Memorandum on Europe As Alternative Supplier of Tanks
(May 16, 1964)
President Johnson and his top advisors hoped to
assist Israel in purchasing tanks from Europe so the U.S. would not
have to make the sale and upset the Arab states. They however did not
want to arouse suspicion in Congress or among Arab-sympathizers. The
discussion also explores tactics to delay any decision and questions
are raised regarding Israeli involvement in developing a nuclear arsenal
(most notably nuclear-capable missiles).
Memorandum for Record1
Washington, May 16, 1964.
SUBJECT
Israeli Tank Discussion with the President, May 16, 1964
PRESENT
The President
Secretary Rusk
Asst. Secretary Talbot
Mr. Jack Valenti
Secretary McNamara
General Maxwell Taylor
Mr. Frank Sloan
Mr. John McCone
Mr. McG. Bundy
Mr. Myer Feldman
Mr. R. W. Komer
When this item came up Mr. Bundy distributed the draft instructions
from the President to Feldman and Sloan for their mission to Israel.
Secretary Rusk queried whether we should say anything
about possible economic aid at this time if this seemed necessary to
pave the way for Israeli tank purchases in Europe. Feldman thought that
this would really be desirable because as he pointed out the Israelis
probably did not want secondhand tanks. Their main interest would be
in the new British Chieftain. However, this was terribly expensive;
hence to steer the Israelis in this direction, we ought to be willing
to promise them some indirect help along the line Rusk suggested. Bundy
felt this would create a difficult political problem. We had been telling
everyone that Israel had done so well economically that it was on the
list of those countries which no longer needed US economic aid. Could
we say now that it should get more aid, and still carry credibility
with the Congress? Rusk thought that the Congress would buy reasonable
continued aid to Israel more easily than to any other country. McNamara
suggested, as a way out, that we were selling many millions of dollars
of equipment to the UK; we could easily knock down the price sufficiently
to make up the difference. If the differential between secondhand M-48s
or Centurions and new Chieftains was on the order of $150,000, then
the total add-on needed might be on the order of $30-40 million.
It was agreed on Bundy's suggestion that this subject should be left
for the Eshkol visit itself. However, Feldman could tell the Israelis
that if price were a serious problem, we could consider how to help
meet it. Feldman thought that if the purpose of his mission was to get
tanks off the Eshkol agenda, we must be able to tell the Israelis more
than currently seemed feasible. Harman had told him that the Israelis
did not want Centurions. The German deal was better, but unfortunately
he couldn't tell them at this point that the Germans were signed on.
Bundy's view was that we couldn't really take tanks off the Eshkol agenda.
We'd have to talk tanks with Eshkol. But we could take them off the
"public" agenda if we handled the matter properly.
Feldman asked Secretary McNamara if we could tell the Israelis that
we would provide the guns and engines for German M-48 tanks if these
were available from Bonn. McNamara seemed to agree, and Rusk pointed
out that this would be feasible if we could sell these items through
the Germans. Bundy commented that this was the best we could do at the
present juncture.
Feldman thought that the best he could come back with under these circumstances
was assurance that the Israelis would keep quiet till they could explore
tank prospects with the Germans and the UK. Bundy agreed, and felt the
Israelis should start on this right now. Feldman warned that the Israelis,
if they did not get satisfactory responses, might come back to us about
tanks. Again Bundy said we would [have?] to leave this to them. He asked
whether the President approved the instructions. The President told
Feldman to "get the job done and don't come back without it."
Rusk raised a question about the points on Israeli missiles in the
Presidential instruction. Missiles were missiles, even if the UAR variety
didn't seem very good; Rusk didn't think the President should tell the
Israelis they shouldn't acquire missiles when the UAR had them. He recognized
the limited military value of such missiles, but pointed out that they
created a major psychological and political problem for Israel. Bundy
said the difference was that the Israelis could make nuclear warheads
to put on their missiles, while the UAR couldn't. The real issue was
whether Israel was going for a nuclear capability. Rusk felt in that
case we should focus on the nuclear weapons. This was the risk. Feldman
agreed. He mentioned that Eshkol had said he would gladly settle for
a 1-2 ratio missiles vis-a-vis the Egyptians. Bundy pointed out that
the number of missiles wasn't the issue. The intelligence community
thought that Israel's covert program was aimed at a nuclear capability.
McCone concurred. The issue, therefore, was one of nuclear proliferation,
as Bundy put it.
Feldman suggested he use as a cover story that he was going to Israel
to arrange a sale of three million pounds of beef under PL-480, and
that he actually sign the agreement while there. This would provide
a perfectly legitimate cover. He had also been asked by the Kennedy
Library to take BG's recollections for the oral history. This might
also provide good cover. The President agreed on the beef story, but
felt it inappropriate for a Government official to be going to take
oral history interviews. He told Feldman to leave this out.
RWK
Note
1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Files of McGeorge Bundy, Memorandum of Meetings with the President,
Vol. I. Secret. Drafted on May 18. Bundy wrote at the top: "No
dis. McGB."
Sources: Department of State |