Hezbollah's use of Lebanese civilians as human shields: the extensive military infrastructure positioned and hidden in populated areas. From within the Lebanese towns and villages deliberate rocket attacks were directed against civilian targets in Israel.

Dr. Reuven Erlich (Lt. Col. Ret.)

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1 The study was carried out at the Center for Special Studies by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center’s staff of experts, headed by Dr. Reuven Erlich. The study was supported by Military Intelligence, the Operations Division of the IDF General Staff, the IDF Spokesperson and the legal experts of the IDF and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs.
The launch…

A Syrian-made 220 mm rocket launched at Haifa from the outskirts of Tyre (August 13)

…and the results

A house in the Bat Galim district of Haifa destroyed by a Syrian-made 220 mm rocket containing ball bearings (July 17, 2006)
Foreword

This study analyzes two central concepts of Hezbollah’s warfare, demonstrated during the second Lebanon war (July-August 2006). The first is the broad use of the Lebanese civilian population as a living shield; the second, viewing the Israeli civilian population as the primary target for the enormous rocket arsenal Hezbollah built up over a period of years. Both acts are considered war crimes under international law. They express the basic asymmetry between Israel, committed to moral conduct and international law, and a terrorist organization operating in direct contravention of those laws. That asymmetry is characteristic of the warfare waged against the State of Israel (and the entire international community) by Hezbollah and other terrorist organizations and as such is, by and large, a most recent case study of a situation prevailing in other conflict zones in this twenty first century.

The background to specific issues treated in this study was a war, the second Lebanon war, which caught both sides – and the world – by surprise. Israel was forced to deal with a host of both moral and practical problems that this war dramatically brought to the fore. From the very outset the hostilities were born of a mistaken perception. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah thought he could carry out a cross-border abduction and that Israel would respond as it had in the past: with limited military action followed by negotiations for the soldiers’ release and a grudging acceptance of Hezbollah’s terms for a prisoner swap. Nasrallah has, indeed, publicly admitted that had he known what Israel’s reaction would be, he would not have embarked on that particular course. For Israel signaled Hezbollah that the ground rules had changed, and that it would react differently from the way it had during the six years that followed its withdrawal from south Lebanon (in May 2000). In the heat of battle and throughout the thirty-three days of fierce combat, media attention was focused on the action, and there was little or no time – or patience – to enter into a thorough examination of facts and basic policies. This now needs
to be done not only for the purpose of chronicling history in the most accurate and authoritative manner as possible, but also as a guide to similar activities taking place in other theaters of action parallel and subsequent to events in Lebanon.

The Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center, which is part of the Center for Special Studies, took upon itself to bring before the public important aspects of the recent war, sifting, verifying, confirming and compiling information that illustrates Hezbollah’s policies and modus operandi. The IDF was forced to deal with a terrorist organization, generously supported by two terrorism-sponsoring states (Iran and Syria), which constructed a broad military infrastructure within populated areas in south Lebanon. The organization systematically used local inhabitants as human shields, cynically endangering their lives and well being.

From within that infrastructure Hezbollah indiscriminately directed its massive fire at civilian targets in Israel, intending to cause death and destruction and to spread fear in Israel’s heartland and demoralize Israelis. Nearly four thousand rockets were fired into Israel, in gross violation of the international law. The use of human shields and the targeting of civilian populations are war crimes. However, Hezbollah does not see itself as bound by such laws, unlike Israel which did and does its utmost to avoid harming civilians.

Given the prospect of renewed hostilities, not only with Lebanon but in the Palestinian Authority-administered territories, we felt it necessary to provide authentic data previously unavailable to the public. This study is the product of the determination of a small group of people, a devoted team led by military intelligence veteran expert Dr. Reuven Erlich, who were privileged to enjoy the cooperation of every potential source of information in Israel. Every item

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As of January 1, 2007, its name will be changed to the Israeli Intelligence Heritage and Commemoration Center.
of information was painstakingly checked and double checked to meet the highest standards of accuracy and veracity that the this group has maintained in recent years.

This study is designed to provide all interested persons with reliable information about Hezbollah’s conduct. Through its reports, and by using its Website to disseminate information, the Center for Special Studies performs a public service for global audiences, including the Arab and Muslim world. We in the Center for Special Studies are dedicated not only to commemorating the fallen of the Israeli intelligence community and to preserving its heritage but no less to harnessing the accumulated capabilities of our veterans to serve the current needs of truth-seeking audiences. Thus, as we look to the past, we make an effort to disseminate information contributing to the current war on terrorism. I sincerely hope that the reader will find the material of interest and be attentive to the wider context within which this unique study should be considered.

With every good wish,

Efraim Halevy
Center for Special Studies - Chairman
(Former Head of the Israeli Mossad 1998-2002)
ABOUT THE STUDY

1. This study examines Hezbollah’s exploitation of Lebanese civilians as human shields. Hezbollah is a terrorist organization which constructed a broad, advanced, comprehensive military infrastructure within densely populated areas of Lebanon. During the last war Hezbollah used that infrastructure to carry out a massive series of previously planned rocket attacks against population centers in Israel. Its objective was to wear down Israel, to cause civilian casualties and property damage, to cripple the economy and rend the fabric of Israeli society.

2. Iran and Syria, both terrorism-supporting states, regard Hezbollah as a strategic asset and are responsible for its military build-up in Lebanon, which they foster with massive arms shipments (long-range rockets and advanced anti-tank missiles), enormous infusions of money and political support. They intended to use Hezbollah’s military might against Israel in due time, when their own strategic considerations dictated, for example in response to an attack on Iran’s nuclear installations.

3. The construction of a broad military infrastructure, positioned and hidden in populated areas, was intended to minimize Hezbollah’s vulnerability. In addition it was designed to provide it with a kind of immunity to IDF attacks by using civilians as human shields, rely on the knowledge that it is IDF commitment to avoid harming civilians whenever possible. Hezbollah would also gain a propaganda advantage if it could represent Israel as attacking innocent civilians, which in fact was exactly what happened during the last war in Lebanon (“the second Lebanon war.”).
4. Hezbollah’s long-term plan, which was speeded up when the IDF withdrew from Lebanon in 2000, was to construct an orderly, organized **military infrastructure within densely populated areas**. They were established in the **southern neighborhoods of Beirut** (especially in Haret Hreik, where the organization’s command center is located), in **south Lebanon** (especially south of the Litani River, the heart of its operational infrastructure) and in **the Beqa’a Valley** (especially in the region of Baalbek, where its training and logistics facilities are located).

5. Hezbollah’s main deployments are the following:

   a. **Offensive**: Before the outbreak of the second Lebanon war, Hezbollah stockpiled an arsenal of more than **20,000 rockets** of various ranges, including long-range rockets capable of reaching both the north and center of Israel. They were primarily concentrated in south Lebanon and for the most part kept in designated storehouses located in **civilian structures** (private residences and public institutions) in many towns and villages. That enabled Hezbollah to wage a **long-term campaign** against Israel and to inflict extensive damage on its civilian population. Hezbollah aspired to create a **balance of deterrence** with Israel and exploit it to carry out attacks and encourage terrorism in the Palestinian Authority-administered territories, and at the same time to continue building up its military power in Lebanon.

   b. **Defensive**: Hezbollah’s defensive deployment is based on its military infrastructure south of the Litani River and in the hills around Nabatiya. Its objective was to enable Hezbollah to conduct **guerilla attacks** against the IDF with advanced anti-tank missiles, engineering forces and well-trained and well-equipped infantry. Its defensive infrastructure is based on a broad deployment within the Shi’ite towns and villages south of the Litani River and the intention to wage determined **urban warfare** (a concept well-illustrated by operational plans captured by the IDF during the war). To
complement its military infrastructure within populated areas, Hezbollah also constructed such an infrastructure in non-populated areas, but its function is secondary in its overall defensive strategy.

c. Logistic: Hezbollah’s logistic deployment consists of numerous storehouses of weapons scattered throughout Lebanon, particularly south Lebanon, which enable Hezbollah to engage in protracted warfare against Israel. To that end Hezbollah instituted a broad logistic system in south Lebanon based on hundreds of private residences and public institutions (including mosques). It also makes extensive use of Lebanon’s road system to transport weapons from Syria to its forces in south Lebanon (as happened during the war), and of Lebanon’s communications and mass media capabilities, among them its own media.

6. Hezbollah’s exploitation of Lebanese residents as human shields for its military infrastructure was well-illustrated during the second Lebanon war. It carried out stubborn urban fighting and launched thousands of rockets at Israeli cities and towns from close proximity to private residences and public institutions. Hezbollah had advance plans to turn many villages into ground-fighting arenas against the IDF, cynically exploiting the local civilian population (such exploitation is considered a war crime and gross violation of international laws governing armed conflict). At the present time Hezbollah is rehabilitating the military infrastructure damaged during the war with no change in its basic policy of hiding within the civilian population.

7. The documentary section of this study provides proof, based on a wide range of intelligence sources, of the use of civilians as human shields and the deliberate shelling of Israeli cities and towns. Its main sections include:

   a. Aerial photographs of Hezbollah headquarters, bases, offices, weapons and ammunition stores, and intelligence and propaganda
installations. The military infrastructure located by the aerial photographs is shown to be positioned and hidden within clearly civilian population centers in south Beirut, south Lebanon and the Beqa’a Valley.

b. Examples of locating the military infrastructure within population centers and of launching rockets close to private residences and public institutions, taken from a wide variety of sources: aerial photographs, land photographs taken by IDF forces, aerial photograph interpretation, seized documents, interrogations of Hezbollah detainees, radar screens of rocket fire from within villages and television footage.

c. Proof that Hezbollah deliberately fired rockets (including fragment-spraying rockets) at population centers and civilian facilities in Israel. The following sources were used: analysis and reconstruction of the rocket remains found in Israel, public statements made by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah, seized Hezbollah documents, and announcements made by Hezbollah’s Al-Manar TV and its other communications media.

8. In addition to the text, the study includes a CD of selected material documenting Hezbollah’s operational activities conducted from within the Lebanese population and the rocket fire aimed at Israeli settlements. It also includes examples of footage photographed by the IDF from the air and on the ground, television network footage, recorded information obtained from three Hezbollah detainees, a selection of public statements made by Hassan Nasrallah and announcements aired by the Hezbollah-controlled media.
9. This study will show that during the second Lebanon war the IDF was forced to fight a terrorist organization which deliberately **positioned and hid a vast military infrastructure** (including rockets specifically intended to attack Israeli cities and towns) within a civilian environment. That was done by cynically using the Lebanese population within which it is located as a human shield.

10. The IDF was therefore faced with the problem of inflicting serious damage on Hezbollah’s military infrastructure to protect the security of Israel’s citizens, while maintaining its moral and ideological commitment to avoid harming civilians. As a solution, and to minimize insofar as possible the harm done to the civilian population, the IDF used a variety of means to **warn** the residents of south Beirut and south Lebanon, advising them to leave areas in which Hezbollah operated.3 The warnings were clearly understood by the local population and most residents **left the areas** where there was fighting, **without a doubt reducing the number of civilians killed**.

11. It should be noted that the **IDF’s air strikes and ground attacks** against Hezbollah targets located in population centers were **carried out in accordance with international law**, which does not grant immunity to a terrorist organization deliberately hiding behind civilians supporting it, using them as human shields. Attacks against Hezbollah targets and the Lebanese infrastructure serving Hezbollah’s military activities were carried out during the war in accordance with the statutes

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3 Although such warnings often endangered the IDF’s operational capabilities.
of international law governing the conduct of war, and Israel was within its rights to defend itself, its security and the health and welfare of its citizens. During the war, as a whole, the decision-making process during the war in the IDF which related to the attacks was accompanied by legal counsel from Military Advocate General’s Corps.

12. Hezbollah, on the other hand, engaged in previously planned massive rocket fire directed against civilian targets with the clear intention to destroy, kill and terrorize the Israeli population while violating the statutes of international law governing the conduct of war. The violations committed by Hezbollah during the war (and which it has every intention of committing again) are within the strict definitions of war crimes, and it is up to the international community to use all available legal and political means to deal with Hezbollah and with the states which encourage it.

Sources Used

13. The study is based on information from Military Intelligence and many other sources. Preparing this study revealed a great deal of information, however, as is only natural, most of the material in the hands of the Israeli security establishment is classified.

14. The study provides a large amount of varied analyses and documentation, the latter coming from a variety of sources:

a) Footage photographed by the Israeli Air Force during the war.

b) Footage and still shots photographed by the IDF Spokesman and IDF ground forces.
c) Television footage of public statements made by Hassan Nasrallah as well as **Hezbollah announcements**.

d) Testimonies of interrogated Hezbollah detainees.

e) Locating Hezbollah headquarters, bases, offices, weapons and installations in aerial photographs.

f) Hezbollah documents captured by the IDF during the war.

g) The IDF radar location of the sources of Hezbollah rocket fire from south Lebanon.

h) Data from the IDF Operational Division, the Israeli Ministry for Environmental Protection, the Israeli Police Department and the National Insurance Institution for losses and damages in Israel caused by rocket fire.

I. Preliminary investigations of IDF forces relating to the war.

15. All parts of this study relating to the legal aspects of the use of civilians as human shields and of rocket fire targeting Israel’s civilian population were prepared with the help of the International Law Department of the IDF’s **Military Advocate General’s Corps** and the Legal Branch of the Foreign Ministry. We would also like to thank Lieutenant Colonel (Ret.) Danny Grossman for his comments.⁴

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⁴ Danny Grossman is the Israeli Director of the American Jewish Congress.
Overview

16. The study is divided into four parts:

a. **Part One**: Introduction. The establishment of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure within the civilian population of Lebanon.

b. **Part Two**: Documentation. Proof of the location of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and operational activities carried out from within the civilian population.

c. **Part Three**: Population centers in Israel as targets for Hezbollah rocket fire.

d. **Part Four**: Text and visual appendices on CD.
17. A general description of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure and the rationale behind establishing and using it:

a. Acceleration of a military force build-up since the IDF withdrawal from south Lebanon in May 2000.

b. The objectives of military force according to Hezbollah, Iran and Syria.

c. A general description of Hezbollah’s concept of deployment and use of military force.

18. Using the civilian population as a human shield:

a. The rationale behind positioning and hiding Hezbollah’s military infrastructure within densely populated areas.

b. A general description of the deployment and functioning of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in populated areas in south Lebanon.

c. Hezbollah’s concept of urban warfare and its application during the second Lebanon war.

d. Hezbollah’s awareness of the danger to the civilians resulting from its presence and activity in the villages.

e. The local residents’ abandoning of the regions where Hezbollah military infrastructure was located.

f. The large percentage of Hezbollah operatives among those killed during the war relative to the number of civilians killed.

g. Rehabilitating Hezbollah’s military infrastructure after the war using the same pattern of positioning and hiding it within the civilian population.
PART TWO: DOCUMENTATION – PROOF OF THE LOCATION OF THE HEZBOLLAH’S MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE AND OPERATIONAL ACTIVITIES CARRIED OUT FROM WITHIN THE CIVILIAN POPULATION

19. Locations of the military infrastructure in the Shi’ite suburbs of south Beirut:
   a. General description.
   b. Examples of aerial photographs of Hezbollah targets attacked by the Israeli Air Force in south Beirut.

20. Locations of the military infrastructure in the villages of south Lebanon and a description of the ground warfare waged there by Hezbollah:
   a. Overview
   b. Bint Jbeil
   c. Aita al-Shaab
   d. Ghandouriyeh-Froun
   e. Maroun al-Ras

21. Locations of Hezbollah headquarters, bases, offices, storehouses and weapons in additional settlements in south Lebanon:
   a. The city of Tyre.
   c. Villages further north (Yater, Soultaniyeh, ‘Abbassiyeh, Khirbet Silm, Qana, Maaroub, Tbnin).
22. The locations in aerial photographs of Hezbollah headquarters and bases within population centers in the Beqa’a Valley, especially in the city of Baalbek.

23. Locations of rocket launchings from villages and village outskirts, based on radar tracking and the aerial photograph interpretation.

24. Some of the documentation is accompanied by a CD nearly an hour long, including:

a. Footage photographed by the IDF and the Israeli TV channels documenting Hezbollah rocket fire and urban warfare (accompanying Appendix 2 i).

b. Testimony given by detained Hezbollah operatives concerning the organization’s activities within population centers (accompanying Appendix 2 ii).

c. Public statements made by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and announcements broadcast by Hezbollah-controlled media concerning rocket fire targeting Israeli population centers (accompanying Appendix 2 iii).
PART THREE: POPULATION CENTERS IN ISRAEL AS TARGETS FOR DELIBERATE HEZBOLLAH ROCKET FIRE

25. General description of Hezbollah’s rocket arsenal:

   a. Amounts, types, ranges and manufacturers of Hezbollah’s rockets.
   b. Rockets as inexact weapons intended to hit settled places rather than pinpoint targets.
   c. The use and significance of fragmentation rockets.
   d. The rationale behind using rockets: targeting population centers and other civilian installations.

26. Hezbollah rocket fire targeting population centers during the second Lebanon war:

   a. Rocket policy during the various phases of the war.
   b. The number and types of rockets fired at Israel.
   c. Casualties and property damage inflicted on Israel resulting from Hezbollah rocket fire.

27. Proof that Hezbollah deliberately attacked Israeli civilians and the country’s economic infrastructure:

   a. **Public statements made by Hassan Nasrallah** and announcements in the Hezbollah-controlled media according to which the Israeli population was the main target.

   b. **Seized documents**: Range cards of upgraded Grad rockets (122 mm) containing lists of targets in Israel, most of them civilian settlements.
28. **Appendices:**

a. **Appendix 1:** Captured documents

1) **Appendix 1 (i):** Hezbollah storehouses of explosives in the villages of Kafr Kila and Dibbin in the eastern sector of south Lebanon.

2) **Appendix 1 (ii):** Hezbollah battle plan for the town of Deir Mimess in the eastern sector of south Lebanon.

3) **Appendix 1 (iii):** Two apartments and two stores rented in the village of Majdal Silm by an operative belonging to the Hezbollah logistics unit.

4) **Appendix 1 (iv):** Purchase of services from businesses in south Lebanon by the Hezbollah logistics unit.

5) **Appendix 1 (v):** Range cards for upgraded Grad rocket (122 mm) positions containing a list of targets and ranges in Israel, most of them civilian towns and cities.

b. **Appendix 2: Visual appendices**

**Appendix 2 (i):** Examples of footage photographed by the IDF and by television channels documenting Hezbollah fire and operational activities carried out from within population centers (see attached CD).

**Appendix 2 (ii):** Testimonies of three Hezbollah detainees regarding the organization’s activity within population centers (see attached CD).

**Appendix 2 (iii):** A selection of public statements made by Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah and announcements appearing in the Hezbollah-controlled media concerning rocket fire targeting population centers in Israel (see attached CD).
c. **Appendix 3**: Examples of locating rocket launchers near residential buildings found by interpreting aerial photographs.

d. **Appendix 4**: Missile launching sites within villages and in village outskirts south of the Litani River according to IDF radar tracking.

e. **Appendix 5**: Casualties and property damage inflicted on Israel:
   1) **Appendix 5 (i)**: Personal details about Israeli civilians who were killed by Hezbollah rocket fire.
   2) **Appendix 5 (ii)**: Estimates of ecological damage inflicted on Israel by Hezbollah rocket fire.

f. **Appendix 6**: The Israeli effort to prevent casualties among the Lebanese population. IDF warnings to the population in Lebanon to leave areas of Hezbollah activity and IDF attacks.

g. **Appendix 7**: Legal aspects prepared by the International Legal Department of the Military Advocate General’s Corps:
   1. **Appendix 7 (i)**: Strikes on terrorist targets located within and nearby civilian population concentration – legal aspects.
   2) **Appendix 7 (ii)**: Targeting of infrastructure serving the Hezbollah military effort – legal aspects.

**Appendix 7 (iii)**: Hezbollah attacks on civilian objects – legal aspects.
PART ONE: INTRODUCTION
THE ESTABLISHMENT OF HEZBOLLAH’S MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN THE CIVILIAN POPULATION OF LEBANON
Storage of arms and ammunition in mosques: a vehicle with anti-tank missiles detonated by the IDF near a mosque in the western-sector village of Marwahin
GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF HEZBOLLAH’S MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE AND THE RATIONALE BEHIND ESTABLISHING AND USING IT
A. ACCELERATION OF MILITARY BUILD-UP SINCE THE IDF’S WITHDRAWAL FROM SOUTH LEBANON IN MAY 2000

1. Following the first Lebanon War (1982-1985), Hezbollah started consolidating its military build-up within Shi’ite population centers in Beirut, south Lebanon, and the Beqa’a Valley. The build-up of its military strength was a **lengthy process**, which **accelerated** following the IDF’s retreat from the security zone (May 24, 2000). **The background for the acceleration of the process was the drop in the intensity of the war** which followed the IDF’s withdrawal from the security zone and the State of Israel’s full compliance with Security Council Resolution 425.

2. The IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon undermined the international and internal Lebanese legitimacy Hezbollah sought to obtain in order to continue perpetrating terrorist attacks from Lebanese territory. Furthermore, while Hezbollah **created new pretexts for itself** to continue fighting against Israel, such as the “liberation” of the Shabaa Farms or the release of Lebanese detainees held in Israel, such pretexts **did not allow Hezbollah to continue a full-scale warfare**. Under the new conditions that emerged after May 2000, Hezbollah found itself limited to the perpetration of casual terrorist attacks, based on new “game rules” which the organization attempted to devise after the IDF’s withdrawal from Lebanon.

3. **In those circumstances, for the first time since its establishment in 1982, Hezbollah was finally free of the burden of daily fighting and could turn its efforts to upgrading and building up its military infrastructure.** The process was greatly facilitated by the unprecedented backing and assistance extended by Syria and Iran, allowing Hezbollah to acquire advanced arms, such
that are held by some sovereign states rather than terrorist organizations.

4. **A key figure in the build-up and operation** of Hezbollah’s military infrastructure is Hajj Imad Fayez Mughniyah, Hassan Nasrallah’s military deputy. As such, Mughniyah is in charge of all the organization’s operative activities, both within Lebanon and abroad.⁵

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⁵ Imad Mughniyah has commanded numerous terrorist attacks, both inside and outside Lebanon, against Western and Israeli targets. Among other things, he has been responsible for hijacking planes, abducting Western diplomats, blowing up the Israeli embassy and the AMIA Jewish community center in Buenos Aires, etc. He is therefore one of the US’ most wanted terrorists, and there has been issued an international arrest warrant against him.
B. THE OBJECTIVES OF BUILDING UP THE MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE IN HEZBOLLAH’S VIEW AND IN IRAN AND SYRIA’S VIEW

5. Over the past six years, Hezbollah has upgraded its military infrastructure. Hezbollah designed this infrastructure, with Syria and Iran’s assistance, to achieve the following goals:

a. To achieve strategic staying power, i.e. the ability to wage a lengthy campaign against Israel to maximize damage both to Israel’s civilian population and IDF soldiers. Hezbollah intends to target civilians by firing rockets and perpetrating terrorist attacks (carried out by Hezbollah-guided Palestinian terrorist squads). The military infrastructure built by the organization in south Lebanon, situated in densely-populated areas, was designed to allow Hezbollah to mount a coordinated defense against a possible ground assault by the IDF, allowing the organization to maintain its survivability, power, and status.

b. To create a balance of deterrence that would prevent Israel from launching a new offensive against Hezbollah. That will allow Hezbollah to carry on its anti-Israeli provocations, based on the game rules it has devised since May 2000 (abductions and abduction attempts, shooting at IDF outposts, rocket fire on Israel, encouragement and assistance to Palestinian terrorism). That balance of deterrence collapsed when Israel changed the game rules following the abduction of two IDF soldiers on July 12, 2006.

c. To establish Hezbollah’s power and status within Lebanon: Hezbollah’s military capabilities, directed against Israel, strengthen its political power within Lebanon, since they could potentially be directed against its internal enemies (disarmed during the Civil War). On the internal Lebanese scene, Hezbollah is a revolutionary
force striving ultimately to establish Shi’ite dominance, to remove
the Christian camp and its allies from their positions of power, and
to fundamentally change the existing Lebanese regime.

6. **Iran and Syria**, two state sponsors of terrorism, have stood behind
Hezbollah’s military build-up and helped strengthening it within
Lebanon. They have done so by extending **massive assistance in
arms and ammunition** (such as providing large quantities of rockets
and advanced anti-tank missiles), **funding** (Hezbollah receives most of
its annual budget from Iran), and **political backing** which allows
Hezbollah to contest its opponents on the internal Lebanese scene. In
addition, Iran’s **radical revolutionary ideology** is actively exported
to Lebanon and spread by Hezbollah among the Shi’ite community,
including children and teenagers who undergo indoctrination and
brainwashing by Hezbollah.⁶

7. For Hezbollah supporters **Iran and Syria**, building up the
organization’s military strength and reinforcing its political power are
meant to achieve the following goals:

   a. As Hezbollah’s main patron, Iran considers the organization a
tangible (and so far the only) example of the success of exporting
the Khomeinist Islamic revolution. The military and political
capabilities acquired by the organization **well serve Iran’s
aspirations for regional hegemony**, being a potential threat
against Israel and, indirectly, the US, the Arab world, and
the current Lebanese regime with its anti-Syrian
orientation.

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⁶ For information on Iranian assistance to Hezbollah, see Information Bulletin dated September 8, 2006
by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center: “Hezbollah as a strategic arm of Iran”. See also
Information Bulletin dated August 8, 2006: “An Iranian figure who had a key role in founding
Hezbollah publicly announced that long-range Iranian Zelzal-2 rockets were delivered to the
organization”.
b. **Syria considers** Hezbollah and its military capabilities as **strong assets** to offset the weakness of the Syrian regime and the pressure exerted on it by the US and the international community. Hezbollah is perceived as a tool in the struggle against Israel, entrenching Syria’s influence in Lebanon, and reinforcing its status vis-à-vis the US and the Arab world without directly involving and implicating Syria.

8. **In Iran and Syria’s view**, the upgraded infrastructure established by Hezbollah in Lebanon will allow high defensive survivability with an offensive option against Israel that was supposed to be activated in due course. The rocket arsenal will permit Hezbollah to gradually wear Israel down through a combination of sustained targeting of population centers in its territory and terrorist attacks. The **offensive option** was supposed to be used **according to Iran and Syria’s strategic considerations**, such as during a Middle East crisis or in response to an assault on Iran's nuclear facilities. It is our assessment that Hezbollah’s offensive during the second Lebanon war was premature in Iran and Syria’s view.

**The personality cult of the Iranian leadership among Hezbollah terrorists**

Posters with the images of Iranian leader Khamenei and the instigator of the Islamic revolution, Ayatollah Khomeini, found in rooms used by Hezbollah operatives in Shihin (right) and Bint Jbeil (left). Found in the possession of Hezbollah terrorists in the various villages were Iranian ideological instruction materials, a clear testimony of the export of the Iranian revolution to Lebanon.7

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7 See Information Bulletin dated September 8, 2006 by the Intelligence and Terrorism Information Center: “Hezbollah as a strategic arm of Iran”.
9. Hezbollah’s deployment in Lebanon covers **four territorial subdivisions** which differ in their operative concepts, their demographic and physical characteristics, and the nature of Hezbollah’s deployment inside.

10. A general description of the four divisions follow:

    a. **Hezbollah’s general staff is located in Beirut, and it includes headquarters and infrastructures in the Dahiya, the densely-populated Shi’ite neighborhoods of southern Beirut.** Most headquarters are set up in the Shi’ite neighborhood of Harat Hreik, in an area called the “security square”, which houses a **general staff of sorts**
for the organization, controlling its operative and regional units across Lebanon. Heavily secured, this region is under Hezbollah’s complete control, and access for strangers and all its Lebanese opponents is forbidden. This “nerve center” is the seat of Hezbollah’s senior leadership, led by Hassan Nasrallah, and the organization’s command and control centers.

b. The operative core in south Lebanon, which includes most of the organization’s rocket arsenal, is deployed south of the Litani River as part of an operative unit named Nasr, split into territorial subdivisions. Before the war, the operative core held most of the organization’s rocket arsenal (see below). The operative core serves two main purposes: maintaining sustained rocket and artillery fire on northern Israel and confronting possible IDF ground assaults.

c. The rear combat zone in the Nabatiyeh region (as part of the regional unit named Badr). This zone, giving Hezbollah defensive depth, is used for firing long-range rockets on Israel and opposing IDF maneuvers and flanking attempts.

d. The training and logistics infrastructures in the Beqa’a Valley: concentrated in the Beqa’a Valley, far from the Israeli border and close to Syria, are Hezbollah’s training and logistics infrastructures. That is where Hezbollah receives arms and ammunition from Syria and Iran, subsequently storing them or distributing them to other territorial divisions. Hundreds of operatives are also located there.

11. In these divisions, key among which is south Lebanon, Hezbollah has built three combat arsenals whose main characteristics are:
a. **The offensive arsenal:** before the outbreak of the war, it was based on a large rocket arsenal estimated at over **20,000 rockets** of varying ranges (from short-range to long-range rockets capable of reaching northern and central Israel). Most of the rockets were hidden in designated warehouses in the villages of south Lebanon, and only some were hidden outdoors, in unpopulated areas. This rocket arsenal allowed Hezbollah to subject Israeli population centers to continuous rocket fire during the second Lebanon war.

b. **The defensive arsenal is mostly located in areas south of the Litani River and the Nabatiyeh region.** It is designed to allow Hezbollah to wage **guerilla warfare.** Its central components were and still are infantry, special forces, anti-tank fire (carried out by skilled operatives who operate advanced anti-tank missiles), sabotage, and anti-aircraft fire. The defensive combat arsenal is largely based on the organization’s extensive deployment in the Shi’ite villages in the operative core in south Lebanon. To supplement this arsenal, Hezbollah has also constructed “outdoor” outposts, located near the villages and **playing a secondary role in the organization’s overall defensive deployment.**

c. **The logistics infrastructure:**

   i) Based on numerous arms warehouses spread across (mostly south) Lebanon, it is **designed to provide Hezbollah with sustained fighting ability.** For that purpose, the organization has established an extensive logistics infrastructure

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8 In a “victory rally” held in Beirut’s southern suburb of Al-Dahiya on September 22, Hassan Nasrallah boasted about Hezbollah’s rocket array which numbers over 20,000 rockets.
in south Lebanon, relying mostly on warehouses in hundreds of private buildings and public facilities.

ii) **The logistics infrastructure makes widespread use of Lebanon’s road network** to collect arms and ammunition coming in from Syria and transfer them to its operatives in south Lebanon. During the war, arms and ammunition were transferred from Syria by trucks and vans, some of which were eliminated by Israeli Air Force strikes.

iii) Hezbollah also made widespread use of the Lebanese communications infrastructure and mass media (including its own television channels, radio stations, and websites). Of particular note is the Al-Manar television channel, which provided propaganda coverage of the rocket assault on Israel.
12. Several thousand Hezbollah operatives served in the Nasr unit south of the Litani River during the core of about 1000 regular operatives, yet the bulk of the organization (some 3,000 individuals, in our assessment) is made up of reservists. Relatively unskilled, they nevertheless possess the advantage of an intimate knowledge of the territory as they reside in those villages housing Hezbollah’s military infrastructure. During the war, the Nasr unit was reinforced with operatives residing north of the Litani River, bringing its total number of operatives to about 3,000-4,000.
USING THE CIVILIAN POPULATION AS A HUMAN SHIELD
A. THE RATIONALE BEHIND POSITIONING AND HIDING HEZBOLLAH’S MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE WITHIN DENSELY-POPULATED AREAS

13. Since its establishment in the early 1980s, Hezbollah has grown out of the Lebanese Shi’ite community and, to date, has been unable to go beyond the sectarian framework. Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah is greatly admired by Lebanese Shi’ites but not by other communities, who consider Hezbollah a threat to Lebanon’s stability and independence. A large circle of Lebanese Shi’ites, the country’s largest sect (representing some 35% of the population), consider Hezbollah to be the representative of the Shi’ite community and its interests vis-à-vis the central government and Lebanon’s other communities.⁹

14. Hezbollah’s method of action consists of massively concealing its military infrastructures inside densely-populated civilian centers where the Shi’ites reside which constitutes a war crime and a blatant violation of the international law of armed conflict. Hezbollah’s ability to maintain a low-signature regular military arsenal among civilian population increases, in its view, its survivability in war, and offers it propaganda advantages (as was the case during and after the war). The organization therefore cynically exploits the marked moral disparity between itself and Israel, which acts in accordance with international law standards. Such a pattern of action puts the civilian population at risk, violates the distinction principle of international law of armed conflict, and constitutes a war crime.

⁹ There is also a secular, more pragmatic Shi’ite faction represented by the Amal movement, led by Parliament Chairman Nabih Berri. Between the mid-1980s and the early 1990s, following the first Lebanon war, Hezbollah managed to establish itself as the dominant factor within the Shi’ite community. Major contributing factors to its success were the extensive military infrastructure, which it was able to retain and develop with Iran and Syria’s assistance, and the support it received from those countries during the struggle it waged against Amal.
Posters of Hassan Nasrallah demonstrating Hezbollah’s dominance and influence in the Shi’ite settlements

Right: a large photograph of Hassan Nasrallah found hanging inside a house in the village of Yaroun. Left: a large photograph of Hassan Nasrallah taken by IDF soldiers from a house in the village of Yaroun (Photo: IDF spokesman).

15. Therefore, Hezbollah is deployed and operates in the main Shi’ite population centers in Lebanon: in southern Beirut (mainly in the neighborhood of Harat Hreik, the seat of its nerve center), in south Lebanon (home to the organization’s operative core), and in the Beqa’a Valley (the logistics division). Due to internal Lebanese reasons, most of the Shi’ite population supports and enlists in Hezbollah, despite the potential destruction and loss inherent to the military infrastructures’ presence inside populated areas (as was well demonstrated in the second Lebanon war).

16. In media interviews, Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah did not even attempt to conceal the fact that Hezbollah terrorists were embedded within the civilian population and operated from its midst. Thus, for example:
a. In a speech given before the war, relating Hezbollah’s defensive strategy, Hassan Nasrallah claimed that his organization’s operatives could not be destroyed since they operated within the population. “[The organization’s operatives] live in their houses, in their schools, in their mosques, in their churches, in their fields, in their farms, and in their factories. You can’t destroy them in the same way you would destroy an army,” said Hassan Nasrallah (Al-Manar Television, May 27, 2006).

b. In a speech given after the war, Nasrallah once again stressed that the Hezbollah operatives who had fought in south Lebanon were residents of the region and therefore could not be removed: “Explain to me how Hezbollah should retreat from the region south of the [Litani] River. This would mean [the retreat of] the people of Aita [al-Shaab] who fought in Aita [al-Shaab]; the people of Bint Jbeil who fought in Bint Jbeil; the people of Al-Khiyam, the people of Al-Taybe, the people of Meiss [al-Jabal], [the people of] all the villages who fought, and I don’t want to name those villages right now... All the youngsters who fought on the front lines, as well as in the rear, south of the [Litani] River, are from those very villages and not from anywhere else... The Hezbollah are the people of the region. There’s no logic to saying that Hezbollah will retreat from the region south of the Litani” (NTV Television, August 27).
B. THE FUNCTIONING AND DEPLOYMENT OF HEZBOLLAH’S MILITARY INFRASTRUCTURE IN POPULATED AREAS IN SOUTH LEBANON

17. Located in the Shi’ite villages of south Lebanon, Hezbollah’s military infrastructure forms the basis for the organization’s offensive and defensive readiness and use of military force. Many civilian houses and public facilities in those villages were used by Hezbollah to conceal arms and ammunition. Hezbollah built bases and logistics warehouses there, and established its command and control centers.

18. As a rule, Hezbollah did not set up an extensive military infrastructure in the heart of Christian and Druze villages, preferring instead to deploy and operate on their outskirts. During the war, Hezbollah operatives attempted to enter Christian towns and villages situated near the border in order to fire rockets on Israel. On July 17, Hezbollah operatives attempted to fire rockets from the eastern town of Qlaiaa. Hand-to-hand fighting broke out between the Hezbollah operatives and local villagers, and the operatives were driven away. Similarly, local youngsters from the villages of Rmaish (central sector) and Alma al-Shaab (western sector) thwarted several attempts to fire rockets from those villages’ houses (in practice, rockets were fired from the southern outskirts of the village of Alma al-Shaab).

19. What follows is a schematic drawing of methods of hiding within the population that will be detailed below.

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10 South Lebanon is home to some 625,000 people, about 74% of whom are Shi’ites.
Hiding of operatives in the villages of south Lebanon

- Residential building used by Hezbollah operatives
- Residential building with a subterranean bunker
- Residential building with a designated arms storehouse
- A residential building with Hezbollah headquarters or offices
- A high-rise building housing Hezbollah offices
- Residential building with a garage for a rocket launcher vehicle
- A residential building with a designated arms storehouse
- An arms storehouse alongside a mosque/public building
- A rocket launcher used in the vicinity of residential buildings
- A residential neighborhood with Hezbollah headquarters/bases/offices
Lebanese civilian infrastructures

A listening facility based on a civilian antenna

Civilian vehicles used by Hezbollah

Motorcycle with a white flag

A vehicle used by Hezbollah closely following a rescue vehicle
Hiding of operatives in the villages of south Lebanon

20. Numerous Hezbollah operatives reside in or near the villages where they operate, bridging between the organization and the local population. They usually keep their own weapons and, at times, other arms, ammunition, and equipment in their houses. They also keep posters, flags, and distinctive Hezbollah symbols in their houses, testifying to the resident’s organizational affiliation. As they go about their operative activities in or between the villages, they are usually dressed in civilian clothes without clearly identifiable external markings.\(^{11}\)

21. Hezbollah is used to renting houses in villages for its activity. Sometimes they even rent business space from the villagers. During the second Lebanon war, a rental contract was seized in the Hezbollah construction unit in the village of Majdal Silm. It details the renting of two apartments and two stores by an operative of Hezbollah’s logistics unit (see Appendix 2(i) for details).

A rental contract of four properties in the village of Majdal Silm by an operative belonging to Hezbollah’s logistics unit (a document seized in Hezbollah’s construction center in the village of Majdal Silm; see Appendix 1(iii)).

\(^{11}\) Following the war, a reporter for Egyptian daily Al-Ahram escorted by a Hezbollah operative visited south Lebanon. He wrote the following based on a conversation with said operative: “There is not a single Hezbollah operative in military uniform to be seen in South Lebanon. This is a confusing phenomenon, and it confused everyone.” The operative goes on to liken Hezbollah operatives to ghosts who may emerge at any time and kill the Israelis (Al-Ahram, October 16). The use of civilian clothes for low-signature activity has also been corroborated by Hezbollah detainees.
22. As part of Hezbollah’s penetration into the villages of south Lebanon, it created a logistics infrastructure also based on receiving services from civilian businesses for the operatives of its military infrastructure. Hezbollah’s logistics unit makes frequent use of civilian businesses in south Lebanon to obtain services for its operatives (food, day-to-day items, construction materials, gas). In the construction center of the village of Majdal Silm, the IDF seized two lists of business owners in south Lebanon who had undergone security screening to facilitate the acquisition of services by Hezbollah’s logistics teams (see Appendix 1(iv) for details). **In the course of the war, Hezbollah used its own civilian or collaborating businesses to help solve logistic problems.** Lebanese civilian companies assisted the organization with electricity, water, car rentals, deliveries of medical supplies, etc.

**Storage of arms and ammunition in civilians’ houses**

23. **Storage of explosives and mines:** Hezbollah stored explosives and mines in civilian houses in the villages of south Lebanon. Testimony to that effect appears in the defense plans of the engineering branch in the Fifth Territorial Subdivision (the eastern sector). **The plan details the method used to take explosives from warehouses in the village of Kafr Kila (west of the Israeli town of Metula) and the village of Dibbin (north of Marjayoun) and deliver them to Hezbollah sabotage teams.** Those teams were supposed to activate the road explosive charges and on key places on roads and junctions (see Appendix 1(i) for details).

24. **Storage of rockets:** Hezbollah distributed its rockets among civilian houses in the villages of south Lebanon. Sometimes a **room was added to an existing building,** as demonstrated in the aerial photograph interpretation below:

**The infrastructure for storing a stationary ground-to-ground rocket**
The construction of a designated structure for a ground-to-ground rocket in the village of Maaroub, east of Tyre, some 4 km south of the Litani River. The addition of the structure to the residential building was completed on September 3, 1996. Hezbollah distributed its rockets among designated buildings and warehouses in the villages of south Lebanon.

**Positioning arms and ammunition near residential buildings and firing rockets from populated areas**

25. During the war, Hezbollah often placed arms and ammunition near residential buildings. Numerous ground-to-ground rockets were fired on Israel from the vicinity of civilian houses. The organization’s operatives often escaped to residential buildings or public facilities (such as mosques) to avoid Israeli air strikes (see Appendix 2(i)). Several examples follow:
Positioning a launcher and firing rockets from the vicinity of residential buildings (aerial photographs)

THE ROCKET

An aerial photograph of a rocket launch (marked with a circle). Firing is carried out from a launcher between two buildings in the village of Sadiqin. The smoke from the launch and the rocket itself are also visible in the photograph (August 7, 2006).

An aerial photograph of a rocket launcher near a house in the village of Abbassiyeh, north of Tyre (August 11, 2006). The rocket launcher is situated at a distance of some 5 meters from the house.
An aerial photograph of a rocket launcher near a house in the village of Abbassiyeh, north of Tyre (August 11, 2006). The rocket launcher is situated at a distance of some 5 meters from the house.

Firing rockets from residential buildings: a 202-mm long-range ground-to-ground rocket launcher near a residential building, firing a rocket on Haifa (August 6, 2006). A 302-mm rocket was also launched from the same location. The houses are situated near the village of Al-Zrariye, in the Nabatiyeh region.

Positioning arms in residential areas: aerial photograph of Hezbollah’s 23mm anti-aircraft cannon standing next to a house in one of the villages of south Lebanon.
26. Hezbollah tends to position its military infrastructure around such sensitive locations as religious institutions, schools, and hospitals to hinder or even prevent IDF assaults. Two examples follow:

Stockpiling arms and ammunition inside or near mosques

A vehicle carrying anti-tank missiles detonated by an IDF force near the village of Marwahin, in the western sector (Photo: IDF Spokesman, July 21). An additional arms stockpile was found in the basement of the mosque (see Appendix 4 for a video clip of the vehicle)

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12 The conscious choice to use such public institutions, which the Geneva Convention defines as “protected places” that enjoy the protection of the international law of armed conflict, is yet another example of the brutality and cynicism shown by Hezbollah: the organization has no restraints about using Lebanon’s population as human shields for its operations.

13 The cynical use military activity of religious institutions protected by international law constitutes a war crime and a blatant violation of the international law of armed conflict, and may turn the site into a legitimate target for a military strike.
A magnified aerial photograph of an arms warehouse (marked in red) situated near a mosque in the village of Qana (central sector)

The use of civilian vehicles and humanitarian aid and rescue vehicles

27. Hezbollah makes widespread and systematic use of unmarked civilian vehicles for operative, administrative, and logistic purposes in order to conceal its activities. During interrogation, Hezbollah detainees related that the organization used civilian vehicles and motorcycles for its operative needs in south Lebanon. The following are the main points of their testimony:

   a. They use primarily non-commercial vehicles (Mercedes and Volvo) and Jeeps (Range Rover, Mitsubishi, Nissan, and Toyota). The organization uses dirt bikes without license plates.

   b. Hezbollah’s logistics teams use pickup trucks to transport arms and ammunition.
c. Hezbollah’s drivers use gas coupons to refuel. Contact with the gas station owner is established by senior commanders (following a security screening). During the war, Hezbollah made extensive use of civilian gas stations.

![Transporting missiles in a civilian vehicle: anti-tank missiles found in a private car in the village of Marwahin](image)

28. The use of ambulances and rescue vehicles: during the war, Hezbollah made use of vehicles designed for humanitarian purposes, knowing they would not be targeted by the IDF. Thus, there were numerous incidents reported of the use of ambulances, Red Cross vehicles, and the Lebanese government’s civilian defense vehicles to transfer operatives, arms and ammunition, and equipment. In other incidents, Hezbollah’s civilian vehicles closely followed Red Cross and other humanitarian convoys to minimize risk.
Countryside and outdoor outposts complementing the village infrastructure

29. Hezbollah has also established outdoor outposts south of the Litani River, some of which it declared “closed military zones”. Those include tunnels, bunkers, and arms and ammunition designed to increase the survivability of Hezbollah’s fighting force, facilitate rocket fire on Israel, and allow the organization to wage continuous guerrilla warfare against Israel. It should be noted, however, that in Hezbollah’s view, the outdoor outposts only serve to complement its infrastructure in the villages, perceived as the primary operative system.

30. As the fighting continued, the Hezbollah operatives retreated from their outdoor posts and disappeared into the towns and villages. It was clear that they had a relative advantage in ambushing IDF forces and conducting urban combat in populated areas. This was particularly evident in the battles fought by Hezbollah in the more populated regions of south Lebanon’s central sector.

An outdoor firing position, probably for a recoilless gun. Outdoor firing positions and outposts were used as complements for the military infrastructure in the villages.
C. Hezbollah’s Concept of Urban Warfare and Its Practical Application During the Second Lebanon War

31. In the years preceding the second Lebanon war, Hezbollah prepared itself for yet another escalation on the Israeli-Lebanese border that would trigger exchanges of fire between the two sides and even an incursion of IDF forces into Lebanon. As part of its preparations, the organization drew up contingency and operative plans on the basis of which it prepared for war.

32. Documents seized during the war shed light on Hezbollah’s defensive plans. These plans were based on relentless urban combat in the villages and the use of populated areas for firing on Israeli population centers. The urban territories and their civilian population were therefore the basis for Hezbollah’s use of its military force. Thus, for example, one of the seized documents details “Al-Muntazar-2”, a plan for defending the village of Deir Mimess in the eastern sector of south Lebanon. The document details the neighborhoods in which explosive charges were to be used and defines the manner in which anti-tank, rocket, mortar, and anti-aircraft fire should be used in the village (see Appendix 1(ii)).
The first page of Al-Muntazar-2, a plan for defending the Christian town of Deir Mimess

33. During the second Lebanon war, Hezbollah employed “disappearing” tactics during the IDF’s ground maneuver. The organization reserved most of its operative efforts for the IDF’s presence inside the villages, relying on the extensive military infrastructure built there in the years preceding the war.
34. **Inside the villages, Hezbollah conducted extensive combat operations, using its various operative arsenals against the IDF:**

a. **The sabotage arsenal:** the organization exerted tremendous efforts to establish a sabotage infrastructure, focusing mainly on those roads which, in its assessment, the IDF would use. Laid along these roads were road explosive charges, and mines. Likewise, in the course of the war, Hezbollah booby-trapped buildings inside the villages penetrated by the IDF. The IDF, for its part, avoided moving on familiar roads, thus significantly reducing the threat of sabotage during its ground maneuvers, yet it suffered numerous casualties inside the villages.

b. **The anti-tank arsenal:** this arsenal was an important element of Hezbollah’s infantry combat. During the war, the organization employed anti-tank weapons against IDF forces moving along the roads. The organization had advanced anti-tank missiles used by the Syrian army (Kornet and Konkurs). Hezbollah also used its anti-tank arsenal against IDF forces located in buildings inside the villages, inflicting heavy casualties. The organization’s anti-tank squads moved between the village houses, relying on mobility, thus making it harder for the IDF to locate the sources of the fire.

c. **The infantry arsenal:** Hezbollah used its infantry arsenal, including combined squads (infantry, anti-tank, sabotage), against IDF forces. This was reflected in close-range small arms shootings, ambushes by infantry laid alongside roads, sniper fire, and waging guerilla warfare inside the villages. There is also a possibility (raised by interrogations of Hezbollah detainees and reports by Golani soldiers who fought in Bint Jbeil) that the organization intended to use suicide bombers against IDF forces (two operatives who

14 See Appendices 1(i) and 1(ii).
attacked an IDF convoy at the entrance of Bint Jbeil were armed with explosives and ready to perpetrate a suicide bombing attack).

d. **The rocket arsenal:** hundreds of rockets were fired on Israeli population centers every day. Hezbollah used hundreds of firing positions, rocket warehouses, and trained operatives who served as the firing squads. Most of the firing positions were set up on the outskirts of villages, with roads paved to enable easy access from the warehouses located inside the villages. Hezbollah also used short-range rockets and mortars to fire on IDF forces maneuvering in Lebanese territory and on IDF concentrations in the villages.

35. In the course of the fighting, Hezbollah operated **out of its own military infrastructures, situated in well-positioned houses on the outskirts of villages, thus attaining tactical dominance across the entire village.** Hezbollah turned those houses into arms warehouses, observation posts, and local headquarters. In the smaller villages, Hezbollah operatives gathered in the heart of the closely built streets and did not stay on the outskirts of the village.

36. **Furthermore, Hezbollah operated from locations near mosques, public facilities, and UN posts in order to impede the IDF’s reaction.** Thus, for example, in the **village of Rashaf (in the central sector), mosques served as primary firing positions and command and control headquarters from which the fighting was directed.** During the fighting, the mosques in the various villages served as meeting places for the operatives, and as launching sites for patrols and combat missions.

37. Most of the fighting took place **after the IDF forces settled in a particular village.** In this context, Hezbollah fighters disguised as civilians conducted guerilla-like warfare, using the civilian infrastructure in the village. However, in several incidents, the fighting began even
before the IDF forces could settle in the villages, with Hezbollah attacking the forces as they were making their way across open territory. Prior to the fighting, Hezbollah squads had positioned themselves inside the villages, and during the fighting they fled between the houses and moved from one place to another. The Hezbollah operatives used civilian vehicles to arrive in the villages; once there, however, they moved mostly on foot.
D. Hezbollah’s Awareness of the Danger Posed to Civilians Resulting from Its Presence and Activity in the Villages

38. According to testimonies of Hezbollah detainees, the organization was well aware that the presence of military bases among population centers and operative activity conducted from there put the civilians in danger.

39. One of the detainees, Muhammad Abd al-Hamid Srour, an anti-tank operative with military experience, was asked whether he and his fellow operatives had been aware that firing an anti-tank rocket on an Israeli tank from a house would result in the destruction of that house. His answer was that firing the rocket was a necessity dictated by military considerations and that it was “in the general Islamic interest”. “[If] the house is destroyed, it will be [re]built after the war,” he said, adding that the residents were supposed to have been evacuated before the war and the houses were therefore supposed to remain empty. “The houses are supposed to be destroyed, but no human being should be killed. The principle, the interest, is that a house can be destroyed, the village can be destroyed, but not the homeland...”
40. The Lebanese civilians were aware of the risks they faced from the presence of the extensive military infrastructure established by Hezbollah in populated areas in south Lebanon and southern Beirut, and from the presence of the terrorist-operotive activity amidst civilian population. To minimize the difficulties involved in operating its forces in populated areas, the IDF took various measures to inform the civilians that they should distance themselves from Hezbollah’s military infrastructure for their own safety. This was mostly done by dropping fliers from planes, delivering messages on an Arabic-language radio station broadcasting from the State of Israel (Radio Mashreq), and initiating telephone conversations with mukhtars, mayors, and community leaders (see Appendix 6 for details).

41. These advance warnings were large-scale, exceeding the demands of international law, even though at times such tactics cost the IDF its element of surprise. This was an attempt to keep the number of fatalities among the population to a bare minimum.

One of the fliers distributed by the IDF, calling upon civilians living south of the Litani River to leave their homes. The residents’ compliance with IDF’s warnings greatly reduced their casualties.
42. Following the warnings delivered by the IDF, and because Hezbollah waged the war from within population centers, **most residents of south Lebanon left their homes during the war.** This was done in several stages. Early during the war, only few civilians left their homes. A massive escape began on July 17, mostly of residents of the villages near the Israeli-Lebanese border. There was a surge in the number of residents fleeing north following the IDF’s incursion into south Lebanon. As the fighting wore on, villages in south Lebanon became increasingly empty. Only elderly people who could not leave, youngsters who decided to stay and help Hezbollah in the fighting, and residents who decided not to leave their homes at any cost remained in the villages. It was only after hostilities ceased on August 14 that residents began returning to their homes.

43. **Hezbollah,** for its part, viewed the continuing presence of residents in the villages during the war as an **operative advantage** (perceiving the civilians as human shields) and a **propaganda advantage** (by presenting the civilian suffering to public opinion). **Thus, in some instances during the war, Hezbollah attempted to convince or force the civilians not to abandon their villages.** Hezbollah operatives in several villages (such as Al-Taybeh and Shihin) prevented the residents from escaping and in some cases even stopped fleeing residents and returned them to the villages. Thus, Hezbollah deliberately risked their safety and turned them into human shields – a war crime. Lebanese officials in south Lebanon, however, encouraged the residents of the border villages to evacuate.
F. HIGH RATE OF HEZBOLLAH OPERATIVE FATALITIES (COMPARSED TO CIVILIAN FATALITIES) IN THE WAR

44. Hezbollah’s attempts to keep the residents from fleeing south Lebanon during the second Lebanon war failed. The villages where the fighting took place and in which Hezbollah’s infrastructures were attacked were almost deserted. As a result, the number of civilian casualties in south Lebanon was relatively low. The number of Hezbollah operatives killed during the war is estimated by the IDF Military Intelligence at some 650; in addition, over 800 operatives were injured. Four hundred and fifty of the killed operatives can be identified with certainty. The Military Intelligence has partial information about an additional 100 fatalities. Over 80% of the fatalities belonged to the Nasr unit (deployed south of the Litani River), most of them residents of Shi’ite villages in south Lebanon.

45. According to information issued by the Lebanese government and media, 1084 civilians and 40 members of the military and the gendarmerie were killed in the war, and at least 3700 people were injured. The Lebanese announcements of the number of killed made no distinction between civilians and Hezbollah operatives. Therefore, a significant number of the civilian deaths and injuries as they appear in Lebanese government reports and media are Hezbollah operatives rather than innocent civilians. Hezbollah, true to its policy, played down the number of its casualties so as not to damage the morale of its operatives.15

15 Ahmed Mali, a member of Hezbollah’s Political Bureau, noted (August 17) that no more than 100 of the organization’s operatives were killed. However, the Hezbollah’s Shahid Institution stated (September 16) that there were 200 fatalities in the organization. The actual numbers, as previously mentioned, are much higher.
46. During and after the war, Hezbollah, assisted by Syria and Iran, began to rebuild the military infrastructure damaged by the IDF. **Hezbollah is now rebuilding its outposts in the villages of south Lebanon** and applying the lessons learned in the war. In this context, it is repairing damaged houses, replacing operatives killed or injured during the war, and rebuilding its damaged military infrastructure. The **Nasr unit in the region south of the Litani River is apparently making efforts to redeploy and resume its pre-war activities, even if that does not include manning the outposts in the vicinity of the “Blue Line”** (the internationally recognized boundary between Israel and Lebanon).

47. Hezbollah is careful to keep a **low profile** with regard to its rebuilding process. More than ever, its operatives are careful not to be seen in uniform or carrying arms in public so as to avoid conflicts with the Lebanese army or with UNIFIL forces. The method of hiding and melting into the population allows it to rebuild itself in the post-war period, now that the Lebanese army and UNIFIL forces have deployed in south Lebanon and that Hezbollah’s opponents in Lebanon once again demand that the organization disarm.

48. **In the public sphere,** Hezbollah has once again declared that it has no intention of disarming as stipulated by Security Council Resolution 1701. That was reflected in Hassan Nasrallah’s speech, delivered in his first public appearance since the war came to an end (September 22). Yet another senior Hezbollah figure, Nabil Qawouk, in charge of
the southern region, gave a speech during a memorial service for the forty people killed in the village of Aitarun, in which he stressed that there was no change in the organization’s concept of hiding among the population: “UNIFIL forces have no authority either to act to disarm these weapons [Hezbollah’s weapons], or to investigate and spy on the resistance... We are now, as we were before July 12, 2006, in the same position: the arms are in the villages and towns of south Lebanon and on the border, but they are invisible” (Lebanese News Agency, October 2, 2006).

Nabil Qawouk during a memorial service in Aitarun: “The arms are in the villages and towns of south Lebanon and on the border, but they are invisible” (Al-Jazeera, October 3, 2006).

49. **The Lebanese government does little** to tackle the process of rebuilding Hezbollah’s military infrastructure in south Lebanon, let alone enforce Hezbollah’s disarmament. With no actual effort on part of the Lebanese government and the international community to strongly enforce Security Council Resolution 1701 and demilitarize south Lebanon, **the local residents will once again find themselves used as human shields by Hezbollah terrorists** should the confrontation between Hezbollah and Israel resume.
UN forces in south Lebanon, with posters of Hassan Nasrallah and Ayatollah Khomeini in the background

French UNIFIL forces standing by a poster of Hassan Nasrallah at a roadblock in the village of Adeisse (Reuters, October 8, photograph by Ali Hashisho)

UNIFIL tanks pass by a poster of Iranian leader Ayatollah Khomeini in the village of Naqoura (Reuters, October 13, photograph by Ali Hashisho)
The reconstruction of Hezbollah’s infrastructure in the villages of south Lebanon following the war (as of early October 2006)