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(GOV/2015/43)

Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran

Report by the Director General

Main Developments

- On 2 July 2015, the Director General held meetings with the President of Iran, HE Mr Hassan Rouhani, and the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, HE Mr Ali Shamkhani, to advance work towards the resolution of all outstanding issues.
- On 14 July 2015, the Director General and the Vice-President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, HE Mr Ali Akbar Salehi, signed a ‘Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme’ (Road-map), as set out in the annex to the Director General’s report of November 2011.
- On 14 July 2015, the E3/EU+3 and Iran agreed on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA).
- On 20 July 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2231, in which, inter alia, it “requests the Director General of the IAEA to undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA”.
- On 15 August 2015, as agreed in the Road-map, Iran provided to the Agency its explanations in writing and related documents, on past and present outstanding issues.
- On 25 August 2015, the Board of Governors, inter alia, authorized the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA, subject to the availability of funds and consistent with the Agency’s standard safeguards practices.
- The Agency has continued to undertake monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear-related measures set out in the Joint Plan of Action (JPA).

A. Introduction

1. This report of the Director General to the Board of Governors and, in parallel, to the Security Council, is on the implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement¹ and relevant provisions of Security Council resolutions² in the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran). It contains information, inter alia, regarding the ‘Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation’ (the Framework for Cooperation) and the ‘Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme’ (Road-map); the Joint Plan of Action (JPA), as further extended; the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA);³ and United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015).

2. The Security Council has affirmed that the steps required by the Board of Governors in its resolutions⁴ are binding on Iran.⁵ The relevant provisions of the six Security Council resolutions⁶ were adopted under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter and are mandatory, in accordance with the terms of those resolutions.^{7,8}

3. This report addresses developments since the Director General’s previous report (GOV/2015/34),⁹ as well as issues of longer standing.

B. Recent Developments

B.1. Clarification of Unresolved Issues

4. The Board of Governors, in its resolution of November 2011 (GOV/2011/69), stressed that it was essential for Iran and the Agency to intensify their dialogue aimed at the urgent resolution of all outstanding substantive issues for the purpose of providing clarifications regarding those issues, including access to all relevant information, documentation, sites, material and personnel in Iran. In its resolution of September 2012 (GOV/2012/50), the Board of Governors decided that Iranian cooperation with Agency requests aimed at the resolution of all outstanding issues was essential and urgent in order to restore international confidence in the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme.

¹ The Agreement between Iran and the Agency for the Application of Safeguards in Connection with the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (INFCIRC/214), which entered into force on 15 May 1974.

² This refers to six United Nations Security Council resolutions adopted between 2006 and 2010: 1696 (2006); 1737 (2006); 1747 (2007); 1803 (2008); 1835 (2008); and 1929 (2010).

³ The text of the JCPOA was communicated to the Director General by the Permanent Representatives to the IAEA of the E3+3 countries and Iran in a letter dated 24 July 2015 (INFCIRC/887).

⁴ Between September 2003 and September 2012, the Board of Governors adopted 12 resolutions in connection with the implementation of safeguards in Iran (see GOV/2013/56, footnote 2).

⁵ Security Council resolution 1929 (2010).

⁶ Those listed in footnote 2.

⁷ Part I.A of the Agency’s Relationship Agreement with the United Nations (INFCIRC/11).

⁸ Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

⁹ The Director General continues to provide the Board of Governors with monthly updates on Iran’s implementation of “voluntary measures” undertaken in relation to the JPA, the most recent of which was provided in GOV/INF/2015/15.

5. As previously reported, on 11 November 2013, the Agency and Iran signed a ‘Joint Statement on a Framework for Cooperation’ (GOV/INF/2013/14). In the Framework for Cooperation, the Agency and Iran agreed to cooperate further with respect to verification activities to be undertaken by the Agency to resolve all present and past issues, and to proceed with such activities in a step by step manner. The practical measures agreed in relation to the Framework for Cooperation between November 2013 and May 2014 are listed in Annex I. Since the Director General’s previous report, no further meetings have been held in respect of these practical measures.

6. On 2 July 2015, the Director General held meetings in Tehran with the President of Iran, HE Mr Hassan Rouhani, and the Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, HE Mr Ali Shamkhani, to advance work towards the resolution of all outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme, including clarification of possible military dimensions.

7. On 14 July 2015, the Director General and the Vice-President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, HE Mr Ali Akbar Salehi, signed in Vienna a ‘Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran’s nuclear programme’ (Road-map), as set out in the annex to the Director General’s report of November 2011 (GOV/2011/65).¹⁰ The Road-map identifies the necessary activities to be undertaken under the Framework for Cooperation, in order to accelerate and strengthen cooperation and dialogue between the Agency and Iran aimed at the resolution, by the end of 2015, of all past and present outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the Agency and Iran. (The Road-map is reproduced in Annex II.)

8. As agreed in the Road-map, on 15 August 2015, Iran provided to the Agency its explanations in writing and related documents, on past and present outstanding issues. The Agency is reviewing this information.

B.2. Joint Plan of Action

9. As previously reported, on 24 November 2013, a Joint Plan of Action (JPA) was agreed between China, France, Germany, the Russian Federation, the United Kingdom and the United States of America (E3+3) and Iran.¹¹ The JPA took effect on 20 January 2014, initially for a period of six months. As requested by the E3+3 and Iran, and endorsed by the Board of Governors (subject to the availability of funds), the Agency undertook the necessary nuclear related monitoring and verification activities in relation to the JPA, involving activities additional to those already being carried out pursuant to Iran’s Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and Security Council.¹² On 24 July 2014, the JPA was extended until 24 November 2014 when it was further extended until 30 June 2015. On 30 June 2015, the E3+3 and Iran requested the Agency, on behalf of the E3/EU+3 and Iran, to continue to undertake the necessary nuclear related monitoring and verification activities in Iran under the JPA “until further communication”.¹³

10. Since the Director General’s previous report, the Agency has continued to undertake the nuclear related monitoring and verification activities under the JPA. These JPA-related activities have been funded by voluntary contributions already provided by Member States. The Secretariat estimates that these funds will be exhausted by the end of September 2015 and has indicated that additional voluntary contributions are necessary to sustain the funding of the Agency’s JPA-related activities.^{14,15}

¹⁰ GOV/INF/2015/14.

¹¹ The text of the JPA was communicated to the Director General by the High Representative of the European Union (EU), on behalf of the E3+3 (INFCIRC/855), and by the Resident Representative of Iran to the IAEA, on behalf of Iran (INFCIRC/856).

¹² See footnote 2.

¹³ GOV/INF/2015/11, Attachment.

¹⁴ It is expected that the Agency will continue conducting JPA-related activities until “Implementation Day”, as defined in the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, para. 34 (iii).

¹⁵ For information on the additional resources required by the Agency in relation to the further extension of the JPA, as well as in relation to the requests of the Security Council contained in resolution 2231, see ‘Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)’ (GOV/2015/53 and Corr. 1), 14 August 2015.

B.3. Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action

11. On 14 July 2015, the E3/EU+3 and Iran agreed on a Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPOA). The JCPOA states, *inter alia*, that it “builds on” the implementation of the JPA and that the “full implementation of this JCPOA will ensure the exclusively peaceful nature of Iran’s nuclear programme”.¹⁶ The Director General welcomed the agreement, stating that it would “facilitate the IAEA’s further verification work in Iran”.¹⁷ He informed IAEA Member States that the Agency would be asked to “monitor and verify the nuclear-related measures set out in the agreement” and that he would then report to and consult the Board of Governors on this request and how to secure the necessary financial resources for the Agency.

B.4. Security Council Resolution 2231

12. On 20 July 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015),¹⁸ in which, *inter alia*, it requested the Director General to “undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA”;¹⁹ reaffirmed that Iran “shall cooperate fully as the IAEA requests to be able to resolve all outstanding issues, as identified in IAEA reports”;²⁰ and requested that the Agency and the Joint Commission²¹ “consult and exchange information, where appropriate, as specified in the JCPOA”.²²

B.5. Board of Governors Meeting of 25 August 2015

13. On 25 August 2015, the Board of Governors took note of the Director General’s report on ‘Verification and Monitoring in the Islamic Republic of Iran in light of United Nations Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015)’ (GOV/2015/53 and Corr. 1); authorized the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran’s nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA, and report accordingly, for the full duration of those commitments in light of United Nations Security Council resolution 2231 (2015), subject to the availability of funds²³ and consistent with the Agency’s standard safeguards practices; and authorized the Agency to consult and exchange information with the Joint Commission, as set out in that report.²⁴ In his opening remarks to the Board of Governors, the Director General indicated that as stated in the JCPOA, all provisions under the agreement are a “special arrangement and do not set a precedent”.

¹⁶ JCPOA, Preamble and General Provisions, para. ii.

¹⁷ Note by the Secretariat, 2015/Note 55, 14 July 2015.

¹⁸ Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) makes provision for the termination of Security Council resolutions 1696 (2006), 1737 (2006), 1747 (2007), 1803 (2008), 1929 (2010) and 2224 (2015) in accordance with its terms. Upon termination of the above referenced Security Council resolutions, the Board of Governors may wish to consider parallel action in regard to its decision (see GOV/2007/7 and GOV/OR.1181, paras 40 and 41) and consequential decisions on technical cooperation provided to Iran, which were taken through the Agency’s Technical Assistance and Cooperation Committee (based on GOV/2008/47/Add.3, GOV/2009/65, GOV/2011/58/Add.3 and GOV/2013/49/Add.3).

¹⁹ The actions requested of the Director General by the Security Council as contained in resolution 2231 are set out in GOV/2015/53 and Corr. 1, para. 8.

²⁰ Security Council resolution 2231, para 3.

²¹ The JCPOA establishes a Joint Commission consisting of representatives of the E3/EU+3 and Iran (Annex IV of the JCPOA).

²² Security Council resolution 2231, para. 19.

²³ A number of Member States indicated that they would make extrabudgetary funds available.

²⁴ The Board of Governors also approved modifications to ‘The Agency’s Programme and Budget 2016–2017 (GC(59)/2) as proposed in paragraph 3 of Section B of GOV/2015/54; and requested the Secretariat to take the necessary actions on the elements contained in Section B of GOV/2015/54 and to modify document GC(59)/2 as necessary to reflect the Board’s decision, for submission to the General Conference.

C. Facilities Declared under Iran's Safeguards Agreement

14. Under its Safeguards Agreement, Iran has declared to the Agency 18 nuclear facilities and nine locations outside facilities where nuclear material is customarily used (LOFs)²⁵ (Annex III). Notwithstanding that certain of the activities being undertaken by Iran at some of the facilities are contrary to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council,²⁶ as indicated below, the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at these facilities and LOFs.

D. Enrichment Related Activities

15. Iran is conducting enrichment related activities in the declared facilities referred to below, contrary to the requirement of relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and Security Council²⁷ to suspend all such activities. However, since 20 January 2014, Iran has not produced UF₆ enriched above 5% U-235 and all of its stock of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235²⁸ has been further processed through downblending or conversion into uranium oxide (see Annex IV). All of the enrichment related activities at Iran's declared facilities are under Agency safeguards, and all of the nuclear material, installed cascades, and feed and withdrawal stations at those facilities are subject to Agency containment and surveillance.²⁹

16. Iran has stated that the purpose of enriching UF₆ up to 5% U-235 is the production of fuel for its nuclear facilities.³⁰ Since Iran began enriching uranium at its declared facilities, it has produced at those facilities, 15 651.4 kg³¹ (+714.7 kg since the Director General's previous report) of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235, of which 7845.4 kg (-869.3 kg since the Director General's previous report)³² remain in the form of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235³³ and the rest has been further processed (see Annex IV).

D.1. Natanz

17. **Fuel Enrichment Plant:** FEP is a centrifuge enrichment plant for the production of low enriched uranium (LEU) enriched up to 5% U-235, which was first brought into operation in 2007. The plant is divided into Production Hall A and Production Hall B. According to the design information submitted by Iran, eight units, each containing 18 cascades, were planned for Production Hall A, which totals approximately 25 000 centrifuges in 144 cascades. Currently, one unit contains IR-2m centrifuges; five contain IR-1 centrifuges; and the other two units do not contain centrifuges.

²⁵ All of the LOFs are situated within hospitals.

²⁶ Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

²⁷ Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

²⁸ Up to the point at which it stopped, Iran had produced 447.8 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 (see Annex IV).

²⁹ In line with normal safeguards practice, small amounts of nuclear material (e.g. some waste and samples) may not be subject to containment and surveillance.

³⁰ As declared by Iran in its design information questionnaires (DIQs) for the Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP) at Natanz.

³¹ This figure includes 115.6 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 that has been produced from the downblending of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235.

³² This figure has decreased because Iran, in line with the JPA, fed 1584 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 into the conversion process at the Enriched UO₂ Powder Plant (EUPP) prior to the JPA deadline, which at that time was 30 June 2015.

³³ This comprises nuclear material in storage as well as nuclear material in the cold traps and inside cylinders still attached to the enrichment process.

Iran has not provided the corresponding design information for Production Hall B. The Agency continues to verify that Production Hall B does not contain any centrifuges.

18. In the unit containing IR-2m centrifuges, as of 22 August 2015, the situation remained unchanged from the Director General's previous report: six cascades had been fully installed with IR-2m centrifuges;³⁴ none of these cascades had been fed with natural UF₆; and preparatory installation work had been completed for the other 12 IR-2m cascades in the unit.

19. In the five units containing IR-1 centrifuges, as of 22 August 2015, the situation remained unchanged from the Director General's previous report: 90 cascades had been fully installed,³⁵ of which 54 were being fed with natural UF₆.³⁶ As previously reported, preparatory installation work had been completed for 36 IR-1 cascades in the two units not containing centrifuges.

20. As of 7 August 2015, Iran had fed 172 375 kg of natural UF₆ into the cascades at FEP since production began in February 2007 and produced a total of 15 056 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235.³⁷

21. As of 24 November 2014, Iran had downblended about 4118 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 2% U-235 to natural uranium.³⁸

22. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FEP,³⁹ and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant design information questionnaire (DIQ).

23. **Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant:** PFEP is a pilot LEU production, and research and development (R&D) facility that was first brought into operation in October 2003. It can accommodate six cascades, and is divided between an area currently being used for the production of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 (Cascades 1 and 6) and an area for R&D (Cascades 2, 3, 4 and 5).

24. **Production area:** As indicated in the Director General's previous reports, since the JPA took effect, Iran has ceased feeding Cascades 1 and 6 with UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 and is feeding them with natural UF₆ instead.⁴⁰ Since the JPA took effect, Iran has not operated Cascades 1 and 6 in an interconnected configuration.⁴¹

25. Between 20 January 2014 and 17 August 2015, Iran fed 1425.2 kg of natural UF₆ into Cascades 1 and 6 at PFEP and produced a total of 135.2 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235.⁴²

26. In a letter dated 19 August 2015, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to conduct a "test run" involving the feeding of depleted uranium into either Cascade 1 or 6. On 22 August 2015, the Agency confirmed that Iran had started feeding Cascade 6 with depleted UF₆ and that Cascade 1 was under vacuum.

³⁴ The number of IR-2m centrifuges installed at FEP (1008) was also unchanged.

³⁵ The number of IR-1 centrifuges installed at FEP (15 420) was also unchanged.

³⁶ GOV/2014/10, para. 22. The Agency has applied additional containment and surveillance measures to confirm that no more than the 54 IR-1 cascades (containing 9156 centrifuges) are being fed with nuclear material at FEP.

³⁷ Based on the amounts of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 verified by the Agency (as of 16 November 2014) and the amounts of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 estimated by Iran (covering the period from 17 November 2014 to 7 August 2015).

³⁸ This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA, as extended. The nuclear material originates from the tails produced by the enrichment of UF₆ up to 20% U-235 and from nuclear material evacuated from the cascades producing UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235, and is not included in the amount of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 indicated in para. 16.

³⁹ Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 17 May 2015.

⁴⁰ As of 23 August 2015, Cascades 1 and 6 contained a total of 328 IR-1 centrifuges (unchanged).

⁴¹ GOV/2014/10, para. 28. The Agency has applied additional containment and surveillance measures to confirm that Cascades 1 and 6 are not interconnected.

⁴² Based on the amounts of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 verified by the Agency (as of 13 September 2014) and the amounts of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 estimated by Iran (covering the period from 14 September 2014 to 17 August 2015).

27. **R&D area:** Since the Director General's previous report, Iran has been intermittently feeding natural UF₆ into IR-1, IR-2m, IR-4 and IR-6 centrifuges, sometimes into single machines and sometimes into cascades of various sizes. The Agency has verified that one IR-5 centrifuge and one prototype IR-8 centrifuge⁴³ are in place but without connections.⁴⁴

28. Between 18 May 2015 and 17 August 2015, a total of approximately 432.2 kg of natural UF₆ was fed into centrifuges in the R&D area, but no LEU was withdrawn as the product and the tails were recombined at the end of the process.

29. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at PFEP,⁴⁵ and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.

D.2. Fordow

30. **Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant:** FFEP is a centrifuge enrichment plant that is currently being used for the production of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235.⁴⁶ The facility, which was first brought into operation in 2011, was designed to contain up to 2976 centrifuges in 16 cascades, divided between Unit 1 and Unit 2. All of the centrifuges installed are IR-1 machines.

31. As previously reported, since the JPA took effect, Iran has ceased feeding UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 into the four cascades of Unit 2 previously used for this purpose and is feeding them with natural UF₆ instead. Iran has also not operated these cascades in an interconnected configuration throughout the same period.⁴⁷ As of 23 August 2015, none of the other 12 cascades in FFEP had been fed with UF₆.⁴⁸

32. As a result of the physical inventory verification (PIV) carried out by the Agency at FFEP between 24 January and 8 February 2015, the Agency verified, within measurement uncertainties normally associated with such a facility, the inventory of nuclear material as declared by Iran on 24 January 2015.⁴⁹

33. Between 20 January 2014 and 8 August 2015, Iran fed 3680.2 kg of natural UF₆ into the cascades at FFEP and produced a total of 344.6 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235.⁵⁰

34. Based on the results of the analysis of environmental samples taken at FFEP,⁵¹ and other verification activities, the Agency has concluded that the facility has operated as declared by Iran in the relevant DIQ.

⁴³ GOV/2014/58, footnote 33.

⁴⁴ On 23 August 2015, there were two IR-1 centrifuges, 11 IR-4 centrifuges, one IR-5 centrifuge, 8 IR-6 centrifuges, one IR-6s centrifuge and one prototype IR-8 centrifuge installed in Cascade 2; eight IR-1 centrifuges, ten IR-2m centrifuges, ten IR-4 centrifuges and seven IR-6 centrifuges installed in Cascade 3; 164 IR-4 centrifuges installed in Cascade 4; and 162 IR-2m centrifuges installed in Cascade 5.

⁴⁵ Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 25 May 2015.

⁴⁶ GOV/2009/74, paras 7 and 14; GOV/2012/9, para. 24. Iran has provided the Agency with an initial DIQ and three revised DIQs with different stated purposes for FFEP. In light of the difference between the original stated purpose of the facility and the purpose for which it is now being used, additional information from Iran is still required.

⁴⁷ GOV/2014/10, para. 36. The Agency has applied additional containment and surveillance measures at FFEP to confirm that only the four IR-1 cascades are used to enrich UF₆ and that they are not interconnected.

⁴⁸ The number of centrifuges installed at FFEP (2710) was also unchanged.

⁴⁹ GOV/2015/15, para. 32.

⁵⁰ Based on the amounts of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 verified by the Agency (as of 24 January 2015) and the amounts of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 estimated by Iran (covering the period from 25 January 2015 to 8 August 2015).

⁵¹ Results are available to the Agency for samples taken up to 8 April 2015.

D.3. Other Enrichment Related Activities

35. Iran continues to provide the Agency with regular managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.⁵² Such access, as well as associated mutually agreed information, was also provided by Iran pursuant to one of the practical measures agreed in relation to the Framework for Cooperation (see Annex I). As part of this managed access, Iran has also provided the Agency with an inventory of centrifuge rotor assemblies to be used to replace those centrifuges that fail. The Agency has analysed the information provided by Iran and, upon request, has received additional clarifications. Based on analysis of all the information provided by Iran, as well as the managed access and other verification activities carried out by the Agency, the Agency can confirm that, since the JPA took effect, centrifuge rotor manufacturing and assembly are consistent with Iran's replacement programme for failed centrifuges.⁵³

E. Reprocessing Activities

36. Iran is required, pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council,⁵⁴ to suspend its reprocessing activities, including R&D.⁵⁵ As previously reported, Iran stated in January 2014 that "during the first step time-bound (six months), Iran will not engage in stages of reprocessing activities, or construction of a facility capable of reprocessing".⁵⁶ In a letter to the Agency dated 27 August 2014, Iran indicated that this "voluntary measure" had been extended in line with the extension of the JPA.⁵⁷

37. The Agency has continued to monitor the use of hot cells at the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)⁵⁸ and the Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility.⁵⁹ The Agency carried out a PIV and a design information verification (DIV) at TRR on 18 August 2015, and a DIV at the MIX Facility on 19 August 2015. The Agency can confirm that there are no ongoing reprocessing related activities with respect to TRR, the MIX Facility and the other facilities to which the Agency has access in Iran.

F. Heavy Water Related Projects

38. Iran is required, pursuant to the relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council,⁶⁰ to suspend work on all heavy water related projects.⁶¹ Since the JPA took effect, Iran has

⁵² This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA.

⁵³ This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA.

⁵⁴ Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

⁵⁵ GOV/2013/56, footnote 28.

⁵⁶ This relates to one of Iran's undertakings in the JPA.

⁵⁷ As further extended (see footnote 13).

⁵⁸ The TRR is a 5 MW reactor which operates with 20% U-235 enriched fuel and is used for the irradiation of different types of targets and for research and training purposes.

⁵⁹ The MIX Facility is a hot cell complex for the separation of radiopharmaceutical isotopes from targets, including uranium, irradiated at TRR.

⁶⁰ Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

⁶¹ GOV/2013/56, footnote 32.

neither installed any major components at the IR-40 Reactor nor produced nuclear fuel assemblies for the IR-40 Reactor at the Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP).

39. **IR-40 Reactor:** The IR-40 Reactor, which is under Agency safeguards, is a 40 MW heavy water moderated research reactor designed to contain 150 fuel assemblies containing natural uranium in the form of UO_2 .

40. On 17 August 2015, the Agency carried out a DIV at the IR-40 Reactor and observed that, since the Director General's previous report, none of the reactor's remaining major components had been installed.⁶² As previously reported, pursuant to one of the practical measures agreed in relation to the Framework for Cooperation, Iran concluded with the Agency a safeguards approach for the IR-40 Reactor in August 2014.⁶³

41. **Heavy Water Production Plant:** The Heavy Water Production Plant (HWPP) is a facility for the production of heavy water with a design capacity to produce 16 tonnes of reactor-grade heavy water per year.

42. As previously reported, although the HWPP is not under Agency safeguards, the plant was subject to managed access by the Agency on 8 December 2013.⁶⁴ During the managed access, Iran also provided the Agency with mutually agreed relevant information. In addition, access to the heavy water storage location at the Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF) at Esfahan in February 2014 enabled the Agency to characterize the heavy water.⁶⁵

G. Uranium Conversion and Fuel Fabrication

43. Iran is conducting a number of uranium conversion and fuel fabrication activities at UCF, the Enriched UO_2 Powder Plant (EUPP), FMP and the Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP) at Esfahan, as indicated below, which are in contravention of its obligations to suspend all enrichment related activities and heavy water related projects,⁶⁶ notwithstanding that the facilities are under Agency safeguards.

44. Since Iran began conversion and fuel fabrication at its declared facilities, it has, inter alia:

- Produced 550 tonnes of natural UF_6 at UCF, of which 185 tonnes have been transferred to FEP.
- Produced 13.8 tonnes of natural uranium in the form of UO_2 at UCF, of which 13.2 tonnes have been transferred to FMP.
- Transferred 6334 kg of natural UF_6 to EUPP. In addition, 6560 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235 have been transferred from FEP to EUPP.
- Fed into the conversion process at EUPP 4304 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 5% U-235.
- Fed into the R&D conversion process at UCF 53 kg of UF_6 enriched to 3.34% U-235 and produced 24 kg of uranium in the form of UO_2 .⁶⁷

⁶² GOV/2013/56, para. 34.

⁶³ GOV/2014/43, para. 46.

⁶⁴ GOV/2014/10, para. 13.

⁶⁵ GOV/2013/56, para. 39.

⁶⁶ Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

⁶⁷ GOV/2012/55, para. 35.

- Fed into the conversion process at FPPF 337.2 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 and produced 162.8 kg of uranium in the form of U₃O₈.⁶⁸
- Used 121.8 kg of uranium in the form of U₃O₈ produced at FPPF for the manufacture of fuel items for TRR.

45. **Uranium Conversion Facility:** UCF is a conversion facility for the production of both natural UF₆ and natural UO₂ from uranium ore concentrate (UOC). It is planned that UCF will also produce UF₄ from depleted UF₆, and uranium metal ingots from natural and depleted UF₄.

46. Since January 2014, Iran has neither produced natural uranium in the form of UO₂ through the conversion of UOC at UCF, nor has it transferred any natural uranium in the form of UO₂ from UCF to FMP.

47. As previously reported, Iran is conducting R&D activities at UCF on the recovery of uranium from liquid and solid scrap resulting from conversion activities at UCF. On 13 June 2015, the Agency observed that the recovery of uranium from such liquid scrap was ongoing.

48. Between 13 and 17 June 2015, the Agency carried out a PIV at UCF to verify the inventory as declared by Iran on 12 June 2015. The results of the PIV are currently being evaluated by the Agency.

49. **Enriched UO₂ Powder Plant:** EUPP is a facility for the conversion of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 into UO₂ powder.⁶⁹ As previously reported, Iran began commissioning the facility in May 2014 using natural uranium. As part of the commissioning, as of 17 August 2015, Iran had fed a total of 6319 kg of natural UF₆ into the conversion process and produced 1828.8 kg of uranium in the form of UO₂. Since the plant began operations in July 2014, as of 17 August 2015, Iran had fed 4304 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 into the conversion process for the production of UO₂ and produced 465.8 kg of uranium in the form of UO₂.

50. The Agency is still evaluating the results of the PIV that it carried out at EUPP between 4 and 6 April 2015.

51. **Fuel Manufacturing Plant:** FMP is a facility for the fabrication of nuclear fuel assemblies for power and research reactors (see Annex IV).

52. In a letter dated 21 February 2015, Iran informed the Agency of its intention to conduct a “sinterability test on UO₂ sample powder” (enriched and natural)⁷⁰ in the form of “VVER-type UO₂ pellets”, which it would produce for this purpose. As of 17 August 2015, the Agency verified that the production of samples of LEU VVER-type UO₂ pellets was ongoing.

53. On 18 August 2015, the Agency carried out an inspection and a DIV at FMP and verified that Iran had continued its cessation of production of nuclear fuel assemblies using natural UO₂ for the IR-40 Reactor and that all of the fuel assemblies that had been produced previously remained at FMP.

54. **Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant:** FPPF is a facility for the conversion of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 into U₃O₈ and the manufacture of fuel assemblies made of fuel plates containing U₃O₈ (see Annex IV).

55. As previously reported, Iran stated in January 2014 that “during the first step of time-bound (six months), Iran declares that there is no reconversion line to reconvert uranium oxide enriched up to 20% U-235 back into UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235”.⁷¹ In a letter to the Agency dated 27 August 2014, Iran indicated that this “voluntary measure” had been extended in line with the extension of the JPA.⁷² Between 15 and 19 August 2015, the Agency carried out an inspection and a

⁶⁸ Unchanged since the Director General’s previous report.

⁶⁹ GOV/2013/40, para. 45.

⁷⁰ Such tests are conducted for quality control purposes.

⁷¹ This relates to one of Iran’s undertakings in the JPA.

⁷² As further extended (see footnote 13).

DIV at FPFPP during which it confirmed that there was no process line at the plant for the reconversion of uranium oxide into UF₆.

56. As previously reported, Iran has fed a total of 337.2 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 (227.6 kg of uranium) into the conversion process of FPFPP. As of 19 August 2015, Iran had produced 162.8 kg of uranium in the form of U₃O₈ and generated solid and liquid scrap containing 55.4 kg of uranium. The remainder of the uranium that was fed into the process remains in the process and in waste. Of the 162.8 kg of uranium in the form of U₃O₈, Iran has used 121.8 kg to manufacture fuel items for TRR and generated 31 kg of solid scrap.

57. On 16 August 2015, the Agency observed that the process lines for the recovery of uranium from solid and liquid scrap at FPFPP had yet to commence operation and that Iran was continuing to conduct R&D activities related to the recovery of uranium from solid scrap.

58. The Agency has verified that, as of 19 August 2015, Iran had produced at FPFPP one experimental fuel assembly and 37 TRR-type fuel assemblies. Thirty of these fuel assemblies, including the experimental assembly, had been transferred to TRR.

H. Possible Military Dimensions

59. Previous reports by the Director General have identified outstanding issues related to possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme and actions required of Iran to resolve these.⁷³ The Agency has concerns about the possible existence in Iran of undisclosed nuclear related activities involving military related organizations, including activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile. Iran is required to cooperate fully with the Agency on all outstanding issues, particularly those which give rise to concerns about the possible military dimensions to Iran's nuclear programme, including by providing access without delay to all sites, equipment, persons and documents requested by the Agency.^{74,75}

60. The annex to the Director General's November 2011 report (GOV/2011/65) provided a detailed analysis of the information available to the Agency at that time, indicating that Iran had carried out activities that are relevant to the development of a nuclear explosive device. This information is assessed by the Agency to be, overall, credible.⁷⁶ The Agency obtained more information after November 2011 that further corroborated the analysis contained in that Annex.

61. In February 2012, Iran dismissed the Agency's concerns, largely on the grounds that Iran considered them to be based on unfounded allegations,⁷⁷ and in August 2014, Iran stated that "most of the issues" in the annex to GOV/2011/65 were "mere allegations and do not merit consideration".⁷⁸

62. As indicated above (para. 7), on 14 July 2015, the Agency and Iran agreed on a Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme, as set out in the annex to the Director General's report of November 2011 (GOV/2011/65). As agreed in the Road-map, on 15 August 2015, Iran provided to the Agency its explanations in writing and related documents, on past and present outstanding issues. The Agency is reviewing this information.

⁷³ For example: GOV/2011/65, paras 38–45 and Annex; GOV/2011/29, para. 35; GOV/2011/7, Attachment; GOV/2010/10, paras 40–45; GOV/2009/55, paras 18–25; GOV/2008/38, paras 14–21; GOV/2008/15, paras 14–25 and Annex; GOV/2008/4, paras 35–42.

⁷⁴ Security Council resolution 1929, paras 2 and 3.

⁷⁵ Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

⁷⁶ GOV/2011/65, Annex, Section B.

⁷⁷ GOV/2012/9, para. 8.

⁷⁸ GOV/2014/43, para. 64.

63. Since the Director General's previous report, at a particular location at the Parchin site, the Agency has continued to observe, through satellite imagery, the presence of vehicles, equipment and probable construction materials.⁷⁹ In addition, a small extension to an existing building appears to have been constructed.⁸⁰ As previously reported, the activities that have taken place at this location since February 2012 are likely to have undermined the Agency's ability to conduct effective verification.⁸¹ Full and timely implementation of the relevant parts of the Road-map is essential to clarify issues relating to this location at Parchin.⁸²

I. Design Information

64. Under the terms of its Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council,⁸³ Iran is required to implement the provisions of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements General Part concerning the early provision of design information.^{84,85} Under the JCPOA, Iran has agreed to notify the Agency that it will "fully implement" the modified Code 3.1 "as long as the Safeguards Agreement remains in force".⁸⁶

J. Additional Protocol

65. Under the terms of its Safeguards Agreement and relevant resolutions of the Board of Governors and the Security Council,⁸⁷ Iran is required to implement the Additional Protocol.⁸⁸ Under the JCPOA, Iran "will notify the IAEA of provisional application of the Additional Protocol to its Safeguards Agreement in accordance with Article 17(b) of the Additional Protocol pending its entry into force, and subsequently seek ratification and entry into force, consistent with the respective roles of the President and the Majlis (Parliament)".⁸⁹

⁷⁹ The Agency has information provided by Member States indicating that Iran had constructed a large explosives containment vessel (chamber) at this location in which to conduct hydrodynamic experiments. Such experiments would be strong indicators of possible nuclear weapon development (GOV/2011/65, Annex, paras 49–51).

⁸⁰ The building referred to here is not the building housing the containment vessel (chamber building) (GOV/2013/6, para. 51).

⁸¹ For a list of the most significant developments observed by the Agency at this location between February 2012 and the publication of the Director General's May 2013 report, see GOV/2012/55, para. 44; GOV/2013/6, para. 52; and GOV/2013/27, para. 55. Further developments were reported in the Director General's reports of May 2014 (GOV/2014/28, para. 59), September 2014 (GOV/2014/43, para. 67), and November 2014 (GOV/2014/58, para. 59).

⁸² GOV/2011/65, Annex, Section C; GOV/2012/23, para. 5.

⁸³ Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

⁸⁴ In a letter dated 29 March 2007, Iran informed the Agency that it had suspended implementation of the modified Code 3.1 of the Subsidiary Arrangements to its Safeguards Agreement (GOV/INF/2007/8). In accordance with Article 39 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, agreed Subsidiary Arrangements cannot be changed unilaterally; nor is there a mechanism in the Safeguards Agreement for the suspension of provisions agreed to in the Subsidiary Arrangements. Therefore, the modified Code 3.1, as agreed to by Iran in 2003, remains in force. Iran is further bound by para. 5 of Security Council resolution 1929 (2010).

⁸⁵ See GOV/2015/15, para. 65.

⁸⁶ JCPOA, Annex I, Section L, para. 65.

⁸⁷ Security Council resolution 2231 (2015) provided that the resolutions listed in footnote 2 shall terminate in accordance with the terms of resolution 2231.

⁸⁸ Iran's Additional Protocol was approved by the Board of Governors on 21 November 2003 and signed by Iran on 18 December 2003, although it has not been brought into force. Iran provisionally implemented its Additional Protocol between December 2003 and February 2006.

⁸⁹ JCPOA, Annex I, Section L, para. 64.

66. Implementation of the Additional Protocol by Iran is an essential prerequisite for the Agency to be able to reach a position where it could provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran.

K. Other Matters

67. On 18 August 2015, the Agency confirmed that 21 fuel assemblies, which had been produced in Iran and which contain uranium that was enriched in Iran up to 20% U-235, were in the core of TRR.⁹⁰ On the same date, the Agency observed that the Mini IR-40 prototype fuel assembly was in the storage pool.⁹¹

68. As of 19 August 2015, the Agency confirmed that one fuel plate (the same one as indicated in the Director General's previous reports), containing a mixture of U₃O₈ (enriched up to 20% U-235) and aluminium, remained at the MIX facility, having been transferred from FPPF, and was being used for R&D activities aimed at optimizing the production of ⁹⁹Mo, ¹³³Xe and ¹³¹I isotopes.⁹²

69. On 11 and 12 July 2015, the Agency conducted an inspection and a DIV at the Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant, at which time the reactor was operating at 100% of its nominal power.

L. Summary

70. While the Agency continues to verify the non-diversion of declared nuclear material at the nuclear facilities and LOFs declared by Iran under its Safeguards Agreement, the Agency is not in a position to provide credible assurance about the absence of undeclared nuclear material and activities in Iran, and therefore to conclude that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities.⁹³

71. On 14 July 2015, the Director General and the Vice-President of Iran and President of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran, HE Mr Ali Akbar Salehi, signed a Road-map aimed at the resolution, by the end of 2015, of all past and present outstanding issues.

72. On the same date, the E3/EU+3 and Iran agreed the JCPOA and, on 20 July 2015, the United Nations Security Council adopted resolution 2231 (2015), which, inter alia, requested the Director General to "undertake the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear related commitments for the full duration of those commitments under the JCPOA".

73. On 25 August 2015, the Board of Governors, inter alia, authorized the Director General to implement the necessary verification and monitoring of Iran's nuclear-related commitments as set out in the JCPOA, subject to the availability of funds and consistent with the Agency's standard safeguards practices.

74. Iran has provided to the Agency its explanations in writing and related documents, on past and present outstanding issues. The Agency is reviewing this information. The Director General will

⁹⁰ On 18 August 2015, the core of TRR comprised a total of 33 fuel assemblies.

⁹¹ GOV/2013/40, para. 64.

⁹² GOV/2013/40, para. 65.

⁹³ The Board of Governors has confirmed on numerous occasions, since as early as 1992, that para.2 of INFCIRC/153 (Corr.), which corresponds to Article 2 of Iran's Safeguards Agreement, authorizes and requires the Agency to seek to verify both the non-diversion of nuclear material from declared activities (i.e. correctness) and the absence of undeclared nuclear activities in the State (i.e. completeness) (see, for example, GOV/OR.864, para. 49 and GOV/OR.865, paras 53–54).

provide, for action by the Board of Governors, the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues by 15 December 2015.

75. The Agency continues to undertake monitoring and verification in relation to the nuclear related measures set out in the JPA, as further extended.

76. The Director General will continue to report as appropriate.

Annex I

Practical Measures agreed by the Agency and Iran, for implementation by Iran, in relation to the Framework for Cooperation between November 2013 and May 2014

FIRST STEP: Six (Initial) Practical Measures, agreed on 11 November 2013

1. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Gchine mine in Bandar Abbas.
2. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Heavy Water Production Plant.
3. Providing information on new research reactors.
4. Providing information with regard to the identification of 16 sites designated for the construction of nuclear power plants.
5. Clarification of the announcement made by Iran regarding additional enrichment facilities.
6. Further clarification of the announcement made by Iran with respect to laser enrichment technology.

SECOND STEP: Seven Practical Measures, agreed on 9 February 2014

1. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Saghand mine in Yazd.
2. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and managed access to the Ardakan concentration plant.
3. Submission of an updated Design Information Questionnaire (DIQ) for the IR-40 Reactor.
4. Taking steps to agree with the Agency on the conclusion of a Safeguards Approach for the IR-40 Reactor.
5. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and arranging for a technical visit to Lashkar Ab'ad Laser Centre.
6. Providing information on source material, which has not reached the composition and purity suitable for fuel fabrication or for being isotopically enriched, including imports of such material and on Iran's extraction of uranium from phosphates.
7. Providing information and explanations for the Agency to assess Iran's stated need or application for the development of Exploding Bridge Wire detonators.

THIRD STEP: Five Practical Measures, agreed on 20 May 2014

1. Exchanging information with the Agency with respect to the allegations related to the initiation of high explosives, including the conduct of large scale high explosives experimentation in Iran.
2. Providing mutually agreed relevant information and explanations related to studies made and/or papers published in Iran in relation to neutron transport and associated modelling and calculations and their alleged application to compressed materials.
3. Providing mutually agreed information and arranging a technical visit to a centrifuge research and development centre.
4. Providing mutually agreed information and managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities.
5. Concluding the safeguards approach for the IR-40 Reactor.

Annex II

Road-map for the clarification of past and present outstanding issues regarding Iran's nuclear programme

The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and the Islamic Republic of Iran (Iran) agree, in continuation of their cooperation under the Framework for Cooperation, to accelerate and strengthen their cooperation and dialogue aimed at the resolution, by the end of 2015, of all past and present outstanding issues that have not already been resolved by the IAEA and Iran.

In this context, Iran and the Agency agreed on the following:

1. The IAEA and Iran agreed on a separate arrangement that would allow them to address the remaining outstanding issues, as set out in the annex of the 2011 Director's General report (GOV/2011/65). Activities undertaken and the outcomes achieved to date by Iran and the IAEA regarding some of the issues will be reflected in the process.
2. Iran will provide, by 15 August 2015, its explanations in writing and related documents to the IAEA, on issues contained in the separate arrangement mentioned in paragraph 1.
3. After receiving Iran's written explanations and related documents, the IAEA will review this information by 15 September 2015, and will submit to Iran questions on any possible ambiguities regarding such information.
4. After the IAEA has submitted to Iran questions on any possible ambiguities regarding such information, technical-expert meetings, technical measures, as agreed in a separate arrangement, and discussions will be organized in Tehran to remove such ambiguities.
5. Iran and the IAEA agreed on another separate arrangement regarding the issue of Parchin.
6. All activities, as set out above, will be completed by 15 October 2015, aimed at resolving all past and present outstanding issues, as set out in the annex of the 2011 Director General's report (GOV/2011/65).
7. The Director General will provide regular updates to the Board of Governors on the implementation of this Road-map.
8. By 15 December 2015, the Director General will provide, for action by the Board of Governors, the final assessment on the resolution of all past and present outstanding issues, as set out in the annex of the 2011 Director General's report (GOV/2011/65). A wrap up technical meeting between Iran and the Agency will be organized before the issuance of the report.
9. Iran stated that it will present, in writing, its comprehensive assessment to the IAEA on the report by the Director General.
10. In accordance with the Framework for Cooperation, the Agency will continue to take into account Iran's security concerns

Annex III

List of Declared Nuclear Facilities and LOFs in Iran

Tehran:

1. Tehran Research Reactor (TRR)
2. Molybdenum, Iodine and Xenon Radioisotope Production (MIX) Facility
3. Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories (JHL)

Esfahan:

4. Miniature Neutron Source Reactor (MNSR)
5. Light Water Sub-Critical Reactor (LWSCR)
6. Heavy Water Zero Power Reactor (HWZPR)
7. Uranium Conversion Facility (UCF)
8. Fuel Manufacturing Plant (FMP)
9. Fuel Plate Fabrication Plant (FPFP)
10. Enriched UO₂ Powder Plant (EUPP)

Natanz:

11. Fuel Enrichment Plant (FEP)
12. Pilot Fuel Enrichment Plant (PFEP)

Fordow:

13. Fordow Fuel Enrichment Plant (FFEP)

Arak:

14. Iran Nuclear Research Reactor (IR-40 Reactor)

Karaj:

15. Karaj Waste Storage

Bushehr:

16. Bushehr Nuclear Power Plant (BNPP)

Darkhovin:

17. 360 MW Nuclear Power Plant

Shiraz:

18. 10 MW Fars Research Reactor (FRR)

LOFs:

Nine (all situated within hospitals)

Annex IV

Table 1: Summary of UF₆ Production and Flows

| | Date | Quantity | Enrichment |
|--|------------------|--------------|------------|
| Produced at UCF | August 2015 | 550 000 kg | Natural |
| Produced by downblending of UF ₆ enriched up to 2% U-235 | 24 November 2014 | 7730 kg | Natural |
| Fed into FEP, PFEP and FFEP | August 2015 | 177 480.4 kg | Natural |
| Fed into EUPP | August 2015 | 6319 kg | Natural |
| Produced at FEP, PFEP and FFEP | August 2015 | 15 535.8 kg | Up to 5% |
| Produced by downblending of UF ₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 | 20 July 2014 | 115.6 kg | Up to 5% |
| Fed into PFEP | 20 January 2014 | 1630.8 kg | Up to 5% |
| Produced at PFEP | 20 January 2014 | 201.9 kg | Up to 20% |
| Fed into FFEP | 20 January 2014 | 1806.0 kg | Up to 5% |
| Produced at FFEP | 20 January 2014 | 245.9 kg | Up to 20% |

Table 2: Inventory of UF₆ Enriched up to 20% U-235

| | |
|-----------------------------|-----------|
| Produced at FFEP and PFEP | 447.8 kg |
| Fed into conversion process | 337.2 kg |
| Downblended | 110.0 kg* |
| Stored as UF ₆ | 0.6 kg** |

* The figure includes 1.6 kg that was previously downblended (GOV/2012/55, para. 10).

** This material is under Agency seal at Iran's declared enrichment facilities where it had been used as reference material for mass spectrometry.

Table 3: Conversion at UCF

| Conversion process | Quantity produced | Transferred to FMP |
|--|-------------------|--------------------|
| UF ₆ (~3.4% U-235) into UO ₂ | 24 kg U | 24 kg U |
| Natural UOC into UO ₂ | 13 792 kg U* | 13 229 kg U |

* Uranium content in material qualified for fuel fabrication.

Table 4: Conversion of UF₆ Enriched up to 20% U-235 into U₃O₈ at FPF

| Feed quantity | Quantity produced |
|--|-------------------|
| 337.2 kg of UF ₆ (227.6 kg U) | 162.8 kg U |

Table 5: Conversion of UF₆ into UO₂ at EUPP

| Feed quantity | Quantity produced |
|--|-------------------|
| 6319 kg of natural UF ₆ (4262.3 kg U) | 1828.8 kg U* |
| 4304 kg of UF ₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 (2904.1 kg U) | 465.8 kg U* |

* The rest of the nuclear material is in different stages of the process.

Table 6: Fuel Manufacturing at FMP

| Item | Number produced | Enrichment | Item mass (g U) | Number irradiated |
|------------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-------------------|
| Test fuel rod for IR-40 Reactor | 3 | Natural uranium | 500 | 1 |
| Test fuel rod | 2 | 3.4% | 500 | - |
| Fuel rod assembly | 2 | 3.4% | 6 000 | 1 |
| Mini IR-40 prototype fuel assembly | 1 | Natural uranium | 10 000 | 1 |
| IR-40 prototype fuel assembly | 36 | Natural uranium | 35 500 | Not applicable |
| IR-40 fuel assembly | 11 | Natural uranium | 56 500 | - |

Table 7: TRR Fuel Fabrication at FPPF

| Item | Number produced | Enrichment | Item mass (g U) | Present at TRR | Irradiated |
|----------------------------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|----------------|------------|
| TRR test plate (Natural Uranium) | 4 | Natural uranium | 5 | 2 | 1 |
| TRR test plate | 5 | 19% | 75 | 5 | 2 |
| TRR control fuel assembly | 10 | 19% | 1 000 | 8 | 6 |
| TRR standard fuel assembly | 27 | 19% | 1 400 | 21 | 16 |
| Test assembly (with 8 plates) | 1 | 19% | 550 | 1 | - |

Annex V

Update on Iran's implementation of "voluntary measures" undertaken in relation to the Joint Plan of Action agreed between the E3+3 and Iran on 24 November 2013

1. The Agency confirms that since 20 January 2014, Iran has:
 - i. not enriched uranium above 5% U-235 at any of its declared facilities;
 - ii. not operated cascades in an interconnected configuration at any of its declared facilities;
 - iii. diluted – down to an enrichment level of no more than 5% U-235 – 108.4 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235;⁹⁴
 - iv. fed 100 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 20% U-235 into the conversion process at FPFPP for conversion into uranium oxide;
 - v. had no process line to reconvert uranium oxides back into UF₆ at FPFPP;
 - vi. not made "any further advances" to its activities at FEP, FFEP or the Arak reactor (IR-40 Reactor), including the manufacture and testing of fuel for the IR-40 Reactor;
 - vii. provided an updated DIQ for the IR-40 Reactor and concluded with the Agency a safeguards approach for the reactor⁹⁵ (based on the updated DIQ and the safeguards measures agreed on 5 May 2014);
 - viii. fed 4304 kg of UF₆ enriched up to 5% U-235 into the conversion process at the EUPP for conversion into uranium oxide;⁹⁶
 - ix. continued its safeguarded enrichment R&D practices at PFEP, without accumulating enriched uranium;
 - x. not carried out reprocessing related activities at TRR and the MIX Facility or at any of the other facilities to which the Agency has access;
 - xi. provided information and managed access to the uranium mine and mill at Gchine,⁹⁷ to the Saghand Uranium Mine⁹⁸ and the Ardakan Uranium Production Plant;⁹⁹
 - xii. continued to provide daily access to the enrichment facilities at Natanz and Fordow;
 - xiii. provided regular managed access to centrifuge assembly workshops, centrifuge rotor production workshops and storage facilities, and provided information thereon; and
 - xiv. provided,¹⁰⁰ in relation to enhanced monitoring, the following:
 - plans for nuclear facilities and a description of each building on each nuclear site;
 - descriptions of the scale of operations being conducted for each location engaged in specified nuclear activities; and
 - information on uranium mines and mills, and on source material.

⁹⁴ For details, see GOV/INF/2014/26, footnote 4.

⁹⁵ On 31 August 2014.

⁹⁶ On 17 August 2015, the Agency verified that 465.8 kg of uranium in the form of UO₂ enriched up to 5% U-235 had been produced since the plant started operation.

⁹⁷ On 29 January 2014.

⁹⁸ On 6 May 2014.

⁹⁹ On 7 May 2014.

¹⁰⁰ As of 20 April 2014: pursuant to Iran's undertaking to provide this information within three months of the JPA taking effect, i.e. 20 January 2014.

2. In addition, the Agency confirms that since 24 July 2014, Iran has:
- (i) used 68.8 kg of U_3O_8 , converted from UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, for the manufacture of fuel items for TRR;¹⁰¹
 - (ii) used 0.084 kg of U_3O_8 , converted from UF_6 enriched up to 20% U-235, for the manufacture of miniature fuel plates for ^{99}Mo production;¹⁰² and
 - (iii) diluted about 4118 kg of UF_6 enriched up to 2% U-235 to the level of natural uranium.

¹⁰¹ The Agency has verified that, since 24 July 2014, an additional 13.2 kg of this U_3O_8 (6.2 kg prior to 24 November 2014 and 7.0 kg since that date), have been generated by and removed from the fuel fabrication process as scrap. Iran reported that this nuclear material, which remains at the facility, had not met the technical specification for fuel fabrication.

¹⁰² In a letter dated 28 December 2014, Iran informed the Agency that FPPF was to start the production of miniature fuel plates for the MIX Facility for Mo^{99} production.