National Security Council Memorandum Seeking to Stall Aircraft Sales to Israel
(October 25, 1965)
This memorandum from the National Security Council
to President Johnson outlines
a desire to stall Israel's
air force from modernizing. In it, the NSC shows a desire to placate
Israel while refusing to engage in a very lucrative deal for the USA.
246. Memorandum From Robert W. Komer of the National
Security Council Staff to President Johnson/1/
Washington, October 25, 1965, 6:30 p.m.
Planes for Israel. Now that Israel has a good tank
sale under its belt (which nets us dollars), it is predictably focussing
on planes. You'll recall that last March we promised that if Israel
would lie low on Jordan arms, we'd sell some tanks and "up to 24
combat aircraft" if they couldn't get them anywhere else.
Again predictably, the Israelis have made a blue sky opening bid--not
for just 24 but for 210 new fighter bombers. Their air chief of staff
was just here proposing in effect that we take over the modernization
of the whole Israeli air force, on the grounds that neither France nor
the UK--the only other suppliers--can provide the planes./2/
State and DOD told him that he'd better go back to
the French and British, and that selling 210 planes--even for dollars
over several years--was out of the question. Nonetheless, it is true
that we produce far better aircraft for the money, and that France and
the UK probably can't meet Israel's total need (in fact the Israelis
are already back in, claiming that a new approach in Paris produced
nothing).
We'll keep stalling the Israelis along, making clear that we simply
can't talk about becoming their chief suppliers but not slamming the
door on a small sale in 1966. State remains adamant against any combat
aircraft, but some of us are coming to wonder whether State doesn't
overestimate the adverse Arab reaction (as it did on Hawks and then
tanks). Moreover, the Israelis are eager enough that they'd even let
us sell planes for dollars to Jordan too (if necessary to block a MIG
deal).
Israel is happy enough about tanks and is asking enough
other things from us--a desalting plant, 1966 economic aid, PL 480--that
we can play hard to get on planes for a few months yet. But we'd recommend
keeping the option open if you approve./3/
R. W. Komer
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National
Security File, Name File, Komer Memos, Vol. II. Secret.
/2/Discussions held October 12-13 between
an Israeli delegation chaired by Ambassador Harman, with Chief of the
Israel Air Force General Ezer Weizman as the chief Israeli spokesman,
and a joint State-Defense U.S. delegation chaired by Hare, with Hoopes
as the chief U.S. spokesman, are summarized in an October 14 memorandum
from Kitchen to Thompson. (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL ISR-US)
/3/The memorandum bears no indication
of Johnson's approval or disapproval.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 20, Arab-Israeli Dispute
1967-1968. DC: GPO,
2001. |