Haggling Over Arms to Jordan and Israel
(March 7, 1965)
The U.S. requests that Israel not do
anything to disrupt an arms deal that the U.S. wants to make
with King Hussein and is looking to avoid commitments to
Israel.
181. Telegram From the Department
of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/
889. For Komer from McGeorge
Bundy.
1. Have reviewed all your messages over this
week end and have had long talks with highest
authority. I detect a difference in temper
between our sense of the problem and yours,
which this message aims to bridge. Current
clear preference here is for a prompt and
clear-cut understanding limited as closely
as possible to the immediate problem of Jordan
arms sale. The general line in Deptel 685/2/
is not a bargaining tactic but his genuine
preference.
2. Highest authority does not now believe
we should accept continuing general open-ended
obligation to supply arms to Israel. The carefully
hedged offer in Harriman's initial instructions
was matched by a requirement of strong Israeli
undertakings on nuclear weapons and on avoidance
of pre-emptive attack over Jordan waters.
But Israelis resist flat undertakings which
affect their ultimate sovereign power. (This
Israeli reluctance has been reaffirmed forcibly
through Feinberg today--protect source.)
3. In this situation White House view is
we should leave these larger wider questions
open for later discussion. We cannot now get
a guarantee on the nuclear matter or even
on Jordan waters. We have requested State-Defense
coordination on concrete proposal which might
meet Eshkol's aside to you--taking account
of your own recommendations to us. In addition
we would want a gentlemen's agreement that
our deal with Hussein will not be undercut
by Israel, but we do not currently think that
Eshkol letter to President is essential means
of registering this gentlemen's agreement.
This message is for guidance only and is
not an instruction. Instruction should follow
today or tomorrow, and present object is simply
to insure that in any intervening discussion
you focus attention sharply on the immediate
problem of Jordan decision and a balancing
arms offer to Israel. Highest authority wishes
to take every possible step to turn talks
away from open-ended arms commitment now./3/
Rusk
/1/Source: National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Priority;
Exdis. The message was drafted at the White
House and sent to the Department of State
with a note from Bundy stating that it had
been cleared in substance by Ball and should
not be sent until Talbot saw it. The telegram
indicates that it was cleared by Talbot.
/2/The reference should be
to telegram 865, Document 175.
/3/Komer replied in telegram
1131, March 8, which reads in part as follows:
"Read Deptel 889 loud and clear. Our
tempered reaction is that prompt and limited
understanding along lines described possble
if we prepared pay reasonable price."
(National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN)
Sources: U.S.
Department of State |