Memorandum on Alternative Weapons For
Israel
(May 6, 1965)
The United States wants to give Israel as few weapons as possible. They are trying particularly
hard to stay away from combat aircraft and looking for alternative
weapons to give Israel that they feel will satisfy Israel's
military needs.
211. Memorandum From the
Joint Chiefs of Staff to Secretary of Defense
McNamara/1/
SUBJECT: Impact on Area Arms
Balance of Military Sales to Israel (S)
1. (U) Reference is made
to a memorandum by the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ISA), I-22656/65, dated 26 April
1965, subject as above./2/
2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of
Staff reiterate their view (JCSM-953-63, dated
7 December 1963)/3/ that our Middle East arms
policy should not positively identify the
United States with either side in the Arab-Israeli
conflict. Every attempt should be made to
avoid a polarization in the Middle East whereby
the United States becomes increasingly identified
with Israel and the USSR with the Arab World.
Such polarization would have the undesirable
consequence of promoting an anti-US Arab unity
under United Arab Republic leadership. This
process would tend to weaken the comparatively
moderate, pro-Western Arab governments while
strengthening Soviet influence among the Arab
states. Sale to Israel of US offensive weapons,
such as tanks and aircraft, can be expected
to generate Arab reactions which would be
detrimental to US political, military, and
economic interests in the Middle East. The
impact of US military sales to Israel is discussed
in Appendices A and B hereto./4/
3. (S) Although the Israelis
have requested 75 combat aircraft, presumably
bomber aircraft, the Memorandum of Understanding,/5/
as understood by the United States, provided
for no more than 24 aircraft. The Joint Chiefs
of Staff believe that the addition of even
24 jet light bombers to the Israeli inventory
would provide a significant relative increase
in the Israeli military capability, and the
addition of 75 bomber aircraft would create
a drastic change in the present military balance
which cannot be justified on military grounds.
With the addition of Hawk missiles, scheduled
to become operational about 15 May 1965, the
Israeli air defense system will provide an
acceptable defense against the numerically
superior United Arab Command offensive air
capability.
4. (S) Israel's combat aircraft needs have been
filled in the past from United Kingdom and French
sources. The United States should avoid sale
of any US combat aircraft to Israel, particularly
bomber aircraft. Every effort should be made
to persuade Israel to continue to satisfy its
combat aircraft requirements from Western European
sources. The British Canberra Mk II or the French
Vautour II B (especially if it were equipped
with the Spey engine) would give Israel a satisfactory
bombing capability. Both aircraft are expected
to be available.
5. (S) If a political decision is made to
sell US aircraft, bomber aircraft should not
be offered, since this would increase the
severity of the Arab reaction. If US aircraft
must be provided, the F-5 aircraft is the
best available compromise on the basis of
performance, cost, political considerations,
and impact on US military posture. Although
its performance does not meet the stated Israeli
requirement, it is probable that Israel would
accept the F-5 in order to obtain a US aircraft.
Other US and Western aircraft which could
be considered for sale to Israel are listed
in Appendices C and D hereto. These aircraft
are listed in the order of preference for
sale to Israel if the F-5 is unacceptable.
6. (S) The Memorandum of Understanding commits
the United States to provide tanks to Israel
of at least the same number and quality as
those sold to Jordan. In addition, it commits
the United States to deliver the remaining
110 tanks from the German tank arrangement.
In additional negotiations, Israel has asked
the United States to furnish 100 M-48-A2C
tanks to balance the initial commitment of
100 M-48s to Jordan and to furnish 100 M-48-A2Cs
to fulfill the German contract. Consummation
of the foregoing will significantly increase
Israeli qualitative superiority. Therefore,
in order to reduce Arab reaction, it is recommended
that the M-48-A1 only be considered for sale
to Israel in fulfillment of the Memorandum
of Understanding to balance the tanks sold
to Jordan. Moreover, any sale of current US
Army M-48-A2 or newer model tanks would have
an adverse impact on the armored capabilities
of the US Army, whereas the sale of earlier
model M-48-A1 or M-48 tanks would not.
7. (S) Since Israel has preferred in the
past to consider self-propelled guns such
as the USSR SU-100 in the category of armor
and in view of the offensive capability of
155mm SP weapons, the Joint Chiefs of Staff
recommend that, if such equipment is requested,
sales be approved only if the number of tanks
sold is reduced by a corresponding amount.
8. (S) If the Israelis were to acquire, as
postulated in the reference, 310 M-48 type
tanks, 60 self-propelled 155mm weapons, and
250 Centurion tanks, the Arab-Israeli arms
balance would be tipped in favor of Israel
to a significant degree by the end of 1967.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
/1/Source: Washington National
Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC 70
A 1266, Israel 470. Secret; Sensitive. A stamped
notation on the memorandum reads: "Sec
Def has seen Brief."
/2/Not found.
/3/Printed in Foreign Relations,
1961-1963, vol. XVIII, Document 383.
/4/The appendices are not attached.
/5/See Documents 182-185.
Sources: U.S.
Department of State |