Meeting on Israeli Request
for Tanks
(April 30, 1964)
One of many documents
related to Israel's request for tanks. This
one notes the desirability at this time of
helping Israel meet its needs by obtaining
the tanks from a third country in Europe.
49. Memorandum for the Record1
Washington, April 30, 1964.
SUBJECT
Standing Group Meeting on Israeli Requests for U.S. Tanks2
The Group met in the White House Situation Room on April 30. Those
present were: Mr. McGeorge Bundy, White House, (in the Chair); Under
Secretary of State for Political Affairs W. Averell Harriman; Deputy
Secretary of Defense Cyrus Vance; Deputy Director of CIA Ray Cline;
Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense Frank Sloan; Gen. Andrew Goodpaster,
JCS; Mr. Robert W. Komer, White House; Mr. Bromley Smith, White House;
and Deputy Assistant Secretary of State John D. Jernegan. After discussion
of the papers presented, it was decided:
1) The United States could not afford the losses in the Arab States
which would be caused by its agreement to furnish the requested tanks
to Israel; 2) nevertheless, Israel had a valid need for the tanks and
failure to meet it in some way would generate unacceptable pressures
against the Administration and in particular against the Foreign Aid
Bill; 3) therefore, the United States should make a strong affirmative
effort to assist Israel in obtaining tanks from other nations, the most
promising sources being Great Britain, France, and West Germany; 4)
it would be highly desirable to communicate the decision on this matter
to the Israelis before the visit to Washington of Prime Minister Eshkol
on June 1 and to be able to assure them that there were good prospects
for purchases outside the United States; 5) knowledgeable, high level
representatives of the Department of Defense should proceed promptly
to London, Paris and Bonn to explore the question with top officials
of the three governments; 6) since European tanks were likely to cost
more and be less immediately available than American tanks, the United
States should be prepared to offer additional economic aid to Israel
to compensate for this extra cost and delay; the United States should
also seek other means of showing its friendship and support for Israel
at the time of Mr. Eshkol's visit--in this connection there was discussion
of the possibility of proposing a cooperative project in desalination
with nuclear power.
It was agreed that it was important to satisfy the Government of Israel
that its needs would be fully met. It was further agreed that the initial
investigation regarding tank availability in Europe should be kept very
quiet.
Notes
1 Source: Johnson Library, National Security File,
Country File, Israel, Tanks, Vol. I. Secret; Limit Distribution. Drafted
by Jernegan.
2 A draft summary record of the meeting by NSC Executive
Secretary Bromley Smith indicates that the meeting was at 5:15 p.m.
It presents the conclusions set forth in this memorandum in summary
form and adds that the Standing Group agreed on a further effort to
persuade Nasser to refrain from a missile program. (Ibid., Files of
Robert Komer, Israel Security (Tanks), Nov. 1963-June 1964)
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
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