Memorandum on Wanting Europe to Arm Israel
(September 8, 1965)
Israel presses the Johnson Administration to sell fighter aircraft,
but State Department officials oppose the idea and hope to get the French
or British to provide planes instead.
Action Memorandum From the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Handley) to Secretary
of State Rusk
SUBJECT
The Israeli Aircraft Request: General Weizman's Visit
Israel has long sought access to U.S. supply of arms.
Currently, the GOI is mounting a strong effort to acquire United States
supersonic fighters and/or light bombers. Its objective is as much to
identify the United States with support of a deterrent offensive air
strike capability against UAR targets as the acquisition of the latest
equipment at a cost substantially less than European supply.
The acquisition of modern supersonic aircraft by the
Israel defense forces is recognized as in our mutual interest of maintaining
Israel's defensive strength. This is evident from the fact that in the
March 10, 1965 memorandum of understanding we agreed to "ensure
an opportunity for Israel to purchase a certain number of combat aircraft,
if not from Western [European]2 sources, then from
the United States." (This was later understood to mean 24 aircraft,
if provided by the United States, to be delivered after December 31,
1966.) The agreement emphasizes our policy need to avoid provision of
offensive or sophisticated weapons when these are available in Western
Europe even if it is ultimately necessary to provide a token quantity
of United States aircraft. Israel is seeking, however, to interpret
the agreement as a commitment for United States aircraft, regardless
of European availabilities.
We do not wish to sell high-performance aircraft either
to Israel or Jordan because the provision of these highly sophisticated
and clearly offensive weapons would spell an end to our arms policy.
Though tattered and torn, this policy has been a major factor in keeping
us out of the Near East arms race and protecting the United States from
the political damage that would result from a policy of uncontrolled
military sales. However, we have used our facilitative services with
the French and British for both countries, and in the case of Israel
we have also offered the French the use of a U.S.-designed engine.
The next major Israeli push will take place during
the visit by Air Force General Ezer Weizman, scheduled to arrive in
Washington October 11 to request U.S. aircraft. Our basic position is
that we have determined Israeli aircraft needs can clearly be met from
French or British sources. Therefore, we will have discharged our commitment
under the memorandum of understanding by locating and assisting toward
acquisition of suitable non-U.S. military aircraft. We will continue
to refuse to provide information on characteristics and performance,
price and availability of United States aircraft inasmuch as we do not
plan to provide such aircraft.
Recommendation
That you approve the basic position that: 1) in our
judgment French or British aircraft should meet Israel's needs, 2) we
are prepared to discuss performance, suitability, and availability of
European aircraft, and 3) we are not prepared to discuss suitability
and availability of United States aircraft.
1. Source: National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Exdis. Drafted by
Nyerges; cleared by Officer in Charge of Politico-Military Affairs in
NR Lieutenant Colonel Billy W. Byrd, Davies, Evans in DOD/ISA, Meyers,
and in substance by Townsend W. Hoopes in DOD/ISA.
2. Brackets in the source text.
3. Rusk initialed his approval on September 20.
Sources: U.S. Government. Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli Dispute
1964-1967. DC: GPO,
2000. Department of State. |