U.S. Cool to Israeli Arms Requests, Hot on Nuclear
Inspections
(January 21, 1966)
This memorandum outlines U.S. policy towards Israel
vis a vis arms sales, the possibility of a nuclear site in Dimona and future U.S. policy towards Israel. In this memo to the President's
Special Assistant for National Security Affairs, the U.S. expresses
its view that Israel should ask for less aid and fewer arms sales. It
is recommended that Israel obtain arms from the Europeans, instead.
The U.S. also demands that Israel submit to inspections at Dimona and
reports on Israeli projections for the new ambassador ( Abba
Eban) and a member of the Israeli cabinet who, it is assumed, may
rise in the Israeli political hierarchy.
Memorandum From the President's Deputy Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Komer) to the President's Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Bundy)/1/
Washington, January 21, 1966.
Mac:
I am putting my talk today with Israeli Minister Evron in the form
of a memo to you, because of the sensitivity of the matters discussed.
He said that Harman will be leaving no later than July. Evron either
didn't know or wouldn't say who would replace Harman.
He also broached the question of an Eshkol visit this year. My first
instinct was to counsel waiting till 1967 but then I reflected that
it's an election year and the President might be interested. So I was
noncommittal, except for saying that a visit would be a lot easier if
our other business had been satisfactorily settled beforehand so that
no one felt that Eshkol would be coming with a shopping list.
After I gently reproved Evron (who is the soft salesman of the Israeli
Embassy) for the press and pressure campaign of recent vintage, we got
down to cases. He thought that Golda Meir's replacement by Eban would
greatly decrease the decibel level of Israeli diplomacy and make things
easier all around.
On planes, I told him that Israel had made a grievous error in trying
to take a whole arm when we extended a hand. When we grudgingly said
last March that up to 24 planes might just be feasible as a bonus if
none were available in Europe, the Israeli response was the Weizman
approach asking us in effect to take over supply of the whole Israeli
airforce--with an initial commitment of 210 planes. This had led us
to draw right back into our shells. If they wanted to increase the chance
of a helpful response, I would advise them to inform us officially as
soon as possible (preferably before Eban got here) that, while they
still thought the Weizman proposal was the most sensible, they now recognized
our reluctance to become the prime Israeli airforce supplier. Therefore,
they would continue to seek primarily European sources. However, they
did have a much smaller requirement for low-level intruders which they
hoped we would supply. They should also tell us that they recognized
(as they had on tanks last year) the importance of forestalling Soviet
supply of aircraft to Jordan by a sale of our own. I could make no promises
as to whether an approach along these lines would unfreeze the aircraft
matter, but in my view it was the only promising way to get us to take
a second look. I also said that, were I an Israeli, I would not ask
for more than the 24 aircraft mentioned last March, and simply express
hope that we might later make a further sale of like magnitude. I think
he got the drift.
Then I pointed out that if Mr. Eban wanted to have a constructive visit,
instead of being put on the defensive about Israel's nuclear posture,
it would be highly desirable to give us an affirmative answer on the
next Dimona inspection before Eban arrived. Otherwise, as Barbour had
told Eban, this would be No. 1 on the agenda of everyone to whom Eban
spoke./2/ Evron and I agreed that another inspection was inevitable,
and that it would be more sensible to agree on it now than to go through
the usual series of acrimonious high-level exchanges. However, he pled
Eshkol's problem with the new faces in his cabinet, plus Eshkol's worries
about Peres. These problems might force a brief delay, until Eshkol
could bring his cabinet around. I replied that Peres should be no problem
since he and BG were the very ones who originally set up the inspection
arrangements. Nor could I help but feel that renewed pleas about Eshkol's
political difficulties were largely evasions. After all, we had just
given him a year's grace on these grounds. If, however, Eshkol did have
a short-term political problem, he would be wise to acquiesce right
now in an inspection within a month or so, and candidly explain why
he asked for this brief delay.
Evron advised that we keep a close eye on Israel Galili,
new Minister without portfolio from Mapai's coalition partner Ahdut
Avoda. Eshkol had wanted to make him Defense Minister, and in Evron's
opinion he might well be the next PM.
Evron asked about economic aid. I indicated that this was a difficult
decision for us, because of the President's desire to cut back wherever
possible in order to finance Vietnam and the Great Society at the same
time. Many in the USG argued strongly that Israel could not justify
any economic aid. But I hoped that, if the Israelis would relax, we
might be able to come at least part way toward them.
I deliberately took the above tack on planes and Dimona, because in
my judgment circumstances will probably demand that we end up selling
some aircraft to the Israelis. If so, it is far wiser for us to soften
them up on certain conditions precedent (on proliferation, on not making
us prime suppliers, and on not expecting too much economic aid) than
to give way piecemeal and end up getting less than otherwise. If I'm
wrong, no harm has been done.
RWK
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Israel, Vol. V. Secret.
/2/Barbour told Eban on January 18
that the most important matter on the agenda was arranging the next
U.S. visit to Dimona. (Telegram 716 from Tel Aviv, January 19; National
Archives and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, AE
11-2 ISR)
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 20, Arab-Israeli Dispute
1967-1968. DC: GPO,
2001. |