THE PRIME MINISTER (Mr. Churchill): I do not think anyone, however Ministerially
minded, could possibly complain of the tone, temper and matter of this
Debate. The kind of criticism we have had to-day, some of it very searching,
is the kind of criticism that the Government not only accept but welcome.
All the same, the House will permit me perhaps to point out that the
way in which this Debate came about was calculated to give one the feeling
of a challenge to the security of the Administration, and, from the
point of view of the advantage to the country, that raises serious considerations.
There were all kinds of paragraphs and reports which appeared in the
papers about the grave uneasiness and unrest, stating that a Debate
on Crete must take place. The parties were demanding it, the Labour
party, the Liberal party and members of the Conservative party were
demanding it, and there must be a full accounting, an inquest held,
and so forth. That being so, one is bound to take a serious view because
of the interests which are confided into our care.
I think that it would be a mistake if the House got into the habit
of calling for explanations on the varying episodes of this dangerous
and widespread struggle and asking for an account to be given of why
any action was lost or any part of the front was beaten in. In the first
place, no full explanations can possibly be given without revealing
valuable information to the enemy information not only about a particular
operation which is over, but about the general position and also of
the processes of thought which are followed, such as they may be, by
our war direction and our high command. There is always a danger that
a Minister in my position, in seeking to vindicate the course we have
pursued, should inadvertently say something which may supply the enemy
with some essential, with some seemingly innocent fact, about which
the enemy is in doubt, and thus enable the enemy to construct a comprehensive
and accurate picture of our state of mind and the way in which we are
looking at things. The heads of the Dictator Governments are not under
any similar pressure to explain or excuse any ill-success that may befall
them. Far be it from me to compare myself or the office I hold or the
functions I discharge with those of these pretentious and formidable
potentates. I am only the servant of the Crown and Parliament and am
always at the disposal of the House of Commons, where I have lived my
life.
Still the House, and I think I may say also the country, have placed
very considerable responsibilities upon me, and I am sure they would
not wish any servant they have entrusted with such duties to be at a
disadvantage against our antagonists. I have not heard, for instance,
that Herr Hitler had to attend the Reichstag and tell them why he sent
the Bismarck on her disastrous cruise, when by waiting for a few weeks,
and choosing his opportunity, when perhaps our capital ships were dispersed
on convoy duty, she might have gone out accompanied by the Tirpitz,
another 45,000-ton ship, and offered a general sea battle. Neither have
I heard any very convincing statement by Signor Mussolini of the reasons
why the greater part of his African Empire has been conquered and more
than 200,000 of his soldiers are prisoners in our hands.
I must say, quite frankly, to the House that I should feel myself under
a needless disadvantage if it were understood that I should be obliged,
in public Debate, to give an account, possibly a controversial account,
of our operations irrespective of whether the times were suitable or
not. It would, for instance, have been a nuisance if Parliament had
demanded a Debate on the loss of the Hood before we had been in a position
to explain what measures we had taken to secure the destruction of the
Bismarck. I always take-and I am sure that what I say will be accepted-very
great pains to serve the House, and on all occasions to associate the
House in the fullest possible manner with the conduct of the war, but
I think it would be better, and I submit it to the House, if in the
future I were permitted on behalf of His Majesty's Government to choose
the occasions for making statements about the war, which I am most anxious
to do.
There is another general reason why I should have deprecated a Debate
upon the Battle of Crete. It is only one part of the very important
and complicated campaign which is being fought in the Middle East, and
to select one particular sector of our widely extended front for Parliamentary
Debate is a partial, lopsided and misleading method of examining the
conduct of the war. A vast scene can only be surveyed as a whole, and
it ought to be exposed and debated piecemeal, especially at a time when
operations which are all related to one another are wholly incomplete.
Into the general survey of the war come all sorts of considerations
about the gain and loss of time and its effect upon the future. There
also comes into the picture the entire distribution of our available
resources to meet the many calls that are made upon them. For instance,
my hon. Friend the Member for Kidderminster (Sir J. Wardlaw-Milne),
who has just spoken, asked why it was that when we had Crete in our
possession for more than six months we had wasted all that time for
constructing numerous airfields and placing them in the highest state
of defence, and he reminded us how very efficiently the Germans would
have done a work like that if Crete had fallen into their hands. Everyone
will, I dare say, admit that it would have been a mistake to make a
great number of airfields in Crete unless we could find the anti-aircraft
guns, both of high and low ceiling, and the aircraft to defend those
airfields, for that would simply have facilitated the descent of the
enemy's air-borne troops upon the island.
Why then, first of all, I must ask, were enough guns not provided for
the two serviceable airfields which existed in Crete? To answer that
question one would have to consider how many guns we have and whether
we could afford to spare them for that purpose. That leads us to a wider
sphere. All this time, the Battle of the Atlantic has been going on,
and a very great number of the guns which might have usefully been deployed
in Crete have been, and are, being mounted in the merchant vessels to
beat off the attacks of the Fokke Wulf and Heinkel aircraft, whose depredations
have been notably lessened thereby.
Again, we must consider, on the subject of these guns, whether our
airfields at home, our air factories or the ports and cities in our
Islands, which are under heavy and dangerous attack, should have been
further denuded or stinted of guns, in the last six or seven months,
for the sake of the war in the Middle East. Further, it must be remembered-I
did not notice that this was mentioned-that everything we sent out to
the Middle East is out of action for the best part of three months,
as it has to go round the Cape. We have run very great risks and faced
very serious maulings in this Island, in order to sustain the war in
the Mediterranean, and no one, I venture to submit, can be a judge of
whether we should have run more risks or exposed ourselves to heavier
punishment at home, for the sake of fortifying and multiplying the Cretan
airfields, without having full and intimate knowledge of all our resources
and making a complete survey of the various claims upon them.
We did, however, from the moment that the Greek Government invited us
into Crete, take steps to defend the anchorage of Suda Bay. as an important
naval base, to develop the aerodrome nearby and to provide the base
and the aerodrome with the largest quantity of high and low ceiling
guns which we thought it fit to divert from other strategic points in
the Mediterranean. We provided, in fact, a deterrent to the enemy attack
sufficient to require a major effort on his part; but, of course there
are a great many islands and strategic points in the seas, and to attempt
to be safe everywhere is to make sure of being strong nowhere.
Therefore, it may well be that if the House were able to go into detail
into these matters, which I am afraid is not possible, hon. Members
would feel that a reasonable and right disposition of our Forces was
made; but without going into the facts and figures, which I am sure
no one would wish me to do, even in Secret Session, let alone in Public
Session, it is quite impossible for the House, or even for the newspapers,
to arrive at a justly proportioned and level judgment on this affair.
There is, however, this much that I should like to say: A man must be
a perfect fool who thinks that we have large quantities of anti-aircraft
guns and aircraft lying about unused at the present time. I will speak
about aircraft in a moment, but, so far as anti-aircraft guns are concerned,
large and expanding as is our present production, every single gun is
in action at some necessary point or other, and all future production
for many months ahead is eagerly competed for by rival claimants with,
very often, massive cases behind each one of them.
This goes back a long way, but four years ago, in March, 1937, I mentioned
to the House that the Germans had already got 1,500 mobile anti-aircraft
guns-mobile and formed in batteries-in addition to the whole of their
static artillery of anti-aircraft defence. Since then they have been
making them at a great rate, and they have also conquered more than
all they want from the many countries they have overthrown, so that
our position is very different from that. The right hon. Member for
Devonport (Mr. Hore-Belisha) has made to-day a very cogent and moderate,
well-informed and thoughtful contribution to the Debate, but he used
a different mood and tone in a speech which he recently delivered in
the country, and that at any rate makes it necessary for me to say that
the state in which our Army was left when the right hon. Gentleman had
ended his two years and seven months' tenure of the War Office, during
the greater part of which he was also responsible for production and
supply, was lamentable. We were short of every essential supply, but
most particularly of those modern weapons, those special classes of
weapons, the anti-aircraft gun, the anti-tank gun and the tank itself,
which have proved themselves the vital necessities of modern war, a
fact which he is now prepared to suggest we are so pur-blind and out-dated
as not to be able to comprehend.
MR. HORE-BELISHA: I do not know why the right hon. Gentleman, for the
purposes of Debate, should make a statement such as he has made, that
I left the Army in a lamentable condition. It is quite out of accord
with what he himself said after the retreat from Dunkirk, that we had
lost the finest lot of equipment that had ever left these shores, and
that the Army had been fully equipped in almost every particular. The
French Ambassador stated that we had fully discharged our obligations
to the French. Perhaps my right hon. Friend will be good enough to recall
that up till very recently before the war the whole House and indeed
the country were opposed to the creation of a Continental Army which
nevertheless I proceeded to try. and create. I do not seek to be judged
by my achievements, but by what I tried to do, and my right hon. Friend
will realise that my obstacles were greater than his today.
THE PRIME MINISTER: I thought that I had misquoted my right hon. Friend
in some way, but it appears he wished to continue the argument. I am
dealing not with the particular equipment of the troops who went to
France, who naturally drained the rest of our Forces, but the fact remains
that the equipment of our Army at that time, and at the outbreak of
war, was of the most meagre and deficient character, and that the deficiencies
made themselves most marked-and still make themselves most marked-in
the very type of weapons for which there is the greatest possible demand.
I could give facts and figures upon this point if we were in private
which would, I think, leave no dispute upon the subject. I am not throwing
all the blame for this upon my right hon. Friend at all-certainly not-but
I think it is only fair, when he himself comes forward and sets himself
up as an arbiter and judge, and speaks so scornfully of the efforts
of some others who have inherited his dismal legacy, I think when he
speaks in this way-he has a greater responsibility in the matter-it
is only fair to point out to him that he is one of the last people in
this country entitled to take that line.
MR. GRANVILLE (Eye): No recriminations.
THE PRIME MINISTER: The hon. Gentleman said something about no recriminations,
but extremely violent and hostile speeches have been spread about, doing
a great deal of harm, and about which I have received information from
different countries and capitals, showing the uncertainty and disturbance
which are caused by them, and certainly if we are attacked we shall
counter-attack.
MR. GRANVILLE: We are dealing with the future, not with the past.
THE PRIME MINISTER: The hon. Member for Eye (Mr. Granville) had better
return to his lucubrations in constitutional experiment, which exercise
his mind so much at present. So much for the difficulty in which we
stand in the matter of the antiaircraft guns. The output is at last
rapidly expanding, but the fact remains that our outfits are incomparably
inferior in numbers to those possessed by the Germans, and every claim
has to be weighed against every other claim. Another general question
which may fairly be asked is, "Why have we not got much stronger
and much larger air forces in the Middle East?" I can only say
this: From the moment when the Battle of Britain was decided in our
favour, in September and October of last year, by the victories of our
fighters, we have been ceaselessly sending aircraft as fast as possible
to the Middle East, by every route and by every method. During the present
year, as our strength in the air has grown, we have not been hampered
in this matter, as we were in the case of the anti-aircraft guns, by
lack of aircraft. The problem has been to send them to the Eastern theatre
of war.
Anyone can see how great are the Germans' advantages, and how easy it
is for the Germans to move their Air Force from one side of Europe to
another. They can fly along a line of permanent airfields. Wherever
they need to alight and refuel, there are permanent airfields in the
highest state of efficiency, and, as for the services and personnel
and all the stores which go with them-without which the squadrons are
quite useless-these can go by the grand continental expresses along
the main railway lines of Europe. One has only to compare this process
with the sending of aircraft packed in crates, then put on ships and
sent on the great ocean spaces until they reach the Cape of Good Hope,
then taken to Egypt, set up again, trued up and put in the air when
they arrive, to see that the Germans can do in days what takes us weeks,
or even more. This reflection, I say, has its bearing upon the possibility
of a German movement back from the East to the West, which certainly
could be executed very swiftly if they were to resolve upon an assault
upon this country. I can give an assurance to the House that we have
done, are doing, and will do, our utmost to build up the largest possible
Air Force in the Middle East; and it is not aircraft, but solely transportation,
which is-
MR. SHINWELL: That is the whole trouble.
THE PRIME MINISTER: Not transportation in the sense of shipping tonnage,
but in the sense of the time that it takes to transfer under the conditions
of the present war. It is not aircraft, but transportation, which is
the limiting factor at this end. I have dealt with anti-aircraft guns;
I have dealt with aircraft. As to the disposition of our Air Force in
the Middle East, it is primarily a matter for the Commanders-in-Chief
in the Middle East, although His Majesty's Government share to the full
their responsibility for whatever is done. I might refer again to what
was said by my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Lewes (Rear Admiral
Beamish) about the importance of coordination between the Services.
It is carried to a very high pitch. The Chief Air Officer lives in the
same house in Cairo as the Commander-in-Chief. They are there side by
side. The Naval Commander-in-Chief has to be at sea very often. He has
to be at Alexandria. But the very closest association exists between
these branches. The idea that any one of these problems would be studied
by one of these commanders only, without the closest association with
the other two is quite an illusory idea, and I can really assure my
hon. Friend on that point.
MAJOR MILNE (Leeds, South East): Who has the final say?
THE PRIME MINISTER: It is not so much a question of the final say. No
disagreement that I know of has arisen. Obviously, the Army is the main
factor in that business, and the Fleet is preserving the security of
the Army on the seas, and preserving the command of the seas, and the
Air is assisting the Army and the Fleet in all their functions. But
in the event of any differences they can be settled in a few hours by
reference here. These Commanders-in-Chief have to settle it among themselves,
although we share to the full responsibility for whatever is done. It
must not be forgotten that apart from the effort we made in Greece,
which was very costly in aircraft, the situation in Iraq, in Palestine,
and potentially in Syria, as well as the winding-up of the Abyssinian
story, all made very heavy demands upon our aircraft and the situation
in the Western Desert had also to be considered. Before any rational
judgment could be formed upon the disposition of our Air Force and the
consequent failure to supply an adequate Air Force for Crete, it would
be necessary, as in the case of the anti-aircraft guns, to know not
only what are our whole resources, but also what is the situation in
these other theatres, which were all, as my right hon. Friend the Member
for Keighley (Mr. Lees-Smith) pointed out, all intimately interrelated,
and it is no use trying to judge these matters without full knowledge,
and that full knowledge obviously cannot be made public, and ought not
to be spread outside the narrowest circle compatible with the execution
of operations.
I come to the next stage of my argument, because I am offering the House
an argument, if they will bear with me as I unfold it. I have shown
them the foundations upon which we started, and I now go a step forward.
In March we decided to go to the aid of Greece in accordance with our
Treaty obligations. This, of course, exposed us to the danger of being
attacked in the Western Desert, and also to defeat by overwhelming numbers
in Greece unless Yugoslavia played her part or unless the Greek Army
could be extricated to hold some narrower line than that actually chosen.
If Greece was overrun by the enemy, it seemed probable that Crete would
be the next object of attack. The enemy, with his vast local superiority
in air power, was able to drive our aircraft from the airfields of Greece,
and adding this to his enormously superior anti-aircraft batteries,
he was able to make those airfields rapidly available for his own use.
Moreover, as the season was advancing, many more airfields became available
to him as the weather improved and dried them up. It was evident, therefore,
that the attack upon Crete, if it were made, would be primarily an air-borne
attack, for which, again, a vastly superior hostile air force would
be available.
The question then arose as to whether we should try to defend Crete
or yield it without a fight. No one who bears any responsibility for
the decision to defend Crete was ignorant of the fact that conditions
permitted of only the most meagre British air support to be provided
for our troops in the island or for our Fleet operating round the island.
It was not a fact that dawned upon the military and other authorities
after the decision had been taken; it was the foundation of a difficult
and harsh choice, as I shall show. The choice was: Should Crete be defended
without effective air support or should the Germans be permitted to
occupy it without opposition? There are some, I see, who say that we
should never fight without superior or at least ample air support and
ask when will this lesson be learned? But suppose you cannot have it?
The questions which have to be settled are not always questions between
what is good and bad; very often it is a choice between two very terrible
alternatives. Must you, if you cannot have this essential and desirable
air support, yield important key points, one after another?
There are others who have said to me, and I have seen it in the newspapers,
that you should defend no place that you cannot be sure you can hold.
Then, one must ask, can one ever be sure how the battle will develop
before it has ever been fought? If this principle of not defending any
place you cannot be sure of holding were adopted, would not the enemy
be able to make an unlimited number of valuable conquests without any
fighting at all? Where would you make a stand and engage them with resolution?
The further question arises as to what would happen if you allowed the
enemy to advance and overrun, without cost to himself, the most precious
and valuable strategic points? Suppose we had never gone to Greece and
had never attempted to defend Crete? Where would the Germans be now?
Suppose we had simply resigned territory and strategic islands to them
without a fight? Might they not, at this early stage of the campaign
in 1941, already be masters of Syria and Iraq and preparing themselves
for an advance into Persia?
The Germans in this war have gained many victories. They have easily
overrun great countries and beaten down strong Powers with little resistance
offered to them. It is not only a question of the time that is gained
by fighting strongly, even if at a disadvantage, for important points.
There is also this vitally important principle of stubborn resistance
to the will of the enemy. I merely throw out these considerations to
the House in order that they may see that there are some arguments which
deserve to be considered before you can adopt the rule that you have
to have a certainty of winning at any point and that if you have not
got it beforehand you must clear out. The whole history of war shows
the fatal absurdity of such a doctrine. Again and again, it has been
proved that fierce and stubborn resistance, even against heavy odds
and under exceptional conditions of local disadvantage, is an essential
element in victory. At any rate, the decision was taken to hold Crete.
The decision to fight for Crete was taken with the full knowledge that
air support would be at a minimum, as anyone can see-apart from the
question of whether you have adequate supplies or not-who measures the
distances from our airfields in Egypt and compares them with the distances
from enemy airfields in Greece and who acquaints himself with the radius
of action of dive-bombers and aircraft.
Of course, I take the fullest personal responsibility for that decision,
but the Chiefs of Staff, the Defence Committee and General Wavell, the
Commander-in-Chief, all in turn and in their various situations not
only thought that Crete ought to be defended in the circumstances, which
were fully before them, but that, in spite of the lack of air support,
we had a good chance of winning the battle. No one had any illusions
about the scale of the enemy air-borne attack. We knew it would be gigantic
and intense. The reconnaissances over the Greek aerodromes showed the
enormous mass of aircraft which were gathering there-many hundreds-and
it turned out that the enemy was prepared to pay an almost unlimited
price for this conquest, and his resources when concentrated upon any
particular point may often be overwhelming at that point.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Devonport referred to the broadcasts
which were given by the spokesman of the War Office, Major-General Collins,
and by the spokesman of the Air Ministry, Air-Commodore Goddard. I take
no responsibility for those statements. I take no responsibility for
those or any others that may be made. It is very convenient to bring
them up in the course of Debate, but the officers who give these broadcasts
are not acquainted with the control of affairs and with what is decided
or thought or felt in the Chiefs of Staff Committee or the Defence Committee.
How can they be? One does not spread things about in that way.
MR. BELLENGER: Stop the broadcasts.
THE PRIME MINISTER: I would have liked very much to have stopped them,
and in some cases I have reduced them in number. I think it is a very
risky thing to ask a professional officer, naval, military or air, to
give a weekly expatiation on the war when, in the nature of things,
although he may be very accomplished in his profession, he cannot know
and ought not to know the facts as they are understood at the secret
meetings.
MR. G. GRIFFITHS: Everybody thinks he speaks for the Government.
THE PRIME MINISTER: I am very glad to see the feeling in the House on
the subject, because, on the other side, one is appealed to ceaselessly
to give more information, to make the war more interesting to the people,
and to tell them more about what is going on. But it is not possible
for the head of the Government or even for the Chiefs of Staff to vet-to
use a slang term-beforehand these detailed weekly statements which are
made. I think the matter must certainly be reconsidered. [HON. MEMBERS:
"Hear, hear."] As I have said, no one had any illusions about
the tremendous scale of the air-borne attack, the greatest ever delivered
in the world, or thought that we should resist it without any but the
most restricted air support on our side. That is the fact. It is not
a nice case, but it is the fact. Let us look at the anatomy of this
battle of Crete which was undertaken in those bleak circumstances. We
hoped that the 25,000 to 30,000 good troops-I am making it a little
vague-with artillery and a proportion of tanks, aided by the Greek forces,
would be able to destroy the parachute and glider landings of the enemy
and prevent him from using the airfields or the harbours.
Our Army was to destroy the air-borne attacks, while the Navy held off
or destroyed the sea-borne attacks. But there was a time limit. The
action of the Navy in maintaining the Northern sea guard without adequate
air defence was bound to be very costly. My hon. Friend has pointed
out how serious were those losses. We could only stand a certain proportion
of naval losses before the Northern sea guard of the Fleet would have
to be withdrawn. If meanwhile the Army could succeed in biting off the
head of the whole terrific apparatus of the airborne invasion before
the naval time limit, or loss limit, was reached, then the enemy would
have to begin all over again, and, having regard to the scale of the
operation, the enormous, unprecedented scale of the operation, and the
losses he would have to incur, he might well for the time being have
at least broken it off-at any rate, there would have been a long delay
before he could have mounted it again. That was the basis on which the
decision was taken.
I wonder what would have been said by our critics if we had given up
the island of Crete without firing a shot. We should have been told
that this pusillanimous flight had surrendered to the enemy the key
of the Eastern Mediterranean, that our communications with Malta and
our power to interrupt the enemy's communications with Libya were grievously
endangered. There is only too much truth in all that, although perhaps
it will not in the end turn out so badly. Crete was an extremely important
salient in our line of defence. It was like Fort Douaumont at Verdun,
in 1916; it was like Kemmel Hill, in 1918. These were taken by the Germans,
but in each case the Germans lost the battle and also the campaign,
and in the end they lost the war. But can you be sure the same result
would have been achieved if the Allies had not fought for Douaumont,
and had not fought for Kemmel Hill? What would they have fought for
if they had not fought for them? These battles can only be judged in
their relation to the campaign as a whole.
I have been asked a lot of questions. My right hon. Friend the Member
for Keighley put them very clearly and precisely about the actual conduct
of the battle in Crete. For instance, why were the Cretan airfields
not mined beforehand? Or again, why were they not commanded by long-range
gunfire, or why were not more tanks allotted to their defences? There
are many other questions like that. I can give answers to these questions,
but I do not propose to discuss tactics here, because I am sure it is
quite impossible for us to fight battles in detail, either before hand
or afterwards, from Whitehall or from the House of Commons. His Majesty's
Government in their responsibility to Parliament choose the best generals
they can find, set before them the broad strategic objects of the campaign,
offer them any advice or counsel that may seem fitting, ask searching
questions which are very necessary in respect of particular plans and
proposals, and then they support them to the best of their power in
men and munitions, and also, so long as they retain their confidence,
they support them with loyal comradeship in failure or success.
It is impossible to go into tactical details, and I never remember in
the last war, in those great battles which cost some thing like 40,000,
50,000 or 70,000 men-I am talking of battles of a single day-in which
sometimes there were very grave errors made, that they were often made
the subject of the arraignment of the Government in the House of Commons.
It is only where great strategic issues of policy come that it is fitting
for us here to endeavour to form a final opinion. Defeat is bitter.
There is no use in trying to explain defeat. People do not like defeat,
and they do not like the explanations, however elaborate or plausible,
which are given them. For defeat there is only one answer. The only
answer to defeat is victory. If a Government in time of war gives the
impression that it cannot in the long run procure victory, who cares
for its explanations? It ought to go-that is to say, if you are quite
sure you can find another which can do better. However, it must be remembered
that no Government can conduct a war unless it stands on a solid, stable
foundation, and knows it stands on that foundation and, like a great
ship, can win through a period of storms into clearer weather. Unless
there is a strong impression of solidarity and strength in a Government
in time of war, that Government cannot give the support which is necessary
to the fighting men and their commanders in the difficult periods, in
the disheartening and disappointing periods. If the Government has always
to be looking over its shoulder to see whether it is going to be stabbed
in the back or not, it cannot possibly keep its eye on the enemy.
There is another point of some difficulty which presents itself to me
whenever I am asked to make a statement to the House. Ought I to encourage
good hopes of the successful outcome of particular operations, or ought
I to prepare the public for serious disappointments? From the purely
British standpoint, there is no doubt that the second of these courses
is to be preferred, and this is the course that I have usually followed.
It is the course which, no doubt, would commend itself to my noble Friend.
He has been urging us to look on the gloomy side of things-a kind of
inverted Couéism. When you get up in the morning you say to yourself,
"we can easily lose this war in the next four months," and
you say it with great emphasis and go on your daily task invigorated.
I must point out to my noble Friend, and to the House generally, that
the British nation is unique in this respect. They are the only people
who like to be told how bad things are, who like to be told the worst,
and like to be told that they are very likely to get much worse in the
future and must prepare themselves for further reverses. But when you
go to other countries-oddly enough I saw a message from the authorities
who are most concerned with our Arab problem at present, urging that
we should be careful not to indulge in too gloomy forecasts. The Arabs
do not understand the British character of meeting trouble long before
it comes, and they think it is much better to go on putting a bold face
on things and then meet the disaster when it arrives. Any statements
of a pessimistic character which are used here are calculated to discourage
our friends and to spread alarm and despondency over wide regions, to
affect the nicely balanced neutrals and to encourage the enemy, who,
of course, seizes upon any phrase or any gloomy allusion and repeats
it myriad-fold in his strident propaganda.
It is a nice question whether the increase in our war effort which would
result from my Noble Friend administering this austere mental treatment
to himself in the mornings would counterbalance the undoubted harm which
would be done when a phrase torn from its context, and probably with
an alteration of the verb, is sent throughout the world-"Admission
in the House of Commons by an eminent nobleman and ex-Minister: We are
going to lose the war," or something like that. I am not blaming
him at all. I feel just like him about it, and it is very much safer.
It makes me feel very much whether Members of Parliament have not got
to pick their words a little carefully. After all, in this deadly war
in which we are gripped, with dangers which are measureless, as they
are unprecedented, closing upon us in so many quarters, with so much
to defend and such limited resources, so many chances which may turn
ill against us-when we think of this position, it is a great pity if
statements are made which add nothing to the informative criticism which
is so valuable, but can be taken from their context and placarded all
over the world as a sign that we are not united or that our case is
much worse than it is.
There is one thing I regret very much, and that is that the brunt of
this fighting in the Middle East-I quite agree it is a very foolish
expression "in the Middle East"-or East should have fallen
so heavily on the splendid Australian and New Zealand troops. I regret
it for this reason among others, that the German propaganda is always
reproaching us for fighting with other people's blood, and they mock
us with the insulting taunt that England will fight to the last Australian
or New Zealander. I was very glad to see that Mr. Menzies, in his noble
speech of Sunday night, deal with this vile propaganda as it deserved.
There have been, in fact, during 1941, almost as many British as there
are Australian and New Zealand troops engaged in all the operations
in the Western Desert, in Greece and in Crete. The losses during this
year compared with the numbers engaged are slightly heavier for the
British than for the Dominion troops.
In Crete also, the numbers were almost exactly equal, and the British
loss again was slightly heavier. These figures include killed, wounded
and missing. They exclude Indian or non-British troops. In order to
turn the edge of this German propaganda, I have asked my right hon.
and gallant Friend the Secretary of State for War to endeavour to have
mentioned more frequently the names of British regiments, when this
can be done without detriment to the operations. The following British
regiments and units, for instance, fought in Crete: The Rangers, the
Black Watch, the Argyle and Sutherland Highlanders, the Leicestershire
Regiment, the Welch Regiment, the York and Lancaster Regiment, the Royal
Artillery, the Royal Engineers and numbers of the Royal Marines, who
formed the rearguard and suffered the most heavily of all. In fact,
of 2,000 Royal Marines landed in Crete, 1,400 became casualties or prisoners.
Naval losses of life in these operations exceeded 500 officers and men,
and while this was going on, we also lost 1,300 men in the Hood. Out
of 90,000 lives lost so far in this war at home and abroad, at least
85,000 come from the Mother Country. Therefore, I repel and repudiate
the German taunt, both on behalf of the Mother Country and of the Dominions
of Australia and New Zealand.
It might well be asked-I am trying to look at the questions which might
fairly be asked-why, having begun the battle for Crete, did you not
persist in the defence of the island? If you could bring off 17,000
men safely to return to Egypt, why could you not have reinforced with
17,000 men to carry on the battle? I have tried to explain in a simple
way that the moment it was proved that we could not crush the air-borne
landings before the Fleet losses became too heavy to hold off longer
a sea-borne landing, Crete was lost, and it was necessary to save what
was possible of the Army. It is one thing to take off 17,000 men as
we did, with their side arms, and quite another to land them in a fighting
condition with guns and materials. It is a wonderful thing that as many
as 17,000 got away in face of the enemy's overwhelming command of the
air.
I do not consider that we should regret the Battle of Crete The fighting
there attained a severity and fierceness which the Germans have not
previously encountered in their walk through Europe. In killed, wounded,
missing and prisoners we have lost about 15,000 men. This takes no account
of the losses of the Greeks and Cretans, who fought with the utmost
bravery and suffered so heavily on the other hand, from the most careful
and precise inquiries I have made, and which have been made by the Commanders-in-Chief
on the spot, we believe that about 5,000 Germans were drowned in trying
to cross the sea and at least 12,000 killed or wounded on the island
itself. In addition the air force the Germans employed sustained extraordinary
losses, above 180 fighter and bomber aircraft being destroyed and at
least 250 troop-carrying aeroplanes. This, at a time when our air strength
is overtaking the enemy's, is important. I am sure it will be found
that this sombre, ferocious battle, which was lost, and lost, I think,
upon no great margin, was well worth fighting and that it will play
an extremely important part in the whole defence of the Nile Valley
throughout the present year. I do not think there are any who are responsible
for it would not take the same decision again, although no doubt, like
our critics, we should be wiser in many ways after the event.
It is asked, Will the lessons of Crete be learned, and how will they
affect the defence of this Island? Officers who took part in the thickest
of the fighting in responsible positions, including a New Zealand brigadier,
are already approaching this country. At the same time, very full appreciations
have been made by the Staff in the Middle East and are being made in
a more lengthy form. All this material will be examined by the General
Staff here and will be placed at the disposal of General Sir Alan Brooke,
who commands the several millions of armed men we have in this Island,
including, of course, the Home Guard. Every effort will be made to profit
by it. There are, however, two facts to be borne in mind in comparing
what happened in Crete with what might happen here. In the first place,
we rely upon a strong superiority in air power and certainly upon a
much greater air power, both actually and relatively, than was proved
sufficient last autumn. This sustains not only the land defence but
liberates again the power of the Navy from the thralldom in which it
was held round Crete. In the second place, the scale of the effort required
from the Germans in attack would have to be multiplied many times over
from what was necessary in Crete, and it might be that this would be
beyond the capacity of their resources or their schemes. Everything,
however, will be done to meet an air-borne and sea-borne attack launched
upon a vast scale and maintained with total disregard of losses.
We shall not be lulled by the two arguments I have put forward into
any undue sense of security. An attack by parachute troops and gliders
may be likened to an attack by incendiary bombs, which, if not quickly
extinguished one by one, may lead not only to serious fires but to an
enormous conflagration. We are making many improvements in the defence
of our airfields and in the mobility of the forces which will be employed
upon that and other tasks. Nothing will be stinted, and not a moment
will be lost. Here I ought to say that it is not true that the Germans
clothed their parachute troops who attacked Crete in New Zealand uniforms.
I gave that report to the House as it reached me from the Commander-in-Chief
in the Middle East, but he now informs me that the mistake arose from
the fact that parachute troops, after landing at one point, drove a
number of New Zealand walking wounded before them and along with them
in their attack, and consequently the cry arose that they themselves
were in New Zealand uniforms. There is no objection to the use of parachute
troops in war so long as they are properly dressed in the uniform of
their country and so long as that uniform is in itself distinctive.
This kind of fighting is, however, bound to become very fierce as it
breaks out behind the fronts and lines of the armies, and the civil
population is almost immediately involved.
Now I come to the operations which have begun in Syria. I have been
waiting all day to have further news of our advance, but at the time
I got up to speak I had not received any advices that I could impart
to the House.
MR. HORE-BELISHA: Will the right hon. gentleman say something about
the Air Arm co-operation?
THE PRIME MINISTER: I certainly will. The right hon. Gentleman associated
himself with a very strong movement there has been for a much greater
development of the air force which is actually associated with the Army.
Last year, when we were considering our affairs, the great need was
to multiply fighters and bombers. It became an enormously important
matter. Nevertheless, portions of the Army co-operation squadrons were
associated with the military forces, but not on the scale which was
desirable or to the extent which was desirable. I think it is of the
utmost consequence that every division, especially every armoured division,
should have a chance to live its daily life and training in a close
and precise relationship with a particular number of aircraft that it
knows and that it can call up at will and need.
MR. BELLENGER: Under its own command?
THE PRIME MINISTER: Certainly, for the purposes of everything that is
a tactical operation. It was not possible last year to provide it on
a large scale without trenching on other domains which were more vital
to our safety, but it is the intention to go forward upon that path
immediately and to provide the Army with a larger number, a considerably
larger number, of aeroplanes suited entirely to the work they have to
do, and above all to the development of that wireless connection between
the ground forces and the air which the Germans have carried to such
an extraordinary point of perfection. If this had been done in Crete,
it would not have made any difference to the event there, because the
numbers there for the purpose of co-operating with the troops could
not have altered the event.
My right hon. Friend the Member for Devonport asked me who it was who
decided that the Air Forces on the aerodromes in Crete were to be withdrawn.
It was decided by the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force in the Middle
East, on the recommendation of General Freyberg, concurred in by the
R.A.F. Officer commanding on the spot, Group-Captain Beamish. It was
at that request. The numbers were small, and if they had not been withdrawn,
they would have been blown off the aerodromes without having been able
in the slightest degree to affect the course of events. I did overlook
that point in my statement, and I am glad that my right hon. Friend
has reminded me of it.
Now I come to the Syrian operation. Let me repeat that we have no territorial
designs in Syria or anywhere else in French territory. We seek no Colonies
or advantages of any kind for ourselves in this war. Let none of our
French friends be deceived by the blatant German and Vichy propaganda.
On the contrary, we shall do all in our power to restore the freedom,
independence and rights of France. I have, in a letter which I wrote
to General de Gaulle, said "the rights and the greatness of France";
we shall do all in our power to restore her freedom and her rights,
but it will be for the French to aid us in restoring her greatness.
There can be no doubt that General de Gaulle is a more zealous defender
of France's interests than are the men of Vichy, whose policy is that
of utter subservience to the German enemy.
It did not take much intelligence to see that the infiltration into
Syria by the Germans and their intrigues in Iraq constituted very great
dangers to the whole Eastern flank of our defence in the Nile Valley
and the Suez Canal. The only choice before us in that theatre for some
time has been whether to encourage the Free French to attempt a counter-penetration
by themselves or whether, at heavy risk in delay, to prepare a considerable
force, as we have done. It was also necessary to restore the position
in Iraq before any serious advance in Syria could be made. Our relations
with Vichy and the possibilities of an open breach with the Vichy Government
evidently raised the military and strategic significance of these movements
to the very highest point. Finally, and above all, the formidable menace
of the invasion of Egypt by the German Army in Cyrenaica, supported
by large Italian forces, with German stiffening, remains our chief pre-occupation
in the Middle East.
The advance by the German army forces into Egypt has been threatened
for the last two months, and there would not be much use in attempting
to cope with the situation in Syria, if, at the same time, our defences
in the Western Desert were beaten down and broken through. We had to
take all these things into consideration, and I was very glad indeed
when General Wavell reported that he was in a position to make the advance
which began on Sunday morning, and which, so far as I have been informed
up to the present, is progressing with very little opposition and favourably.
This position in Syria was very nearly gone. The German poison was spreading
through the country, and the revolt in Iraq, perhaps beginning prematurely,
enabled us to take the necessary measures to correct the evil; but,
as I say, we must not rejoice or give way to jubilation while we are
engaged in operations of this difficulty and when the reaction of the
Germans still remains to us obscure and unknown.
It is very easy, if I may say so, for critics, without troubling too
much about our resources and even without a sense of the features of
time and distance, to clamour for action now here and now there: "Why
do you not go here; what," as I think an hon. Member said, "are
you dithering about, why do you not go in there?" and so on. Indeed,
one can see how many attractive strategic propositions there are, even
with the most cursory examination of the atlas. But the House will,
I am sure, best guard its own dignity and authority by refraining from
taking sweeping or superficial views. Others have said that we must
not follow a hand-to-mouth strategy, that we must regain the initiative
and impart to all our operations that sense of mastery and design which
the Germans so often display. No one agrees with that more than I do,
but it is a good deal easier said than done, especially while the enemy
possesses vastly superior resources and many important strategical advantages.
For all those reasons I have never, as the House knows, encouraged any
hope of a short or easy war.
None the less, it would be a mistake to go to the other extreme and
to belittle the remarkable achievements of our country and its Armed
Forces. There are many things for which we may be thankful. The air
attack on this Island has not overwhelmed us; indeed, we have risen
through it and from it strengthened and glorified. There is no truth
in the statement of my right hon. Friend the Member for Devonport, which
he made in his speech in the country, that productivity in our factories
is falling off at an alarming rate. It may not be going as fast as we
would like, and if anyone can do anything to make it go faster, or tell
us how to do it, he will be rendering a great service. But it is not
simply a question of giving very strident orders and demands. There
is a great deal more than that in making the whole of our factories
go properly, but it is certainly the exact reverse of the truth to say
that productivity is falling off at an alarming rate. In guns and heavy
tanks, for instance, the monthly average for the first quarter of 1941
was 50 per cent. greater than in the last quarter of 1940. The output
for the month of May, a four-week month, was the highest yet reached
and more than double the monthly rate for the last quarter of 1940.
MR. HORE-BELISHA: Surely my right hon. Friend is confusing productivity
and the production. Of course, there is an increase of production in
certain articles, but with absenteeism, to which his attention was called
by the Labour party conference, and by the Select Committee on Aircraft
Production, the output per man cannot be what it was, and one can give
many other illustrations.
MR. BENJAMIN-SMITH (Rotherhithe): It is not the men but the lack of
materials.
MR. HORE-BELISHA: I agree.
THE PRIME MINISTER: I read into the word the meaning most people read
into it; when he said productivity was falling off, I took it to mean
not the effort of each man but the general production. I felt I must
contradict his statement to-day because it happens that I have heard
from two foreign countries in the course of the morning of the very
serious effect which this statement produced upon opinions there; how
it was published rapidly throughout Spain, for instance, and given the
greatest prominence coming as it did from an ex-Secretary of State.
It was said to be exercising a bad effect.
MR. HORE-BELISHA: But the Minister of Labour the very same day had said
that the building of factories and aerodromes was falling behind. Did
that get circulated in Spain?
THE PRIME MINISTER: I do not see any difficulty in reconciling that.
The Minister might be urging the men to make greater efforts, he might
say that this particular lot of airfields were falling behind, what
the programme actually was, but that is quite a different thing from
saying that the productivity of our factories is falling off. I must
say I do not think we are in a sufficiently safe position to allow ourselves
the full luxuries of vehement statements upon these very grave matters.
As I say, we have many things we may be thankful for. In the first place,
we have not been overwhelmed by the air attack; and our production,
far from being beaten down by the disorganisation, of that attack, has
been increasing at a very high rate.
The Battle of the Atlantic is also being well maintained. In January,
Herr Hitler mentioned March as the peak month of his effort against
us on the sea. We were to be exposed to attacks on a scale never before
dreamed of, and there were rumours of hundreds of U-boats and masses
of aircraft to be used against us.
These rumours were spread against us in the world, and a very alarming
impression was produced. March has gone, April has gone, May has gone,
and now we are in the middle of June. Apart from the losses incurred
in the fighting in the Mediterranean-which were serious-the month of
May was the best month we have had for some time on the Atlantic. Prodigious
exertions were made to bring in the cargoes and to protect the ships,
and these exertions have not failed. It is much easier to sink ships
than to build them or to bring them safely across the ocean. We have
lately been taking a stronger hand in this sinking process ourselves.
It is a most astonishing fact that, in the month of May we sank, captured
or caused to be scuttled no less than 257,000 tons of enemy shipping,
although they present us with a target which is perhaps one-tenth as
great as we present to them. While they slink from port to port, under
the protection of their air umbrella, and make short, furtive voyages
from port to port across the seas, we maintain our whole world-wide
traffic, with never less than w,000 ships on the seas or less than 400
in the danger zones on any day. Yet the losses we inflicted upon them
in the month of May were, I think, in the nature of three-quarters of
the losses they inflicted upon us. This also has a bearing on the possibility
of sea-borne invasion, because the destruction of enemy tonnage is proceeding
at a most rapid and satisfactory rate.
Nor need these solid grounds for thankfulness and confidence fall from
us when we look at the aspect of the war in the Middle East. We have
been at war for 21 months. Almost a year has passed since France deserted
us and Italy came in against us. If anybody had said in June last that
we should to-day hold every yard of the territories for which Great
Britain is responsible in the Middle East; that we should have conquered
the whole of the Italian Empire of Abyssinia, Eritrea and East Africa;
that Egypt Palestine and Iraq would have been successfully defended,
he would have been thought a very foolish visionary. But that is the
position at the moment. It is more than three months since the Germans
gave out that they would be in Suez in a month and were telling the
Spaniards that when Suez fell they would have to come into the war.
Two months ago many people thought that we should be driven out of Tobruk,
or forced to capitulate there. The last time we had a Debate on the
war in this House so instructed a commentator as my hon. and gallant
Friend the Member for Petersfield (Sir. G. Jeffries) warned us gravely
of the danger of a German thrust at Assiout, at the head of the delta.
Six weeks ago all Iraq was aflame, and Habbaniya was declared to be
in the direst jeopardy. Women and children were evacuated by air. It
was reported from enemy quarters that a surrender would be forced. A
hostile, insurgent Government ruled in Baghdad, in closest association
with the Germans and the Italians. Our forces were pinned in Basra,
having only just landed. Kirkuk and Mosul were in enemy hands. All has
now been regained. We are advancing into Syria in force. Our front at
Mersa Matruh in the Western Desert is unbroken and our defensive lines
there are stronger than ever. The large forces which were occupied in
the conquest of Abyssinia are now set free, with an immense mass of
transport, and large numbers are on their way to, or have already reached,
the Delta of the Nile.
I think it would be most unfair and wrong, and very silly in the midst
of a defence which has so far been crowned with remarkable success,
to select the loss of the Crete salient as an excuse and pretext for
branding with failure or taunt the great campaign for the defence of
the Middle East, which has so far prospered beyond all expectation,
and is now entering upon an even more intense and critical phase.
I give no guarantee, I make no promise or prediction for the future.
But if the next six months, during which we must expect even harder
fighting and many disappointments, should find US in no worse position
than that in which we stand to-day, if, after having fought so long
alone, single-handed against the might of Germany and against Italy,
and against the intrigues and treachery of Vichy, we should still be
found the faithful and unbeaten guardians of the Nile Valley and of
the regions that lie about it, then I say that a famous chapter will
have been written in the martial history of the British Empire and Commonwealth
of Nations.