In 1952, Gen. Omar Bradley, head of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, believed the West required 19 divisions to defend the Middle East and that Israel could supply two. He also expected only three states to provide the West air power in Middle Eastern defense by 1955: Great Britain, Turkey and Israel. Bradley's analysis was rejected because the political echelon decided it was more important for the United States to work with Egypt, and later Iraq. It was feared that integration of Israeli forces in Western strategy would alienate the Arabs. This was no doubt also a reason why NATO turned down Israel's request for membership and the United States declined to sign a bilateral defense treaty that Israel hoped would counterbalance the Western alliance with Arab states that would eventually become the Baghdad Pact.
Israel's crushing victory over the combined Arab forces in 1967 caused this view to be revised. The following year, the United States sold Israel sophisticated planes (Phantom jets) for the first time. Washington shifted its Middle East policy from seeking a balance of forces to ensuring Israel enjoyed a qualitative edge over its enemies.
Israel proved its value in 1970 when the United States asked for help in bolstering King Hussein's regime. Israel's willingness to aid Amman, and movement of troops to the Jordanian border, persuaded Syria to withdraw the tanks it had sent into Jordan to support PLO forces during Black September. In addition, the Soviets knew that all the squadron leaders of the Sixth Fleet landed in Israel to coordinate activities.
Also, by the early 1970s, it had become clear that no Arab state could or would contribute to Western defense in the Middle East. The Baghdad Pact had long ago expired, and the regimes friendly to the United States were weak reeds in the region compared to the anti-Western forces in Egypt, Syria and Iraq. Even after Egypt's reorientation following the signing of its peace treaty with Israel, the United States did not count on any Arab government for military assistance.
The Carter Administration began to implement a form of strategic cooperation (it was not referred to as such) by making Israel eligible to sell military equipment to the United States. The willingness to engage in limited, joint military endeavors was viewed by President Carter as a means of rewarding Israel for "good behavior" in peace talks with Egypt.
Though still reluctant to formalize the relationship, strategic cooperation became a major focus of the U.S.-Israel relationship when Ronald Reagan entered office. Before his election, Reagan had written: "Only by full appreciation of the critical role the State of Israel plays in our strategic calculus can we build the foundation for thwarting Moscow's designs on territories and resources vital to our security and our national well-being."
Reagan's view culminated in the November 30, 1981, signing of a Memorandum of Understanding on "strategic cooperation." On November 29, 1983, a new agreement was signed creating the Joint Political-Military Group (JPMG) and a group to oversee security assistance, the Joint Security Assistance Planning Group (JSAP).
The JPMG was originally designed to discuss means of countering threats posed by increased Soviet involvement in the Middle East. It has placed increasing emphasis, however, on bilateral concerns about the proliferation of chemical weapons and ballistic missiles.
The JSAP was formed in response to Israel's economic crisis in the mid1980s. It is a binational group that meets annually in Washington to examine Israel's current and future military procurement requirements. It also formulates plans for the allocation of U.S. Foreign Military Sales credits in light of current threat assessments and U.S. budgetary capabilities.
An example of cooperation between the branches occurred January 23, 1987, when Congress designated Israel as a major non-NATO ally. This law formally established Israel as an ally, and allowed its industries to compete equally with NATO countries and other close U.S. allies for contracts to produce a significant number of defense items.
By the end of Reagan's term, the U.S. had prepositioned equipment in Israel, regularly held joint training exercises, began co-development of the Arrow Anti-Tactical Ballistic Missile and was engaged in a host of other cooperative military endeavors.
Since then, U.S.-Israel strategic cooperation has continued to evolve. Today, these strategic ties are stronger than ever. To cite a few examples:
The strategic cooperation agreements established Israel as a de facto ally of the United States, institutionalized military to military contacts, sent a message to the Arabs that America was not afraid to risk upsetting them and shifted at least part of the focus of relations with Israel from Congress to the Executive Branch.