U.S. Concern Over Nasser's Possible Reaction
To Israel Arms Sale
(March 29 1965)
The United States gives some aid to the UAR hoping this
will balance out the arms deal with Israel.
Nasser did not react badly, but the United States is worried
about what is to come. The United States hopes that by offering
to make deals with Nasser, he will not make a big deal out
of aid to Israel.
198. Memorandum From Robert
W. Komer of the National Security Council
Staff to President Johnson/1/
Small CCC Credit for the
UAR. We've been keeping tight WH control over
every facet of aid to Nasser.
The UAR has requested CCC credit terms for
200,000 tons of corn (about $10 million worth).
This would be a dollar sale on only slightly
softer than normal commercial terms, and is
not regarded as "aid."
Even so, we'd be chary were it not that Nasser
reacted very mildly when we told him about
limited US arms sales to Israel. While this
may be only the lull before the storm, it
would make life a lot easier for us if he
kept quiet. Therefore, State and our Ambassador
see the CCC offer as a small and low key signal
that we're still interested in doing business
if he's a good boy. In fact Luke Battle's
analysis (Cairo 3382 attached)/2/ is hopeful
on this score.
Bundy and I agree with Rusk, but want to
check it out with you./3/
R. W. Komer/4/
/1/Source: Johnson Library, National Security
File, Files of Robert W. Komer, Presidential
Decisions (LBJ), 1965. Secret.
/2/Battle commented in telegram 3382 from
Cairo, March 27, on his March 24 meeting with
Nasser. He stated that it strengthened the
Embassy's impression that they were witnessing
the beginning of the end of the current phase
of Egyptian policy with its emphasis on Arab
unity. He thought a number of Nasser's comments
to him made him sound like an "Egypt
firster." (Ibid., Country File, United
Arab Republic, Vol. III)
/3/The "Disapprove" line is checked
with the notation "See me. L." in
Johnson's handwriting.
/4/Bundy initialed below Komer's signature.
Sources: U.S.
Department of State |