Fact Sheets

#23: Iran

(Updated August 6, 2008)

Iran is one of America’s foremost self-proclaimed enemies, and one of the most serious threats to stability in the Middle East. Iran has also been one of the most vociferous opponents of Arab-Israeli peace efforts and a leader of the rejectionist camp that advocates the destruction of Israel. In October 2005, recently elected President, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, quoted Ayatollah Khomeini and declared, “As the Imam said, Israel must be wiped off the map.”

Though sometimes portrayed as a matter only of concern to Israel, the truth is the Iranian nuclear program is vehemently opposed by the international community, especially Iran’s Arab neighbors. The Crown Prince of Bahrain was the first Gulf leader to explicitly accuse Iran of lying about its weapons program. “While they don’t have the bomb yet, they are developing it, or the capability for it,” Salman bin Hamad bin Isa al-Khalifa said.

In October 2007, a senior Iranian general said that suicide bombers were ready to strike at targets throughout the Gulf “if necessary.” The threat was aimed at Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. Earlier in 2007, a close associate of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad resurrected an old claim on Bahrain as Iran’s 14th province, which Bahrain’s foreign minister said “touched on the legitimacy of our country.” The effect of Iran’s saber rattling, Giles Whittell wrote, “is especially chilling in Bahrain as the only Sunni-led country with a Shia majority that is not at war or on the brink of war.”

European leaders also clearly see Iran as a threat to their interests. French President Nicolas Sarkozy has said, for example, “Iran is trying to acquire a nuclear bomb. I say to the French, it’s unacceptable.” Similarly, German Chancellor Angela Merkel has stated, “I’m emphatically in favor of solving the problem through negotiations, but we also need to be ready to impose further sanctions if Iran does not give ground.” A nd Great Britain’s Prime Minister Gordon Brown reiterated, “We are absolutely clear that we are ready, and will push for, further sanctions against Iran....We will work through the United Nations to achieve this. We are prepared also to have tougher European sanctions. We want to make it clear that we do not support the nuclear ambitions of that country.”

President Bush said February 16, 2005, “Iran has made it clear that they don’t like Israel, to put it bluntly. And the Israelis are concerned about whether or not Iran develops a nuclear weapon, as are we, as should everybody....Clearly, if I was the leader of Israel, and I listened to some of the statements by the Iranian ayatollahs that regarded my security of my country, I’d be concerned about Iran having a nuclear weapon as well.”

Israeli intelligence officials have repeatedly revised their estimates of Iranian progress toward the development of nuclear weapons. In February 2008, Mossad director Meir Dagan estimated that Iran will develop a nuclear weapon within three years (AFP, February 5, 2008). In May, Israeli officials said Iran could master the technology needed to enrich uranium on a military scale within six months (Jerusalem Post, May 6, 2008).

On July 31, 2006, the UN Security Council approved Resolution 1696, giving Iran until August 31 to verifiably suspend its uranium enrichment and reprocessing-related activities and implement full transparency measures requested by the IAEA. Iran's top nuclear negotiator, Ali Larijani, responded to the resolution by insisting that Iran will expand - not suspend - uranium enrichment activities.

In response to Iran’s continued defiance, the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1737 on December 23, 2006, “blocking the import or export of sensitive nuclear materiel and equipment and freezing the financial assets of persons or entities supporting its proliferation sensitive nuclear activities or the development of nuclear-weapon delivery systems.” The resolution requires Iran to suspend “all enrichment-related and reprocessing activities, including research and development; and work on all heavy-water related projects, including the construction of a research reactor moderated by heavy water.” The Council also decided that “all States should prevent the supply, sale or transfer, for the use by or benefit of Iran, of related equipment and technology, if the State determined that such items would contribute to enrichment-related, reprocessing or heavy-water related activities, or to the development of nuclear weapon delivery systems.” The Council requested a report within 60 days from the Director General of IAEA on whether Iran had complied with the resoluiton.

On February 22, 2007, the IAEA found Iran in violation of a Security Council ultimatum to freeze uranium enrichment and other demands meant to dispel fears that it intends to build nuclear weapons. A few days later Iranian foreign minister Manouchehr Mottaki reiterated that Iran would never suspend uranium enrichment. On March 8, 2007, the IAEA announced the suspension of nearly two dozen nuclear technical aid programs to Iran as part of UN sanctions imposed because the country's nuclear defiance. Russia then announced it would withhold nuclear fuel for the Bushehr power plant unless Iran suspended its uranium enrichment. In December 2007, however, Russia reversed its position and delivered the long-delayed first shipment of nuclear fuel to Bushehr. President Bush said, “If the Iranians accept that uranium for a civilian nuclear power plant, then there's no need for them to learn how to enrich” But a senior Iranian official said his country would under no circumstances halt its efforts to enrich uranium (Reuters, December 18, 2007 ).

An internal European Union document said there was no way to prevent Iran from enriching enough weapons-grade uranium to produce a bomb and that the Iranian program had been slowed by technical limitations rather than diplomatic pressure. The Financial Times quoted the document as saying: “At some stage we must expect that Iran will acquire the capacity to enrich uranium on the scale required for a weapons program” and that “the problems with Iran will not be resolved through economic sanctions alone” (Jerusalem Post, February 13, 2007).

In April 2007, Iranian President Ahmadinejad announced that the Natanz facility had begun “industrial-scale” production of nuclear fuel. Iran claimed to be injecting uranium gas into a new array of 3,000 centrifuges (AP, April 12, 2007). A week later, the head of Iran's atomic energy agency, Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, admitted that some of the centrifuges blew up during the enrichment process. Without giving a precise number, he said that the damages ranged from ten to twenty per cent. Aghazadeh said Iran ultimately wants to install 50,000 uranium enriching centrifuges at the plant in Natanz. Aghazadeh said it would take four years for Iran to complete its own nuclear fuel cycle (Agence France-Presse, Haaretz, April 17, 2007). A month later, however, IAEA inspectors concluded that Iran appeared to have solved most of its technological problems and was starting to enrich uranium on a far larger scale than before (New York Times, May 15, 2007). In August, the IAEA reported Iran was expanding its nuclear program in defiance of the UN. The agency said Iran was operating nearly 2,000 centrifuges, the machines that produce enriched uranium, an increase of several hundred machines from three months earlier (New York Times, August 30, 2007).

The IAEA issued a report on November 15, 2007, which said Iran was cooperating with the agency, but also said that Iran has ignored for more than a year the Security Council’s demand that it stop enriching uranium. Moreover, the report warned that its understanding of Iran’s nuclear program “is diminishing” because Tehran was preventing more extensive inspections. In addition, Iran reportedly denied IAEA requests to interview at least two Iranians about their nuclear work. According to Newsweek, “ agency investigators are still waiting for Iranian explanations and documents about uranium contamination at a technical university, the operations of a uranium mine, and alleged studies related to atomic weapons research, including high-explosive testing and the design of a missile re-entry vehicle.” The magazine also noted, “The report was unequivocal in verifying that despite Security Council demands to the contrary, Iran is proceeding with uranium enrichment and construction of a heavy-water production plant, which would supply a heavy-water reactor capable of producing plutonium. The IAEA found that Iran had installed nearly 3,000 centrifuges at its main uranium enrichment plant as of November 3.” A week earlier, Iran gave the IAEA a document that essentially described how to make components for a nuclear bomb (Newsweek, November 15, 2007).

The IAEA issued a report on May 26, 2008, that accused Iran of stonewalling the agency. “Iran has not provided the Agency with all the information, access to documents and access to individuals necessary to support Iran's statements” that its activities were purely peaceful in intent. The agency also noted that Iran had ignored three sets of Security Council sanctions calling for an end to its enrichment activities and, instead, expanded its operational centrifuges by about 500 since the IAEA’s February report (AP, May 26, 2008). The IAEA, moreover, found “substantial parts of the centrifuge components were manufactured in the workshops of the Defense Industries Organization.” It also describes evidence of detonators, testing systems, and missile configuration that can only go with a nuclear weapon (Christian Science Monitor, May 30, 2008).

In June 2008, the United States, Russia, China, France, Britain and Germany offered Iran technical and commercial incentives to suspend uranium enrichment. A few weeks later, the powers held talks in Geneva, attended for the first time by a senior U.S. official, aimed at reaching an agreement with Iran and forestalling further sanctions. A senior Iranian official, however, ruled out any freeze in uranium enrichment (Reuters, July 20, 2008). Five days later, the head of Iran’s nuclear agency, Iranian Vice President Gholam Reza Aghazadeh, announced Iran would no longer cooperate with IAEA experts investigating the country’s clandestine nuclear weapons program (Washington Post, July 24, 2008). Shortly thereafter, Ahmadinejad announced that Iran had 6,000 centrifuges operating at its uranium enrichment facility at the underground Natanz facility, double the number operating less than a year ago, a worrisome development that shows the progress Iran has made toward developing a nuclear weapon (Washington Post, July 26, 2008). Iran's supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, added that Iran would not retreat in the face of demands by world powers for Tehran to halt sensitive nuclear work (Agence France-Presse, July 31, 2008).

After ignoring the deadline to respond to the sextet’s June offer to refrain from pursuing more UN penalties if Iran froze expansion of its nuclear work, Iran delivered a letter to European Union foreign policy chief Javier Solana promising a “clear response” at an unspecified date. “It is more of the same from the Iranians – obfuscation and delays,” according to a U.S. official (Reuters, August 6, 2008).

Iran claims it wants to develop nuclear energy for civilian purposes, but this makes no sense given the country’s enormous reserves of petroleum and gas. In addition, the United States has intelligence indicating Iran is trying to fit missiles to carry nuclear weapons, which only makes sense if Iran was also developing or planning to develop a nuclear capability

Hassan Rowhani, the man who headed talks with Britain, France and Germany until 2005, told a meeting of Islamic clerics and academics that Iran played for time and tried to dupe the West after its secret nuclear program was uncovered by the Iranian opposition in 2002. He revealed that while talks were taking place in Teheran, Iran completed the installation of equipment for conversion of yellowcake – a key stage in the nuclear fuel process – at its Isfahan plant.

Dr. Abdul Qadeer Khan, the father of Pakistan’s nuclear program, passed secrets and equipment to Iranian officials. Russia is also helping to rebuild Iran’s Bushehr nuclear reactor. The project has provided valuable training to Iranian technicians and engineers, and expanded the regime’s nuclear infrastructure. Iran is scheduled to receive low-enriched uranium fuel from Russia for the plant, but, contrary to some reports, Iran did not agree to return the spent fuel to Russia.

Iran purchased special gas from China that could be used to enrich uranium for the production of nuclear weapons. The gas purchase was supposed to be reported to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), but it was concealed instead. Chinese experts have also been involved in the supervision of the installation of centrifuge equipment that can be used to enrich uranium.

In February 2003, Iranian President Mohammad Khatami announced the discovery of uranium reserves near the central city of Yazd and said Iran was setting up production facilities “to make use of advanced nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.” This is alarming because it suggests Iran aims to produce and process fuel itself, despite an agreement to obtain all the uranium it would need for civilian purposes from Russia.

Defying a key demand set by 35 nations, Iran confirmed in May 2005 that it had converted 37 tons of uranium into gas, its first acknowledgment of advances made in the production process for enriched uranium. This means Tehran is in a position to start enriching uranium quickly if negotiations over the future of its nuclear program fail. Iran also admitted that it conducted experiments to create plutonium — which is used only in weapons and not for energy production — for five years beyond the date when it previously insisted it had ended all such work. In another sign of Iran’s determination to move forward with a nuclear weapons program, the government announced in March 2005 the establishment of a secret nuclear research center to train its scientists in all aspects of atomic technology.

In September 2005, newly elected Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad defended his country's right to produce nuclear fuel in a fiery speech to the UN General Assembly and later raised worldwide concern about nuclear proliferation when he said, “Iran is ready to transfer nuclear know-how to the Islamic countries due to their need.”

In yet another apparent effort to demonstrate its unwillingness to be deterred by international opprobrium, Iran announced in early December 2005 plans to build two nuclear power plants in addition to the Bushehr reactor (Washington Post, December 6, 2005).

In May 2006, UN inspectors found traces of highly enriched uranium on equipment from an Iranian research center linked to the military. Initial reports suggested the density of enrichment was close to or above the level used to make nuclear warheads. But later a diplomat accredited to the IAEA said it was below that, although higher than the low-enriched material used to generate power and heading toward weapons-grade level (AP, May 13, 2006).

In January 2007, Iran reportedly reached an agreement with North Korea to share all the data and information the Koreans received from their nuclear test in October 2006 with Teheran's nuclear scientists. Iran also stepped up its research activity and was said to be preparing for their own underground nuclear test (Daily Telegraph, January 24, 2007).

In September 2007, Iran unveiled a new version of its ballistic Shahab-3 missile (“Shahab” means shooting star in Farsi), which was already capable of reaching Israel and U.S. forces in the Middle East. The missile’s range has been improved from 810 to 1,125 miles (JTA, September 23, 2007). The missile, which is capable of carrying a non-conventional warhead, could be stationed anywhere in Iran and reach Israel as well as parts of Europe. In January 2006, Iran tested a missile that may have a range of nearly 2,500 miles, capable of reaching Israel and U.S. forces in the Middle East. In March 2005, Ukraine admitted that it had exported cruise missiles to Iran that can carry nuclear weapons and target Israel. Israel is now concerned that Teheran is developing its own cruise missile to evade interception by the Arrow, the IDF's anti-ballistic missile defense system (Jerusalem Post, May 6, 2008).

Iran is believed to have the capability to produce a variety of biological and chemical weapons. Iran has already agreed to assist Syria in developing the capability to independently produce chemical weapons. Iran could also transfer its own stocks to terrorists or use them in warheads to threaten American, Israeli, and other nations’ interests.

The Iranian government’s adherence to Islamic law, and its anti-Western philosophy, inspire many Islamic extremists. Iran is also one of the principal state sponsors of terror. For example, weapons delivered from Tehran via Damascus to Hizballah terrorists in Lebanon have allowed them to stockpile at least 10,000 Katyusha rockets with the capability of hitting major Israeli population centers. When Israel seized the Karine-A ship in 2002, it was loaded with more than 50 tons of Iranian arms bound for the Palestinian Authority.

Iran has been implicated in numerous anti-West and anti-Israel terrorist attacks. Some of these incidents include the taking of more than 30 Western hostages in Lebanon from 1984 through 1992, the bombings of the U.S. Embassy and the French-U.S. Marine barracks in Beirut in 1983 and the Buenos Aires terrorist attacks on the Israeli Embassy in 1992 and on the Argentine Jewish communal building in 1994. Iran also provides at least transit and temporary safe haven to members of al-Qaida. In 2005, Iran promised a reward of $10,000 to Islamic Jihad for launching rockets from the West Bank toward Tel Aviv.

A nuclear Iran would change the entire strategic balance in the Middle East. Officials in Tehran have repeatedly said Iran will never scrap its nuclear program, and talks with the Europeans are aimed at protecting the country’s nuclear achievements, not negotiating an end to them.

In recent months, as tensions with Iran have escalated, several Arab countries suddenly announced their interest in nuclear power. Like the Iranians, they all publicly claim their interest is solely in the peaceful purpose of electrical generation. After more than 30 years of living with Israel’s assumed arsenal, Jordan, Egypt, Yemen, Algeria, Morocco, Tunisia, the UAE and Saudi Arabia did not suddenly decide they needed nuclear energy. Since Jordan and Egypt have peace treaties with Israel and the other Arab states have no dispute with Israel, their motivation is more likely to have come from the fear of a nuclear Iran.

If Iran’s nuclear program is not stopped, it is clear the arms race in the Middle East will be on and the proliferation of nuclear weapons will become a far more serious danger.

The difficult question is what to do to preempt the Iranians. Military action is an option, but does not have wide support in the administration or abroad. Imposing trade and other sanctions is feasible, but many European nations are loathe to jeopardize their profitable economic ties to Iran, and Saddam proved sanctions are not necessarily an impediment to continuing weapons programs. Stricter IAEA monitoring is also an option, but Iraq, Iran, and North Korea all proved the IAEA is incapable of preventing secret weapons development, and may make matters worse by creating a sense of false security about the program they are monitoring. In April 2007, Mohammad Baqer Zolghadr, Iran’s deputy interior minister in security affairs, said Iran will strike U.S. interests around the world and Israel if attacked. “Nowhere would be safe for America with [Iran’s] long-range missiles ... we can fire tens of thousands of missiles every day,” Zolghadr said (Haaretz, April 26, 2007).

Israel’s detractors portray Israel and the “Israeli lobby” as campaigning for military action against Iran. In fact, Israel and its supporters have been the most outspoken in their desire to see tough measures implemented to stop Iran’s nuclear weapons program to avoid war.

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