Note: We are presenting raw data. When available, we provide some or all of the crosstabs (i.e., breakdowns by various categories such as party ID). To analyze the data, we encourage users to read the entire study and the methodology used. Results and reliability can be affected by such things as sample size, question wording, and question order. Responses may also be influenced by context and timing; for example, if the survey is conducted during a war. The wording of questions in Arabic may not be exact.
The latest events in Gaza - % saying they see them as: (Arab Barometer, Fall 2025)
| Egypt | Iraq | Jordan | Lebanon | Morocco | Palestine | Syria | Tunisia | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| War | 9% | 16% | 6% | 7% | 15% | 5% | 10% | 12% |
| Mass killing | 11% | 15% | 9% | 16% | 19% | 6% | 12% | 9% |
| Conflict | 0% | 3% | 1% | 3% | 7% | 1% | 1% | 2% |
| Ethnic cleansing | 3% | 3% | 5% | 6% | 9% | 14% | 6% | 9% |
| Hostilities | 2% | 3% | 1% | 3% | 11% | 1% | 2% | 2% |
| Massacre | 23% | 26% | 24% | 26% | 15% | 13% | 14% | 29% |
| Genocide | 26% | 30% | 46% | 34% | 18% | 49% | 44% | 31% |
| All of these terms | 25% | 2% | 9% | 5% | 4% | 11% | 10% | 2% |
| Other - specify | 1% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 2% |
| DK/NA | 0% | 0% | 0% | 0% | 1% | 0% | 0% | 1% |
Favorability: Iran - % saying they have a very or somewhat favorable view (Arab Barometer, Fall 2025)
| Country | 2021-2022 | 2023-2024 | 2025 |
|---|---|---|---|
| Iraq | 24% | 34% | 44% |
| Jordan | 21% | 25% | 24% |
| Lebanon | 28% | 36% | 31% |
| Palestine | 30% | 28% | 42% |
Iran's nuclear program - % saying the threat is critical (Arab Barometer, Fall 2025)
| Country | Total |
|---|---|
| Syria | 85% |
| Egypt | 75% |
| Jordan | 73% |
| Lebanon | 71% |
| Iraq | 69% |
| Morocco | 60% |
| Palestine | 55% |
Iran’s political influence in the region - % saying the threat is critical (Arab Barometer, Fall 2025)
| Country | Total |
|---|---|
| Syria | 83% |
| Iraq | 66% |
| Jordan | 62% |
| Egypt | 61% |
| Lebanon | 60% |
| Morocco | 41% |
| Palestine | 40% |
Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories - % saying the threat is critical (Arab Barometer, Fall 2025)
| Country | Total |
|---|---|
| Egypt | 96% |
| Syria | 92% |
| Palestine | 92% |
| Lebanon | 88% |
| Jordan | 88% |
| Iraq | 81% |
| Morocco | 63% |
Stance of Iran on Israel-Palestine War - % saying they are: (Arab Barometer, Fall 2025)
| Egypt | Iraq | Jordan | Lebanon | Morocco | Palestine | Syria | Tunisia | |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| More committed to defending Palestine than Israel | 52% | 62% | 38% | 77% | 18% | 51% | 32% | 62% |
| More committed to defending Israel than Palestine | 5% | 14% | 13% | 2% | 19% | 9% | 20% | 10% |
| Equally committed to defending both Palestine and Israel | 5% | 6% | 9% | 0% | 33% | 7% | 3% | 4% |
| Unclear on their commitment to defending either Palestine and Israel | 31% | 17% | 37% | 18% | 28% | 32% | 31% | 18% |
| DK/NA | 6% | 0% | 3% | 2% | 2% | 1% | 14% | 6% |
Which is a critical threat to your country’s national security? (Arab Barometer, 2025)
| Country | Iran’s political influence | Iran’s nuclear program | Israeli occupation of the Palestinian territories |
|---|---|---|---|
| Egypt | 61% | 75% | 96% |
| Iraq | 66% | 69% | 81% |
| Jordan | 62% | 73% | 88% |
| Lebanon | 60% | 71% | 88% |
| Morocco | 41% | 60% | 63% |
| Palestinian Territories | 40% | 55% | 92% |
| Syria | 83% | 85% | 92% |
How would you rate Iranian Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s foreign policy toward the Middle East and North Africa? (% saying “very good” or “good”) (Arab Barometer, September-November 2025)
| % Saying “Very Good” or “Good” | |
|---|---|
| Tunisia | 49% |
| Iraq | 48% |
| Palestine | 36% |
| Morocco | 35% |
| Lebanon | 29% |
| Jordan | 19% |
| Syria | 3% |
Attitudes towards the Palestinian cause by country (Doha Institute, 2019/2020, 2022)
| 2019/20 | 2022 | 2019/20 | 2022 | |
| Country* | Concerns All Arabs | Solely Concerns the Palestinians | ||
| Jordan | 93% | 90% | 6% | 7% |
| Qatar | 88% | 79% | 8% | 11% |
| Saudi Arabia | 89% | 69% | 8% | 12% |
| Egypt | 74% | 75% | 21% | 18% |
| Iraq | 71% | 75% | 20% | 18% |
| Kuwait | 69% | 72% | 24% | 25% |
| Lebanon | 69% | 62% | 21% | 28% |
| Palestine | 66% | 70% | 29% | 26% |
| Aggregate | 79% | 76% | 15% | 16% |
*Also included Algeria, Tunisia, Mauritania, Sudan and Morocco
Which states poses the greatest threat to the Arab Countries (Doha Institute, 2019/2020, 2022)
| Country* | 2011 | 2012/2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017/2018 | 2019/2020 | 2022 |
| Israel | 51% | 52% | 42% | 45% | 41% | 39% | 37% | 38% |
| United States | 22% | 21% | 24% | 22% | 27% | 28% | 29% | 21% |
| Iran | 4% | 6% | 9% | 10% | 10% | 10% | 12% | 7% |
| Arab countries | 2% | 3% | 5% | 5% | 5% | 7% | 5% | 5% |
*Included Russia, European countries, others, no threats which all had negligible responses
Do you hold negative or positive views of U.S. foreign policy towards Palestine? (Doha Institute, 2016, 2017, 2019/2020, 2022)
| 2016 | 2017 | 2019/2020 | 2022 | |
| Very positive | 2% | 1% | 1% | 3% |
| Positive | 7% | 5% | 6% | 8% |
| Negative | 26% | 23% | 27% | 24% |
| Very Negative | 54% | 64% | 54% | 53% |
| Don't know/No answer | 11% | 7% | 12% | 12% |
Does Israel pose a threat to the stability of the region? (Doha Institute, 2016, 2017, 2019/2020, 2022)
| 2016 | 2017/2018 | 2019/2020 | 2022 | |
| Certainly | 80% | 82% | 80% | 74% |
| Yes, to an extent | 9% | 8% | 9% | 10% |
| No | 3% | 2% | 3% | 4% |
| Certainly not | 2% | 2% | 3% | 5% |
| Don't know/No answer | 6% | 6% | 5% | 7% |
Would you support or oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel by your country? (Doha Institute, 2017, 2019/2020, 2022)
| 2011 | 2012/ 2013 | 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017/2018 | 2019/2020 | 2022 | |
| Support | 9% | 6% | 6% | 9% | 9% | 8% | 6% | 8% |
| Oppose | 84% | 87% | 87% | 85% | 86% | 87% | 88% | 84% |
| Don't know/No answer | 7% | 6% | 7% | 6% | 5% | 5% | 6% | 8% |
Would you support or oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel by your country? (Doha Institute, 2022)
| 2022 | ||
| Country* | Support | Oppose |
| Jordan | 4% | 94% |
| Qatar | 5% | 87% |
| Saudi Arabia | 5% | 38% |
| Egypt | 13% | 84% |
| Iraq | 7% | 92% |
| Kuwait | 13% | 85% |
| Lebanon | 11% | 84% |
| Palestine | 3% | 95% |
| Aggregate | 76% | 16% |
Why do you oppose diplomatic recognition of Israel by your country? (Doha Institute, 2017, 2019/2020, 2022)
| 2014 | 2015 | 2016 | 2017/2018 | 2019/2020 | 2022 | |
| Because it is a settler colonialist state and occupies Palestine | 23.4% | 24.5% | 27% | 31.7% | 33.7% | 46.7% |
| Because it is an expansionist state that wants to dominate or occupy other Arab countries | 2.4% | 13% | 13% | 10.1% | 9.4% | 17.9% |
| Because it is a terrorist state and supports terrorism | 1.2% | 10.4% | 7.6% | 7.4% | 7.6% | 7.0% |
| Because it is an entity that deals with Arabs in a hateful and racist way | 12.2% | 10.2% | 8.2% | 6.3% | 5.9% | |
| Because the state arose by ethnically cleansing Palestinians and continues to persecute them | 5.5% | 6.9% | 8.1% | 8.3% | 6.8% | |
| Because it opposes Palestinian rights and continues to legitimize what it did to the Palestinian people | 7.5% | 5.6% | 5.8% | 5.3% | 4.8% | |
| Because it is an enemy to our country specifically and to the Arab people more generally | 11.5% | 4.7% | 3.3% | 3.4% | 4.1% | |
| Because it threatens the stability and security of the region | 2.5% | 3.4% | 3.2% | 3.4% | 3.6% | 3.6% |
| Oppose for religious reasons | 4.9% | 3.3% | 5.2% | 6.6% | 6.7% | 5.1% |
| Because it violates agreements and treaties | 2.3% | 2.4% | 2.1% | 1.6% | 1.6% | 1.8% |
| I do not agree with the existence of the State of Israel | 3.4 | 0.3% | 0.6% | 1.1% | 2.3% | 2.3% |
| No reason given | 10.2% | .6% | 1.8% | 1.6% | 1.9% | 0.2% |
| I would accept my country's diplomatic recognition of Israel | 6% | 8.9% | 9.5% | 7.9% | 6.2% | 7.5% |
| Don't know/No answer | 7% | 6% | 5% | 5% | 5.6% | 7.9% |
| Total of those opposed to recognizing Israel | 87% | 85.4% | 85.9% | 86.8% | 88.2% | 84.3% |
Sources: The 2016 Arab Opinion Index, The Doha Institute;
The 2017 Arab Opinion Index, The Doha Institute.
The 2019-20 Arab Opinion Index, The Doha Institute.