Mufti began by thanking the Fuhrer for the great honor he had bestowed
by receiving him. He wished to seize the opportunity to convey to the
Fuhrer of the Greater German Reich,
admired by the entire Arab world,
his thanks for the sympathy which he had always shown for the Arab and
especially the Palestinian cause, and to which he had given clear espressos
in his public speeches. The Arab countries were firmly convinced that Germany would win the war
and that the Arab cause would then prosper: The Arabs were Germany's
natural friends because they had the same enemies as had Germany, namely
the English, the Jews,
and the Communists. They were therefore prepared to cooperate with Germany
with all their hearts and stood ready to participate in the war, not
only negatively by the commission of acts of sabotage and the instigation
of revolutions, but also positively by the formation of an Arab Legion.
The Arabs could he more useful to Germany as allies than might he apparent
at first glance, both for geographical reasons and because of the suffering
inflicted upon them by the English and the Jews. Furthermore, they had
had close relations with all Moslem
nations, of which they could make use in behalf of the common cause.
The Arab Legion would he quite easy to raise. An appeal by the Mufti
to the Arab countries and the prisoners of Arab, Algerian,Tunisian,
and Moroccan nationality in
Germany would produce a great number of volunteers eager to fight. Of
Germany's victory the Arab world was firmly convinced, not only because
the Reich possessed a large army, brave soldiers, and military leaders
of genius, but also because the Almighty could never award the victory
to an unjust cause.
In this struggle, the Arabs were striving for the
independence and unity of Palestine, Syria and Iraq. They had the fullest
confidence in the Fuhrer and looked to his hand for the balm on their
wounds which had been inflicted upon them by the enemies of Germany.
The Mufti then mentioned the letter he had received
from Germany, which stated that Germany was holding no Arab territories
and understood and recognized the aspirations to independence and freedom
of the Arabs, just as she supported the elimination of the Jewish national
A public declaration in this sense would be very useful
for its propagandistic effect on the Arab peoples at this moment. It
would rouse the Arabs from their momentary lethargy and give them new
courage. It would also ease the Mufti's work of secretly organizing
the Arabs against the moment when they could strike. At the same time,
he could give the assurance that the Arabs would in strict discipline
patiently wait for the right moment and only strike upon an order from
With regard to the events in Iraq, the Mufti observed
that the Arabs in that country certainly had by no means been incited
by Germany to attack England, but solely had acted in reaction to a
direct English assault upon their honor.
he believed, would welcome the establishment of' an Arab government
in the neighboring territories because they would prefer weaker Arab
to strong European governments in the neighboring countries, and, being
themselves a nation of 7 million, they had moreover nothing to fear
from the 1.700,000 Arabs inhabiting Syria. Transjordan, Iraq. and Palestine.
would have no objections to the unification plan because she had conceded
independence to Syria as early as 1936 and had given her approval to
the unification of Iraq and Syria under King Faisal as early as 1933.
In these circumstances he was renewing his request
that the Fuhrer make a public declaration so that the Arabs would not
lose hope, which is so powerful a force in the life of nations. With
such hope in their hearts the Arabs, as lie had said, were willing to
wait. They were not pressing for immediate realization of their aspirations:
they could easily wait half a year or a whole year. But if they were
not inspired with such a hope by a declaration of this sort, it could
be expected that the English would be the gainers from it.
The Fuhrer replied that Germany's fundamental attitude
on these questions, as the Mufti himself had already stated. was clear.
Germany stood for uncompromising war against the Jews. That naturally
included active opposition to the Jewish national home in Palestine.
which was nothing other than a center, in the form of a state, for the
exercise of destructive influence by Jewish interests. Germany was also
aware that the assertion that the Jews were carrying out the function
of economic pioneers in Palestine was a lie. The work there was done
only by the Arabs, not by the Jews. Germany was resolved, step by step,
to ask one European nation after the other to solve its Jewish problem,
and at the proper time direct a similar appeal to non-European nations
Germany was at the present time engaged in a life
and death struggle with two citadels of Jewish power: Great Britain
and Soviet Russia. Theoretically
there was a difference between England's capitalism and Soviet Russia's
communism: actually, however, the Jews in both countries were pursuing
a common goal. This was the decisive struggle: on the political plane,
it presented itself in the main as a conflict between Germany and England,
but ideologically it was a battle between National Socialism and the
Jews. It went without saying that Germany would furnish positive and
practical aid to the Arabs involved in the same struggle, because platonic
promises were useless in a war for survival or destruction in which
the Jews were able to mobilize all of England's power for their ends.
The aid to the Arabs would have to be material aid.
Of how little help sympathies alone were in such a battle had been demonstrated
plainly by the operation in Iraq, where circumstances had not permitted
the rendering of really effective, practical aid. In spite of all the
sympathies. German aid had not been sufficient and Iraq was overcome
by the power of Britain, that is, the guardian of the Jews.
The Mufti could not but he aware, however. that the
outcome of the struggle going on at present would also decide the fate
of the Arab world. The Fuhrer therefore had to think and speak coolly
and deliberately, as a rational man and primarily as a soldier, as the
leader of the German and allied armies. Everything of a nature to help
in this titanic battle for the common cause, and thus also for the Arabs.
would have to he done. Anything, however, that might contribute to weakening
the military situation must be put aside, no matter hose unpopular this
move might be.
Germany was now engaged in a very severe battles to
force the gateway to the northern Caucasus region. The difficulties
were mainly with regard to maintaining the supply. Which was most difficult
as a result of the destruction of railroads and highways as well as
of the oncoming winter. If at such a moment, the Fuhrer were to raise
the problem of Syria in a declaration, those elements in France which
were under de Gaulle's influence would receive new strength. They would
interpret the Fuhrer's declaration as an intention to break up France's
colonial empire and appeal to their fellow countrymen that they should
rather make common cause with the English to try to save what still
could be saved. A German declaration regarding Syria would in France
he understood to refer to the French colonies in general, and that would
at the present time create new troubles in western Europe, which means
that a portion of the German armed forces would be immobilized in the
west and no longer he available for the campaign in the east.
The Fuhrer then made the following statement to the
Mufti. enjoining him to lock it in the uttermost depths of his heart:
1. He (the Fuhrer) would carry on the battle to the
total destruction of the Judeo-Communist empire in Europe.
2. At some moment which was impossible to set exactly
today but which in any event was not distant, the German armies would
in the course of this struggle reach the southern exit from Caucasia.
3. As soon as this had happened, the Fuhrer would
on his own give the Arab world the assurance that its hour of liberation
had arrived. Germany's objective would then be solely the destruction
of the Jewish element residing in the Arab sphere under the protection
of British power. In that hour the Mufti would be the most authoritative
spokesman for the Arab world. It would then be his task to set off the
Arab operations which he had secretly prepared. When that time had come.
Germany could also he indifferent to French reaction to such a declaration.
Once Germany had forced open the road to Iran and Iraq through Rostov, it would he also the beginning of the end of
the British world empire. He (the Fuhrer) hoped that the coming year
would make it possible for Germany to thrust open the Caucasian gate
to the Middle East. For the good of their common cause. it would he
better if the Arab proclamation were put off for a few more months than
if Germany were to create difficulties for herself without being able
thereby to help the Arabs.
He (the Fuhrer) fully appreciated the eagerness of
the Arabs for a public declaration of the sort requested by the Grand
Mufti. But Ire would beg barn to consider that he (the Fuhrer) himself
was the Chief of State of the German Reich for five long years during
which he was unable to make to his own homeland the announcement of
its liberation. He had to wait with that until the announcement could
he made on the basis of a situation brought about by the force of arms
that the Anschluss had been carried out.
The moment that Germany's tank divisions and air squadrons
had made their appearance south of the Caucasus, the public appeal requested
by the Grand Mufti could go out to the Arab world.
The Grand Mufti replied that it was his view that
everything would come to pass just as the Fiihrer had indicated. He
was fully reassured and satisfied by the words which he had heard from
the Chief of the German State. He asked, however, whether it would not
be possible. secretly at least, to enter into an agreement with Germany
of the kind he had just outlined for the Fuhrer.
The Fuhrer replied that he had just now given the
Grand Mufti precisely that confidential declaration.
The Grand Mufti thanked him for it and stated in conclusion
that he was taking his leave from the Fuhrer in full confidence and
with reiterated thanks for the interest shown in the Arab cause.