Memorandum on Israeli Arms Needs
(March 5, 1964)
Memorandum for Record/1/
Washington, March 5, 1964.
SUBJECT
Israeli Arms Needs
PARTICIPANTS
H.E. Abba Eban, Deputy Prime Minister of Israel
H.E. Avraham Harman, Israeli Ambassador
McGeorge Bundy, Special Assistant to the President
R.W. Komer
In a most relaxed, low-key
discussion Messrs. Eban and Bundy exchanged
thoughts on Israel's need to redress the imbalance
between Israeli and Arab armor, and the pros
and cons of further escalation of the arms
race. Eban said that he was not here primarily
on security business; nevertheless he hoped
to contribute to narrowing any points of difference
between us before the Eshkol visit, as the
President had suggested in his letter to Eshkol.
The latter was of course looking forward very
much to the visit.
Eban did not dwell on the
tank problem, commenting that we seemed to
be in agreement on the need. It was the Arabs
who invariably started the parade by acquiring
new weapons systems, and Israel which generally
followed. He cited jets and submarines as
cases in point. Moreover, Israel had seen
in the Hawk sale US acceptance of the principle
that we would not allow an arms imbalance
to develop.
Eban did stress, however,
the importance of not linking the tank and
missile questions. These were two quite different
matters. If Mr. Eshkol could be given favorable
word on tanks when he came, this would create
the right atmosphere for further productive
discussions on other matters. He and Harman
both urged that we not attempt to deal simultaneously
with an immediate and clear-cut question such
as tanks, and a murky issue which was not
immediate and on which the PM had explained
to Mr. Rowen the Israeli views.
As to missiles, Eban acknowledged
the gap between Israeli and US estimates.
But he emphasized that despite the limited
military value of UAR missiles they presented
a real psychological hazard, especially to
a small, beleaguered nation like Israel. In
response to Bundy's query, he said that the
purpose of Israeli missiles would be deterrence
via threat of retaliation against Cairo. Israel
needed a psychological counter which would
both bolster popular morale and deter Nasser
from thinking he could disrupt Israel with
a bomber and missile attack while the US was
making up its mind.
Bundy rehearsed the arguments
as to why we saw potentially great costs and
risks to Israel's moving ahead in this field.
The UAR missiles of today seemed to be more
for parades than a serious military weapon,
though we saw force in the argument that Nasser
might over-estimate his own strength. Quite
candidly, however, what greatly concerned
us were the implications of Israel, with an
acknowledged nuclear potential, moving to
acquire a delivery system which made real
sense only with nuclear warheads. Whether
or not Israel had any such intention, the
Arabs could hardly be expected not to draw
this conclusion. What they might do then was
deeply disturbing. By now Israel should be
fully reassured as to the firmness of US support;
the one thing that might upset this increasingly
close relationship would be US belief that
Israel was moving in the direction of a nuclear
deterrent. Yet Israel's lack of candor in
explaining its missile program generated suspicions
which should be laid to rest.
The most significant aspect
of the discussion centered around the relationship
of tanks and missiles. Bundy explained that
we were not trying to link the two questions
in any attempt at oriental bargaining. What
we were trying to say was that we were deeply
concerned over both these aspects of Israel's
security problem--precisely because both aspects
could also deeply involve us. We felt a bit
as though Israel was not confiding in us about
its missile intentions because it feared our
reaction; this in turn made us suspicious
that Israel simply wanted to postpone the
matter until after the tanks were settled,
and then tell us that it proposed to go ahead
on a course which could have a deeply unsettling
effect on our relationship. The US should
not say "it won't do A without B",
nor Israel say "we won't talk about B
unless you do A." All we could ask was
a rational approach; they should not insist
we separate the two issues or have no discussion,
and we shouldn't insist we link them or have
no discussion. We should go ahead on both
problems as a mark of mutual confidence. He
couldn't exaggerate the importance of coming
to a harmonious view on these issues.
Harman and Eban both saw
tanks as the "test" of our commitment
in Israeli eyes. If the US were unwilling
to help meet an agreed need, it would powerfully
reinforce the views of those skeptics who
felt that Israel could not rely on the US
commitment. Eban had again been impressed
on this visit, as by past experience here
and the Kennedy and Johnson letters, with
the extent to which Washington stood firmly
behind its words. But we had to reckon with
the psychological problem--the fact that our
assurances were so private and informal lessened
their credibility. Moreover, Israelis closely
followed such situations as Cyprus, Vietnam,
Malaysia; when they saw the inhibitions on
the use of US power, though everyone knew
the US had an abundance of power, this raised
doubts. Others feared that our tendency to
push the UN to the fore in a crisis might
lead us down this road at a time when Israel's
critical need dictated a quick response.
Bundy made clear that we
fully understood these concerns; we could
well realize how a beleaguered Israel might
worry over the US response. As one of the
custodians of nuclear power (which some of
us had grown increasingly to wish we hadn't
brought into the world), we were very cautious
about the responsible use of such power. This
of course was one reason why we were so opposed
to nuclear proliferation, and felt that steps
by Israel which might seem to be creating
a new nuclear dimension in the Middle East
could so affect US policy as to force us to
rethink it. In short, the way to make certain
our commitment was unreliable might be to
act as if one couldn't rely on it.
Eban raised another question
as to how to give credibility to our assurances
that we could come quickly to Israel's aid
if necessary. When General Rabin, the new
Israeli C/S, had been here, he was "impressed
as a citizen" but concerned as a soldier
with the vagueness of US protestations that
we could come quickly and effectively to Israel's
support. To military men precision was essential.
He realized the problems "joint planning"
might give us, but hoped something could be
done to facilitate clear, operational understandings.
Bundy felt that "joint planning"
didn't prove very much. Our military were
understandably reluctant to get pinned down
to plans that rarely fitted the real case
when it arose, yet robbed us of flexibility
and often generated argument and mistrust.
The problem of possible
arms limitations was also discussed, with
neither Bundy nor Eban very optimistic over
this route. Eban stressed Eshkol's deep desire
to find some way to forestall the constant
piling up of arms which cancelled each other
out. This was a terrible waste, aside from
the grave risks. Perhaps something might emerge
from the Geneva talks. Did we see much chance
of convincing the Arabs that some sort of
a standstill would be mutually advantageous?
Eshkol might want to raise this question when
here.
Bundy guardedly indicated
that we didn't see many signs to date of Arab
interest, but all of us were undergoing a
process of education along these lines, witness
the US and USSR. If we felt that we had something
to go on from the Israeli side, it would certainly
enhance our desire to keep trying. Here Eshkol's
refusal to let us reassure Nasser that Israel
wasn't going nuclear tended to tie our hands.
If the Arabs, already worried about Israel's
nuclear capacity, were to see missiles (which
were not much use without nuclear warheads)
added to the arsenal, this might create quite
a problem.
At Eban's request Bundy
gave some background on our Vietnam policy.
There was also a brief allusion to Cyprus,
Libya, and the repeated Arab statements of
hostility toward Israel. All agreed that such
words were generally a substitute for action,
but they did serve to keep the pot boiling.
RWK [Robert Komer of the
National Security staff]
Notes
/1/Source:
Johnson Library, National Security File, Country
File, Israel, Vol. I. Secret. Copies were
sent to Rusk, Harriman, Bundy, Jernegan, Department
of Defense General Counsel John T. McNaughton,
and Myer Feldman at the White House.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
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