Memorandum on Recommendation to Sell Planes to Jordan and Israel
(1965)
After a long delay, and with great reluctance, the Administration
decided to sell aircraft to Israel as part of a deal to also sell planes
to Jordan.
Draft Memorandum From Secretary of State Rusk and Secretary of Defense
McNamara to President Johnson 1
Washington, undated.
SUBJECT
Proposed Sale of American Aircraft to Israel and Jordan
Recommendation
We recommend you authorize us to proceed with a sale
of American military aircraft to Israel and Jordan along the lines of
proposals in Enclosure 1: (a) up to 24 U.S. A4's to Israel on MAP credit
terms, with an option for Israel to buy 24 more at a later date, and
(b) up to 36 F-5's or F-104 A/B's, or a mix of the two, to Jordan in
increments of 12 for cash allocated to Jordan by other Arab states. 2
Discussion
We have reviewed the options available to us in meeting
Jordan's requirement for supersonic military aircraft (Enclosure 2)
and conclude we must agree to sell up to 36 American aircraft if we
are going to preclude King Hussein's accepting MIG's under pressure
from the United Arab Command (UAC). The UAC has offered Jordan Soviet
MIG's, but has allocated funds to Jordan to purchase 36 aircraft from
Western sources in lieu thereof. Since the King feels he has already
obtained the maximum numerical concessions at the last Arab Summit (from
60 to 36 aircraft), we believe an offer of less than 36 would not obviate
the risk of his accepting MIG's. In making our offer, however, we would
not relate it to the UAC requirements as such. (Enclosure 3 is a chronology
of developments leading up to the present situation.)
This course is distasteful, but less so than the probable
results of other courses of action. We agree with Ambassador Barnes'
assessment that Hussein cannot put off a decision much beyond mid-January.
MIG's in Jordan could precipitate a chain of events that would seriously
damage our interests not only in Jordan but elsewhere in the Near East.
A subsidy for the purchase of more expensive French or British aircraft
would have balance of payments disadvantages and would put us in a position
of indirectly fueling the Near East arms race without the compensating
advantage of control we would gain from a U.S. sale.
We have been under considerable pressure from Israel
to sell U.S. aircraft regardless of what we may do for Jordan. If we
sell to Jordan there would have to be a compensating sale to Israel.
Without the sale to Jordan we might be able to stall the Israelis for
a time. However, particularly if we believe that eventually we must
provide some aircraft to Israel, a sale now to Jordan would have a number
of advantages. It would protect the considerable U.S. investment in
that country, would enable us to exert continued influence for stability
in the area and, by preempting the Soviets in Jordan, would prevent
a major step toward an East-West polarization of arms supply to the
area. At the same time, an offer to sell to Israel would make a sale
to Jordan more acceptable to circles in which criticism of such a sale
could be expected. Our agreement to sell U.S. supersonics to Jordan,
to which we are convinced there is no feasible alternative, could be
incorporated in the same kind of Israel-Jordan package arrangement developed
for the ground equipment sales last March. (Enclosure 4 is a summary
of U.S. aircraft cost and availability data.)
We recognize that the course of action recommended
will not put an end for all time to either Jordanian or Israeli pressures
on us for military sales of supersonic aircraft and other military equipment.
The threat of Soviet equipment in Jordan will remain to be invoked in
the future. Soviet supplies to the U.A.R., Syria, and Iraq will create
continued Israeli pressures for deterrent equipment. Some sort of agreement
with the U.S.S.R. would therefore appear to offer the best hope of ultimately
checking the arms race in the Near East. The Soviets have been probed
a number of times on this subject, most recently by Secretary Rusk on
October 1, 1965, but our efforts have not been fruitful (Enclosure 5).
We are now studying possibilities for a further effort to explore Soviet
attitudes in this regard.3
Dean Rusk
Robert S. McNamara 4
1. Source: Washington National Records Center, RG
330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 452. Secret; Limdis. Filed as
an attachment to a January 18 memorandum from John T. McNaughton to
McNamara, a notation on which indicates that McNamara signed the draft
memorandum to the President on January 19. A February 10 memorandum
from Hoopes to Vance states that Rusk allowed the draft memorandum to
go forward to the White House without his express approval. (Washington
National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 452)
2. There is no indication of the President's approval
or disapproval. The enclosures are not attached.
3. Rusk raised this subject with Gromyko during an
October 1 conversation in New York which covered a number of subjects.
He stated that he thought it might be possible to reach an informal
understanding to bring pressure on Israel and Egypt to limit their arms
buildup and that some day it might be possible for the United States
and the Soviet Union to jointly declare that they would not tolerate
the use of force to resolve disputes in the Near East. Gromyko brought
the conversation back to U.S.-Soviet efforts at arms control. The relevant
portion of the memorandum of conversation is printed in Foreign Relations,
1964-1968, vol. XI, Document 97.
4. Printed from a copy that bears Rusk's typed signature
and McNamara's handwritten signature.
Sources: U.S. Government. Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli Dispute
1964-1967. DC: GPO,
2000. Department of State. |