Memorandum on Willingness to Sell Tanks and Guns to Israel, But Not Aircraft
(June 5, 1965)
The U.S. is prepared to sell Israel tanks and some guns, but will only sell Israel aircraft if
they cannot obtain the from European countries.
222. Telegram From the Department
of State to the Embassy in Israel/1/
1254. Israel Arms Procurement.
This message FYI throughout.
High level discussions within USG May 22
on Israel arms procurement/2/ resulted in
following US position:
I. Tanks: US prepared:
1. Offer 110 M-48A2c tanks to make up shortfall
in German deliveries. Fifteen ready for delivery
in US this summer; balance in three months
beginning mid-June 1966.
2. Offer 100 M-48A1 tanks to offset sale
similar number basic M-48 tanks to Jordan.
In view of Israeli request that M-48A1's be
delivered before M-48A2c's to permit early
conversion, deliveries to Israel would be
made over four months beginning in mid-January
1966. US could deliver M-48A2c's ahead of
M-48A1's if Israelis change their minds.
3. Provide kits to install 105-mm guns on
110 M-48A2c tanks and 140 M-48A1 tanks (40
from Germany and 100 from the US) in Israel.
4. Provide 140 kits for conversion in Israel
of Israel's M-48A1 tanks to M-48A3 configuration.
In view known Jordanian desires and comparability
of Jordan and Israel tank sales (see Deptel
898 and US-Israeli Memorandum of Understanding),/3/
implication clear US will in due course be
under strong pressure to supply Jordan M-48A3
tanks with 105-mm guns.
If Israel should press for delivery of 100
M-48A2c instead of M-48A1 tanks (as we think
they will) to offset the Jordan sale, we could
probably agree (unless it turns out that it
seriously degrades US forces), provided we
supplied neither kits for conversion of the
40 M-48A1's in Israel to M-48A3 configuration,
nor kits to up-gun any of Israel's M-48 type
tanks. Since these M-48A2c models could not
be delivered before 1967 this concession would
have advantage of broader phasing of deliveries
and less political impact on Israel's neighbors.
Any up-gunning kits would have to come from
the UK.
II. Self-Propelled Guns:
US prepared to supply only M-44A1 SP 155-mm
howitzers and then only in lieu of tanks on
one-for-one basis.
III. Aircraft:
1. Clear consensus contrary US interests
to sell military aircraft to Israel.
2. We are committed to sell Israel aircraft
only if Israel cannot obtain suitable aircraft
from Western European sources. In any event,
we would not sell supersonic aircraft, the
number would not exceed 24, and delivery would
not be until 1967. We are also most reluctant
to sell a bomber or even an attack aircraft,
but to avoid charges of bad faith we propose
to stick for this round with the precise language
of Memorandum of Understanding (i.e. certain
number of combat aircraft) and March 10 Agreed
Minutes (i.e. certain number of mutually agreed
type).
3. We propose tell Israel Embassy here we
expect detailed evidence of GOI effort procure
Western European aircraft.
4. If, after intensive effort, GOI unable
find suitable aircraft, we intend canvass
Western European sources ourselves.
5. Since we wish to steer Israel to Europe
rather than whet its appetitite for US aircraft,
we do not now intend furnish GOI information
on availability, price, characteristics, or
recommendations re potentially available US
combat aircraft. Supply such information before
conclusion investigation Western European
possibilities could destroy credibility US
insistence upon thorough search for Western
European aircraft. However, we will provide
certain information on costliness selected
US aircraft we do not intend to sell, with
a view to encouraging Israelis to search for
suitable foreign aircraft.
During forthcoming discussions with Israel
here/4/ we intend to reiterate statement made
to Israel Ambassador May 19 (Deptel 1184)/5/
and stress that Israel's military attacks
intended to solve water diversion issue could
cause suspension of arms arrangements at any
stage.
Rusk
/1/Source: National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, Central Files 1964-66,
DEF 12-5 ISR. Secret; Priority; Exdis. Drafted
by Russell; cleared by Symmes, Talbot, Solbert,
Bunte, Creel, and Komer; and approved by Rusk.
A May 27 draft by Russell is attached with
a note that the telegram was retyped with
White House changes. Repeated to London, Bonn,
and to Paris for the Embassy and DEFREPNAMA.
/2/No record of these discussions has been
found.
/3/See footnote 2, Document 183 and Document
185.
/4/Talbot and Solbert presented the U.S. response
to the Israeli arms request to Harman on June
15. (Memorandum of conversation; National Archives
and Records Administration, RG 59, Central Files
1964-66, DEF 12-5 ISR)
/5/See footnote 3, Document 216.
Sources: U.S.
Department of State |