Minutes from 7th Negotiation Team Meeting

(In Preparation for Annapolis) Monday, 12th November 2007, 3h00pm Crowne Plaza Hotel, West Jerusalem

Attendees:

Palestinian

- Ahmed Querei (AA)
- Yaser Abd Rabbo (YAR)
- Akram Haniyeh (AH)
- Dr. Saadi Kronz (SK)
- Zeinah Salahi (ZS)
- Dr. Saeb Erekat (SE)

Israeli

- FM Tzipi Livni (TL)
- Yoram Turbovich (YT)
- Shalom Turjeman (ST)
- Gen Amos Gilad (AG)
- DG Abromovich (Abr)
- Tal Becker (TB) (Arrived late)
- Alon Bar (AB) (Head of Policy Staff of the Foreign Ministry)

Detailed minutes:

TL:

- [Notes that all parties need to leave early today. TL needs to leave to defend a vote of no confidence in the Knesset due to the negotiations process. AA had to leave to a meeting in Ramallah. She noted that the next meeting should be longer than two hours. She suggests the next day as the best time for the next meeting.]
- Today we should focus on what the issues are and outline where agreement is, and not address what the disagreement is over. We should leave that until the next meeting.
- Tomorrow while we are sitting we can start to draft.
- [Discussion over timing of the meeting tomorrow. Five pm is agreed. Side discussion over possible locations for the meeting.]

AA:

- [Makes point that he was denied from entering Jerusalem yesterday, and that this greatly concerns the Palestinians.]
- I am afraid soon that I will need a visa to enter Jerusalem!

- If we have some items that are agreed we can start drafting tomorrow. Let's not discuss what was not agreed today.
- On the preamble [TL then highlights the key points from the Israeli perspective of the preambular language that was read in earlier meetings. She notes specifically:
 - o the Bush vision,
 - o the principle of two states for two peoples,
 - o language referring to the fact that a future agreement will address all outstanding issues,
 - o that the two states will be the homelands of their respective peoples and fulfill their national aspirations, Israel a state for the Jewish people, and Palestine for the Palestinians,
 - o the importance of implementation of the Roadmap ["RM"] by both sides.]

SE:

• So basically your preamble [as read at earlier meetings].

TL:

• Not the language. I'm just trying to understand what is not agreed [in principle].

AA:

• There are many things that we don't agree with.

SE:

We agreed not to exchange drafts.

AA:

- We see three elements in the preamble:
- The Terms of Reference ["TOR"], which will include good words, address the future;
- The two state solution I think we agreed on this;
- Implementation of the RM. We talked about the first phase we have the five points.

TL:

• But we couldn't reach and understanding on the TOR? You want to put all the future points in the preamble?

AA:

- Second point, is the core issues;
- Third point is the day after Annapolis negotiations, the process, timeline etc.

TL:

• We added the role of the international community and the Arab world.

AA:

• We have no problem with these.

TL:

- But we have to outline what we agreed. These are the basic parameters/outline of the future agreement. On the TOR -- you say yours, we say ours. We can try to find the common ground.
- 242, 338
- RM and previous agreements
- President Bush's vision [clarifies that this is the vision not the speech]
- 3 quartet principles is this agreed?

AH:

We agreed to present these in another way.

SK:

• This is about the Hamas government!

AA:

- The RM
- The Arab Peace Initiative ["API"] [TL: this is not agreed]
- International Law
- International legitimacy [TL: what does this mean?] Resolutions 242, 338, 1397, 1515, 194
- President Bush's vision

TL:

- President Bush's vision is agreed.
- Now we have the agreed and the not agreed.
- I don't want to go into detail on each one today.
- Now the TORs agreed and not agreed.
- The two-state solution this refers to two states for two peoples. We suggested that we refer to it as a fundamental principle. The goal is two nation states, Israel and Palestine living side by side in peace and security [repeats homeland for its people language, that these states would fulfill the national aspirations of their people in their own territory, Palestine for Palestinians, Israel for Jews.] This is what we want. Now what is agreed and what is not?

AH:

• First of all I noticed that Olmert hinted in the Knesset that Palestinians approved, and that Abu Mazen approved [the Jewish state language]. It's not true!

ST:

• I was with him. He didn't say that!

AH:

• That is what is reported in the press.

AA:

• This point is fundamental for you. Not to have it is fundamental for us.

TL:

• I read four lines – I want to know what is agreed and what is not.

AA:

• It's not for the Iraqis or the Kuwaitis – we don't need it. Two states with full sovereignty [and all the other attributes of statehood].

TL:

• Why establish a Palestinian state? Because you want self determination which we respect. The conflict is based on [achieving] your national aspirations for your people. [The two] nation states are to give an answer to these aspirations.

YAR:

• Beyond the words we see the problems. First – we don't want to interfere in the nature of the state. We don't want to join the Zionist movement. We want to leave the Arab national movement!

AA:

• [Suggesting language acknowledging the suffering of the people.]

TL:

• But it's not about individual suffering. Line by line [what are the problems] – I really don't understand.

YAR:

• We can't interfere with the nature of the states. [Sovereign states are sovereign states and can do whatever they'd like with their states.] We are sovereign people and don't want to interfere with yours even if you let us! It's your decision – we recognize your state however you want [to define it yourselves].

TL:

• You are referring to the last line as a Jewish state.

YAR:

 No – until we solve the issue of refugees we don't want any sentence to complicate our life. We don't want our intellectuals to debate the true meaning of that sentence.

TL:

• But you want something that says at the end of the road [our goal is] to create a Palestinian state? [The creation of the state is connected to the principle of giving an answer to the national aspirations of the people.] When we talk about the core

issues – it's not like we'll erase the refugees. We'll talk about it. [TL again tries to walk through her language sentence by sentence.] So what is the meaning of a state?

AA:

• For Palestinians, to alleviate the suffering – achieve national rights -- we are not here to describe for each state what to do.

TL:

• So what's not agreed is the nature of the state?

AA:

• [Sovereignty over all of the territory and natural resources, viability, independence, etc. this is the language with which we can describe states.]

TL:

• I understand we both know what we are talking about. I just want to list [i.e. what is agreed and what is not agreed] this meeting. You have problems agreeing to the nature of the state of Israel.

YAR:

• We are not against what Israel describes itself as. We just don't want to say it -- we have citizens of Jordanian citizenship. It will create problems. [Continues to explain the problematic nature of defining the nature of a state.]

AA:

• We want a two state solution. [Reiterates traditional language on this, side by side... etc.]

TL:

Two states for two people.

AA:

• What if we import other people?

TL:

• We respect your right for a state of your own. You should respect mine. Two states for two people. Two nation states. If you cannot say that a Palestinian state answers the national aspirations of the Palestinian people...

AA:

• In a permanent agreement we can say whatever we want. Now we are preparing for Annapolis. Now we are talking about a two state solution. We can elaborate in a permanent agreement. If you want a one state solution, we can discuss that.

AH:

• [Raises engagement metaphor.]

SE:

• How can we describe a state without describing its borders!

TL:

• We can say [this description will come to fruition] once we have borders.

SE:

• We have six core issues to solve – Jerusalem, Refugees, Borders, Settlements, Water and of course Security. We cannot solve the problems in a preamble.

TL:

• If we can't say two states for two people then we have a problem. This is not a core issue.

AA:

• There is two states or one state [i.e. there are only two solutions to the conflict].

TL:

• There is also two states with one on the other side of the Jordan [River].

YAR:

Or three states – Gaza.

AA:

• The two state solution is what we agreed. Since this means sovereignty – two states – we don't want to describe the two states!

TL:

• There is no two states if there is no [two states for] two people.

SE:

• If we want a confederation with Jordan – how is that your business?

TL:

• The historic reconciliation is based on two states for two people. Once we do that you can do whatever you want!

AA:

- In an agreement we don't need it.
- [Notes that he received a visitor today that asked him what a Jewish sate means did it mean that 1.5million Palestinians would be deported from Israel?] Also we need to decide refugees.

• This is not about the refugees. 20% [of the state] is Palestinian so [if you ask me] it doesn't affect refugees if it can be 20 or 21. Refugees [will be dealt with as one of] the core issues. Refugees is one of the core issues. Also there are those that say that you don't represent the Israeli Palestinians!

AH:

Aren't you asking for an end of claims in a permanent agreement?

TL:

• But if a Palestinian state will not answer the questions... we are not talking about end of claims [with this issue].

AA:

• If you insist on this it forces Palestinians back to the one state [solution].

[TL receives a phone call from her son who has recently gotten his first call to the army. She reiterates the importance of making peace for precisely that reason, although it may be too late for her son already.]

AA:

• Our aspirations we will speak about it to our peoples. It is not necessary to speak about it [in the document].

TL:

- This was not agreed at all.
- What you are doing now [is a huge mistake] it's like rejecting the partition plan!

AA:

• 181? If you want we'll put it on the table.

TL:

• But without this sentence – you have your problems we have ours. [Makes point that she can explain away some of the problems by saying that negotiations on the core issues come after Annapolis, etc. implying that this issue cannot be so easily explained away.]

AH:

• [In] the peace treaty there will be a recognition of each state...

TL:

• But this is like agreeing to talk with no idea what the vision is!

YAR:

• Postpone it...

• Ok, the RM. Three principles. We have a problem which is the committee.

AA:

• When will the committee meet? [Joking.]

TL:

• We agreed to the Americans the principles that implementation of both sides starting now, that the Americans will be the judge, and that any future agreements are subject to the RM. You asked for the trilateral committee, and we did not agree.

AA:

• Why didn't you agree parallel?

TL:

• Some things in the RM [are not parallel.] [TL repeats arguments over the sequentiality of some of the obligations in the RM. She also notes again that the Israeli side did not agree immediate and parallel.] To be fair, I did say that since the Americans are the judge they can invite anyone they want to any meeting; if we are invited we will come. But we disagree to the trilateral committee. [Continues to recap the three principles again.]

[Discussion on the language in the RM and the utility and logic of using it as an absolute TOR continues – for example, SE raises the question where does the principle of "subject to" appear in the RM.]

AA:

• When will the Israeli government take a decision to freeze all settlement activity and reopen Jerusalem institutions? It doesn't need a bulldozer or anything! [Continues to press Israelis on a concrete and immediate commitment to implement their RM obligations.]

TL:

• In the document we will [sign to our intention] to implement fully and completely the RM.

AA:

• This is just words – we need deeds!

TL:

• Before Annapolis we'll discuss what we can do. [We'll discuss] other CBMs...

AH:

• So not before Annapolis?

• We will discuss. We are discussing now. This will be signed right before Annapolis. [You can decide not to sign it if it doesn't meet your needs.] After it's signed you can ask me when we will start. We are willing to sign that we are ready to fully and completely implement the RM. Once we sign this you can ask me when [and we can fight about the timing of each other's obligations. You don't see us asking when you will complete each security obligation? Then we can ask you about] your security obligations. [TL continues along these lines.]

[SE hands out a paper listing some of the tenders that have happened since 2004 to refute TL's assertion in the last meeting that there had been no tenders or money towards settlements except Maale Addumim since a government decision in 2004.]

TL:

• The day after, the international community, the Arab world, and the core issues. How do you see the reference to the core issue – since Annapolis will launch negotiations...

AA:

• I told you – for example on borders. The 1967 border. We can discuss [the possibility of] minor modifications, the percentage, that [any swaps] will not prejudice territorial contiguity or national resources....

TL:

• Since we are talking about the day after – should we try to reference these issues the day before? Or leave all of them to the day after? To try to find an understanding on each of the core issues [now] will be a mistake.

AA:

• [Notes that the importance of addressing the core issues now is to understand the direction that the negotiations will go in post Annapolis and what kind of an agreement we are working towards.]

SE:

• In our meeting with Olmert he said he needed indicators on each of the core issues. What does this mean?

ST:

• He said that there will be a list of issues that will be dealt with. The substantive discussion on each of the core issues [will be] post-Annapolis.

SE:

• [Asks for further clarification.]

ST:

• He also said that there would be no solution in the Annapolis statement.

TL:

- We need to be pragmatic. In the past there was an understanding on the need to agree the core issues, to meet in Annapolis, and then implement the RM.
- Then there was a change in the process. Then Israel agreed to do something that they did not agree before to launch [negotiations on the] core issues post-Annapolis. [So if we address the core issues in the Annapolis statement,] there will be no post-Annapolis.

AA:

• First we agree the four main issues in the document: first the preamble, second the core issues, third the day after Annapolis, fourth the timetable, fifth (you added this) the international community. Let's go through our position again, so there is no misunderstanding. [Notes again the Palestinian position on the two state solution, the five US points on the RM, the timetable of 7-8 months to be concluded within the Bush term (and the process to include a committee to follow the negotiations).] On the core issues – do you want to hear our position now? Or later?

TL:

• Tomorrow. But it's about being pragmatic about time. [Recaps all of the Israeli positions on the above again.] On the core issues – each and every party should ask and answer itself – whether it's feasible and whether you want [to include them in the document now] because [addressing core issues] means hard compromises on both sides. We have two options – in two weeks we launch real permanent status negotiations, or we fight over it now. [TL makes the point that whatever is agreed now will be attacked by the public on both sides.]

[TL leaves to attend the no-confidence vote in the Knesset.]

[It was agreed that the next meeting of the teams would be held on Tuesday at five pm, location to be determined.]