The Unilateral Withdrawal Option
(Updated December 2003)
As far back as 1947,
Israel was prepared to coexist with a Palestinian state . Since 1967, Israel has consistently said it would
trade land in the West Bank and Gaza Strip for peace and
security. Successive Israeli governments have pursued this objective
without success. Meanwhile, Israelis and Palestinians have suffered.
For years, Israel hoped a moderate Palestinian leadership
would emerge that would agree to negotiate, but none did. Finally, at Oslo, Israel reached out
to its bitterest adversary, the PLO,
when Yasser Arafat promised to recognize Israel, end terror, and negotiate all their disputes.
Since 1993, Israel has signed onto a variety of plans aimed at providing Palestinians an independent state that would coexist
beside Israel; however, the Palestinians have repeatedly failed to deliver
on the one essential ingredient of each agreement — ending violence
against Israeli citizens.
As recently as 2000, Israel offered the Palestinians
a state in all of the Gaza Strip and 97% of the West Bank, with East
Jerusalem as its capital, but Arafat rejected the proposal because
he could not accept any deal that would permanently end the conflict
with Israel.
Israel continued to hold out hope for a negotiated
solution. The government agreed to the road
map and was optimistic that Abu
Mazen, the Palestinians’ first Prime Minister, would deliver
on his commitment to dismantle the terrorist infrastructure. He would
not do so and was forced to resign when it became clear that Arafat
retained all the power. The current Prime Minister, Abu
Ala, has no more authority than his predecessor and has also refused
to stop the violence.
After negotiating for nearly a decade, giving up much
of the West Bank and most of the Gaza Strip, and losing
hundreds of lives to Palestinian
terror, Israelis have come to the painful conclusion that no Palestinian
leader has both the will and ability to make peace.
If Israel has no one to negotiate with, what options
does it have for improving the situation for both Israelis and Palestinians?
Israel does not wish to hold onto the territories because
it does not want to rule over the Palestinians, and it cannot annex
the territories because the Palestinian population is growing at a rate
that would one day make Arabs the majority of the Israeli population.
The only reasonable alternative is to unilaterally withdraw from the
West Bank and Gaza.
While not ideal for the Palestinians, unilateral action
by Israel will allow them to achieve their stated goal of independence.
The Palestinians could establish their state in all of the Gaza Strip
and most of the West Bank. Most, if not all of the Jewish settlers who they insist should leave would be gone. The refugees would be free to return to what would become Palestine.
If Israel withdraws unilaterally, it will move its borders to an area approximating
the likely boundaries it would have accepted after a negotiation; that
is, a frontier that would be roughly along the 1967 border with modifications
to make that boundary secure while at the same time incorporating most
of the settlers. This is roughly where the security
fence is now being constructed.
Unilateral withdrawal would be extremely painful for
Israelis, but majorities support the idea in public
opinion polls. The most difficult aspect of the plan would be to
give up land that has great historic, geographic, and strategic significance.
Many Jews would have to give up their homes, some in places where their
ancestors have lived for centuries. This will be a wrenching experience
for all Israelis.
By allowing Jews to remain in peace, the Palestinians
could prove they have no animus toward Jews and are the peace-loving
people they have claimed to be. From Israel’s perspective, it
would be advisable to offer settlers compensation to move within the
new borders so they will not be vulnerable to attack and cannot become
hostages to Palestinian demands on other issues.
Some argue that unilateral action gives the Palestinians
no incentive for coexisting with Israel, but the opposite is true. Once
they have their independence, Palestinians should want to keep it, and
refrain from actions that might provoke Israel to retake territory or
otherwise undermine its newfound sovereignty.
Even though Israel will aim to create a secure boundary,
any withdrawal from territory is risky. Though Israel would hope the
Palestinians would establish a peaceful, democratic state on its side
of the border, there is no guarantee it will do so. Furthermore, some
terrorists might interpret Israel’s action as a sign of weakness
and, incorrectly, believe that it was their violence that drove Israel
out of the territories. Such a belief might motivate them to escalate
their violence.
Israel is not withdrawing out of weakness; however,
it is doing so from a position of strength. The terrorists can believe
whatever they like, but they will never drive Israel into the sea. Should
the Palestinians attack Israel, then the conflict will no longer pit
mighty Israel versus the stateless Palestinians, it will be a sovereign
state that committed an act of war against another sovereign state that
has every right to respond. It will also be in Jordan’s interest to insure the Palestinians do not build an army that could
make Palestine an even greater threat to the Kingdom than to Israel.
The United States and, ideally, the rest of the world,
must say to the Palestinians, “The conflict is over. You have
your state; now we’ll support you so long as you build a peaceful,
democratic nation, but we will oppose any attempts to militarize or
to export terror.”
Should the leadership of the Palestinians change, Israel
can still negotiate over borders and relations; the security fence may
be torn down, moved, or opened to allow the movement of goods and people.
Unilateral withdrawal is not a utopian plan. It is
a realistic acknowledgment that Israel cannot enjoy perfect peace. So
long as radical Muslims remain unwilling to accept a Jewish state in
their midst, violence against Israel will continue. Unilateral withdrawal,
however, allows Israel to maximize the amount of peace it enjoys and
minimize the danger.
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