Telegram on Israeli Request for Arms Package Equivalent
to U.S. Arms For Jordan
(March 11, 1965)
Israel asks to be given the same quality and quantity of arms as Jordan is supposed
to receive from the U.S. The United States is not happy with
this request, but does not reject it. The U.S. asks Israel
not to tell anyone about either of the arms sales it wants
to make. The U.S. says that they want to provide arms to
Jordan so that Jordan will not get arms from the USSR. The
United States , in the interest of both themselves and Israel
wants Israel, to not to do anything that will disrupt their
deals with Jordan. This includes military action and telling
other parties about the arms deals. The United States also
asks Israel to communicate with them directly and not through
other channels.
184. Telegram From the Embassy
in Israel to the Department of State/1/
1151. For SecState, SecDef,
Bundy. Ref: Embtel 1150./2/ Highlights final
sessions with Israelis. Komer went over script
with Peres at luncheon, saying had only tentative
Washington OK since top echelon had not yet
signed off./3/ But told Peres previous night's
session enabled him suggest way break logjam
by urging some give on planes in lieu impossible
idea $40-50 million compensatory sales. Gave
Peres list suggested oral understandings plus
draft memo.
In evening Peres, Levavi
insisted meeting first with us and attempted
reintroduce concept sales to Israel of value
comparable to Jordan. Komer flatly rejected,
saying if so must go back to comparable kinds
and quantities too. That was that. Then accepted
minor addition of "direct" sales
para 5.
Also told Peres Washington willing consider
so-called Peres gambit on Bonn/US/Israel tank
drill./4/ Peres sent off cable Bonn that "unofficial
US answer is they will consider if and when
Germans approach US."
When met Eshkol he had word on preceding,
so all went well. Expressed great appreciation
President's response Israel's needs. Said
ready to sign memo. On publicity we could
tell President he would do everything possible.
He wouldn't brag US giving Israel tanks, if
only so Jordan wouldn't brag either.
Said tell President Israel relations with
Germany would now improve. Pleased at Nasser's
latest "folly."
Komer replied would assure President Israel
would not undercut Jordan sales program. Komer
regarded US as having gentlemen's agreement
(PM nodded assent). As agreed yesterday, we
depended on Harman give clear private guidance
friends in US why US compelled sell limited
arms Jordan prevent Soviets/Nasser coming
in. Hoped Eshkol wouldn't mind if President
told one or two mutual friends too. Assured
Eshkol we would try hardest avoid press leaks
our end too. On principle cui bono, US had
no interest damaging Hussein by revealing
Israel agreed US arms sales.
We planned deliver basic M-48 to Jordan and
M-48A1 to Israel, Israel could convert latter
under contract with US. Remaining M-48's we'd
deliver if Germans didn't were 90.
On planes, should leave to military experts.
Though planes either from US or other sources,
we did not exclude B-66 or include it, latest
word was our military people don't think B-66
best type for Israel.
In response Peres question, Komer said that,
speaking entirely personally, he didn't see
why USG wouldn't at least consider SP guns
instead of tanks or engines instead of planes.
Let's leave to experts. PM agreed.
Komer said must repeat this no change our
long-standing arms policy--a balanced exception;
not open-ended.
Komer expressed appreciation PM's agreement
on secrecy. Said essential keep M-48A3 kit
deal secret as long as possible too. This
in Israel's own interest to keep down Jordanian
pressure for M-48A3's.
Next Komer said asked make clear genuine
perturbation at highest levels USG at unofficial
approaches purporting speak for Israel. Hoped
government-to-government matters could be
handled through same channels though couldn't
stop friends from talking about general attitudes.
Stressed importance mutual understanding between
heads of states as more important than anything
else. PM got point.
Had earlier told Peres to tell PM not send
people Washington prematurely. Suggested at
least 6-8 week interval let us recover from
shock. PM himself mentioned this later. Believe
point made.
At this point Deptel 909/5/ brought to us
in meeting. Asked recess so could consider.
Must say this almost blew up whole show again.
We compelled make command decision, what to
change in memo already being typed for signature
and which to finesse. We take full responsibility.
Got in clear reference to 90 tanks, i.e.
remainder of the 150 not shipped. Peres wanted
latter phrase to cover possibility Italians
would hold back 20 in Italy. We said would
argue later. Felt essential leave language
re sources aircraft as change this sensitive
matter could have re-opened whole package.
Furthermore, present form says same thing
as Deptel 909. Skipped altered secrecy provision;/6/
can't repudiate all previous words at last
meeting.
[Language?] on Hussein's intention inserted,
at cost raised eyebrows. Last sentence para
7 also altered per Deptel 910. In return we
agreed new sentence in para IV that US told
Hussein no sales if he got Soviet arms.
To clear atmosphere, Komer then paraphrased
Deptel 909 para on Peres gambit,/7/ citing
it as good news. This helped.
Next we suggested agreed memcon to be initialed
both sides. PM agreed and Barbour will follow
through./8/ Finally, Komer asked PM if could
give him some good word on non-preemption. PM
said Israel wouldn't move "for month, two
months, three months." While discussions
going on. Agreed must be further talk about
water, either here or in Washington.
One comment PM was that between Komer and Harriman
over last four weeks, they had managed much
persuade him Jordan sale made sense.
Harman urged, with PM's consent, that we
urge Hussein keep US sales to him secret as
long as possible. This would greatly help
Israel keep quiet too. Harman further proposed
we consult on what Israel might say if and
when matters began coming out. We agreed.
And urge prompt follow-through on both items.
In final private aside to Eshkol and Meir,
Komer told them President had made every effort
meet their needs. He asked reciprocal understanding.
Planes from US or other sources was great
last-minute concession Komer hadn't really
expected. In fact, in response PM's plea for
concreteness President had just told Komer
tell PM privately "up to 24" planes
in mind. After near blow-up result in arrival
Deptel 910, Komer and Barbour felt had to
state number positively instead of negatively.
PM moved, expressed appreciation, said tell
President we'll collaborate fully. Komer ended
by saying don't press things too hard. Give
us time to think matters through. Let's work
together, not argue with each other. Gently
reminded PM that personal rapport with President
worth more than any and all pieces of paper.
Barbour
/1/Source: National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central
Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 JORDAN. Secret; Immediate;
Exdis. Received on March 10 at 8:32 p.m. and
passed to the White House.
/2/Telegram 1150 from Tel
Aviv, March 10, informed Johnson, Rusk, and
Bundy that the memorandum of understanding
had been signed. (Ibid.)
/3/Telegram 903 to Tel Aviv, sent at 12:59
a.m. on March 10, told Komer that he should
press for a final understanding that evening
but that his instructions would be confirmed
in time for his talk with Eshkol. (Ibid.,
DEF 12-5 ISR)
/4/Reference is to a proposal reported by
Komer in telegram 1144 (see footnote 3, Document
183) that since the United States had been
willing to sell 150 M48A2 tanks to Germany
to replace the ones that Germany had intended
to sell to Israel, the United States might
ship 90 of them to Israel and charge the cost
to the Germans.
/5/Telegram 909 to Tel Aviv, March 10, authorized
Komer to give U.S. agreement to a draft memorandum
of understanding, the text of which was transmitted
in telegram 910 to Tel Aviv, also March 10,
and commented on some of the desired changes.
(Both in National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR)
The draft transmitted in telegram 910 was
similar in substance to the signed memorandum
of understanding except as indicated in this
telegram and in footnote 6 below.
/6/The paragraph on publicity in the draft
transmitted in telegram 910 to Tel Aviv consists
of two sentences similar in substance to the
second and third sentences in paragraph VII
in telegram 1152 (Document 185), but does
not include the first sentence. Telegram 909
states that the change was made in view of
the U.S. intention to disclose the general
outline of the deal to the Jordanian and UAR
Governments and to some Western Europe allies.
/7/It expressed willingness to cooperate
in the "Peres gambit" but commented
that it would be best arranged through a private
Israeli-German understanding.
/8/Barbour sent the memorandum of conversation, initialed by
Bitan and Barbour, to Komer with a covering letter of March
17, and Komer forwarded it to Read with a covering memorandum
of March 31. (National Archives and Records Administration,
RG 59, Central Files 1964-66, POL 7 US/KOMER) A copy of the
memorandum of conversation is in the Johnson Library, National
Security File, Country File, Israel, Harriman Israeli Mission
(IV).
Sources: U.S.
Department of State |