DEAR MR. PRESIDENT:
The further this campaign progresses, the more probable it appears
that there will never be a clean-cut military surrender of the forces
on the Western Front. Our experience to date is that even when formations
as small as a division are disrupted their fragments continue to fight
until surrounded. This attitude if continued, will likely mean that
a V-E Day will come about only by proclamation on our part rather than
by any definite and decisive collapse or surrender of German resistance.
Projecting this idea further, it would mean that eventually all the
areas in which fragments of the German Army, particularly the paratrooper,
Panzer and SS elements may be located, will have to be taken by the
application of or the threat of force. This would lead into a form of
guerrilla warfare which would require for its suppression a very large
number of troops.
Of course, if the Government of Germany or any group that could take
over a political control would make a national surrender, then all armed
bodies remaining in the field would, in my opinion, no longer be classed
as soldiers of a recognized government, but would occupy the status
of brigands or pirates. Since, if captured under these conditions, they
would not be entitled to protection afforded by the laws of war, it
is my conviction that, except for extreme fanatics, they would largely
surrender.
But so long as any of the Hitler gang retains a semblance of political
power I believe the effort will be to continue resistance not only throughout
Germany, but in all of the outlying areas, including the western port
areas of France and Denmark and Norway.
To counteract this eventuality our local propaganda stations are constantly
pointing out to the Germans that they should now be planting crops for
next winter's food instead of fighting. In addition, I am hopeful of
launching operations at the proper time that should partially prevent
a guerrilla control of any large area, such as the southern mountain
bastion.
It is, of course, always possible that there might be in Germany a
sudden upsurge of popular resentment against the war, which would lead
to a much easier pacification than that described above. My opinion
is based upon the supposition that our experience to date provides our
best basis of future prediction. At best we should be prepared for the
eventuality described.
DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER