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## DEPARTMENT OF STATE INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

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NEA - Nicholas 🕰 Veliotes

SUBJECT:


Ideas for Handling the Haddad Problem

The following is our best effort to be creative on the Haddad problem, in response to your request. You probably should discuss these ideas with Phil when he returns late this week.

The future of Saad Haddad has become a serious obstacle to progress in the Lebanon negotiations. For Israel, he represents part of the answer to ensuring security over the next year or two in southern Lebanon which the Lebanese Army is perceived as incapable of doing. Moreover, Begin is fully supportive of the present Israeli negotiating position and emotionally committed to Haddad personally as a "true friend of Israel, who must not be humiliated or summarily dismissed. For Lebanon, the retention of Haddad is seen as a condition which would destroy Amin Gemayel's political consensus while inviting Syrian refusal to withdraw.

Lebanon's promise that an honorable future will be found for Haddad has not been sufficient for the Israelis. Similarly, Israel's proposals regarding Haddad's role are inconsistent with strengthening the central government of Lebanon and getting the Syrians and PLO out. Ideas for solving this problem fall into three categories.

Defining the "Honorable Future": One problem is that Lebanon has not yet clearly expressed to the Israelis -- or to Haddad--what Haddad's future could be under a scheme for his departure with grace and dignity. From what we know of President Gemayel's thinking, this could entail appointment abroad as an Ambassador or Defense Attache, possibly in Australia where his sister lives. Another possibility would be to "retire" Haddad at home in Marjayoun for a year or so followed by appointment to some public post, or possibly a seat in the Parliament and a hefty sweetner in the form of a






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retirement bonus. It is possible that Haddad could be attracted to such proposals, but the Lebanese have apparently not yet had an opportunity to explore them privately with Haddad, away from his ever-present Israeli advisers. The U.S. would have to push the Lebanese, and probably obtain Israeli agreement as well, for Haddad and the Lebanese to talk. Despite the reservations they would have, it would be difficult for the Israelis to refuse such a meeting or for that matter a private meeting between Ambassador Habib and Haddad, if you were to ask for it. However, they would probably insist on attending.


Keeping Haddad On: An alternative approach to explore further with President Gemayel and his advisers would be to find a face-saving way to keep Haddad on in some active capacity in Lebanon, while shedding his militia role. Haddad, as a civilian, might be emplaced as governor of the South Lebanon administrative district; he might serve in some fashion as titular head of the Israeli-orchestrated \*Organization of the South", a collection of village leaders; or, he might receive a position in a party represented in the Lebanese Forces, such as the Chamunist National Liberal Party. Another idea might be to arrange Haddad's participation, perhaps after completion of his participation in arrangements for Israeli withdrawal, in a "National Reconciliation Conference" designed to bring together confessional and political leaders, even estranged ones such as Haddad and Syrian protege Suleiman Franjiyah, to discuss the political structure of Lebanon's future.

Using the Negotiations: Although the alternatives within the context of the talks appear close to exhaustion, we could press the Lebanese further on accepting Haddad as one of several commanders in the south, perhaps as second in command of the two brigades for the south instead of as commander of the southern-most "territorial brigade." A more radical possibility would be to press Lebanon to "trade" Haddad for greater Israeli operational latitude, including a more substantial Israeli presence if not intervention rights, in southern Lebanon, which is probably what Israel seeks in any event. Both carry the dual risks of provoking internal opposition to the Gemayel government and raising the likelihood of a Syrian refusal to withdraw.

In summary, our best bet may be to bring Haddad and the Lebanese together to discuss his future with the object of enticing Haddad to begin if not announce a commitment to a dignified transition away from Israeli control to an agreed



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future. We might supplement a Lebanese approach to Haddad by urging Israel to acquiesce, while simultaneously letting Haddad know through a protected UNTSO channel that Lebanon, with U.S. support, is prepared to talk in concrete terms about his future options. The first step would be for Phil or Morrie to discuss these possibilities frankly with President Gemayel.

Finally, we should be conscious of the fact that there are no clear signs that Haddad is willing to leave now while there is every public and private sign that the Israelis are determined to keep him where he is. While General Tamir has said that the GOI could not object if Haddad wanted to leave, Shamir has stated that if Haddad wanted to leave the GOI would convince him to stay. A further informal discussion of the Haddad issue with Tamir may also be in order.

Drafted: NEA/ARN--CDWelch

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