Letter to Israeli PM Eshkol Encouraging Peacemaking
(April 6, 1968)
A number of terrorist incursions by Palestinians
from Jordanian territory provoked Israeli reprisals.
King Hussein would then complain to the United States
and American officials would try to discourage Israel
from using military force in response to terrorism.
This letter from President Johnson to Prime Minister Eshkol is one
example of this line of argument and the President's
efforts to coax Israel to cooperate with the Jarring mission.
Dear Mr. Prime Minister:
I have considered your message of
March 22 with two thoughts uppermost in my mind deep
sympathy for the serious problems which continuing terrorist
acts pose for your country; and deep anxiety about the
prospects for peace in the Middle East.
2. I appreciate, of course, the dilemma which the recent
growth of terrorism presents. I believe, however, that military action
across ceasefire fines does not deter the type of terrorism you face,
but leads to greater insecurity, above all at this critical moment.
3. We both recognize, I am sure, that true security
for Israel lies only in peace.
4. I believe we are now at a crossroads in this respect
in the Near East: the sole peace-making process now available is the
jarring Mission. I am deeply concerned by the lack of tangible results
from this mission and the cumulative deterioration of the situation
resulting from a growing incidence of terrorism and counter military
actions-especially at this delicate moment in the internal life of Jordan.
5. I feel, therefore, that there is an urgent need
to reverse the present trend-a trend which carries the risk not only
of greater and greater violence and insecurity, but indeed of another
round of general hostilities, as well as irreparable damage to the Jarring
Mission. We wish to see every possible step taken to minimize these
risks.
6. There is very little time. There is still, however,
an opportunity for an active strategy of peace.
7. I have just learned of Ambassador
Goldberg's discussion with Ambassador Tekoah of April
5. I believe that we must seize the opportunity presented
by King Hussein's visit to Nasser, and the King's apparent
willingness to urge acceptance of the formulation which
Ambassador Jarring gave the Israeli Government on March
10. I understand that Foreign Minister Eban told Ambassador
Jarring at that time that your Government could accept
this formulation. I urge you most strongly to make your
acceptance clear to Ambassador Jarring. The King believes
it would greatly enhance the possibility of his success
with Nasser if you could also agree to a variation in
wording1 which Ambassador
Goldberg set forth to Ambassador Tekoah. I hope you
will be able to consider such a variation in language,
as necessary.
8. This may be the last chance for the Jarring Mission,
and for peace.
Lyndon B. Johnson
1The
language proposed by Jordan stipulated
not only acceptance of Resolution
242 but also a readiness to implement
it.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 20, Arab-Israeli Dispute
1967-1968. DC: GPO,
2001. |