Memorandum from Joint Chiefs on Military Assistance to
Israel
(March 12, 1964)
Memorandum From the Joint
Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense McNamara/1/
JCSM-207-64
Washington, March 12, 1964.
SUBJECT
Military Assistance for Israel (U)
1. Reference is made to
a memorandum by the Deputy Secretary of Defense,
dated 11 February 1964, on the above subject,
which requested the views of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff regarding certain questions posed
in a letter by the Deputy Under Secretary
of State, dated 8 February 1964./2/ These questions, concerning the desirability
of selling tanks to Israel, are:
a. Whether a significant imbalance exists
in the relative strengths of the Arab-Israeli
military forces;
b. The need for Israel to augment its tank
strength;
c. The need for modernization of Israel's
tank force; and
d. Possible substitution of antitank weapons
that would meet Israel's needs.
2. A significant imbalance in the relative
strengths of Arab and Israeli military forces
does not exist at this time.
a. Though superior in total numbers and
hardware, the Arabs trail Israel in quality
and experience of leadership, in the level
of general educational and technical background
among the enlisted ranks, in mobilization
capability, and in incentive to fight. The
serious political differences and jealousies
of the Arabs make effective combined military
action against Israel highly unlikely. Israel
will probably retain its over-all military
superiority vis-a-vis the Arab States for
the next several years.
b. Apart from such estimates of over-all
capabilities, Israel's concern about tanks
is justified. Israel cannot be complacent,
for example, in knowing that Egypt has moved
from a position of tank disadvantage to
advantage in a period of five years. Egypt
has moved far ahead in tank quality and
has increased its tank inventory from 322
to 739, while Israel's has increased from
626 to 798.
3. There is no need for Israel to augment
its tank strength at this time. Current force
levels and equipment levels are adequate for
the defense of Israel in the light of announced
US policies and Arab disunity and weaknesses.
With the ability to mobilize to a strength
of 250,000 in two d4ays, Israeli forces can
continue to counter Arab threats as long as
such forces are well led, trained, and equipped.
4. There is a military need for Israel to
modernize its tank force because the bulk
of its tank inventory is obsolescent. The
Arabs (Egypt, Syria, Jordan, Saudi Arabia,
Lebanon, and Iraq) have already gained a favorable
modernization differential as well as a numerical
advantage, and they are gradually improving
their training and maintenance. Thus, Israel
needs to replace obsolete M-4 tanks in order
to counter Arab T-34s, T-54s, and JS-3s.
5. With reference to the question of substituting
antitank weapons for tanks, it must be noted
that these weapons are complementary to each
other. Even though a nation may have adopted
a defense strategy, there is a requirement
for an offensive tactical capability to repel
and, if necessary, eject enemy forces which
have penetrated its territory. Thus, Israel
has a need for an appropriate mix of tanks
and antitank weapons in order to maintain
a balanced military force.
6. The foregoing comments
do not alter the views of the Joint Chiefs
of Staff as furnished in JCSM-953-63, dated
7 December 1963, subject: "Near East
Arms Policy (U)," and JCSM-40-64, dated
18 January 1964, subject: "Arms for Israel
(U)."/3/
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Acting Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Notes
/1/Source:
Washington National Records Center, RG 330,
OSD Files: FRC 70 A 1266, Israel 470. Secret.
A stamped note reads, "Mr. Vance has
seen."
/2/The memorandum
from Vance to the JCS Chairman and the letter
from U. Alexis Johnson to Vance are not printed.
(Both ibid.)
/3/See Document
10 and footnote 3 thereto.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
2000. |