Nazi Foreign Minister Ribbentrop on the Declaration of War on the Soviet
Union
(June 22, 1941)
When in the Summer of 1939 the Reich Government, motivated
by a desire to achieve adjustment of interests between Germany and the
U.S.S.R., approached the Soviet Government, they were aware of the fact
that it was no easy matter to reach an understanding with a State that
on one hand claimed to belong to a community of individual nations with
rights and duties resulting therefrom, yet on the other hand was ruled
by a party that, as a section of the Comintern, was striving to bring
about world revolution-in other words, the very dissolution of these
individual nations.
The German Government, putting aside their serious
misgivings occasioned by this fundamental difference between political
aims of Germany and Soviet Russia and by the sharp contrast between
diametrically opposed conceptions of National Socialism and Bolshevism,
made the attempt.
They were guided by the idea that the elimination
of the possibility of war, which would result from an understanding
between Germany and Russia, and safeguarding of the vital necessities
of the two people, between whom friendly relations had always existed,
would offer the best guarantee against further spreading of the Communist
doctrine of international Jewry over Europe.
This belief was strengthened by the fact that certain
happenings in Russia itself and certain measures of international scope
undertaken by the Russian Government allowed it to be assumed that departure
from these doctrines and former methods of causing disintegration among
foreign nations appeared possible.
The reception accorded in Moscow to the German démarche
and the readiness of the Soviet Government to conclude a pact of friendship
with Germany appeared to confirm this change of attitude.
Thus, on Aug. 23, 1939, a non-aggression pact was
concluded, while on Sept. 28, 1939, a frontier and friendship agreement
was signed by the two States. The essence of these agreements consisted
of:
1. Reciprocal engagement on the part of both States
not to attack one another and to live on peaceful and neighborly terms,
and
2. Delimitation of spheres of interest-the German
Reich renouncing all influence in Finland, Latvia, Estonia, Lithuania
and Bessarabia while territories of the former Polish State as far as
the line formed by the Narew, Bug and San (rivers) were to be incorporated
into Russia according to the desire of the Soviets.
The Reich Government, in the pact immediately following
conclusion of the non-aggression pact with Russia, effected a fundamental
change in their policy toward the Soviet Union. The German Government
faithfully adhered in both letter and spirit to the treaties concluded
with the Soviet Union.
In addition to this they had, through the conquest
of Poland, by shedding German blood, gained for the Soviet Union the
greatest success in foreign politics that it had achieved since coming
into existence. This was only possible by reason of Germany's friendly
policy toward Russia and the overwhelming victories of German forces.
Not unreasonably, the Reich Government therefore felt
entitled to expect that the attitude of the Soviet Union toward the
German Reich would be of the same nature, especially since, during the
negotiations that were conducted in Moscow by Herr von Ribbentrop, Reich
Minister for Foreign Affairs, and also on other occasions, the Soviet
Government had repeatedly expressed the view that these treaties would
form the basis for permanent adjustment of German-Soviet Russian interests
and that the two peoples, each respecting the regime of the other and
prepared to abstain from any interference in internal affairs of the
other partner, could reach permanent good neighborly relations.
Unfortunately it soon was to become evident that the
German Government had been quite mistaken in this assumption.
In actual fact the Comintern resumed its activities
in every sphere very soon after conclusion of the German-Russian treaties.
This was true not only of Germany herself, but also as applied to States
friendly to Germany, to neutral States and to such European territory
as was occupied by German troops. In order to avoid openly infringing
the treaties methods were changed and camouflage was applied more painstakingly
and with greater cunning.
It obviously was thought necessary in Moscow to counteract
the effect of conclusion of the pact with National Socialist Germany
by continually pillorying Germany's alleged "imperialistic war."
Strict and effective preventive measures adopted by
German police compelled the Comintern to seek to conduct their subversive
activities and their intelligence work in Germany by devious routes,
making use of centers established for that purpose in neighboring countries.
For this purpose former German Communist agents were
employed to foment sedition and to arrange for acts of sabotage in Germany.
OGPU Commissar Kryloff was in charge of systematic courses of training
with this object in view. Apart from this, intensive subversive activities
were carried on in territories occupied by Germany, more particularly
in the protectorate [Bohemia-Moravia] and occupied France, but also
Norway, Holland, Belgium, etc.
Soviet Russian representatives, notably the Consul
General at Prague, rendered valuable assistance in this connection.
Assiduous intelligence service maintained by means of wireless transmitters
and receiving stations afforded absolute proof of the activities of
the Comintern directed against the German Reich. There also is comprehensive
documentary evidence consisting of witnesses' statements and correspondence
concerning all subversive activity and reconnoitering carried on by
the Comintern.
In addition to this sabotage groups were formed, which
maintained their own laboratories for the manufacture of incendiary
and high-explosive bombs for the purpose of committing acts of sabotage.
Attempts of this kind were made, for example, against no fewer than
sixteen German ships.
Espionage was another field of activity. Thus repatriation
of Germans from Soviet Russia was utilized for the purpose of gaining
the services of these Germans for ends of the OGPU by the most reprehensible
means. Not only men but women too were victims of shameless extortion
and were forced to enter the service of the OGPU.
Even the Soviet Russian Embassy in Berlin, headed
by M. Kobuloff, Counselor of the Embassy, did not shrink from unscrupulous
abuse of the rights of extraterritoriality for espionage purposes. M.
E. Mokhoff, member of the Russian Consulate at Prague, was at the head
of another Russian espionage organization, which had ramifications throughout
the protectorate.
Further instances in which the police were able to
take action in good time provided clear, unequivocable evidence of these
extensive Soviet Russian machinations. The whole of the evidence proves
irrefutably that Soviet Russia was engaged against Germany in the political,
military and economic spheres in large-scale subversive activities,
acts of sabotage, terror and espionage in preparation for war.
As to activities by Russia in European countries outside
Germany, they extended to almost all European states that are friendly
to or are occupied by Germany. Thus in Rumania, for example, Communist
propaganda in the form of pamphlets of Russian origin represented Germany
as being responsible for all local troubles in order to create an anti-German
atmosphere
The same thing had been evident in Yugoslavia since
the Summer of 1940. Pamphlets there incited the people to protest against
the Cvetkovitch regime, which was "hobnobbing with the imperialistic
governments in Berlin and Rome." At a meeting of Communist party
functionaries in Zagreb the whole of Southeastern Europe from Slovakia
to Bulgaria was described as a Russian protectorate that would come
into being after Germany's hoped for military decline.
In the Soviet Legation at Belgrade, German troops
discovered documentary evidence of the Soviet Russian origin of this
propaganda.
Whereas Communist propaganda in Yugoslavia sought
to make use of nationalist catch-words, in Hungary it was effective
chiefly among the Ruthenian population, to whom it held out hopes of
coming liberation through Soviet Russia.
Anti-German propaganda was particularly active in
Slovakia, where the propaganda was openly carried on in favor of annexation
of that country by Soviet Russia.
In Finland the notorious "Association for Peace
and Friendship With the Soviet Union" actively cooperated with
the Petroskoi broadcasting station, attempting to bring about disintegration
of this country and at the same time carried on activities of a marked
anti-German nature.
In France, Belgium and Holland agitation was directed
against the German armies of occupation. A similar campaign was conducted
in the Government General [Poland], cloaked by national Pan-Slavistic
propaganda.
Scarcely had Greece been occupied by the German and
Italian Armies when Soviet Russian propaganda commenced there too.
All this is evidence of a campaign systematically
carried out in every country by the U.S.S.R. against Germany's endeavor
to establish a sound order in Europe.
Parallel with this there was directed propaganda designed
to counteract measures of German policy, taking the form of denunciation
of these measures as anti-Russian and attempting to win over various
countries to side with Soviet Russia against Germany.
In Bulgaria there was agitation against adherence
to the Tripartite Pact and in favor of a guarantee pact with Russia.
In Rumania attempts were made at infiltration into the Iron Guard and
suborning its leaders, including Groza, a Rumanian who started the Putsch
of Jan. 23, 1941, and behind whom Bolshevist agents of Moscow stood
as wire-pullers. Indisputable proofs of this are held by the Reich Government.
In regard to Yugoslavia the Reich Government has come
in possession of documents according to which a Yugoslav delegate named
Georgevitch gained the impression from a conversation with Molotoff
[Vyacheslaff M. Molotoff, Russian Foreign Commissar], in Moscow early
in May, 1940, that Germany was being regarded there as a mighty foe
of tomorrow.
Soviet Russia's attitude to requests for arms made
by Serbian military circles left even less doubt. In November, 1940,
the Chief of the Soviet Russian General Staff declared to the Yugoslav
military attaché: "We will give you everything you ask for
immediately." The prices to be paid and the mode of payment were
left to the discretion of the Belgrade Government and only one condition
was made-secrecy as far as Germany was concerned.
When the Cvetkovitch government subsequently approached
the Axis powers Moscow began to delay deliveries of munitions, and this
was briefly communicated to the Yugoslav military attaché by
the Soviet Russian War Ministry.
The staging of the Belgrade Putsch of March 27 of
this year formed the climax to these conspiracies against the Reich
by Serbian plotters and Anglo-Russian agents. The Serbian leader of
this Putsch and the head of the "Black Hand," M. Simitch,
is still today in Moscow, displaying there great activity against the
Reich on closest cooperation with Soviet Russian propaganda officers.
The foregoing examples provide only a glimpse of the
enormously varied propaganda activities which the U.S.S.R. is conducting
against Germany throughout Europe. In order to furnish the outside world
with a comprehensive survey of the activities of Soviet Russian authorities
in this direction since the conclusion of the pacts between Germany
and Russia and to enable the public to judge for themselves, the Reich
Government will publish the extensive material at their disposal.
In general, the Reich Government note the following:
At the conclusion of the pacts with Germany, the Soviet
Government repeatedly made the unequivocal declaration that they did
not intend to interfere, either directly or indirectly, in German affairs.
On conclusion of the pact of friendship they solemnly
stated they would collaborate with Germany in order to bring an end,
in accordance with the true interests of all peoples, of the war existing
between Germany on one hand and Great Britain on the other, and to achieve
this aim as soon as possible.
In the light of the above mentioned facts, which have
continually become more apparent during the further course of the war,
these Soviet Russian agreements and declarations were revealed as being
intentionally misleading and deceptive. Nor did the advantages accruing
from Germany's friendly attitude cause the Soviet Government to adopt
a loyal attitude toward Germany.
On the contrary, the Reich Government have been forced
to observe that conclusion of the pacts in 1939 was yet another instance
of the application of Lenin's thesis, as expressly reaffirmed in October,
1939, in "instructions for the Communist party in Slovakia,"
stating that "pacts may be concluded with certain other countries
if they further the interests of the Soviet Government and help render
the opponent innocuous."
The conclusion of these pacts of friendship was, accordingly,
for the Soviet Government only a tactical manoeuvre. The real aim was
to reach agreements which were advantageous to Russia, thus simultaneously
preparing for future action.
The leading idea remained the weakening of non-bolshevist
states in order to be in a position to disintegrate them more easily
and, when the time came, break them up. In a Russian document discovered
after the capture of Belgrade in the Soviet Legation there, this object
was expressed with stark brutality in the following words:
"The U.S.S.R. will not wait until the opportune
moment occurs. Axis powers have further dissipated their forces and
the U.S.S.R. will consequently strike a sudden blow against Germany."
The Soviet Government have not heeded the voice of
the Russian people, who sincerely wished to live in peace and friendship
with the German people, but have continued in the old bolshevist policy
of duplicity and, by so doing, have assumed a heavy burden of responsibility.
If the Soviet Union's subversive propaganda carried
out in Germany and the rest of Europe leaves no room for doubt as to
its attitude toward Germany, then the policy of the Soviet Government
toward Germany in the military sphere and in the fields of foreign politics,
even since the conclusion of pacts between Germany and Russia, makes
matters even clearer.
In Moscow, on the occasion of the delineation of spheres
of interest, the Soviet Government declared to the German Minister of
Foreign Affairs that it did not intend to occupy, bolshevize or annex
any states situated within their sphere of interest, other than territories
of the former Polish State, which were at that time in a state of disintegration.
In actual fact, however, as the course of events has
shown, the policy of the Soviet Union during the whole time was exclusively
directed toward one object-namely, that of extending Moscow's military
power wherever the possibility offered in the area between the Arctic
Ocean and the Black Sea, and of furthering bolshevism in Europe.
Development of this policy was marked by the following
stages:
1. It was initiated by the formulation of so-called
assistance pacts with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania in October and November,
1939, and by establishment of military bases in those countries.
2. The next Soviet Russian move was against Finland,
when Soviet Russian demands, acceptance of which would have meant the
end of the sovereignty of an independent Finnish State, were rejected
by the Finnish Government. The Soviet Government was responsible for
the formation of the Kusinin Communist puppet government, and, when
the Finnish people refused to recognize this government, an ultimatum
was presented to Finland. The Red Army was subsequently marching in
at the end of November, 1939. By the Finnish-Russian peace concluded
in March, Finland was obliged to surrender part of her southeastern
provinces immediately.
3. A few months later-in July, 1940-the Soviet Union
took action against the Baltic States. Under terms of the first Moscow
pact Lithuania belonged to the German sphere of interest.
In the second pact, at the desire of the Soviet Union,
the German Government relinquished their interests in a greater part
of Lithuania in favor of the Soviet Union for the sake of peace, although
they did so with heavy heart. A strip of this territory still remained
within the German sphere of interest.
Following upon an ultimatum delivered on June 15,
the whole of Lithuania, including that part which had remained within
the German sphere of interest, was occupied by the Soviet Union without
notification of the German Government so that the U.S.S.R. now extended
right up to the entire eastern frontier of East Prussia.
When subsequently Germany was approached on this question
the German Government, after difficult negotiations and in order to
make a further effort toward reaching a friendly settlement, ceded this
part of Lithuania also to the Soviet Union.
A short time afterward Latvia and Estonia were likewise
occupied by military force, procedure which constituted gross abuse
of the pacts of assistance concluded with these states.
Contrary to the express assurance given by Moscow,
all Baltic States were then Bolshevized and summarily annexed by the
Soviet Government a few weeks after occupation.
Simultaneously with the annexation, the Red Army was
for the first time concentrated in force throughout the whole of the
northern sector of the Soviet Russian buttress directed toward Europe.
It goes almost without saying that the economic pacts
between Germany and these States, which, according to the Moscow agreements
were not to be affected, were unilaterally canceled by the Soviet Government.
4. In the pacts of Moscow it had been expressly agreed
in connection with the delimitation of interest in former Polish territories
that no kind of political agitation was to take place beyond the frontiers
marking these zones of interest, but that activity of occupation authorities
on either side was to be restricted exclusively to peaceful development
of these territories.
The German Government possesses irrefutable proof
that in spite of these agreements the Soviet Union very soon after occupation
of the territory not only permitted anti-German propaganda for consumption
in the Government-General of Poland but, in point of fact, sponsored
it parallel with Bolshevist propaganda in the same region. Strong Russian
garrisons were also transferred to these territories immediately after
the occupation.
5. While the German Army still was fighting in the
west against France and Britain, the Soviet Union advanced in the Balkans.
Although the Soviet Government had declared during the Moscow negotiations
they would never make the first move toward achieving settlement of
the Bessarabian question, the German Government was informed on June
24, 1940, by the Soviet Government that they now were resolved to settle
the Bessarabian question by force.
It was stated at the same time that Soviet claims
also extended to Bukovina, that is to say, territory which was ancient
Austrian crown land, had never belonged to Russia and had, moreover,
not ever been mentioned at the time of the Moscow negotiations.
The German Ambassador to Moscow declared to the Soviet
Government their decision had come as a complete surprise to the German
Government and that it would seriously affect Germany's economic interest
in Rumania and lead to disruption of the life of a large German settlement
there as well as of the German element in Bukovina. Molotoff replied
that the matter was one of extreme urgency and that the Soviet Union
expected to be apprised of the German Government's attitude with regard
to this question within twenty-four hours.
In spite of this brusque action against Rumania, the
German Government once more intervened in favor of the Soviet Union
in order to preserve peace and maintain their friendship with that country.
They advised the Rumanian Government, who had appealed
to Germany for help, to yield and recommended to them to surrender Bessarabia
and Northern Bukovina to Soviet Russia. The affirmative answer of the
Rumanian Government was communicated to the Soviet Government by Germany,
together with the Rumanian Government's request to be granted sufficient
time for evacuation of these large areas and the safeguarding of lives
and property of the inhabitants.
Once more, however, the Soviet Government presented
an ultimatum to Rumania, and, before its expiration, began to occupy
parts of Bukovina on June 28, and immediately afterward the whole of
Bessarabia as far as the Danube. Those territories were also immediately
annexed by the Soviet Union, bolshevized and thus literally reduced
to ruin.
By occupying and bolshevizing entire spheres of interest
in Eastern Europe and in the Balkans accorded to the U.S.S.R. by the
Reich Government during the Moscow negotiations, the Soviet Government
plainly and irrefutably acted contrary to the Moscow agreements.
In spite of this, the Reich Government continued to
maintain an absolutely loyal attitude toward the U.S.S.R. They refrained
from intervention in the Finnish war and in the Baltic question. They
supported the attitude of the Soviet Government against the Rumanian
Government in the Bessarabian question, and reconciled themselves, albeit
with heavy heart, to the state of affairs created by the Soviet Government.
Furthermore, in order to eliminate as far as possible
any divergences between the two States from the very outset, the Reich
government set to work on a large-scale resettlement scheme, whereby
all Germans in areas occupied by the U.S.S.R. were brought back to Germany.
The Reich Government felt that more convincing proof of their desire
to come to a lasting peace with the U.S.S.R. could scarcely be given.
As a result of Russia's advance toward the Balkans,
territorial problems in this region came up for discussion. In the Summer
of 1940, Rumania and Hungary appealed to Germany to effect settlement
of their territorial disputes after these divergencies, fostered by
British agents, had resulted in a serious crisis at the end of August.
War was imminent between Rumania and Hungary. Germany,
who had repeatedly been requested by Hungary and Rumania to mediate
in their quarrel, desired to maintain peace in the Balkans and, together
with Italy, invited the two States to confer at Vienna, where, at their
request, she proclaimed the Vienna arbitration award of Aug. 30, 1940.
This defined the new frontier between Hungary and
Rumania and, in order to enable the Rumanian Government to justify before
their people territorial sacrifices which they made and to eliminate
any quarrels in this area for the future, Germany and Italy undertook
to guarantee the remaining Rumanian State.
As Russian aspirations in this area had been satisfied,
this guarantee could never be taken as directed against Russia. The
Soviet Union nevertheless complained and stated that, contrary to former
declarations according to which its aspirations in the Balkans had been
satisfied by occupation of Bessarabia and Northern Bukovina, it had
further interests in Balkan questions, though for the time being those
were not further defined.
Soviet Russia's anti-German policy began from that
time to become steadily more apparent. The Reich Government kept on
receiving more and more definite news, according to which negotiations
which had been carried on for some time in Moscow by British Ambassador
Cripps were developing favorably. The Reich Government at the same time
came into possession of proof of the Soviet Union's intensive military
preparations in every sphere.
These proofs are, among other things, confirmed by
a report recently found in Belgrade by the Yugoslav military attaché
to Moscow, dated Feb. 17, 1940, which reads literally: "According
to information received from Soviet sources, armaments for the air force,
tank corps and artillery in accordance with experiences of the present
war are in full progress and will, in the main, have been completed
by August, 1941. This probably also constitutes a time limit before
which no appreciable changes in the Soviet's foreign policy can be expected."
Despite the unfriendly attitude of the U.S.S.R. over
the Balkan question, Germany made a fresh effort to come to an understanding
with the Soviet Union: the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs, in a letter
to Stalin, gave a comprehensive survey of the policy of the Reich Government
since the negotiations in Moscow. The letter referred in particular
to the following points:
When the Tripartite Pact between Germany, Italy and
Japan was concluded it was unanimously agreed this pact in no sense
was directed against the Soviet Union, but that friendly relations of
the three powers and their treaties with the U.S.S.R. should remain
completely unaffected by the pact. This was also placed on record in
the Tripartite Pact of Berlin.
At the same time the letter expressed the desire and
hope that it might prove possible jointly to clarify still further friendly
relations with the U.S.S.R. desired by the signatories to the Tripartite
Pact and to give such relations concrete form. In order to discuss these
questions more fully, the Reich Minister of Foreign Affairs invited
Molotoff to visit Berlin.
During Molotoff's visit to Berlin the Reich Government
was forced to the conclusion that the U.S.S.R. was inclined toward genuinely
friendly cooperation with the signatories of the Tripartite Pact and
with Germany in particular, provided the latter were prepared to pay
the price demanded by the Soviet Union. This price was to take the shape
of further penetration of the Soviet Union into North and Southeast
Europe.
The following demands were made by Molotoff in Berlin
and in subsequent diplomatic conversations with the German Ambassador
in Moscow:
1. The Soviet Union desired to give a guarantee to
Bulgaria and, above this, to conclude with her a pact of assistance
on the same lines as those concluded with the Baltic states-i.e., providing
for military bases.
At the same time Molotoff declared he did not wish
to interfere with the internal regime of Bulgaria. A visit of Russian
Commissar Soboleff to Sofia at that time was likewise undertaken with
the object of realizing this intention.
2. The Soviet Union demanded an agreement in the form
of a treaty with Turkey for the purpose of providing, on the basis of
a long-time lease, a base, for Soviet land and naval forces on the Bosporus
and in the Dardanelles. In case Turkey should not agree to this proposal,
Germany and Italy were to cooperate with Russia in diplomatic steps
to be undertaken to enforce compliance with this demand. These demands
were aimed at the domination of the Balkans by the U.S.S.R.
3. The Soviet Union declares that once more it felt
itself threatened by Finland and therefore demanded complete abandonment
of Finland by Germany, which, in actual fact, would have amounted to
occupation of this state and extermination of the Finnish people.
Germany naturally was unable to accept these Russian
demands designated by the Soviet Government as a primary condition for
cooperation with the signatories to the Tripartite Pact. Thus the latter's
efforts to come to an understanding with the Soviet Union failed.
In consequence the attitude adopted by Germany was
that the U.S.S.R. now had intensified a policy more openly directed
against Germany and that its increasingly close cooperation with Britain
was clearly revealed.
In January, 1941, this antagonistic attitude on the
part of Russia first showed in the diplomatic sphere. When that month
Germany adopted certain measures in Bulgaria against the landing of
British troops in Greece the Russian Ambassador in Berlin pointed out
in an official démarche that the Soviet Union regarded Bulgarian
territory and the two straits as the security zone for the U.S.S.R.
and that it could not remain a passive spectator of events taking place
in these territories which amounted to a menace for the interests of
such security. For this reason the Soviet Government issued a warning
with regard to the appearance of German troops on Bulgarian territory
or on that of either of the two straits.
Thereupon the Reich Government furnished the Soviet
Government with exhaustive information about the causes and aims of
their military measures in the Balkans.
They made it clear Germany would prevent, with every
means of her power, any attempt on the part of Britain to gain a foothold
in Greece, but that she had no intention of occupying the straits and
would respect Turkish sovereignty and territory. The passage of German
troops through Bulgaria could not be regarded as an encroachment on
the Soviet Union's security interests; on the contrary, the Reich's
Government believed they were serving Soviet interests by those operations.
After carrying through her operations in the Balkans, Germany withdrew
her troops from there.
Despite the declaration on the part of the Reich Government,
the Soviet Government for their part published a declaration addressed
to Bulgaria directly after the entry of German troops into that country
which manifested a character clearly hostile to the German Reich and
said in effect that the presence of German troops in Bulgaria was not
conducive to the peace of the Balkans, but rather to war.
An explanation of this attitude was found by the Reich
Government in incoming information, steadily increasing in volume, about
growing collaboration between Soviet Russia and Britain. Even in the
face of these facts, Germany remained silent.
Along the same lines was the assurance given in March,
1941, that Russia would not attack Turkey in event of the latter's joining
in war on the Balkans. This, according to information in possession
of the Reich Government, was the result of Anglo-Russian negotiations
during the visit of the British Foreign Secretary in Ankara, who thereby
aimed at drawing Russia closer to the British camp.
The aggressive policy of the Soviet Union toward the
German Reich, which steadily was becoming more pronounced ever since
this time, as well as the hitherto somewhat discreet political cooperation
between the Soviet Union and Britain became, however, patent to the
whole world on the outbreak of the Balkan crisis at the beginning of
April.
It is today fully established that the Putsch instigated
by Britain in Belgrade after Yugoslavia had joined the Tripartite Pact
was started with the connivance of Soviet Russia. A long time before,
in fact since Nov. 19, 1940, Russia had secretly assisted Yugoslavia
in arming against the Axis powers. Documents which fell into the hands
of the Reich Government after the occupation of Belgrade revealing every
phase of these Russian deliveries of arms in Yugoslavia give decisive
proof of this.
Once the Belgrade Putsch had succeeded Russia on April
5 concluded a friendly agreement with the illegal Serbian Government
of General Simovitch which was to lend moral support to the Putschists
and with its weight assist the growing Anglo-Yugoslav-Greek front.
Evident satisfaction was expressed on this occasion
by American Under-Secretary of State Sumner Welles when he stated on
April 6, 1941, after several conversations with the Soviet Ambassador
in Washington that "the Russo-Yugoslav Pact might, under certain
circumstances, be of the greatest importance. It is attracting interest
in many quarters and there are grounds for assuming it will be more
than a mere pact of friendship and non-aggression."
Thus, at the same time when German troops were being
concentrated on Rumanian and Bulgarian territory against growing landings
of British troops in Greece, the Soviet, now obviously in concerted
action with the British, was attempting to stab Germany in the back
by:
1. Giving Yugoslavia open political and secret military
support.
2. Attempting to move Turkey to adopt an aggressive
attitude toward Bulgaria and Germany by guaranteeing not to attack her
and to concentrate her army in a very unfavorable strategic position
in Thrace.
3. Herself concentrating a strong force on the Rumanian
frontier in Bessarabia and in Moldavia, and
4. The sudden attempt early in April of Vyshinski,
Deputy Peoples' Commissar in the Foreign Commissariat, in his conversations
with Gafencu, Rumanian Minister in Moscow, to inaugurate a policy of
rapid rapprochement with Rumania in order to persuade that country to
break away from Germany.
British diplomacy through the intermediary of the
Americans was making efforts in the same direction in Bucharest.
According to the Anglo-Russian plan, German troops
concentrated in Rumania and Bulgaria were to have been attacked from
three sides, namely Bessarabia and Thrace and from the Serbian-Greek
frontier.
It solely was due to the loyalty of General Antonescu's
realistic policy, followed by the Turkish Government and, above all,
to the rapid German initiative and decisive victories of the German
Army, that this Anglo-Russian plan was frustrated.
According to information in the hands of the Reich
Government, almost 200 Yugoslav aircraft carrying Soviet Russian and
British agents as well as Serbian parachutists led by Simitch were flown
off, partly to Russia-these officers are today serving in the Russian
Army-and partly to Egypt. This fact alone throws a particularly characteristic
light upon the close collaboration between Britain, Russia and Yugoslavia.
In vain the Soviet Government tried on various occasions
to veil the real intentions underlying their policy. Besides maintaining
economic relations with Germany even during the last stage, they adopted
a succession of measures to deceive the world into thinking they were
maintaining normal, even friendly, relations with Germany.
Instances of this, for example, are requests to leave
that they addressed a few weeks ago to diplomatic representatives of
Norway, Belgium, Greece and Yugoslavia, silence observed by the British
press about German-Russian relations, acting under instructions of Sir
Stafford Cripps, British Ambassador, who was in agreement with the Russian
Government, and finally the dementi recently published by the Tass Agency
in which relations between Germany and the Soviet Union were described
as completely correct.
These attempts at camouflage, which stand in such
flagrant contrast to the real policy of the Soviet Government, naturally
did not succeed in deceiving the Reich Government.
The anti-German policy of the Soviet Government was
accompanied in the military sphere by steadily increasing concentration
of all available Russian armed forces on the long front extending from
the Baltic to the Black Sea. Already at the time when Germany was deeply
engaged in the west in the campaign against France and when only a few
German detachments were stationed in the east, the Russian High Command
began systematically to transfer large bodies of troops to their eastern
frontiers with the Reich, marked mass movements being noticed along
the East Prussian frontier and that of the Government-General, as also
in Bukovina and Bessarabia, opposite Rumania.
Russian garrisons facing Finland continually were
being reinforced. Constant transfers of more and more fresh Russian
divisions from the Far East and the Caucasus to Western Russia were
further measures of a similar kind. After the Soviet Government had
declared originally that the Baltic area, for instance, would only be
occupied by troops, they proceeded to concentrate in this area, after
military occupation had been completed, masses of additional troops,
their number today being estimated at twenty-two divisions.
It was obvious that Russian troops were advancing
ever closer to the German frontier, although no military measures had
been adopted on the German side which might justify such action on the
part of the U.S.S.R. It is this action on the part of the Soviet Union
which first compelled German armed forces to adopt counter-measures.
Various units of the Russian Army and Air Force moved
closer and closer in the direction of the frontier and strong detachments
of the air force were posted on airdromes along German boundaries. Since
the beginning of April more frontier violations also have taken place
and a steadily increasing number of incursions over Reich territory
by Russian aircraft have been observed.
According to reports from the Rumanian Government,
similar occurrences have been observed on the Rumanian frontier in the
area of Bukovina and along Moldavia and the Danube.
Since the beginning of the current year the German
High Command has repeatedly attracted attention of the Foreign Office
to the steadily increasing menace which the Russian Army presents for
Reich territory, emphasizing at the same time that only aggressive intentions
could account for the troop concentrations. The communications from
the German High Command will be published in detail.
If the slightest doubts about the aggressive intentions
of this Russian concentration could still be entertained, they have
been completely dispelled by news which reached the German High Command
during the past few days.
Now that the Russian general mobilization is complete,
no less than 160 divisions are concentrated facing Germany. Observations
made during the past few days have shown that grouping of Russian troops,
and especially of motorized and armored units, has been carried out
in such a way as to allow the Russian High Command at any moment to
make an aggressive advance on the German frontier at various points.
Reports about increased reconnaissance patrol activity
as well as accounts received daily of incidents on the frontier and
outpost skirmishes between the two armies complete the picture of an
extremely strained military situation which may at any moment reach
the breaking point.
News received today from England about negotiations
by Sir Stafford Cripps, with the view of establishing still closer collaboration
between the political and military leaders of Britain and the U.S.S.R.,
together with the appeal by Lord Beaverbrook, one-time enemy of the
Soviet regime, to support Russia in the oncoming conflict by every available
means and his exhortation to the United States to do the same, show
unambiguously what kind of a fate it is desired to prepare for the German
nation.
Summarizing the foregoing points the Reich Government
wish therefore to make the following declaration:
Contrary to all engagements which they have undertaken
in absolute contradiction to their solemn declarations, the Soviet Government
have turned against Germany. They have:
1. Not only continued but, even since the outbreak
of war, intensified subversive activities against Germany and Europe;
they have
2. In continually increasing measure, developed their
foreign policy in a tendency hostile to Germany; and they have
3. Massed their entire forces on the German frontier
ready for action.
The Soviet Government have thus violated treaties
and broken their agreements with Germany.
Bolshevist Moscow's hatred of National Socialism was
stronger than its political wisdom.
Bolshevism is opposed to National Socialism in deadly
enmity.
Bolshevist Moscow is about to stab National Socialist
Germany in the back while she is engaged in a struggle for her existence.
Germany has no intention of remaining inactive in
the face of this grave threat to her eastern frontier.
The Fuehrer has, therefore, ordered German forces
to oppose this menace with all the might at their disposal.
In the coming struggle the German people are fully
aware that they are called upon not only to defend their native land
but to save the entire civilized world from the deadly dangers of bolshevism
and clear the way for true social progress in Europe.
[New York Times, June 23, 1941]
Sources: ibiblio |