no formal constitution but it does have constitutional laws that are among the
most progressive and liberal of any democratic nation. This is due to "the
constitutional revolution," the adoption by the Israeli parliament, the Knesset, of two basic laws concerning human rights.
The saga of Israel's Basic Laws can be traced back to the country's birth
in 1948. The Declaration of Independence prescribes a clear course for the development
of a future constitution of the Jewish State:
We declare that, with effect from the moment of the termination of the
[British] Mandate being tonight, the eve of Sabbath…15th May, 1948
until the establishment of the elected, regular authorities of the State in
accordance with the Constitution which shall be adopted by the Elected
Constituent Assembly not later than the 1st October 1948, the
People's Council shall act as a Provisional Council of State, and its executive
organ, the People's Administration, shall be the Provisional Government of the
Jewish State, to be called 'Israel.'
In this respect, David Ben Gurion, the drafter of the declaration and the
first Prime Minister was loyal to the UN partition plan which was passed by the
general assembly on November 29, 1947. The partition plan split the land of
Palestine into two independent states: one Jewish and one Arab. That decision
laid down the rules regarding the constitutional formulas of these states:
The Constituent Assembly of each State shall draft a democratic
constitution for its State and choose a provisional government to succeed the
Provisional Council of Government appointed by the Commission. The
constitutions of the States shall embody chapters 1 and 2 of the Declaration
provided for in section C below...”
Accordingly, as soon as Israel’s War of Independence ended on January 25,
1949, elections for the constituent assembly took place. The fledgling state’s
electorate went to the polls expecting to help draft a constitution. Initially,
Prime Minister Ben Gurion was inclined to adopt the American model of a written
constitution, but he changed his mind and began to advocate a legal code
modeled after the British, which contained no formal constitution. It is not
clear what motivated this change of heart, but Ben Gurion, like the other
founding fathers, admired the strength behind the constitution-less British
In his speeches in the Knesset, Ben Gurion argued that "our state is being recreated every day.
Every day, additional Jews liberate themselves by immigrating to our country;
every day, additional parts of our country are liberated from their status as
wasteland. This dynamism cannot tolerate a rigid framework and artificial
constraints. The laws of Israel must adapt themselves to this dynamic
Ben Gurion presided over a transition from the provisional council that
initially governed the state after the declaration of independence to a
constituent assembly elected in 1949. In its first official act, the assembly
changed its name to the First Knesset – a seemingly innocuous linguistic
change, but one which gave a hint of things to come. The constituent assembly
was destined to be reborn as a regular parliament.
Finally, Ben Gurion and his Mapai party - aided and abetted by the
religious members of the Knesset who themselves objected to any secular
constitution - came out openly against a formal written constitution.
Facing them with his rhetorical might stood Menachem Begin, leader of the
opposition Herut party, who argued stubbornly and forcefully for the assembly’s
writing of a formal constitution as laid down by the Declaration of
Independence. Ben Gurion and Begin locked horns for an entire year exchanging
verbal broadsides for and against a written constitution. Finally, this
emotional debate culminated in June 1950 in a compromise solution. The First
Knesset voted for the following decision named after its initiator (MK Y.
“The first Knesset charges the Constitution, Law and Justice
Committee with preparing a draft of the State Constitution. The Constitution
will consist of separate chapters, each chapter constituting a Basic Law of its
own. The chapters will be presented to the Knesset, as the Committee concludes
its deliberations, and all of the chapters shall be consolidated into the State
It was in this way that the Basic Laws came into being as the
half-legitimate heirs to the defunct constitution. The decision was
intentionally vague. Would the Knesset intend to enact a constitution by
installments that would be binding only after its completion, or would each
Basic Law, have a constitutional standing and be normatively above ordinary
legislation? No clear answer was given at the time.
The First Knesset charged its aforementioned Constitution, Law and
Justice Committee with drafting and presenting the outlines of Basic Laws to
the Knesset. No special procedure or majority were mentioned or later adopted.
The first Knesset was dissolved in 1950 due to the first of Israel's many
political crises centering on state and religion. The first Knesset had not
passed one Basic Law and all of its powers were transferred to the
soon-to-be-elected second Knesset. According to the Second Knesset (Transition)
Law, 1951, "the Second Knesset and its members shall have all the powers
which the First Knesset and its members had" and the law added that this
shall be applicable to the Third Knesset and to all future Knessets." No
specific mention of its constituent power was included, thus further
obfuscating the question and causing within the Supreme Court half a century
after the fact.
Knessets passed a series of Basic Laws as if they were the lawful inheritors of
the First Knesset. These Basic Laws were generally ordinary laws in their
content although in form they had a specific character. Their titles did not
include the year in which these laws were enacted. Indeed, the Basic Laws –
except for one dealing with the Knesset itself, which will be detailed below – were pieces of ordinary legislation dealing
with state institutions and did not pretend to be of superior normative
standing. They dealt with the mundane business of government and in most cases
embodied existing norms. Altogether, nine such laws were passed by the Knesset
between 1958 and 1992  – the
year in which the first Human Rights Basic Laws were passed.
These pre-1992 laws were really “cut and paste” jobs. They contained only
a handful of articles that were entrenched (i.e., immune to change and repeal by ordinary majorities) and
consequently, little public or juridical attention was paid to them. There was
one exception to this rule: The Basic Law about the Knesset – the only law of
the nine which was drafted in accordance with the Harari Decision by the
Committee – contained words which alluded to normative superiority. The words
in this section entrenched the purely-proportional electoral system. The
section, valid to this day, states that any amendment of the relevant section
requires an absolute majority of Knesset members – i.e., 61 out of 120 – as
distinct from the ordinary majority which is otherwise required for
This provision gave rise to a number of petitions to the High Court of
Justice dealing with the public finance of political parties. In its
decisions, the court held that only entrenched articles were superior
normatively to ordinary legislation and consequently, offending laws (i.e.,
laws which did not ensure financial equality between parties, and were not
passed by the required majority of 61 members) were invalid.
All of this would change in 1992.
A short political explanation is necessary at this point. The 1990s was
an unusual period in Israeli political and legislative history. In the spring
of 1990, the Israeli political system fell into total disrepute. Shimon Peres,
the leader of the Labor party, tried to oust and replace Yitzhak Shamir, leader
of the Likud party, as Prime Minister. Peres succeeded in pushing a
no-confidence motion through the Knesset – the first in Israel's political
history – but found it difficult to form an alternative coalition government.
The dirty deals that followed as each party attempted to "acquire"
members of the Knesset to get the necessary 61 votes to form a new government stunned
the public and were referred to as the "the smelly exercise" by Yitzhak Rabin.
The prestige of the government and the political class had sunk to a new
low. In these circumstances, a number of Knesset members from different parties
decided to shun party discipline, disregard coalition dictates and initiate a
series of legislative reforms to save the political structure of the Israeli
democracy. These reforms included a law severely limiting the power of
individual Knesset members to "cross the floor" – i.e., to leave
their faction and join another party; a new parties law regulating their
internal structure; a new electoral law providing for direct election of a
Prime Minister (a semi-presidential system which was revoked after three
elections) and, finally, the enactment of two Basic Laws concerning Human
Rights. The enactment of these two basic laws became known as the
"constitutional revolution” and the history of these two Basic Laws –
Israel's Bill of Rights – is both unique and dramatic.
For many years Knesset members attempted to pass Basic Laws protecting
human rights but these attempts were frustrated by strong opposition from the
Jewish–Orthodox parties, whose cooperation was essential for Israel's fragile
coalition governments. In 1989, Minister of Justice, Dan Meridor, initiated a
Governmental Basic Law on Human Rights. As expected, the ultra-Orthodox
coalition partner in the Likud cabinet vetoed the bill and Meridor had to
shelve it. The Orthodox opposed the legislation out of fear that the power of
religious authorities would be weakened.
This author nevertheless submitted the same bill to the Knesset. I
The Jewish people have a long and continuing love affair with Human
Rights. When, in 1789, the French National Assembly declared in words which
still echo today that 'all men were born and remain free and equal in their
rights', the Jews were directly connected to this event: first, in the Jewish
Diaspora a recognition took root that revolutionary France grants a new meaning
to the old Jewish credo that all human beings were created in God's image: and
secondly, that this declaration opened up a new gate, a new dawn of equal
rights for Jews. And since then to the present time, Jews have been champions
of Human Rights. 
The Orthodox parties again threatened to bring down the government if the
bill was adopted and it was clear a compromise was required if the bill was to
have a chance to pass through the three Knesset readings necessary to transform
it into law.
The Bill was ultimately split into four separate parts – dealing
respectively with personal dignity and liberty, freedom of professional
occupation, freedom of speech and freedom of association. These smaller, less
ambitious parts would be easier pills for the Orthodox parties to swallow for
two reasons: First, dealing with four separate bills was easier than dealing
with a complete charter of human rights, second, by dealing separately with
distinct subjects, it was possible to sweeten the pill by passing from the less
objectionable issues of personal freedom and freedom of employment to the less palatable ones, such as freedom
of speech (which the Orthodox feared would legitimize pornography and
This move was helpful but not sufficient. Further concessions were
needed, in particular, the preservation of the law that gave the rabbinical
courts exclusive jurisdiction in matters of marriage and divorce. Additionally,
the laws had to define the values of Israel as being of both a Jewish and a
democratic nature; “freedom of movement” within the country had to be deleted
so as not to enable vehicular traffic to pass through devout Orthodox
neighborhoods on the Sabbath; and finally, an explicit reference to equality
under the law had to be removed as the Orthodox feared that this would be
interpreted as giving non-Orthodox communities and their rabbis equal status to
that of their own privileged institutions. Later, however, an explicit
reference to the Declaration of Independence was added to the article describing
the purposes of the laws. Because the Declaration includes the principle of
equality,  the
two Basic Laws incorporate, albeit indirectly, the constitutional guarantee of
There is no mention of judicial review in the laws, but the discussions
in the Knesset Committee as well as the protracted conducted with Orthodox and
other parties assumed that these Basic Laws would have constitutional standing
and that any offending law could be judged invalid.
Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir attempted to stall the proceedings and stop
the deliberations of the Committee. In the then rebellious mood of the Knesset,
however, the Likud chairman of the Committee, Uriel Lynn, could disregard the
government’s wishes. In presenting the Bill, which incorporated the compromises
with the orthodox parties, I said:
We live in a period in which Human Rights have acquired a meaning
undreamt of even a few years ago. We witness in this most horrible of
centuries, in which a third of our people were murdered […] a new era of
universal human rights. In the name of these rights, men and women raised
barricades. The spring of 1989 in East Europe gave human rights a new political
and universal significance […] It is inconceivable that in the parliament of
the state whose culture gave the world the concept of protecting everyone who
is created in God's image, there will be no legal status to human rights. This
is totally inconceivable. This is something we cannot live with. This is a
stain on our statute-book. And we want to begin to remove this stain, in a
spirit of compromise. We want to usher in a parliamentary consensus in order to
remove this stain. 
seemingly impossible then happened: The two first Basic Laws – Freedom of
Occupation and Personal Dignity and Liberty – went to the Knesset plenum and,
after many long sessions, were finally voted into law on March 13, 1992. After
more than fifty years of futile attempts to enact a Bill of Rights, the Knesset
had passed two laws which subscribed to a most progressive version of liberal
not the end of the story, however. In 1995, the Supreme Court decided in the Mizrahi case that the two Basic Laws stand above ordinary legislation because in
enacting them, the Knesset acted in its capacity as the inheritor of the 1949
Constituent Assembly. Consequently; the court had an inherent authority to
judicially review laws which were incompatible with the 1992 Basic Laws.
decision, the judicial review of the Knesset Acts has become a fact of legal
and parliamentary life. Since then, the Supreme Court has based its power of review on an article which appears in the
two laws, popularly called the ”limitation clause.” Under this article – which
is couched in terms similar to those of article 1 of the Canadian Charter of
Rights and Freedoms – "The rights according to this Basic Law shall not be
infringed except by a law befitting the values of the State of Israel, enacted
for a proper purpose and to an extent no greater than required."  The
values of the State are defined in both laws in identical language:
human rights in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of the human
being, the sanctity of human life and the principle that all persons are free;
these rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the
Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.
purpose of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to
establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and
Thus the High Court of Justice Court could, under the Mizrahi rule, invalidate any law that did not fulfill the
conditions of the limitation clause. As shall be explained, the
High Court of Justice has since used this power of constitutional review
sparingly. In only four cases has the court rescinded an act or part of it and
in all these cases the Knesset accepted the Court's rulings.
the Knesset, through its legal advisers, goes over any bill, proposed by either Government or
Knesset members (i.e., private members bills), to ascertain its compatibility
with the limitation clauses of these two Basic Laws. Thus the new Basic Laws
constituted, in the words of Chief Justice Aaron Barak a "constitutional
revolution." In actuality, the entire tenor of the public debate on human
rights in Israel has been transformed by the 1992 laws and the subject of human
rights has acquired a legal dominance it had previously
however, a price to be paid for these acquired human rights. As a result of the
Court's decisions and Chief Justice Barak dictum, the Orthodox parties let it
be known that they would object to any further Basic Laws and would prevent
their passage in the Knesset. Indeed, when the Supreme Court held that under
the Basic Law of freedom of occupation the government could not
constitutionally prevent the importation of pork and other non-kosher meat, the
leader of the Shas ultra-Orthodox party publicly announced that henceforth he
would even object to the Ten Commandments if they were to be incorporated into
a Basic Law.
was a paralysis in the writing of a constitution. The two remaining drafts of
this author's – dealing with Freedom of Speech and Freedom of Association – were dead and buried, and while more recently there have been brave attempts to
draft an entire constitution, there are no signs that this will happen soon.
Thus Israelis will have to content themselves with a partial constitution made
up of Basic Laws and its Bill of Rights will consist of the two Basic Laws
passed in 1992, before the religious parties clamped down on any further
Practical Implications of the Basic Laws
As discussed above, the language of the articles
describing the principles of these Basic Laws is couched in liberal terms The
laws are based on the recognition of the centrality of the individual and the
protection of his or her life and freedom. There is no direct reference to
equal protection in the laws but the reference to the Declaration of
Independence, which includes a strongly worded equality clause, is a substitute
for this absence. The wording of this section can be compared favorably with
the Canadian Charter of Right and Freedoms (part of the Constitution Act, 1982)
which states that it guarantees rights and freedoms set out in it without
specifying the philosophical principle on which these rights are founded except
for the general constitutional statement that "Canada is founded upon
principles that recognize the supremacy of God and the rule of Law." The
Charter resembles the preamble to the European Convention of Human Rights that
includes the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
The formula invoked by Israeli law follows the
principle established after World War I that restrictions on human rights must, in addition to being prescribed by
law, be limited by an objective criterion that can be judicially reviewed. This
is of course the major lesson drawn from the Nazi takeover of the German
judicial system in which the organization relied on the formal authority of the
Weimar constitution. The universal declaration of Human Rights indicated this
new post-Nazi approach in article 29(2):
"In the exercise of his rights and freedoms, everyone shall be
subject only to such limitations as are determined by law solely for the
purpose off securing due recognition and respect for the rights and freedoms of
others and of meeting the just requirements of morality, public order and the
general welfare in a democratic society."
The European convention on Human rights incorporates the same
idea. After ensuring the right of privacy, article 8 states:
“There shall be no interference by a public authority with the
exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is
necessary in a democratic society…. ”
A similar provision is incorporated in article 9 (freedom of
religion and conscience), article 10 (freedom of expression) and 11 (freedom of
The Knesset opted to incorporate such a restriction in
one comprehensive provision instead of enumerating it in separate articles
relating to individual rights.
It has been argued that by placing this restriction in
a limitation clause that refers to the values of Israel as "Jewish and
democratic," the Basic Laws stray from the clear instruction of the
Universal Declaration, the European Convention and the Canadian Charter.
This admonition is valid. That being said, as this
phrase was suggested and inserted into the laws by the present author, I would
like to defend its use. The term
"Jewish and democratic" excludes a religious interpretation of the
term. Indeed, the Supreme Court interpreted the term "Jewish" so as
to be always compatible with "democratic." Moreover, the expression
“Jewish and democratic” was often used by the politically left Peace Now
movement so as to point out that Israel,
if it were to annex the occupied territories, could not conceivably be both
Jewish and democratic. Israel would either have to disenfranchise millions of
Palestinian Arabs or, alternatively, lose its Jewish majority in the Knesset.
This is perhaps the reason why the Arab parties in the Knesset did not vote
against this section.
Having said that, I maintain that it is still
desirable to move the Jewish element from specific human rights legislation to where it belongs: The preamble of a
future constitution – if ever it materializes.
looks beyond mere declarations, the Israeli Basic Law falls short of similar
constitutional instruments. Existing legislation – including the monopoly given
to religious courts on family law matters – is preserved and is immune from
judicial review; equality is only obliquely referred to and freedom of movement
within Israel is absent, as is freedom of religion and conscience.
Yet, despite these shortcomings, the two Basic Laws
have served a major purpose by turning Israel into a more liberal democracy.
This process began to take root not only because of the decisions of the
Supreme Court but also because two phrases coined by these laws – “Jewish and
Democratic” and “Personal Liberty and Dignity” – became almost overnight catch
phrases and their concepts are taught and debated in schools and universities.
As to the judicial results of this "constitutional revolution," the
harvest is small in size but impressive in its intensity.
Invoking the two Basic Laws, the Court has in the past
intervened and declared null and void altogether four sections of laws passed
by the Knesset. In all these cases, the Knesset acquiesced and moreover
accepted the rulings of the Court. Paradoxically, it was a decision of the Court in which, by a majority of
one, the court did not annul a law of the Knesset which started an intensive
debate as to the scope of its constitutional review.
The four cases in which the Court historically struck down
sections of Knesset Laws were:
1. H.C. 1715/97 Lishkat Menahalei
Hashkaot v. Minister of Finance (Piskei Din 51(4) 367 –Hebrew) in which the
court declared null and void a section of a law imposing a new licensing
regiment on investment brokers. The sections dealing with practicing brokers
stated that those who have been practicing for less than seven years must pass
an exam and the court ruled that this was an infringement of the Basic Law:
Freedom of Occupation. The Knesset amended the law accordingly.
2. H.C. 6055/95 Tsemach
v. Minister of Defense – (Piskei Din 53(5)241 – Hebrew) in which sections of the Military
Jurisdiction Act were set aside because they allowed the detention of a soldier
for a period up to 72 hours before bringing him or her before a court. The
Knesset amended the law so as to lessen the period to 48 hours.
3. H.C. 1030/99 Oron M.K. v. Government of
Israel – (Piskei Din 56(3) 640 –Hebrew) in which the court set aside a
section of the law which gave licenses to pirate radio stations (mainly
nationalist-religious) who had been operating illegally for at least five years
prior to the law. The court held that this provision infringed on their lawful
competitors' freedom of occupation and was therefore invalid. The Knesset did
not attempt to revive these sections.
4.H.C. 1661/05 Hof Gaza Regional Council v. The Knesset – (Piskei
Din 59(2) 481 – Hebrew) in which the unilateral Israeli withdrawal from Gaza
was the subject of litigation. In that case, the Knesset passed a special law
compensating the Jewish settlers, who were to be forcefully evicted, from their
properties. The Court held that property rights of the settlers were infringed
upon by the withdrawal. The Court examined whether the law fulfilled the
conditions of the limitation clause. Eventually, the Court set aside four
provisions of the disputed law with regard to rights to compensation but the
majority – 10 of 11 judges – refrained from dealing with the actual decision to
unilaterally withdraw from Gaza saying "that in such matters we cannot
interfere except for extraordinary and extreme cases"  . The
dissenting Judge Levy was ready to set aside the withdrawal decision as incompatible
with the "limitation clause.”
was divided between a majority of six judges who accepted the government's case
and turned down the petition and a minority of five judges who were ready to
set aside the disputed law. The minority opinion – headed by Barak, President
of the Supreme Court – was strengthened by the fact that one of the majority
judges – Judge Levy -agreed in principle
with the minority but refused to set aside the law because it was provisional
and was about to be replaced by a new law. The new law is again being
challenged on similar grounds in the High Court of Justice.
This decision gravely antagonized certain parts of the
Knesset. Had the minority view won, the result would have been the entry of
tens of thousands of Palestinians into Israel. It is safe to assume that the
majority of Knesset members would have taken legal measures to frustrate the
decision, most likely by amending the Personal Liberty and Dignity Law. The
inevitable result would have been a clash between the Supreme Court and the
De Facto Entrenchment
The two 1992 Basic Laws differ in two respects. According to the first law, the right to
occupation is entrenched – i.e., it
cannot be amended or rescinded without an absolute majority of Knesset members
(61 out of 120) and it incorporates a Canadian-style override clause which
enables the Knesset to enact laws incompatible with the Basic Law provided
their duration is at most five years and provided a majority of Knesset members
vote for it.
The Liberty and Dignity Law is not entrenched and therefore
can be amended by an ordinary majority of present members. Political
circumstances can account for the differences in these laws. The entrenchment
clause in the Dignity Law failed to pass by one vote as the members of the
Knesset supporting it were only partially present in the plenum – this being
primaries time.  Despite
growing agitation against the Supreme Court's recent "activism,” there has
been no attempt to change the un-entrenched Liberty and Dignity Law. The only
explanation for this phenomenon is that the principle enshrined in this Basic
Law and its popularity, as well as fear of international public opinion, has
deterred Knesset members from changing a law which has become synonymous with
Israel's Bill of Rights.
Has there ever been a similar case in
the history of other democratic nations? Has ever a constitution – albeit a
partial one – been passed by the private initiative of a single member of the
opposition in parliament in the face of the Prime Minister's attempts to block
it? Indeed, 1992 afforded a uniquely opportune moment created by political
circumstances. While the old political
establishment was reeling, the Knesset members shared the public sentiment that
a change was needed. Meanwhile, the Law and Constitution Committee was chaired
by an independent and courageous Member of Knesset who was willing to be the
leader of this change. At the same time the religious parties were ready for a
compromise that would secure their past achievements while allowing for future
gains. Finally, the Minister of Justice “privately” gave his support for the
These extraordinary circumstances, in addition to a
series of lengthy intra-party negotiations, enabled this author to carry out a
mission which for many years seemed impossible. The constitution-less state of
Israel acquired a partial constitution with a strongly worded Bill of Rights
and full judicial review of offending laws. The Israeli political system
emerged an island of constitutional stability.
LAW: HUMAN DIGNITY AND LIBERTY, (5752-1992) 
1. Fundamental human rights
in Israel are founded upon recognition of the value of the human being, the
sanctity of human life, and the principle that all persons are free; these
rights shall be upheld in the spirit of the principles set forth in the
Declaration of the Establishment of the State of Israel.
1A. The purpose
of this Basic Law is to protect human dignity and liberty, in order to
establish in a Basic Law the values of the State of Israel as a Jewish and
Preservation of life, body and dignity
2. There shall be no violation of the life, body or dignity
of any person as such.
Protection of property
3. There shall be no violation of the property of a person.
Protection of life, body and dignity
4. All persons are entitled to protection of their life,
body and dignity.
5. There shall be no deprivation or
restriction of the liberty of a person by imprisonment, arrest, extradition or
Leaving and entering Israel
6. (a) All persons are free to leave Israel.
(b) Every Israel national has the right of
entry into Israel from abroad.
7. (a) All persons have the right to privacy and to
(b) There shall be no entry into the
private premises of a person who has not consented thereto.
(c) No search
shall be conducted on the private premises or body of a person, nor in the body
or personal effects.
(d) There shall
be no violation of the confidentiality of conversation, or of the writings or
records of a person.
Violation of rights
8. There shall
be no violation of rights under this Basic Law except by a Law befitting the
values of the State of Israel, enacted for a proper purpose, and to an extent
no greater than is required, or by regulation enacted by virtue of express
authorization in such Law.
Reservation regarding security forces
9. There shall be no
restriction of rights under this Basic Law held by persons serving in the
Israel Defense Forces, the Israel Police, the Prisons Service and other
security organizations of the State, nor shall such rights be subject to
conditions, except by virtue of a Law, or by regulation enacted by virtue of a
Law, and to an extent no greater than is required by the nature and character
of the service.
Validity of laws
10. This Basic
Law shall not affect the validity of any law in force prior to the commencement
of the Basic Law.
11. All governmental authorities are bound to respect the
rights under this Basic Law.
12. This Basic
Law cannot be varied, suspended or made subject to conditions by emergency
regulations; notwithstanding, when a state of emergency regulations;
notwithstanding, when a state of emergency exists, by virtue of a declaration
under section 9 of the Law and Administration Ordinance, 5708-1948, emergency
regulations may be enacted by virtue of said section to deny or restrict rights
under this Basic Law, provided the denial or restriction shall be for a proper
purpose and for a period and extent no greater than is required.