Arab/Muslim Opinion Toward Hamas and War in Gaza
Note: We are presenting raw data. When available, we provide some or all of the crosstabs (i.e., breakdowns by various categories such as party ID). To analyze the data, we encourage users to read the entire study and the methodology used. Results and reliability can be affected by such things as sample size, question wording, and question order. Responses may also be influenced by context and timing; for example, if the survey is conducted during a war. The question wording is not exact in polls in Arabic translated to English.
See also: Arab Attitudes Toward the Israeli-Palestinian Conflict
The most important reasons for Hamas to carry out the military operation on October 7, 2023. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| Egypt | Jordan | Kuwait | Lebanon | West Bank | Saudi Arabia | Qatar | TOTAL* | |
| The ongoing Israeli occupation of Palestinian land | 31% | 34% | 50% | 43% | 24% | 33% | 33% | 35% |
| Defending al-Aqsa Mosque against attacks | 26% | 26% | 16% | 16% | 45% | 20% | 26% | 24% |
| The ongoing blockade of Gaza | 6% | 9% | 7% | 9% | 16% | 11% | 10% | 8% |
| Ongoing and expanding settlement on Palestinian land | 4% | 2% | 6% | 5% | 4% | 2% | 11% | 6% |
| Liberating Palestinian detainees and prisoners in Israeli prisons | 4% | 5% | 4% | 6% | 8% | 3% | 3% | 6% |
| Israel’s rejection of the establishment of a Palestinian state | 5% | 3% | 4% | 4% | 0% | 1% | 3% | 4% |
| The international community’s disregard for Palestinian rights and the ongoing occupation | 4% | 3% | 4% | 3% | 0% | 2% | 4% | 4% |
| The United States’ failure to achieve a just peace | 2% | 2% | 2% | 1% | 2% | 2% | 2% | 2% |
| Halting the normalization process between Arab and Israeli governments | 2% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 0% | 1% | 1% | 2% |
| Carrying out the plan or agenda of a foreign power such as Iran | 2% | 1% | 2% | 5% | 1% | 4% | 1% | 2% |
*Includes Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Oman, Libya, Mauritania, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan.
Assessments of Hamas’ military operation on October 7, 2023. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| Egypt | Jordan | Kuwait | Lebanon | West Bank | Saudi Arabia | Qatar | TOTAL* | |
| A legitimate resistance operation | 34% | 84% | 68% | 72% | 79% | 58% | 69% | 67% |
| A legitimate resistance operation that made mistakes | 54% | 6% | 23% | 14% | 11% | 13% | 18% | 19% |
| A legitimate resistance operation that involved unacceptable/condemnable acts | 1% | 1% | 3% | 5% | 4% | 2% | 1% | 2% |
| An illegitimate operation | 6% | 3% | 3% | 5% | 0% | 9% | 2% | 5% |
*Includes Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Oman, Libya, Mauritania, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan.
Comparisons between Hamas and ISIS. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| Egypt | Jordan | Kuwait | Lebanon | West Bank | Saudi Arabia | Qatar | TOTAL* | |
| Hamas is entirely different/differs greatly from ISIS | 78% | 90% | 88% | 83% | 88% | 68% | 86% | 82% |
| Hamas is partially/no different from ISIS | 13% | 2% | 7% | 10% | 1% | 13% | 4% | 8% |
*Includes Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Oman, Libya, Mauritania, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan.
Solidarity with Palestinians and support for Hamas. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| TOTAL | |
| I stand with the people of Gaza and Hamas | 69% |
| I stand with the people of Gaza and oppose Hamas | 23% |
| I do not stand with the Palestinians | 1% |
Most important factors contributing to Israel’s continuation of its war on Gaza. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| Egypt | Jordan | Kuwait | Lebanon | West Bank | Saudi Arabia | Qatar | TOTAL* | |
| US military and political support | 48% | 50% | 52% | 55% | 67% | 43% | 56% | 50% |
| Arab governments’ lack of decisive action toward Israel | 13% | 13% | 13% | 15% | 9% | 11% | 11% | 14% |
| Recent normalization (peace) agreements between Israel and some Arab governments (by which diplomatic relations have been restored) | 7% | 8% | 15% | 12% | 14% | 8% | 12% | 11% |
| Western governments’ support for Israel | 13% | 11% | 9% | 6% | 1% | 9% | 9% | 10% |
| Western governments’ support for Israel | 4% | 4% | 5% | 3% | 6% | 3% | 4% | 4% |
| The Palestinian Authority’s lack of practical stances against Israel | 1% | 1% | 2% | 3% | 3% | 1% | 3% | 2% |
*Includes Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Oman, Libya, Mauritania, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan.
Measures that must be taken by Arab governments to stop the war. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| Egypt | Jordan | Kuwait | Lebanon | West Bank | Saudi Arabia | Qatar | TOTAL* | |
| Suspend relations or normalization with Israel | 33% | 33% | 49% | 44% | 41% | 21% | 41% | 36% |
| Deliver aid to Gaza without Israeli approval | 13% | 13% | 12% | 18% | 22% | 20% | 13% | 14% |
| Use the oil weapon to pressure Israel and its supporters | 10% | 15% | 9% | 9% | 18% | 3% | 5% | 11% |
| Establish a global alliance to boycott Israel | 11% | 10% | 6% | 6% | 7% | 8% | 15% | 9% |
| Provide military aid to Gaza | 11% | 6% | 5% | 3% | 4% | 11% | 5% | 8% |
| Announce military mobilization | 3% | 4% | 5% | 5% | 2% | 6% | 6% | 5% |
| Reconsider relations with the United States | 2% | 2% | 4% | 5% | 2% | 6% | 6% | 4% |
| Reconsider relations with states that support Israel’s war on Gaza | 2% | 1% | 5% | 1% | 3% | 7% | 2% | 3% |
| Build alliances with states that have taken practical steps against Israel | 4% | 2% | 3% | 2% | 1% | 5% | 31% | 3% |
*Includes Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Oman, Libya, Mauritania, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan.
Impact of the war on prospects for peace. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| Egypt | Jordan | Kuwait | Lebanon | West Bank | Saudi Arabia | Qatar | TOTAL* | |
| I have become certain that there will be no possibility for peace with Israel | 57% | 71% | 63% | 69% | 56% | 57% | 63% | 59% |
| I have serious doubt of the possibility for peace with Israel | 11% | 10% | 17% | 12% | 14% | 15% | 15% | 14% |
| I still believe there is a possibility for peace with Israel | 17% | 8% | 8% | 11% | 5% | 13% | 7% | 13% |
| I believe that even before the war, there was no possibility for peace with Israel | 9% | 4% | 11% | 4% | 24% | 7% | 7% | 9% |
*Includes Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Oman, Libya, Mauritania, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan.
Should recognize Israel. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| Egypt | Jordan | Kuwait | Lebanon | West Bank | Saudi Arabia | Qatar | TOTAL* | |
| Agree | 6% | 4% | 5% | 8% | 2% | 3% | 4% | 4% |
| Disagree | 89% | 83% | 89% | 88% | 92% | 68% | 90% | 89% |
*Includes Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Oman, Libya, Mauritania, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan.
Should recognize Israel. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| 2011 | 2012/13 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017/18 | 2019/20 | 2022 | Gaza War | |
| Agree | 9% | 6% | 6% | 9% | 9% | 8% | 6% | 8% | 4% |
| Disagree | 84% | 87% | 87% | 85% | 86% | 87% | 88% | 84% | 89% |
Evaluation of international and regional positions. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| USA | UK | France | Germany | Russia | China | Iran | Turkey | |
| Very Good/Good | 3% | 8% | 10% | 9% | 41% | 40% | 48% | 47% |
| Very Bad/Bad | 94% | 78% | 79% | 75% | 42% | 38% | 37% | 40% |
How opinion on US policy in the Arab region has changed since the war on Gaza. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| TOTAL | |
| Has become more negative than before the war | 76% |
| Has not changed | 19% |
| Has become more positive than before the war | 1% |
Evaluation of US response to the Israeli war on Gaza. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| TOTAL | |
| Very Good/Good | 94% |
| Very Bad/Bad | 3% |
Evaluation of US seriousness in establishing a Palestinian state in the 1967 Occupied Palestinian lands. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| Egypt | Jordan | Kuwait | Lebanon | West Bank | Saudi Arabia | Qatar | TOTAL* | |
| Serious/Somewhat serious | 12% | 11% | 18% | 8% | 3% | 17% | 16% | 14% |
| Somewhat unserious/Not at all serious | 84% | 84% | 80% | 90% | 94% | 71% | 77% | 81% |
*Includes Morocco, Tunisia, Yemen, Oman, Libya, Mauritania, Iraq, Algeria, and Sudan.
Biggest threats to the peace and stability of the region. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| Gaza War | 2022 | 2020 | 2018 | |
| USA | 51% | 39% | 44% | 43% |
| Israel | 26% | 41% | 37% | 37% |
| Iran | 7% | 7% | 10% | 13% |
| Russia | 4% | 6% | 2% | 3% |
Evaluation of US media coverage of the war on Gaza. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| TOTAL | |
| Biased in favor of Israel | 82% |
| Biased in favor of Palestine | 4% |
| Unbiased/Neutral/Professional | 7% |
Consideration of the Palestinian Cause as an Arab issue. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| 2011 | 2012/13 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017/18 | 2019/20 | 2022 | Gaza War | |
| The Palestinian cause is a cause for all Arabs and not the Palestinian people alone | 84% | 84% | 77% | 75% | 75% | 77% | 79% | 76% | 92% |
| The Palestinian cause is a cause of the Palestinians solely, and they alone should work to resolve it | 9% | 6% | 14% | 18% | 17% | 15% | 15% | 16% | 6% |
Negative effects experienced in the West Bank since October 7, 2023. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| TOTAL | |
| The level of security in the West Bank | 97% |
| The general economic situation in the West Bank | 96% |
| Ability to move between the governorates | 96% |
| The level of safety in your neighborhood | 95% |
| Household income | 94% |
| Your sense of security and personal safety | 93% |
| Access to goods and services | 84% |
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Frequency of witnessing or happening upon incidences of raids, arrests, or settler harassment in the West Bank since October 7, 2023. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| TOTAL | |
| Israeli military raids | 60% |
| Arrests and interrogation by the Israeli army | 44% |
| Settler harassment (of Palestinians) | 22% |
Assessment of whether Israel will succeed in executing a second Nakba of the Palestinians in Gaza. (Arab Center for Research and Policy Studies, Doha, December 12, 2023-January 5, 2024)
| TOTAL | |
| Will succeed | 15% |
| Will not succeed | 80% |
What impact will Hamas firing missiles or rockets against Israel from Gaza have on our region? (Washington Institute, April 2023)
| Bahrain | Egypt | Jordan | Kuwait | Saudi Arabia | UAE | |
| Positive | 31% | 56% | 60% | 31% | 22% | 20% |
| Negative | 67% | 40% | 37% | 67% | 76% | 76% |
Approval of Hamas (Washington Institute, October 17-November 9, 2020)
| Saudi Arabia | UAE | Qatar | Bahrain | |
| Approve | 11% | 30% | 47% | 43% |
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