldiers.  In 2019, Mohammed Saeed Alshamrani killed three persons and injured eight others in a shooting at Naval Air Station Pensacola in Florida.  AQAP released a video the following year, claiming “full responsibility” for the shooting.  In 2021, AQAP killed eight Yemeni soldiers and four civilians in an attack on a security forces checkpoint in Abyan governorate, Yemen.  In 2022, AQAP kidnapped five UN workers in Abyan governorate and held them hostage for 18 months.  Later that year, AQAP ambushed a security forces checkpoint in Abyan, killing at least 21 Yemeni soldiers – the group’s deadliest attack since 2019.

In 2023, AQAP claimed responsibility for an attack on a security forces checkpoint by AQAP gunmen in March that killed several soldiers; an April sniper attack that killed three pro-government soldiers; an IED attack targeting pro-government forces in Abyan governorate; and several drone attacks in the Shabwa governorate of southern Yemen.

Strength:  AQAP is estimated to have up to 3,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation:  Yemen.

Funding and External Aid:  AQAP’s funding has historically come from theft, robberies, oil and gas revenue, kidnap-for-ransom operations, and donations from likeminded supporters.

Ansar al-Islam

Aka Ansar al-Sunna; Ansar al-Sunna Army; Devotees of Islam; Followers of Islam in Kurdistan; Helpers of Islam; Jaish Ansar al-Sunna; Jund al-Islam; Kurdish Taliban; Kurdistan Supporters of Islam; Partisans of Islam; Soldiers of God; Soldiers of Islam; Supporters of Islam in Kurdistan.

Description:  Ansar al-Islam (AAI) was designated as an FTO on March 22, 2004.  AAI was established in 2001 in the Iraqi Kurdistan Region through the merger of two Kurdish terrorist factions that traced their roots to the Islamic Movement of Kurdistan.  AAI seeks to expel western interests from Iraq and establish an independent Iraqi state based on its interpretation of Sharia.

Activities:  From 2003 to 2011, AAI conducted attacks against a wide range of targets including Iraqi government and security forces, and U.S.-led Global Coalition to Defeat ISIS forces.  The group also carried out numerous kidnappings, murders, and assassinations of Iraqi citizens and politicians.  In 2012, AAI claimed responsibility for the bombing of the Sons of Martyrs School in Damascus, which was occupied by Syrian security forces and pro-government militias; seven persons were wounded in the attack.

In 2014, parts of AAI issued a statement pledging allegiance to ISIS, although later reports suggest that a faction of AAI opposed joining ISIS.  In 2019, AAI claimed its first attack in Iraq in five years, placing two IEDs in Iraq’s Diyala province.  AAI did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2023.

Strength:  AAI is estimated to have between 250 and 350 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation:  Iraq and Syria.

Funding and External Aid:  AAI receives assistance from a loose network of associates in Europe and the Middle East.

Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi

Aka Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar al-Shariah Brigade; Ansar al-Shari’a Brigade; Katibat Ansar al-Sharia in Benghazi; Ansar al-Shariah-Benghazi; al-Raya Establishment for Media Production; Ansar al-Sharia; Soldiers of the Sharia; Ansar al-Shariah; Supporters of Islamic Law

Description:  Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi (AAS-B) was designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014.  AAS-B was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya.  The group has been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets as well as the assassination and attempted assassination of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.

Activities:  Members of AAS-B were involved in the 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya.  Four U.S. citizens were killed in the attack:  Glen Doherty, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens.

Throughout 2016, AAS-B continued its fight against the “Libyan National Army” in Benghazi, resulting in the deaths of numerous Libyan security personnel and civilians.  Additionally, AAS-B controlled several terrorist training camps in Libya and trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Iraq, Mali, and Syria.  AAS-B announced its formal dissolution in 2017 owing to suffering heavy losses, including the group’s senior leadership and defections to ISIS in Libya.  AAS-B did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2023.

Strength:  AAS-B’s precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation:  Benghazi, Libya.

Funding and External Aid:  AAS-B obtained funds from AQIM and through charities, donations, and criminal activities.

Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah

Aka Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Derna; Ansar al-Sharia in Libya; Ansar al-Sharia; Ansar al-Sharia Brigade in Darnah.

Description:  Ansar al-Shari’a in Darnah (AAS-D) was designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014.  AAS-D was created after the 2011 fall of the Qadhafi regime in Libya.  The group has been involved in terrorist attacks against civilian targets as well as the assassination and attempted assassination of security officials and political actors in eastern Libya.

Activities:  Members of AAS-D were involved in the 2012 attacks against the U.S. Special Mission and Annex in Benghazi, Libya.  Four U.S. citizens were killed in the attack:  Glen Doherty, Sean Smith, Tyrone Woods, and U.S. Ambassador to Libya J. Christopher Stevens.

Throughout 2013 and 2014, AAS-D was believed to have cooperated with Ansar al-Shari’a in Benghazi in multiple attacks and suicide bombings targeting Libyan security forces in that city.  In 2016, AAS-D continued fighting in and around Darnah.  Additionally, AAS-D maintained several terrorist training camps in Darnah and Jebel Akhdar, Libya, and trained members of other terrorist organizations operating in Iraq and Syria.  In 2018, there were unconfirmed reports that AAS-D was involved in clashes with the Libyan National Army.  AAS-D did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2023.

Strength:  AAS-D’s precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation:  Darnah, Libya.

Funding and External Aid:  Sources of AAS-D’s funding are unknown.

Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia

Aka al-Qayrawan Media Foundation; Supporters of Islamic Law; Ansar al-Sharia in Tunisia; Ansar al-Shari’ah; Ansar al-Shari’ah in Tunisia; Ansar al-Sharia.

Description:  Ansar al-Shari’a in Tunisia (AAS-T) was designated as an FTO on January 13, 2014.  Founded in 2011 by Seif Allah Ben Hassine, AAS-T has been implicated in attacks against Tunisian security forces, assassinations of Tunisian political figures, and attempted suicide bombings of popular tourist locations.  AAS-T has also recruited Tunisians to fight in Syria.

Activities:  AAS-T was involved in the 2012 attack against Embassy Tunis and the American school in Tunis, which threatened the safety of more than 100 U.S. embassy personnel.  In 2013, AAS-T members were implicated in the assassination of Tunisian politicians Chokri Belaid and Mohamed Brahmi.  Since 2016, Tunisian authorities have continued to confront and arrest AAS-T members.  AAS-T did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2023.

Strength:  AAS-T’s precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation:  Libya and Tunisia.

Funding and External Aid:  Sources of AAS-T’s funding are unknown.

Army of Islam

Aka Jaysh al-Islam; Jaish al-Islam.

Description:  Army of Islam (AOI) was designated as an FTO on May 19, 2011.  Founded in 2005, AOI is a Gaza-based terrorist organization responsible for numerous terrorist acts against the Israeli and Egyptian governments and British, New Zealander, and U.S. citizens.  The group, led by Mumtaz Dughmush, subscribes to a violent Salafist ideology.

Note:  AOI is a separate and distinct group from the Syria-based Jaysh al-Islam, which is not a designated FTO.

Activities:  Since 2006, AOI has been responsible for kidnappings and terrorist attacks including kidnappings of civilians, including a U.S. journalist; 2009 attacks on Egyptian civilians in Cairo and Heliopolis, Egypt; the 2011 attack on a Coptic Christian church in Alexandria that killed 25 people and wounded 100 others; and rocket attacks on Israel in a joint operation with the Mujahidin Shura Council in the Environs of Jerusalem in 2012.

In 2015, AOI reportedly released a statement pledging allegiance to ISIS.  In a short post attributed to the group, AOI declared itself an inseparable part of ISIS-Sinai Province.  Since then, AOI has continued to express support for ISIS.  In 2017 the group released a video meant to encourage ISIS fighters defending Mosul, Iraq.  In 2019, AOI shared another video praising ISIS that included training information for individuals to conduct suicide attacks.  In 2020, AOI published more than two dozen images of fighters conducting military training.  AOI did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2023.

Strength:  Its precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation:  Egypt, Gaza, and Israel.

Funding and External Aid:  AOI receives much of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Gaza.

Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq

Aka:  AAH; Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq min al-Iraq; Asaib al Haq; Asa’ib Ahl al-Haqq; League of the Righteous; Khazali Network; Khazali Special Group; Qazali Network; the People of the Cave; Khazali Special Groups Network; al-Tayar al-Risali; the Missionary Current.

Description:  Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq (AAH) was designated as an FTO on January 10, 2020.  Led by Qays al-Khazali, AAH is an Iran-backed, militant organization that remains ideologically aligned with Iran and loyal to Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.  The group seeks to promote Iran’s political and religious influence in Iraq, maintain Shia control over Iraq, and expel any remaining western military forces from the country.

Activities:  Since its creation in 2006, AAH has claimed responsibility for more than 6,000 attacks against U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces.  The group has carried out highly sophisticated operations, including mortar attacks on an American base, the downing of a British helicopter, and an attack on the Karbala Provincial Headquarters that resulted in the capture and murder of five U.S. soldiers.

In 2019, two individuals assessed to be AAH members were arrested in connection to rockets fired at the Camp Taji military training complex, where U.S. personnel provide divisional training.  Also in 2019, AAH members opened fire on a group of protestors trying to set fire to the group’s office in Nasiriya, killing at least six.  AAH continued to be active in 2023, including through indirect fire attacks on U.S. facilities in Iraq, typically using front names or proxy groups.

Strength:  AAH is estimated to have between 10,000 and 15,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation:  Iraq, Syria.

Funding and External Aid:  AAH receives funding, logistical support, training, and weapons from Iran’s Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Qods Force and Hizballah.  AAH also receives funding through illicit activities such as kidnapping for ransom, smuggling, and “taxing”/extortion of economic activities in areas where the group is dominant.

Asbat al-Ansar

Aka AAA; Band of Helpers; Band of Partisans; League of Partisans; League of the Followers; God’s Partisans; Gathering of Supporters; Partisan’s League; Esbat al-Ansar; Isbat al-Ansar; Osbat al-Ansar; Usbat al-Ansar; Usbat ul-Ansar.

Description:  Designated as an FTO on March 27, 2002, Asbat al-Ansar (AAA) is a Lebanon-based Sunni terrorist group composed primarily of Palestinians that first emerged in the early 1990s.  Linked to al-Qa’ida and other Sunni terrorist groups, AAA aims to thwart perceived anti-Islamic and pro-western influences in the country.  AAA’s base is largely confined to Lebanon’s refugee camps.

Activities:  Throughout the mid-1990s, AAA assassinated Lebanese religious leaders and bombed nightclubs, theaters, and liquor stores.  The group also plotted against foreign diplomatic targets.  Between 2005 and 2011, AAA members traveled to Iraq to fight Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces.  AAA has been reluctant to involve itself in operations in Lebanon, in part because of concerns of losing its safe haven in the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp.  AAA did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2023.

Strength:  AAA is estimated to have membership in the low hundreds.

Location/Area of Operation:  AAA’s primary base of operations is the Ain al-Hilweh Palestinian refugee camp in southern Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid:  AAA likely receives money through international Sunni violent extremist networks.

Hamas

Aka the Islamic Resistance Movement; Harakat al-Muqawama al-Islamiya; Izz al-Din al Qassam Battalions; Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades; Izz al-Din al-Qassam Forces; Students of Ayyash; Student of the Engineer; Yahya Ayyash Units.

Description:  Hamas was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997.  Established in 1987 at the onset of the first Palestinian uprising, or First Intifada, Hamas is an outgrowth of the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood.  Its armed element, the Izz al-Din al-Qassam Brigades, has conducted anti-Israeli attacks, including the horrific October 7th attacks on Israel that killed more than 1,100 people, including hundreds of Israeli civilians and at least 31 U.S. citizens, and more than 240 people kidnapped, including U.S. citizens.  Hamas also manages a broad, mostly Gaza-based, network of Dawa (or ministry activities) that include charities, schools, clinics, youth camps, fundraising, and political activities.  After winning Palestinian Legislative Council elections in 2006, Hamas gained control of significant Palestinian Authority (PA) ministries in Gaza, including the Ministry of Interior.  In 2007, Hamas expelled the PA and Fatah from Gaza in a violent takeover.  In 2017, Ismail Haniyeh was selected as Hamas’s new leader.  Hamas remained in de facto control over Gaza in 2023, though much of its control had been disrupted by year’s end owing to Israel’s military response to the October 7 Hamas attacks on Israel.

Activities:  Hamas has conducted numerous anti-Israeli attacks, including suicide bombings, rocket launches, IED attacks, and shootings.  U.S. citizens have died and been injured in the group’s attacks.  In 2012, Hamas and Palestine Islamic Jihad operatives coordinated and carried out a bus bombing in Tel Aviv that wounded 29 people.  In 2014, Hamas kidnapped and murdered three Israeli teenagers, including 16-year-old U.S.-Israeli citizen Naftali Fraenkel.  In 2016 a Hamas member carried out a suicide attack on a bus in Jerusalem, killing 20 people.  Since 2018, Hamas has continued rocket attacks from Gaza into Israeli territory, including an 11-day escalation with Israel in 2021 during which Hamas and other militant groups launched more than 4,000 rockets into Israeli cities.  In 2022, Israeli security forces thwarted an attack planned by a Hamas cell in Jerusalem.  The cell planned to shoot Israeli public figures, launch bombing attacks, and kidnap soldiers.

On October 7, 2023, Hamas, with participation from members of PIJ, the PFLP, and other terrorist groups, launched a surprise attack on Israel that killed more than 1,100 people, including hundreds of Israeli civilians and at least 31 U.S. citizens.  Supported by armed drones and thousands of rockets, Hamas fighters kidnapped more than 240 people, including U.S. citizens.

Strength:  Hamas is estimated to have between 20,000 and 40,000 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation:  Gaza, the West Bank, and Lebanon.

Funding and External Aid:  Hamas has received funding, weapons, and training from Iran and raises funds in Persian Gulf countries.  The group receives donations from some Palestinians and other expatriates as well as from its own charity organizations.

Harakat Sawa’d Misr

Aka HASM; Harakah Sawa’id Misr; Harikat Souaid Misr; HASM Movement; Hassam Movement; Arms of Egypt Movement; Movement of Egypt’s Arms; Movement of Egypt’s Forearms; Hassm; Hamms; Hassam; Hasam.

Description:  Harakat Sawa’d Misr (HASM) was designated as an FTO on January 14, 2021.  Formed in Egypt in 2015 with the goal of overthrowing the Egyptian government, HASM attacks Egyptian security officials and other government-affiliated targets.

Activities:  Since 2016, HASM has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks, including the 2016 attempted assassination of Egypt’s former Grand Mufti Ali Gomaa, the 2017 assassination of Egyptian National Security Agency officer Ibrahim Azzazy; the 2017 attack on Burma’s embassy in Cairo; and two 2019 car bomb attacks targeting security forces in Giza and on a government health institute in Cairo.  HASM did not claim responsibility for any terrorist attacks in 2023.

Strength:  HASM’s precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation:  Egypt.

Funding and External Aid:  Its sources of funding are unknown.

Hizballah

Aka Party of God; Islamic Jihad; Islamic Jihad Organization; Revolutionary Justice Organization; Organization of the Oppressed on Earth; Islamic Jihad for the Liberation of Palestine; Organization of Right Against Wrong; Ansar Allah; Followers of the Prophet Muhammed; Lebanese Hizballah; Lebanese Hezbollah; LH; Foreign Relations Department; FRD; External Security Organization; ESO; Foreign Action Unit; Hizballah ESO; Hizballah International; Special Operations Branch; External Services Organization; External Security Organization of Hezbollah.

Description:  Hizballah was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997.  Formed in 1982 following the Israeli invasion of Lebanon, the Lebanon-based radical Shia group takes its ideological inspiration from the Iranian Revolution and the teachings of the late Ayatollah Khomeini.  The group generally follows the religious guidance of the Iranian supreme leader, Ali Khamenei.  Hizballah is closely allied with Iran and often serves as a proxy for Iran.  The two often work together on shared initiatives, although Hizballah also occasionally acts independently.  After Hamas launched its horrific attacks on Israel, Hizballah quickly joined in with near-daily hostilities across the Lebanon-Israel border.  Hizballah, along with other Iran-aligned militia groups, continues to share a close relationship with the Syrian regime of Bashar Assad and, like Iran, provides assistance – including fighters – to Syrian regime forces in the Syrian conflict.

Activities:  Hizballah is responsible for multiple large-scale terrorist attacks, including the 1983 suicide truck bombings of Embassy Beirut and the U.S. Marine barracks; the 1984 attack on the Embassy Beirut annex; and the 1985 hijacking of TWA Flight 847, during which U.S. Navy diver Robert Stethem was murdered.  Hizballah also was implicated, along with Iran, in the 1992 attacks on the Israeli embassy in Argentina and the 1994 bombing of the Argentine Israelite Mutual Association in Buenos Aires.  Hizballah assisted Iraqi Shia militant and terrorist groups in Iraq who in 2007 attacked the Karbala Provincial Joint Coordination Center, killing five American soldiers.  In 2012, Hizballah was responsible for an attack on a passenger bus carrying 42 Israeli tourists at the Burgas Airport in Bulgaria, killing five Israelis and one Bulgarian.

Several Hizballah operatives have been arrested or tried around the world, including two arrested in the United States in 2017.  One Hizballah operative arrested in Michigan had identified the availability of explosives precursors in Panama in 2011 and surveilled U.S. and Israeli targets in Panama as well as the Panama Canal during 2011-12.  Another operative arrested in New York had surveilled U.S. military and law enforcement facilities from 2003 to 2017.  In 2018, Brazil arrested a Hizballah financier, extraditing him to Paraguay for prosecution two years later.  In 2020, judges at the Netherlands-based Special Tribunal for Lebanon found Hizballah operational leader Salim Ayyash guilty for his central role in the bomb attack in Beirut in 2005 that killed former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafic Hariri.  In 2022, appeals judges sentenced two other Hizballah members, Hassan Habib Merhi and Hussein Hassan Oneissi, to life imprisonment for their roles as accomplices in the assassination.

Hizballah has increased the number and intensity of attacks on Israel since October.  In November, Hizballah fired antitank missiles at an Israeli community just over the border according to Israeli officials.  Hizballah later announced attacks on Israeli military gatherings, and barracks in border areas as clashes continued to intensify.  In December, Hizballah unleashed multiple rounds of rocket attacks and multiple drone strikes, according to Israel, reaching approximately three dozen total attacks on Israel since October 7.

Strength:  Hizballah is estimated to have up to 45,000 fighters and thousands of supporters and members worldwide.

Location/Area of Operation:  Lebanon and Syria.  Hizballah has plotted and conducted operations worldwide.

Funding and External Aid:  Hizballah continues to receive most of its funding, training, weapons, and explosives, as well as political, diplomatic, monetary, and organizational aid, from Iran.  Iran’s annual financial backing to Hizballah – which has been estimated to be hundreds of millions of dollars annually – accounts for the overwhelming majority of the group’s annual budget.  The Assad regime in Syria has provided training, weapons, and diplomatic and political support.  Hizballah also receives funding in the form of private donations from some Lebanese Shia diaspora communities worldwide, including profits from legal and illegal businesses.  These include smuggling contraband goods, passport falsification, narcotics trafficking, money laundering, and credit card, immigration, and bank fraud.

Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps

Aka IRGC; the Iranian Revolutionary Guards; IRG; the Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution; AGIR; Pasdarn-e Enghelab-e Islami; Sepah-e Pasdaran Enghelab Islami; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enghelab-e Eslami; Sepah-e Pasdaran-e Enqelab-e Eslami; Pasdaran-e Inqilab; Revolutionary Guards; Revolutionary Guard; Sepah; Pasdaran; Sepah Pasdaran; Islamic Revolutionary Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps; Iran’s Revolutionary Guard Corps; Islamic Revolutionary Guards; Iran’s Revolutionary Guards; Army of the Guardians of the Islamic Revolution.

Description:  The Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) was designated as an FTO on April 15, 2019.  Founded in 1979, the IRGC plays a central role in Iran’s use of terrorism as a key tool to support its efforts to deter and counter its perceived foes and project power in the Middle East.  The organization is composed of several subdepartments, including: the IRGC Ground Forces, the IRGC Air Force, the IRGC Navy, the Basij, the IRGC Intelligence Organization (IRCG IO), and the IRGC-Qods Force (IRGC-QF). The IRGC – primarily through its Qods Force – has been directly involved in terrorist plotting worldwide; its support for terrorism is foundational and institutional, and it has killed U.S. citizens.

Founded in 1979, the IRGC has since gained a substantial role in executing Iran’s foreign policy and wields control over vast segments of the economy.  The IRGC-QF provides guidance, training, funding, and weapons to partners and proxies throughout the Middle East, including Hizballah in Lebanon, the Houthis in Yemen, Hamas in Gaza, and Iran-aligned militia groups in Iraq and Syria. The organization’s support to these nonstate armed groups in the region helps Iran compensate for its relatively weak conventional military forces and increases its ability to further destabilize the region.  Answering directly to the supreme leader, the IRGC also is influential in domestic politics, and many senior officials have passed through its ranks.

Activities:  The IRGC is Iran’s primary mechanism for cultivating and supporting terrorist groups abroad.  In 2023 the IRGC continued to provide financial and other material support, training, technology transfer, advanced conventional weapons, guidance, or direction to a broad range of terrorist organizations, including Hizballah, Hamas, the Houthis, Kata’ib Hizballah, Asa’ib Ahl al-Haq and Harakat al-Nujaba in Iraq, al-Ashtar Brigades and Saraya al-Mukhtar in Bahrain, and other terrorist groups in Syria and around the Persian Gulf.  Iran provides up to $100 million annually in combined support to Palestinian terrorist groups, including Hamas, PIJ, and the PFLP-GC.  The IRGC also is active in Syria in support of the Assad regime.

In addition to its support for armed nonstate groups in the Middle East, the IRGC-QF conducts terrorist operations worldwide targeting dissidents and anti-regime critics, Jewish, and Israeli individuals, and former U.S. officials who Iran believes were involved in the death of former IRGC-QF Commander Qasem Soleimani.  In 2011 the IRGC plotted a brazen attack against the Saudi ambassador to the United States on American soil.  In 2012, IRGC-QF operatives were arrested in Türkiye and Kenya for plotting attacks.  An IRGC operative was convicted in 2017 of espionage for a foreign intelligence service; he had been surveilling a German-Israeli group.  In 2018, Germany uncovered 10 IRGC operatives involved in a terrorist plot in Germany.  Also in 2018, a U.S. federal court found Iran and the IRGC liable for the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia that killed 19 U.S. citizens.  In 2022, an IRGC member was charged for attempting to arrange the murder of a former U.S. National Security Advisor.

IRGC operatives pursued or supported terrorist attacks against Israeli targets in 2023, including a thwarted plot to attack Israeli tourists in Cyprus.

Strength:  The IRGC has between 125,000 and 190,000 personnel, including the IRGC-QF, which consists of an estimated 5,000 to 15,000 personnel.

Location/Area of Operation:  The IRGC-QF has plotted and conducted covert operations worldwide.

Funding and External Aid:  The IRGC continues to engage in large-scale illicit financing schemes and money laundering to fund its malign activities.  In 2023 the United States designated 39 entities constituting an international sanctions evasion network, granting sanctioned Iranian entities access to the international financial system, and obfuscating their trade with foreign customers.  This sanctions evasion network enabled the sale of billions of dollars’ worth of petrochemicals from Iran-based companies to buyers overseas.

Islamic State of Iraq and Syria

Aka al-Qa’ida in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida Group of Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida in Mesopotamia; al-Qa’ida in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of Jihad in Iraq; al-Qa’ida of Jihad Organization in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Qa’ida of the Jihad in the Land of the Two Rivers; al-Tawhid; Jam’at al-Tawhid Wa’al-Jihad; Tanzeem Qa’idat al Jihad/Bilad al Raafidaini; Tanzim Qa’idat al-Jihad fi Bilad al-Rafidayn; the Monotheism and Jihad Group; the Organization Base of Jihad/Country of the Two Rivers; the Organization Base of Jihad/Mesopotamia; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in Iraq; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base in the Land of the Two Rivers; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in Iraq; the Organization of al-Jihad’s Base of Operations in the Land of the Two Rivers; the Organization of Jihad’s Base in the Country of the Two Rivers; al-Zarqawi Network; Islamic State of Iraq; Islamic State of Iraq and al-Sham; Islamic State of Iraq and Syria; ad-Dawla al-Islamiyya fi al-’Iraq wa-sh-Sham; Daesh; Dawla al Islamiya; al-Furqan Establishment for Media Production; Islamic State; ISIL; ISIS; Amaq News Agency; Al Hayat Media Center; al-Hayat Media Center; Al Hayat.

Description:  Al-Qa’ida in Iraq was designated as an FTO on December 17, 2004.  In the 1990s, Jordanian militant Abu Mus’ab al-Zarqawi organized a terrorist group called al-Tawhid wal-Jihad to oppose the presence of U.S. and western military forces in the Middle East as well as the West’s support for, and the existence of, Israel.  In 2004, Zarqawi joined al-Qa’ida and pledged allegiance to Usama bin Laden, and his group became known as al-Qa’ida in Iraq (AQI).  Zarqawi led AQI during Operation Iraqi Freedom to fight against U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces in Iraq until he was killed in 2006.

In 2006, AQI publicly renamed itself the Islamic State in Iraq before adopting the moniker of the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS) in 2013, to express its regional ambitions as it expanded operations to include the Syrian conflict.  ISIS was led by Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi, who declared an Islamic caliphate and separated this group from al-Qa’ida in 2014, before he was killed in 2019.  In 2017 the U.S. military fighting with local Syrian allies announced the liberation of Raqqa, the self-declared capital of ISIS’s so-called caliphate.  Also in 2017, then-Iraqi Prime Minister Haidar al-Abadi announced the territorial defeat of ISIS in Iraq.  In 2018 the Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF), with support from the Defeat-ISIS Coalition, began a final push to oust ISIS fighters from the lower Middle Euphrates River Valley in Syria.  2019 marked the full territorial defeat of ISIS’s so-called caliphate; however, ISIS remains a serious threat.  The group benefits from instability, demonstrating intent to cause and inspire terrorist attacks around the world.  To that end, ISIS-Core has relied on its regional General Directorate of the Provinces to provide operational guidance and funding to its branches, networks, and affiliates around the world through its regional offices.  These offices include the Bilad al-Rafidayn Office, the al-Furqan Office, the Dhu al-Nurayn Office, the al-Siddiq Office, and the al-Karrar Office.  This report refers to central ISIS leadership as ISIS-Core.

In April, ISIS emir Abu al-Hussein al-Husseini al-Qurayshi was killed, and, in August, ISIS named Abu Hafs al-Hashimi al-Quraishi as the group’s new leader.

Activities:  ISIS has conducted numerous high-profile attacks, including rocket attacks, videotaped beheadings of U.S. citizens, suicide bombings against both military and civilian targets, and IED attacks against U.S. military personnel and Iraqi infrastructure.  The terrorist group was responsible for most of the 12,000 Iraqi civilian deaths in 2014.  ISIS also has been heavily involved in the fighting in Syria and participated in numerous kidnappings of civilians, including aid workers and journalists.  And it directs, enables, and inspires individuals to conduct attacks on behalf of the group around the world.

In 2015, ISIS carried out a series of coordinated attacks in Paris, including at a rock concert at the Bataclan concert hall, killing about 130 people, including 23-year-old U.S. citizen Nohemi Gonzalez.

The organization has claimed responsibility for several large-scale attacks in Iraq and Syria, including a 2016 car bombing at a shopping center in Baghdad that killed nearly 300 people – the deadliest bombing in the city since 2003.  Also that year, ISIS directed two simultaneous attacks in Brussels, Belgium – one at Zaventem Airport and the other at a metro station, killing 32 people, including four U.S. citizens.  That same year, a gunman who pledged allegiance to ISIS killed 49 individuals at the Pulse nightclub in Orlando, Florida.  ISIS claimed responsibility for two additional attacks in 2016:  one in which a terrorist driving a cargo truck assaulted a crowd in Nice, France, during Bastille Day celebrations, resulting in 86 deaths, including three U.S. citizens; the second a truck attack on a crowded Christmas market in Berlin that killed 12 people and injured 48 others.

In 2017, ISIS claimed responsibility for two attacks in the United Kingdom:  one a terrorist attack on London’s Westminster Bridge, when a man drove his car into pedestrians and stabbed others, killing five persons; the other a suicide bombing in Manchester, England, that killed 22 people outside of a live concert.  That same year, a man claiming to be a member of ISIS drove a truck into a crowded shopping center in Stockholm, Sweden, killing five persons.

During 2018, ISIS conducted multiple suicide bombings and simultaneous raids in a brutal offensive in southwestern Syria, killing more than 200 people.

In 2019, ISIS-inspired terrorists carried out coordinated suicide bombings at multiple churches and hotels across Sri Lanka, killing more than 250 people on Easter Sunday.  Also in 2019, ISIS claimed responsibility for a stabbing attack near the London Bridge in which a man killed two persons.

Since 2019, ISIS has claimed responsibility for numerous attacks including the 2019 suicide bombing of a restaurant in Manbij, Syria, that killed 19 people, including four U.S. citizens; the 2019 killing of a U.S. servicemember while he was participating in a combat operation in Ninewa province, Iraq; the 2021 twin suicide bombings in a busy market in Tayaran Square in Baghdad that killed at least 32 people; and a 2021 suicide attack in a busy market in a predominantly Shia neighborhood in east Baghdad that killed 30 people.

In 2022, ISIS attacked Hasakah prison in Syria, triggering a 10-day battle that spilled over into the streets, killing at least 121 SDF soldiers, 374 suspected ISIS militants, and four civilians.  Also in 2022, ISIS claimed responsibility for an attack at the Shāh Chérāgh shrine in Shiraz, Iran, killing at least 15 people.

In 2023, ISIS continued attacking both civilians and government security forces.  ISIS targeted people foraging for desert truffles in the Syrian Desert, resulting in more than 150 people killed, between February and April.  Overall, ISIS claimed a total of 102 attacks in Iraq and 99 attacks in Syria in 2023.

Strength:  Estimates suggest ISIS fighters in Iraq and Syria number between 3,000 and 7,000, including several thousand foreign terrorist fighters (FTFs).  Since at least 2015, the group has integrated local children and children of FTFs into its forces and used them as executioners and suicide attackers.  ISIS has systematically prepared child soldiers in Iraq and Syria using its education and religious infrastructure as part of its training and recruitment of members.  ISIS also has abducted, raped, and abused thousands of women and children, some as young as 8 years old.  Women and children were sold and enslaved, distributed to ISIS fighters as spoils of war, forced into marriage and domestic servitude, or otherwise subjected to physical and sexual abuse.

Location/Area of Operation:  Iraq and Syria, with branches and networks around the world.

Funding and External Aid:  ISIS received most of its funding from a variety of criminal activities in Iraq and Syria.  Criminal activities included extortion of civilian economies, smuggling oil, and robberies.  The organization maintains stockpiles of as much as tens of millions of dollars, scattered across Iraq and Syria, which it looted during its occupation of those countries during 2013-19.  ISIS continues to rely on trusted courier networks and money services businesses to move its financial resources within and outside of Iraq and Syria.  The territorial defeat of ISIS that eliminated its control of territory in Syria in 2019 reduced the group ability to generate, hold, and transfer its financial assets.  Despite this, ISIS continues to generate some revenue from criminal activities through its many clandestine networks and provides financial support and guidance to its network of global branches and affiliates.

ISIS-Libya

Aka Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in Libya; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant-Libya; Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in Libya; ISIS-L; ISIS-Libya; ISIL-Libya; Wilayat Barqa; Wilayat Fezzan; Wilayat Tripolitania; Wilayat Tarablus; Wilayat al-Tarabulus.

Description:  The Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham in Libya (ISIL-L) was designated as an FTO on May 20, 2016.  In 2014, then-ISIS leader Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi dispatched ISIS operatives from Syria to Libya to establish a branch.  In 2014, several hundred operatives set up a base in Darnah.  The following month, Baghdadi formally established the branch after announcing he had accepted oaths of allegiance from fighters in Libya.

Activities:  Since its establishment, ISIS-L has claimed responsibility for and carried out multiple attacks targeting government officials and civilians throughout Libya, including a 2015 suicide attack on a luxury hotel in Tripoli that killed eight persons, including a U.S. contractor; 2018 attacks including on Libya’s electoral commission headquarters in Tripoli that killed 14 people, a suicide attack on Libya’s National Oil Corporation headquarters that killed two persons, and on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs that killed three persons; and a 2021 suicide attack at a police checkpoint in Sabhā, Libya, that killed at least two Libyan National Army personnel.  In 2022, ISIS-L attacked and killed three Libyan security personnel in southwest Libya.  This followed an attack on the same brigade a week earlier that had killed two members.  ISIS-L did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2023.

Strength:  ISIS-L is estimated to have up to a few hundred fighters.

Location/Area of Operation:  Libya.

Funding and External Aid:  ISIS-L’s funding comes from a variety of sources, including criminal activity, such as smuggling and extortion, and external funding.  The group also receives support from ISIS.

ISIS-Sinai Province

Aka Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis; Ansar Jerusalem; Supporters of Jerusalem; Ansar Bayt al-Maqdes; Ansar Beit al-Maqdis; ISIS-SP; Islamic State of Iraq and ash-Sham-Sinai Province; Islamic State of Iraq and the Sham-Sinai Province; Islamic State-Sinai Province; Islamic State in the Sinai; Jamaat Ansar Beit al-Maqdis fi Sinaa; Sinai Province; Supporters of the Holy Place; the State of Sinai; Wilayat Sayna; Wilayat Sinai.

Description:  Ansar Bayt al-Maqdis (ABM) was designated as an FTO on April 9, 2014.  ABM emerged in 2011 following the revolution in Egypt.  In 2014, ABM officially declared allegiance to ISIS.  The Department of State amended ABM’s designation to add, among others, the aliases ISIL Sinai Province and Islamic State-Sinai Province in 2015 and ISIS-Sinai Province (ISIS-SP) in 2021.

Activities:  Before pledging allegiance to ISIS, ABM claimed responsibility for numerous attacks against Israeli and Egyptian interests from 2012 through 2014, including attacks on Israeli economic and military assets, as well as on the Egyptian military and tourist sectors.  From 2015 through 2023, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for many attacks, including the bombing of a Russian passenger plane, the abduction and killing of a Croatian citizen, rockets launched at Israeli cities, attacks on Egyptian Christians and Sufis, and on Egyptian military and security personnel.

In 2020, ISIS-SP increased its attacks against Sinai tribal members, including the killing of a tribal elder, age 75, who was strapped to a pole with explosives detonated next to him, and a suicide bombing that targeted a tribal family gathering and killed at least three persons.  In 2022, ISIS-SP continued attacks on Egyptian security personnel, including at military and border guard checkpoints.

In January, ISIS-SP claimed responsibility for an attack on a police checkpoint in Ismailia, Egypt, that resulted in the death of three police officers.

Strength:  ISIS-SP is estimated to have a few hundred members.

Location/Area of Operation:  Egypt.

Funding and External Aid:  ISIS-SP receives funding from external actors, including ISIS-Core, and from smuggling.

Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi

Aka Army of the Men of the Naqshbandi Order; Armed Men of the Naqshabandi Order; Naqshbandi Army; Naqshabandi Army; Men of the Army of al-Naqshbandia Way; Jaysh Rajal al-Tariqah al-Naqshbandia; JRTN; JRN; AMNO.

Description:  Jaysh Rijal al-Tariq al-Naqshabandi (JRTN) was designated as an FTO on September 30, 2015.  In 2006 the group, which consists of former Baath Party officials, military personnel, and Sunni nationalists, announced insurgency operations against international forces in Iraq in response to the execution of Saddam Hussein.  Izzat Ibrahim al-Douri, former vice president of Saddam Hussein’s Revolutionary Council, led the group until his death in 2020.  JRTN aims to overthrow the Government of Iraq, install a new Baathist regime, and end external influence in Baghdad.

Activities:  Between its founding in 2006 and the 2011 withdrawal of Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces from Iraq, JRTN claimed responsibility for numerous attacks on U.S. bases and forces.  JRTN also is known to have used vehicle-borne IEDs (VBIEDs) against Iraqi government security forces.  In 2014, elements of JRTN joined military forces with ISIS in opposition to the Iraqi government.  JRTN played a major role in the capture of Mosul from Iraqi security forces in 2014.  However, fissures between ISIS and JRTN quickly emerged after ISIS’s advance in Baiji and Tikrit.  Although some elements of JRTN splintered off, most of the organization was subsumed by ISIS.  JRTN did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2023.

Strength:  Its precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation:  Iraq.

Funding and External Aid:  JRTN has received funding from former regime members, major tribal figures in Iraq, and Persian Gulf-based financiers of terrorism.

Kata’ib Hizballah

Aka Hizballah Brigades; Hizballah Brigades in Iraq; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq; Kata’ib Hezbollah; Khata’ib Hezbollah; Khata’ib Hizballah; Khattab Hezballah; Hizballah Brigades-Iraq of the Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Islamic Resistance in Iraq; Kata’ib Hizballah Fi al-Iraq; Katibat Abu Fathel al-A’abas; Katibat Zayd Ebin Ali; Katibut Karbalah.

Description:  Kata’ib Hizballah (KH) was designated as an FTO on July 2, 2009.  Formed in 2006 as an anti-western Shia group, the group conducts attacks against U.S., Israeli, Iraqi, and Defeat-ISIS Coalition targets in Iraq and threatened the lives of Iraqi politicians and civilians supporting the legitimate political process in Iraq.  KH is notorious for its extensive use of media operations and propaganda, such as filming and releasing videos of attacks.  KH has ideological ties to and receives support from Iran.

Activities:  KH has claimed responsibility for numerous terrorist attacks since 2007, including IED attacks, rocket-propelled grenade attacks, and sniper operations.  In 2007, KH gained notoriety for its attacks against U.S. and Defeat-ISIS Coalition forces in Iraq.  In 2011, five U.S. soldiers were killed in Baghdad when KH assailants fired multiple rockets at the Camp Victory U.S. military base.

In 2019, KH members stormed the Bahraini embassy in Baghdad, the organization was reportedly involved in sniper operations against Iraqi protestors, and it was blamed for a December rocket attack on K-1 Air Base in Kirkuk that killed one U.S. citizen.  Also in 2019, KH members broke into the Embassy Baghdad compound and set fires inside, which destroyed security checkpoints and reception rooms.  In 2020, KH reportedly launched rockets at Camp Taji near Baghdad, killing two Americans and one British soldier, and wounding 14 others.  In 2021, KH was suspected of a rocket attack on Ain al-Asad Air Base, which hosts U.S. soldiers.  In 2022 the group was suspected of launching two Iranian-manufactured unmanned aerial vehicles toward the U.S. base at al-Tanf, Syria.

In 2023, KH remained active in Iraq and Syria, typically using front names or proxy groups to obfuscate its involvement in attacks.  Near year’s end, KH was suspected of being behind a spate of attacks against U.S. military and possibly diplomatic personnel in Iraq and Syria in the months following the beginning of the Israel-Hamas conflict in October.  On December 25, three U.S. military personnel were injured in a drone attack targeting Erbil Air Base, Iraq, suspected to have carried out by KH.  KH is also suspected of kidnapping Israeli-Russian researcher Elizabeth Tsurkov in March 2023.

Strength:  KH is estimated to have as many as 30,000 fighters.

Location/Area of Operation:  Iraq and Syria.

Funding and External Aid:  KH depends heavily on support from Iran.

Kurdistan Workers’ Party

Aka Kurdistan Freedom and Democracy Congress; Freedom and Democracy Congress of Kurdistan; KADEK; Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan; Halu Mesru Savunma Kuvveti; HSK; Kurdistan People’s Congress; People’s Congress of Kurdistan; KONGRA-GEL; PKK; KGK; KHK; KCK.

Description:  The Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997.  Founded by Abdullah Ocalan in 1978 as a Marxist-Leninist separatist organization, PKK is composed primarily of Turkish Kurds who launched a campaign of violence in 1984.

Activities:  In the early 1990s, PKK moved beyond rural-based insurgent activities to engage in urban terrorism.  Türkiye became the scene of significant violence, with some estimates suggesting there have been at least 40,000 casualties during the 38-year-long conflict.  After the arrest of the PKK’s founder in 1999, the group abandoned the insurgency until 2004, when its hardline militant wing solidified control and renounced the self-imposed ceasefire.  The Turkish government and PKK resumed peace negotiations in 2009 and again during 2013-2015, but the negotiations ultimately failed.

From 2016 to 2022, numerous attacks by the PKK were reported against Türkiye security forces and government officials, including a 2016 VBIED strike against police headquarters; and a 2017 attack on a military convoy; a 2018 roadside bomb against a bus carrying workers from the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry, killing seven persons and wounding 13 in Diyarbakir Province’s Kulp district; the 2019 assassination of a senior Turkish diplomat in Erbil, Iraq; several 2020 PKK-claimed attacks aimed at a Türkiye-Iran customs border gate, a natural gas pipeline near the Turkish-Iranian border, and a Turkish military base in northern Iraq; and a 2022 attack on a police guesthouse in southern Türkiye.  Türkiye also accused the PKK of being responsible for a 2022 explosion in Istanbul that killed at least six persons and wounded 81 others.  The PKK denied responsibility for the blast.

In October the PKK claimed responsibility for a bombing attack outside Türkiye’s Interior Ministry building in Ankara that killed one person and injured two others.  In December, Türkiye government officials stated that 12 Turkish soldiers had been killed during fighting with the PKK in northern Iraq.

Strength:  PKK is estimated to have 4,000 to 5,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation:  Iraq, Iran, Syria, Türkiye, and Europe.

Funding and External Aid:  PKK receives financial support from the large Kurdish diaspora in Europe.

Palestinian Islamic Jihad

Aka PIJ; Palestinian Islamic Jihad – Shaqaqi Faction; PIJ-Shaqaqi Faction; PIJ-Shallah Faction; Islamic Jihad of Palestine; Islamic Jihad in Palestine; Abu Ghunaym Squad of the Hizballah Bayt al-Maqdis; al-Quds Squads; al-Quds Brigades; Saraya al-Quds; al-Awdah Brigades.

Description:  The Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997.  Formed by militant Palestinians in Gaza during the 1970s, the PIJ is committed to the destruction of Israel and to the creation of an Islamic state in historic Palestine, including present-day Israel.

Activities:  The PIJ has conducted numerous attacks against Israeli civilian and military targets, including 2014 attacks on Israeli buses in Tel Aviv and a 2016 plot to abduct and kill an Israel Defense Forces (IDF) soldier and carry out a mass-casualty attack on a reception hall in Beersheba.  Over the past decade, the PIJ has carried out waves of rocket attacks into Israeli territory.

On October 7, members of PIJ participated in Hamas’s attack on Israel that killed more than 1,100 people, including hundreds of Israeli civilians and at least 31 U.S. citizens.  The PIJ claimed to hold more than 30 hostages captive.

Strength:  The PIJ is estimated to have about 1,000 members.

Location/Area of Operation:  Israel, Gaza, and the West Bank.

Funding and External Aid:  The PIJ receives financial assistance and training primarily from Iran.  Hizballah provides PIJ leaders and representatives with safe harbor in Lebanon.  The PIJ has also partnered with Hizballah to carry out joint operations.

Palestine Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction

Aka PLF; PLF-Abu Abbas; Palestine Liberation Front.

Description:  The Palestinian Liberation Front-Abu Abbas Faction (PLF) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997.  In the late 1970s, the PLF splintered from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command.  It later split into pro-Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), pro-Syrian, and pro-Libyan factions.  The pro-PLO faction was led by Muhammad Zaydan (aka Abu Abbas) and was based in Baghdad before Operation Iraqi Freedom.

Activities:  The PLF was responsible for the 1985 attack on the Italian cruise ship Achille Lauro and the murder of U.S. citizen Leon Klinghoffer.  Throughout the 1990s, the PLF was suspected of supporting terrorism against Israel by other Palestinian groups.  In 2004, Abu Abbas died of natural causes while in U.S. custody in Iraq.  After not claiming an attack for 16 years, the PLF claimed responsibility for the 2008 assault against an Israeli military bus in Huwarah, West Bank, and the shooting of an Israeli settler.  In 2010 the group claimed responsibility for an IED attack against an IDF patrol, which caused minor injuries to a soldier; another IED was discovered during a search of the area.  The PLF did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2023.

Strength:  Its precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation:  Gaza, the West Bank, Lebanon, and Syria.

Funding and External Aid:  Sources of the PLF’s funding are unknown.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine

Aka PFLP; Halhul Gang; Halhul Squad; Palestinian Popular Resistance Forces; PPRF; Red Eagle Gang; Red Eagle Group; Red Eagles; Martyr Abu-Ali Mustafa Battalion.

Description:  The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997.  The PFLP is a Marxist-Leninist group founded in 1967 by George Habash after splitting from the Arab Nationalist Movement.  The group earned a reputation for committing large-scale international attacks in the 1960s and 1970s, including airline hijackings that killed more than 20 U.S. citizens.

Activities:  The PFLP increased its operational activity during the Second Palestinian Intifada.  During that time the group assassinated Israeli Tourism Minister Rehavam Ze’evi in 2001, carried out at least two suicide operations, and with other Palestinian terrorist groups launched multiple joint operations.

Since 2014, the PFLP has conducted numerous attacks, including a 2014 attack in which two Palestinians reportedly affiliated with the organization entered a Jerusalem synagogue and attacked Israelis with guns, knives, and axes, killing five persons, including three U.S. citizens; a 2017 attack involving two PFLP members near East Jerusalem’s Old City that killed an Israeli border security agent, although ISIS claimed responsibility for the attack; and allegedly a 2019 detonation of an IED in the West Bank, killing an Israeli teenager and seriously wounding two others.  In 2020, Israeli security forces in the West Bank arrested approximately 50 members of a PFLP cell believed to be behind a string of deadly attacks in the area and seized weapons and bomb making materials.

In March, PFLP claimed responsibility for two separate attacks in the West Bank town of Huwara, injuring an Israeli-American and two Israeli soldiers.  On October 7, members of the PFLP participated in Hamas’s surprise attack on Israel that killed more than 1,100 people, including hundreds of Israeli civilians and at least 31 U.S. citizens.  PFLP reportedly holds hostages captured during the attacks.

Strength:  The PLFP’s precise numbers are unknown.

Location/Area of Operation:  Gaza, Israel, Lebanon, Syria, and the West Bank.

Funding and External Aid:  Its sources of support are unknown.

Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command

Aka PFLP-GC.

Description:  The Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine-General Command (PFLP-GC) was designated as an FTO on October 8, 1997.  PFLP-GC split from the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine in 1968, claiming it wanted to concentrate more on resistance and less on politics.  Ahmad Jibril, a former captain in the Syrian Army, led PFLP-GC until his death in 2021 and was succeeded by Talal Naji.  PFLP-GC has close ties to both Syria and Iran.

Activities:  The PFLP-GC carried out dozens of attacks in Europe and the Middle East during the 1970s and 1980s.  The organization was known for conducting cross-border attacks into Israel using unusual means, such as hot-air balloons and motorized hang gliders.  Since the early 1990s the group has focused primarily on supporting Hizballah’s attacks against Israel, training members of other Palestinian terrorist groups, and smuggling weapons.  The PFLP-GC also has been implicated by Lebanese security officials in several rocket attacks against Israel.  In 2009 the group was responsible for wounding two civilians in an armed attack in Nahariyya, Israel.

In 2012 the PFLP-GC claimed responsibility for a bus bombing in Tel Aviv that injured 29 people, although four Palestine Islamic Jihad and Hamas operatives later were arrested for the attack.  In 2015 the PFLP-GC reportedly began fighting alongside the Assad regime in Syria, while also receiving logistical and military aid from Hizballah and Iran.  Separately that year, the PFLP-GC took responsibility for rocket fire aimed at Israeli territory.  In that attack, at least three rockets were fired from Lebanon into northern Israel and landed near Shlomi, a small town near the Lebanese frontier with Israel.  The PFLP-GC did not claim responsibility for any attacks in 2023.

Strength:  The PFLP-GC is estimated to have several hundred members.

Location/Area of Operation:  Syria, Lebanon, and Gaza.

Funding and External Aid:  The PFLP-GC receives safe haven and logistical and military support from Syria as well as financial support from Iran.

Source: Country Reports on Terrorism 2023, U.S. Department of State.