Telegram on Reconciling Jordanian, Israeli Arms
Demands
(March 8, 1965)
The U.S outlines for Israel
how many weapons they will get from the United
States depending on how many weapons their
neighbor Jordan gets. The United States promises
to give Israel more weapons then Jordan receives
from either the United States or the USSR.
Both Israel and the United States would rather
have Jordan making arms deals with the U.S
then the USSR (this is an example of how the
Cold War effected world politics). Finally,
the United States is not pleased with some
of the tactics used by the Israeli government
to deal with the United States. The United
States feels Israel is trying to obtain information
in ways that are not honest.
182. Telegram From the Department
of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/
896. For Komer.
1. Since Israelis have delayed several days
in making counter proposal, you should now
approach Eshkol as soon as possible and seek
his prompt agreement on carefully defined
and limited agreement foreshadowed in Deptel
865./2/
2. Terms and conditions of proposal are as follows:
(1) The US recognizes Israeli tank needs
have increased because of prospective Jordan
sale and possibility of non-delivery of 90
remaining German tanks. Accordingly, the US
is now prepared to ensure sale on favorable
credit terms of tanks to meet these changes
as follows:
(a) 100 tanks for later delivery to match
new Jordan sales, and
(b) 90 tanks for delivery in calendar year
'66 if German agreement is not completed.
We can make these deliveries in form of M-48A1
or M-48A3 tanks, but you should point out
that what we offer Israel we may have to offer
Jordan.
(2) The USG is prepared to ensure opportunity
for Israel to buy "a few" planes
for later delivery, if not from Western sources,
then from the United States. The USG does
not believe it is in the interest of either
government to decide now on exact model of
airplane. FYI. "A few" means less
than 20, which is the upper limit of possible
sales under proposed Jordan agreement, and
you should make this number privately known
to Eshkol. End FYI.
(3) We wish to have a private agreement with
Prime Minister Eshkol that Israel will not
attack Jordan arms sale and that friends of
Israel in the US will be given clear private
guidance on this point. We ask this private
agreement because we understand from Harriman/Komer
mission that Government of Israel does plainly
prefer US to USSR as Jordanian arms supplier.
You should re-emphasize our understanding
of this point and make it clear to Eshkol
that if he takes a different view, now and
not later is the time to say so.
(4) US undertakings on tanks and aircraft
for Israel, as stated above, must be kept
wholly secret for as long as possible in interest
of both governments, and there must be agreement
to consult fully on means of handling public
statements when they become necessary.
3. You and Ambassador are authorized to develop
argumentation for this straightforward agreement
in the light of your own understanding of
thinking of GOI. The following arguments seem
important to us:
(1) Unless Israelis will tell us that they
prefer Soviet arms to Jordan, we must move
promptly with Hussein. But we greatly prefer
not to make a deal with Hussein unless we
have an understanding with Eshkol, and therefore
such understanding is increasingly urgent
unless Israelis wish to take responsibility
for driving Hussein to the Soviets.
(2) The offer to find necessary tanks up
to a total of 190 should more than meet immediate
Israeli concerns deriving from Jordan sale
and possible German shortfall.
(3) Similarly, offer to join in finding "a
few" aircraft represents precisely what
Eshkol asked for in his aside to you. First
military analysis suggests that B-66 is not
at all what Israelis really want, in either
political or military terms. It would outrage
Cairo but not offer best capabilities. There
are a number of other planes, both US and
European, which deserve careful study before
a decision is made. In this situation it is
much better not to decide on specific aircraft
or means of ensuring sale. We have taken full
note both of Eshkol's aside to you and of
his statement that Israelis can find the funds
they need. We believe him on both counts.
He in turn should believe us when we say that
we will help. This offer in fact goes beyond
any commitment we will now make to Jordan.
(4) You should make it absolutely clear that
broader agreement initially proposed by Harriman
now seems to us wholly impracticable. Our
offer to supply arms in the future was carefully
hedged and made contingent upon Israeli acceptance
of undertakings on Jordan waters and on nuclear
development which are flatly unacceptable
to the GOI. We recognize and accept that it
is impossible for Eshkol to abandon final
sovereign right of decision. But what is true
for Prime Minister is just as true for the
President. We therefore conclude that it is
much better for both governments to reach
a clear agreement now on the issues which
need decision and to proceed as friends in
the future, treating wider issues on their
merits. We both will be free to press our
view on these wide issues, always within the
framework of recognition by both governments
of their deep common interest in preserving
the peace both by limiting the arms race and
by avoiding a dangerous imbalance of power.
FYI. If necessary to reach agreement, we could
consider a reaffirmation of US policy in this
sense, just as we are ready to reaffirm our
policy on Jordan waters as stated in Shriver
letter and our readiness to press Hussein
for agreement to keep tanks east of the river.
End FYI.
4. You should make it very clear to Eshkol
that if this generous solution to the immediate
problem is not acceptable, your mission will
be at an end and it may become necessary for
USG to make its own decision on Jordan even
without Israeli support. You should make it
clear as your own personal judgment that,
without agreement, Washington would have to
reach and publicize its own judgment that
Israelis themselves prefer US supply to Jordan,
as against Moscow. The US and Israel have
now spent a month exploring alternatives and
we are not prepared to allow the Government
of Israel to bargain indefinitely in search
of advantage from a US decision which in and
of itself already serves true Israeli interest.
5. Finally, you should make it very clear
indeed that we are not ready to accept a shift
in the arena of discussion either by a special
Israeli emissary to Washington or by an attempted
end-run through friends of Israel in the United
States. Such tactics are certain to react
adversely to the interests of Israel. We have
now made this point clear on about five occasions
to friends of Israel in Washington and we
are not pleased by continuing efforts to use
these side channels.
Rusk
/1/Source: National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Immediate;
Exdis. Text received from the White House,
cleared by McGeorge Bundy, and approved by
Jernegan. The substance of the telegram was
apparently decided at a meeting of the President,
McNamara, Rusk, Ball, and McGeorge Bundy between
6:01 and 7 p.m. (Johnson Library, President's
Daily Diary) No record of the meeting has
been found. Briefing memoranda and draft cables
prepared for the meeting are ibid., National
Security File, Country File, Harriman Israeli
Mission (II), and in Washington National Records
Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266,
Israel 470.
/2/Document 175
Sources: U.S.
Department of State |