

**Memorandum from Samuel M. Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 5, 1972**

Hoskinson reported on the Israeli hostage situation in Munich and commented that the Department of State was at a loss over how to apply pressure on the terrorists.

**Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 6, 1972**

Kissinger was informed that the Israeli Olympic athletes were killed during a rescue mission attempted by West German security forces. Hoskinson suggested that there was very little that could be done to prevent terrorism.

**Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) for the President's File, Washington, September 6, 1972, 8:30 a.m.**

The President, his Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, Secretary of State Rogers, and Haig discussed how to respond to the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes in Munich.

**Memorandum From Samuel M. Hoskinson and Fernando Rondon of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 6, 1972**

Hoskinson and Rondon recommended that action against international terrorism should not be pursued in the United Nations at this time.

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, September 6, 1972**

Rogers informed the President of the anti-terrorism initiatives he planned to take after the Munich Olympics massacre.

**Telegram 164170 From the Department of State to Embassy in Israel, September 8, 1972, 2025Z**

Rogers and Israeli Ambassador Rabin discussed how to respond to the Munich incident.

**Circular Telegram 164986 From the Department of State of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom and Other Posts, Washington, September 9, 1972, 2334Z**

In a personal message to ambassadors, Rogers said that Nixon had charged him with the responsibility to mobilize the international community to take action to combat terrorism and directed them to approach host governments in an attempt to persuade the Arabs to disassociate themselves from terrorists.

**Telegram 167911 From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations, September 14, 1972, 1941Z**

Ambassador Bush was directed to transmit a letter to Secretary-General Waldheim from Secretary Rogers expressing continued U.S. interest in the problem of terrorism.

**Telegram 169556 From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations, September 15, 1972, 2354Z**

The Department discussed its strategy on handling terrorism issues at the UN General Assembly.

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, September 18, 1972**

Rogers provided the President with an initial report on current measures to combat terrorism and proposals for the future.

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, September 21, 1972**

Rogers informed the President of international measures taken to combat terrorism.

**Information Memorandum From Assistant Secretary of State, International Organization Affairs (De Palma) and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, September, 21, 1972**

De Palma and Sisco briefed Rogers on the Department's scenario for handling the terrorism item at the UN General Assembly.

**Information Memorandum From the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Stevenson) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, September 22, 1972**

Stevenson described the new draft convention for prevention of terrorism to be circulated by the United States at the United Nations.

**Telegram 174121 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ceylon, Washington, September 22, 1972, 2335Z**

The Department of State instructed key posts to explain to host governments that a vote against inscription of the terrorism item on the UNGA agenda would be a vote against the Secretary-General and would weaken the United Nations.

**Telegram 3421 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, September 22, 1972, 2311Z**

Ambassador Bush reported that inscription of Secretary-General Waldheim's terrorism item would likely fail.

**Telegram 174571 From the Department of State to the Consulate in Montreal, September 25, 1972, 1736Z**

Extracts from Secretary of State Rogers' remarks before the UN General Assembly setting out steps to counter international terrorism.

**Memorandum From President Nixon to Heads of Departments and Agencies, Washington, September 25, 1972**

The President directed the establishment of a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism to be chaired by Secretary of State Rogers.

**Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, September 25, 1972**

The President described the membership of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism and set the scope of its activities.

**Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 29, 1972**

Kissinger answered the President's query about attacks on U.S. businesses overseas in a 3-page memorandum that summarized a longer CIA memorandum on the topic.

**Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 21, 1972**

The Department reported on a setback to U.S.-supported terrorism items at the UN General Assembly.

**Memorandum From Fernando Rondon and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 25, 1972**

**NSC staffers updated Kissinger on the status of the Terrorism Convention and the Convention on the Protection of Diplomats at the United Nations.**

**Memorandum From Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 1, 1972**

**Kennedy brought Kissinger up-to-date on all anti-terrorism action taken since the President's directive of September 25th.**

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, November 7, 1972**

**Rogers recounted for the President both domestic and international counterterrorism actions undertaken by the United States.**

**Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Attorney General Kleindienst, Washington, November 13, 1972**

**Rogers asked Kleindienst how the U.S. Government could prevent terrorist violence by Yugoslav émigré groups operating in the United States and asked Kleindienst to investigate these types of activities.**

**Memorandum From Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 1, 1972**

**The memorandum summarized the CIA's assessment of the terrorist threat to U.S. business enterprises overseas.**

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington, December 11, 1972**

**Rogers reported that the UN's Legal Committee had voted to support a "disappointingly weak" resolution on terrorism.**

**Telegram 5526 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, New York, December 13, 1972, 0052Z**

**Text of the terrorism item as adopted by the UN General Assembly.**

**Telegram 5582 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, December 15, 1972, 0221Z**

**Ambassador Bush explained how Arab pressure on Africans and Third World discontent with Western nations led to a weak and ineffectual UN resolution on terrorism.**

**Telegram 227601 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, December 16, 1972, 1825Z**

**The Department agreed with reluctance that the U.S. delegation should participate on the terrorism committee required by the UNGA terrorism resolution.**

**Memorandum from Samuel M. Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 5, 1972**

**Hoskinson reported on the Israeli hostage situation in Munich and commented that the Department of State was at a loss over how to apply pressure on the terrorists.**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION  
6526

September 5, 1972  
MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: SAMUEL M. HOSKINSON

SUBJECT: Munich Situation as of 5:30 EDT

The latest unconfirmed news report is that the terrorists and the hostages have been taken to the Munich airport. No further details are yet available. The terrorists reportedly continue to stand firm on maintaining that the remaining Israeli hostages will be killed unless Israel agrees to release some 200 Arabs currently under detention for political offenses. Meanwhile, all Olympic competitive events have been suspended pending the outcome of the negotiations and final decisions on the continuation of the games reportedly will be made tomorrow.

Our embassy in Tel Aviv reports that the Israeli public appears stunned. They expect that if more Israeli lives are lost the reaction in Israel will be extremely bitter and could transcend the fedayeen issue and bring on a souring of public attitudes toward any efforts to reach peace with the Arabs. The West Germans, at all times a sensitive subject in Israel, also could be expected to come in for their share of Israeli bitterness. Nor does the embassy think that the Israelis are very likely to forgive their own security forces for allowing an attack on the team, given reported prior warnings of the German security services.

State is at a loss over how to apply effective leverage on the terrorists. The best they could come up with today was a cable to the major European capitals plus Jidda and Kuwait (the big financial contributors to the fedayeen) calling on them to use whatever influence they may have in Arab capitals or elsewhere to bring pressure to bear on the terrorists. Secretary Rogers and Department spokesmen have also made the appropriate remarks of outrage in public. We have offered our assistance to the Israelis, but so far they have not asked.

**Memorandum From Samuel Hoskinson of the National Security Council Staff  
to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger),  
Washington, September 6, 1972**

**Kissinger was informed that the Israeli Olympic athletes were killed during a rescue mission attempted by West German security forces. Hoskinson suggested that there was very little that could be done to prevent terrorism.**



MEMORANDUM  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
ACTION

September 6, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. KISSINGER

FROM: SAMUEL M. HOSKINSON

SUBJECT: Munich Killings

As you know, all of the Israeli Olympians held hostage by the fedayeen terrorists were killed last night when West German security forces attempted to kill or capture the terrorists at an airport on the outskirts of Munich. This is by far the most dramatic and outrageous incident since fedayeen radicals hijacked five aircraft over Labor Day weekend two years ago.

Attached is a memo which you can provide the President for his use during the meeting this morning with you, Secretary Rogers and others on this incident. It stresses the operational measures we might take at this point. The hard reality, however, is that there is really very little we, or any major power, can do to rectify this situation or make sure that it will not happen again. We can attempt to focus world moral indignation and press for tighter international security measures, but we will remain vulnerable to the dedicated extremist.

This being the case, it would seem best at this point to strike a statesmanlike posture; deeply concerned but not over reacting. We will want to do everything reasonably possible to help avert similar tragedies in the future, but should not let our sense of outrage lead us into actions which could jeopardize other important interests which we have in the Middle East. We will want to identify with Israeli sorrow and bitterness, but it would not be in our interest to do this in a way that closes off our options to work with both Arabs and Israelis to produce a peace settlement.

**Memorandum From the President's Deputy Assistant for National Security Affairs (Haig) for the President's File, Washington, September 6, 1972, 8:30 a.m.**

**The President, his Assistant for National Security Affairs Kissinger, Secretary of State Rogers, and Haig discussed how to respond to the deaths of 11 Israeli athletes in Munich.**

MEMORANDUM  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRET  
September 11, 1972  
MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT'S FILES

FROM: MAJOR GENERAL ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.

SUBJECT: President's Meeting with Secretary of State Rogers, Dr. Kissinger and M/Gen. Haig

TIME AND DATE: 10:00 a.m., Wednesday, September 6, 1972

PLACE: The Oval Office

PARTICIPANTS:  
President Nixon  
Secretary of State William Rogers  
Henry A. Kissinger  
M/Gen. Alexander M. Haig, Jr.

The meeting was held for the purpose of discussing the situation in Munich which resulted in the death of 11 Israeli athletes together with Arab terrorists.

The President stated that he had had spoken to Ambassador Rabin the previous evening and found him to be completely rational. The President continued that the US must pursue a delicate line which demonstrated justified sympathy for Israel but which did not serve to encourage Israeli retaliation which could only further escalate tensions and dangers in the Middle East. The President noted that he had called Mrs. Meir from San Clemente the day before and assured her that the United States was working diligently on the terrorist problem. It now remains to outline a number of measures, practical and public, with which to deal with the problem.

Secretary Rogers noted that it was tragic that the German Government had handled the public notification of the situation so poorly with initial reports that the athletes were safe followed by a complete reversal of this news. The Department of State had formed a task force that had been working all the previous day and throughout the night on the situation. There was some indication that the Israeli Government might ask the United States Government to cancel its further participation in the Olympics. This developed earlier that morning and General Haig, Dr. Kissinger and Secretary Rogers coordinated on a position which precluded our becoming involved in this knotty issue. Nevertheless, it could come up again in the hours ahead. The Secretary noted that one of the measures which we might consider would be to direct the US flags in Washington be placed at half mast and declare a day of mourning.

The President stated that the United States should not agree to drop out of the Olympics and that Israel should remain consistent with the position it announced earlier to see the games through.

Secretary Rogers stated that all had agreed on this stand the day before since it would be a terrible slap at the Germans to precipitously withdraw. It appeared that the Germans were in deep difficulty already for their handling of the situation at the NATO airbase. Secretary Rogers stated that most nations were in deep sympathy with Israel but were they to withdraw from the games that sympathy could be reversed. An additional problem was the fact that even if the United States were to accept Israel's logic it could not control either its athletes or the head of the Olympic Committee.

The President directed that Israel be informed that we wished to continue.

Dr. Kissinger commented that it was important that the United States not permit Israel to "put the heat" on us to withdraw. The President noted that withdrawal would be the New York Times /McGovern approach

Secretary Rogers again asked about the propriety of lowering our flags and a day of mourning. The President stated that we had not done similar things when deaths occurred in Ireland or during the earthquake in Peru and we must be careful not to demonstrate a double standard. Secretary Rogers suggested that we could call for a period of silence during the funeral of the Israeli athletes. He added that the Israelis apparently do not want high-level delegations in order to avoid politicization and perhaps we should send some of our athletes such as the US swimmer who is of Jewish descent. In any event, we should abide carefully by Israel's own wishes.

Secretary Rogers stated that the Department of State is not favorably inclined towards the suggestion that we convene the Security Council on the terrorist issue. The President stated that this kind of action would butt us up against China

and the Soviet Union but if the US were to go to the Security Council condemning countries which harbor guerrillas, this would in effect support Israel while at the same time not encouraging it to take escalatory retaliatory action.

Secretary Rogers stated that a cable had been prepared to the Prime Minister outlining our disgust and sympathy. He noted that he would make a strong statement at the International Hijacking Conference being conducted at the Department of State that day. The President agreed that the message should go and that the Secretary should make the statement. He inquired what kind of a resolution we would seek should we decide to go to the United Nations.

Dr. Kissinger stated that no resolution would be likely to pass. The question is how to posture ourselves. The resolution should talk about rules of conduct of those who sponsor radicals who operate across international borders. It is probable that the Peoples' Republic of China would veto. On the other hand, this would be a statesmanlike US position. It would likely engender extensive debate and would tend to defuse Israeli emotions during the critical hours ahead. Then when the General Assembly meets the debate could continue. All this tends to control Israeli retaliatory action.

The President stated that we should now turn to the public relations aspects of the problem and following that bring Mr. Ziegler to the meeting.

Secretary Rogers again expressed opposition to the United Nations initiative. Dr. Kissinger stated that the government lawyers could develop a formulation which included something on border crossing, something on countries who harbor organizations which operate beyond their borders and in this way the US would go to the Security Council in a statesmanlike posture and solicit the views of other nations. Secretary Rogers stated that it would be impossible to get any kind of action. Dr. Kissinger stated that this was true but it would serve as a deterrent to Israeli action. Secretary Rogers stated that the Israelis would not be impressed by Security Council action and that for the moment it is important that we keep in close contact with them.

The President noted that we had been doing precisely this. He also noted that the public statements made thus far by Israel were also statesmanlike. Dr. Kissinger stated that all of this is true. Nevertheless if we do nothing it is probable that we will see strong Israeli action. Secretary Rogers urged that the President think about this before proceeding with the UN initiative.

The President stated that in his discussions last night with Ambassador Rabin he underlined the fact that despite the disadvantages of the tragedy it would bring the terrorist activity to the attention of the world. Secretary Rogers stated that another advantage of the tragedy was that it will again underline the need for an overall settlement. He noted that Dayan had made some overtures and that Egypt would probably launch some initiatives in conjunction with the General Assembly meeting this fall. This is the basic problem and only a settlement will solve it. If Dayan was actually speaking for Israel then it is important that we get the process started for another round of negotiations.

The President stated that the situation in Munich will not soften up the Israeli attitudes but will strengthen their hawks. Secretary Rogers agreed but said that this only underlined the need for seeking a solution to the Middle East situation and certainly there will be efforts in the fall to get negotiations started.

The President stated that Secretary Rogers should make a strong statement at the hijacking conference. Secretary Rogers stated that with respect to the UN initiative we should leave it open until he has an opportunity to check the Israeli view.

The President instructed the Secretary to see what kind of a game plan we could come up with for the United Nations. Secretary Rogers stated that his people were tired and he hoped that Dr. Kissinger's people would also work on this. Dr. Kissinger stated that if the decision is made to proceed in the UN it must be done quickly.

The President stated that 'we might also have some legislation for the Congress to get the Conventions for Hijacking, etc. moved. Also we should give some thought to what the Congress could do on terrorism.

The President told Secretary Rogers to consider the UN initiative seriously, since it might just serve to buy time. It serves as a visible reaction to the Israeli outcries. Secretary Rogers said that he would discuss it with Rabin although he does not think the Israelis will support it because of their anti-UN feelings. Secretary Rogers continued to the effect that feelings in Israel are very high against the Germans for three reasons: (1) because they afforded poor protection to the Israeli athletes, (2) because of the reporting of the incident, and (3) because of the trigger-happy performance of the German police.

The President commented that it was ironic that the German Government found itself in the position of protecting Israeli athletes. He stated that in summary the following actions should be undertaken:

The cable sent to Mrs. Meir.

Secretary Rogers would make a strong statement at the Hijacking Conference.

We would look into the feasibility of a UN initiative.

We would do whatever remained to be done with our own Congress with respect to pending legislation and the possibility of new legislation.

Secretary Rogers should ask Ambassador Rabin about the UN initiative, tell him that we have no illusions but that it would serve to spotlight the issue.

Secretary Rogers asked that Dr. Kissinger keep him informed if he should have any contact with the Israelis. The President told General Haig to do this should Ambassador Rabin contact the White House.

Secretary Rogers then noted as an aside that the President should give a brief speech at the IMF Conference since it was a good platform for an expression of the President's monetary policies. The President stated that Treasury Secretary Shultz was opposed on the convertibility issue but that Mr. Burns favored it. Secretary Rogers agreed that this was a problem.

Secretary Rogers recapitulated noting that he would call Ambassador Rabin, that we should continue to consider lowering our flags and that he would give the speech at the Hijacking Conference.

The President stated that he did not think the flag at half mast was a good idea. Dr. Kissinger agreed. Secretary Rogers said that we would just do this in public buildings. The President stated maybe just the White House. Dr. Kissinger again stated that he disagreed. Secretary Rogers stated that an alternative would be a moment of silence during the funeral. The President stated that it might be worth considering. Dr. Kissinger stated that it was less troublesome than lowering the flags. The President asked why not do something on a personal basis. He could go to church at the time of the funeral. This looked more spontaneous and more of an individual reaction rather than a government reaction.

Press Secretary Ziegler was then called into the Oval Office and was given the following press guidance. He should discuss the fact of the meeting, the message to the Prime Minister, and the fact that we are considering measures to include consultations with other governments on an urgent basis to see what can be done to prevent terrorist activity. The point should be made that the President, Secretary Rogers and Dr. Kissinger consulted throughout the night and that close consultation was maintained with Israel and Bonn. It should be noted that the President talked to Ambassador Rabin and that Secretary Rogers will see the Ambassador later today. The point should be made that precautionary measures have been ordered by the President to ensure the security of Israeli and other foreign personnel and facilities in the rising tensions.

**Memorandum From Samuel M. Hoskinson and Fernando Rondon of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, September 6, 1972**

**Hoskinson and Rondon recommended that action against international terrorism should not be pursued in the United Nations at this time.**

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
SECRET

MEMORANDUM FOR: DR. HENRY KISSINGER

FROM: SAMUEL M. HOSKINSON  
FERNANDO RONDON

SUBJECT: International Terrorism at the UN

This would not appear to be an ideal time to get the Security Council to take effective action against international terrorism. At a maximum, we would be seeking to (1) focus world public pressure on those governments which tacitly or directly support groups which engage in acts of international terrorism, (2) bleed Israeli reaction away from acts of military retaliation into more constructive channels, and (3) project our determination to stamp out international terrorism.

In order to achieve the purposes cited above, a Security Council resolution would be needed which:

- condemns all acts of international terrorism;
- calls for immediate action by all member states to take all necessary steps to prevent future acts of terrorism;
- demands that member states withhold support from organizations which engage in international terrorism.

Realistically, we would have to expect any resolution containing the foregoing provisions to fail. Only the US, UK, Belgium, Japan, Italy and Argentina could be counted on voting for a strong resolution. If France were persuaded to go along, we would still only have seven affirmative votes--nine are required. Panama and India would be the swing votes, with six negative votes (including possible vetoes) expected from the USSR, PRC, Yugoslavia, Somalia, Sudan and Guinea. (In the General Assembly, things would be worse for us because of Afro-Asian support for liberation movements in general).

The basic issue boils down to whether we wish to back a losing but strong resolution in the Security Council or settle for something less. If we lose:

- the terrorists may take heart by the Security Council's failure to act against them and by an unhelpful airing of Arab grievances against Israel;
- the Israelis, who might well oppose any move to the UN in the first place, would only be further embittered by an abortive effort and even more inclined to handle things their own way;
- the UN would be further exposed as an ineffectual institution.

In short, an appeal to the UN Security Council to seek a strong resolution might exacerbate rather than ease the already tense situation created by the terrorist attack on the Israeli Olympic Team. For these reasons we recommend against seeking meaningful action now on terrorism from the UN Security Council.

Agree Disagree

If, in response to public pressure, we still want to take the matter to the UN, we might instruct our UN Mission to seek a resolution specifically condemning the Munich attack acceptable to the Security Council as a whole. This would stand a better chance of getting through.

Agree Disagree

Another option would be to ask George Bush to explore urgently with UN officials and other delegations how UN action in any form might be taken against international terrorism.

Agree Disagree

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington,  
September 6, 1972**

**Rogers informed the President of the anti-terrorism initiatives he planned to  
take after the Munich Olympics massacre.**



September 6, 1972  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT -- Evening Report

1. ICAO Conference -- I addressed a legal conference of the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) at the Department of State this noon, expressing United States Government shock and sympathy with respect to the terrorist attack at the Munich Olympics. I urged the Conference to work hard to produce a draft convention which would help put an end to aerial piracy and terrorism. There is reason to hope that the Munich events, added to the publicity surrounding the conference and my appearance, may have the effect of galvanizing the conference into success-fully drafting such a convention. For example, the UK, which heretofore has opposed a convention, today put forth a positive proposal.

2. Munich tragedy stimulates legislative action -- We are taking steps to insure that the legislative implications of Munich are thoroughly understood on the Hill. I called Senator Eastland to suggest that we should move without delay on the House version of the Administration's legislation for the protection of foreign officials in the United States which passed the House this session. David Abshire and Marshall Wright called on Senator Hruska this afternoon for the same purpose. As a result, Eastland and Hruska have now agreed to call a special meeting of the Judiciary Committee tomorrow afternoon at which time the House bill will be approved with the intention of reporting it to the floor for passage on Friday.

We also discussed with Senator Hruska the need to move without delay on his air piracy bill (S. 2567) and on the implementing legislation for the Hague Convention on Hijacking, both of which are languishing in the Commerce Committee. Senator Hruska is totally cooperative, and we will be moving vigorously in the next few days to try to stimulate action in both the Senate and House Committees.

3. Congressional Reaction to the Munich Tragedy -- The Senate today passed by a vote of 83-0 S.Res. 358 which expressed the sense of the Senate on the tragic killings of the Israeli Olympic team members at the 20th Olympiad at Munich. The resolution expressed sorrow and alarm at the episode, condemned terrorism anywhere in the world and called for the U.S. to join with the world in combatting the menace by all available means. Senators Scott and Mansfield took the leadership introducing the resolution and were joined by numerous other Senators.

The House passed an identical resolution, introduced by Congressman Cellar, by a vote of 346-0.

No public criticism of Chancellor Brandt or the German Government has been expressed by members of Congress.

Consultations with Ambassadors on Measures to avoid Terrorism -We called in Ambassadors and Charges from all over the world e.g. UK, France, Germany, USSR, Canada, Latin American countries, Morocco, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, Turkey, Lebanon, Saudi Arabia, Pakistan, India, Iran, Kuwait and Jordan to convey U.S. views on the Munich tragedy and to urge them to devote renewed attention to combatting acts of terrorism. We called attention to your sending the Montreal Sabotage Convention to the Senate today and to our appeal to Congress for prompt legislation to strengthen U.S. laws against hijacking and improving protection of foreign officials. We asked for collective effort and any suggestions for a program to develop an effective counter program. Apart from deploring the Munich tragedy most Ambassadors listened intently and promised to query their governments for views and ideas. The Saudi, Lebanese and Kuwaiti Ambassadors cautiously threaded a line between not condoning the violence but not condemning the fedayeen movement outright.

William P. Rogers

**Telegram 164170 From the Department of State to Embassy in Israel,  
September 8, 1972, 2025Z**

**Rogers and Israeli Ambassador Rabin discussed how to respond to the Munich  
incident.**

Department of State TELEGRAM  
FM SECSTATE WASH DC  
TO AMEMBASSY TEL AVIV .  
INFO AMEMBASSY AMMAN  
USINT CAIRO  
AMEMBASSYBEIRUT AMEMBASSYBONN AMEMBASSYJIDDA AMEMBASSYKUWAIT AMEMBASSYLONDON  
AMEMBASSYMOSCOW  
AMEMBASSY PARIS .  
AMEMBASSY TRIPOLI USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
STATE, 164170

SUBJECT: MUNICH INCIDENT: SECRETARY-RABIN CONVERSATION SEPT 6

1. SECRETARY AND ISRAELI AMBASSADOR RABIN MET SEPTEMBER 6 TO DISCUSS ASPECTS OF MUNICH INCIDENT. ALSO PRESENT WERE MINISTER DEAN, POLITICAL COUNSELOR RAVIV, AMBASSADOR BARBOUR, DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY ATHERTON, AND COUNTRY DIRECTOR STACKHOUSE. SUMMARY OF CONVERSATION TRANSMITTED BY REFTEL.

2. SECRETARY OPENED CONVERSATION WITH EXPRESSIONS OF SHOCK AND SORROW WE FELT AT MUNICH INCIDENT. RABIN EXPRESSED GRATITUDE. HE SAID HE WOULD FIRST LIKE TO GIVE REACTION TO IDEA THAT TERRORIST PROBLEM MIGHT BE TAKEN TO SECURITY COUNCIL. FOREIGN MINISTER EBAN APPRECIATED DEEPLY U.S. EFFORTS TO BE HELPFUL BUT HE DID HAVE RESERVATIONS RE USING SECURITY COUNCIL AS MEANS TO ACHIEVE GOALS. REASONS FOREIGN MINISTER BELIEVED SC MEETING WOULD NOT BE HELPFUL WERE: (1) THE MAIN REASON IS THAT PRESIDENT OF SC IS REPRESENTATIVE OF PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINA. ISRAEL DID NOT BELIEVE IT COULD HAVE ANY DOUBTS RE HIS ATTITUDE AND UNWILLINGNESS TO COOPERATE IN SC, (2) IN 20 YEARS IN WHICH ISRAEL HAD BEEN IN UN, IT KNEW OF NO RESOLUTIONS PASSED BY SC WHEN ARABS WERE IN OPPOSITION. ISRAEL DID NOT BELIEVE IT HAD ANY REASON TO HOPE THAT THIS WOULD CHANGE. (3) DEMONSTRABLE INCAPACITY OF SC TO DO ANYTHING EFFECTIVE CREATES QUOTE DEEP DEPRESSION UNQUOTE IN ISRAEL. AN ATTEMPT AND THEN A FAILURE ENCOURAGES THOSE IT IS MEANT TO CONDEMN. (4) ISRAEL BELIEVED THAT UN PRESTIGE, EVEN IN PUBLIC RELATIONS MATTERS, HAD REACHED SUCH LOW EBB THAT FOR U.S. TO TURN TO IT WOULD GIVE IT UNJUSTIFIED INCREASE IN PRESTIGE.

3. SECRETARY THANKED RABIN FOR QUICK RESPONSE. AS RABIN KNEW SECRETARY HAD SHARED FOREIGN MINISTER'S RESERVATION RE RESORT TO SC. USG, HOWEVER, WAS ANXIOUS BRING ABOUT EFFECTIVE ACTION AND FELT ALL POSSIBLE ALTERNATIVES SHOULD BE CONSIDERED. SECRETARY WANTED GOI TO KNOW THAT EVEN THOUGH WE HAD HAD RESERVATIONS RE FEASIBLE UN ACTION, WE WERE PREPARED PROCEED ALONG THESE LINES IF ISRAEL THOUGHT IT USEFUL. SECRETARY NOTED HE HAD MADE STATEMENT BEFORE COMMITTEE MEETING IN WASHINGTON (LEGAL SUBCOMMITTEE, ICAO) TO DEVISE MEANS TO END HIJACKING. THIS STATEMENT MIGHT BE HELPFUL IN BRINGING ABOUT SOME ACTION. WE OUGHT TO BE THINKING ABOUT WHAT ELSE MIGHT BE DONE IN CIRCUMSTANCES. WE WERE TALKING WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS, INCLUDING ARAB GOVERNMENTS GIVING FINANCIAL SUPPORT TO TERRORISTS. THIS COULD BE USEFUL.

4. RABIN SAID THAT GOI ASKED THAT USG TAKE FOLLOWING ACTIONS: 1) TALK TO THOSE ARAB COUNTRIES BELIEVED TO SUPPORT ARAB TERRORISTS. GOI BELIEVED THERE WAS RELATION BETWEEN BLACK SEPTEMBER GROUP. AND FATAH. SECRETARY AND ATHERTON INTERJECTED THAT WE HAD INFORMATION TO SAME EFFECT. RABIN NOTED THE LEBANESE PRIME MINISTER HAD ADMITTED INDIRECTLY THERE WAS SUCH A LINK. (2) U.S. COULD COME OUT IN CLEAR WAY AND EXPLAIN TO CAIRO, BEIRUT AND DAMASCUS THAT AS LONG AS THEY OFFERED THEIR TERRITORY AS REFUGE FOR GROUPS ACTING AGAINST ISRAEL, OR AS STAGING AREAS FOR ACTIONS IN OTHER COUNTRIES, THEY WOULD HAVE TO BEAR RESPONSIBILITY. (3) USG COULD TAKE ACTION BY TALKING WITH WESTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES TO PERSUADE THEM TO CARRY OUT, BY MORE EFFECTIVE MEANS, ACTIONS AGAINST ARAB ORGANIZATIONS LINKED TO TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS.

5. SECRETARY SAID WE WERE TALKING TO EUROPEAN COUNTRIES ALREADY. RABIN COMMENTED THAT THERE WERE SPECIFIC ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN EUROPE AND HE NOTED THAT EVEN IN NEW YORK, PLO HAD REPS. RABIN SAID THAT THESE ORGANIZATIONS MUST BE MADE TO KNOW THEY COULD NOT OPERATE FREELY.

6. RABIN SAID THAT ANOTHER WAY THAT MIGHT BE EMPLOYED TO IMPROVE SECURITY WOULD BE FOR U.S. TO ADVISE EUROPEAN COUNTRIES RE SECURITY MATTERS. IT WOULD ALSO BE HELPFUL IF AT WORKING

LEVEL MEANS COULD BE DEvised FOR MORE PRACTICAL EXCHANGE OF VIEWS ABOUT WHAT COULD BE DONE RE HIJACKING AND OTHER TERRORIST ACTS.

7. SECRETARY SAID THAT WAS GOOD IDEA AND WE OUGHT TO DO IT. HE NOTED THAT IN LAST 24 HOURS, USG WORKING INTENSIVELY WITH LOCAL AUTHORITIES, HAD ENSURED INCREASED SECURITY FOR ISRAELIS IN U.S. ATHERTON SAID THAT NEA, IN RESPONSE TO REQUEST FROM MINISTER DEAN TO COUNTRY DIRECTOR STACKHOUSE THAT MORNING, HAD FORWARDED TO DEP ASST SEC GENTILE RECOMMENDATIONS DESIGNED TO LEAD TO IMPROVED SECURITY OF ISRAELI PERSONNEL AND INSTALLATIONS IN U.S. SECRETARY REMARKED THAT PRESIDENT'S COMMENTS TO MRS. MEIR RE OUR RESOLVE TO ASSURE ISRAELI SECURITY IN U.S. WOULD BE HELPFUL IN OBTAINING RESOURCES NECESSARY AT LOCAL AND NATIONAL LEVELS. SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT U.S. WANTED HAVE CLOSE WORKING RELATIONS WITH ISRAEL ON THIS MATTER TO OBTAIN QUICK ACTION IF NECESSARY AND TO KNOW WHAT EACH IS DOING ON CONTINUING BASIS. SECRETARY NOTED THAT WE COULD NOT DO EVERYTHING AT ONCE. BUT WE SHOULD EXCHANGE VIEWS. THERE WERE, AS ISRAEL KNEW, PROBLEMS DERIVING FROM DIVISION OF FEDERAL AND LOCAL AUTHORITIES. SECRETARY OFFERED TO TRY TO BE OF HELP IN RESOLVING SUCH PROBLEMS.

8. RABIN SAID THAT ISRAEL'S. PROBLEMS, OF COURSE, WERE NOT ONLY THOSE ARISING IN U.S. THERE WAS NEED TO DO ALL NECESSARY TO ENCOURAGE BETTER CLIMATE GENERALLY. THERE WAS NEED TO MAKE PROVISION OF SECURITY OF ISRAELIS TRAVELING IN U.S. (HE MENTIONED APPROACHING VISIT OF 100 MAN ISRAELI PHILHARMONIC), BUT THERE WAS NEED AS WELL TO COOPERATE IN POLITICAL FIELD SO AS TO INCREASE PRESSURE AND PRVENT REPETITION OF ATROCITIES.

9. SECRETARY ROGERS AGREED NOW WAS TIME TO UNDERTAKE SUCH ACTIONS. HE AGAIN NOTED USG HAD MAD MANY DIPLOMATIC CONTACTS. SEPT 6: ALL ASSISTANT SECRETARIES RESPONSIBLE FOR GEOGRAPHIC AREAS HAD BEEN INVOLVED. PART OF JOB, HE RECOGNIZED, WAS TO KEEP AMBASSADOR RABIN ADVISED OF WHAT WE WERE DOING. COUNTRIES, OF COURSE, MIGHT BE ABLE TO HELP. SECRETARY ENCOURAGED RABIN TO PASS ANY SUGGESTIONS TO ATHERTON.

10. RABIN THEN TURNED TO QUESTION OF CANCELLATION OF OLYMPIC GAMES. HE DESCRIBED GOI POSITION CAREFULLY: ISRAELI VIEW IN VIEW OF WHAT HAD HAPPENED AT OLYMPIC GAMES WAS THAT GAMES SHOULD NOT CONTINUE. GOI DID NOT WANT TO TURN AND PRESENT REQUEST TO OTHERS TO WITHDRAW FROM OLYMPIC GAMES BUT IF U.S. TEAM WOULD HAVE CUT ITS PRESENCE THERE, ISRAEL WOULD HAVE WELCOMED THIS. THEREFORE, THIS WAS WAY ISRAEL WAS PUTTING IT OFFICIALLY. ALL OTHER FORMULATIONS OF ISRAELI POSITION ON THIS MATTER USG MIGHT HAVE HEARD WERE IRRELEVANT.

11. SECRETARY SAID HE UNDERSTOOD. RABIN SAID HE DID NOT BELIEVE IT WAS ADVISABLE TO ELABORATE. WHAT RABIN WAS EXPRESSING WAS GOI FEELING RATHER THAN FIRM OPERATIONAL REQUEST.

12. RABIN ASKED WHAT USG HAD HEARD RE REACTION TO MUNICH INCIDENT IN ARAB COUNTRIES. HOW DID USG ANALYZE IT? ATHERTON SAID IT WAS HARD TO GENERALIZE. A COMMON THEME, HOWEVER, SEEMED TO BE GENERAL SENSE OF FEELING OF DISCOMFITURE AND UNEASINESS AND RELUCTANCE OF GOVERNMENTS TO SPEAK OUT OFFICIALLY EITHER WAY OR EVEN TO GIVE PRESS GUIDELINES. WE DID NOT KNOW IF THIS SITUATION WOULD HOLD. ATHERTON SAID WE WERE GETTING PRIVATE ARAB STATEMENTS OF DISAPPROVAL BUT NONE WERE READY TO COME OUT PUBLICLY IN THIS SENSE. ATHERTON SAID ONLY CLEAR CRITICAL ARAB STATEMENT WAS FROM KING HUSSEIN. LEBANESE STATEMENT WAS LESS STRONG BUT NOT BAD FOR LEBANON: IT OPENED WITH EXPRESSION OF REGRET BUT THEN MADE STATEMENTS STRESSING PALESTINIAN DESPAIR AND TRYING EXPLAIN PALESTINIAN MOTIVES.

13. SECRETARY COMMENTED ON IDIOTIC AND INSANE NATURE O ATROCITY AT MUNICH. GAMES HAD BEEN GOING SO WELL AND NOW ONE RESULT WAS THAT ARAB CAUSE IN EYES OF WORLD HAD SUFFERED SETBACK. PERHAPS ONE DAY THOSE WHO DIED WOULD BE CONSIDERED MARTYRS IN CAUSE OF PEACE.

14. RABIN SAID NOTION HE SENSED IN SOME MEDIA COMMENT WAS THAT MUNICH INCIDENT WOULD STIMULATE EFFORTS FOR PEACE. ISRAEL BELIEVED THERE WAS NEED FOR PEACE BUT ASSUMPTION THAT ATROCITIES SHOULD BRING NEW POLITICAL INITIATIVES ONLY PLAYS INTO HAND OF THOSE WHO COMMIT ATROCITIES. SECRETARY INTERJECTED, POINT WE WERE MAKING TO DIPLOMATS WAS THAT MUNICH INCIDENT WAS SETBACK TO PROSPECTS OF PEACE. RABIN SAID THAT AFTER EGYPTIAN EXPULSION OF RUSSIANS THERE SEEMED TO BE SENSE OF RELAXATION AND BROADENING OF CHANCES FOR PEACE.

NOW AFTER MUNICH, THINGS WERE TAKEN BACK TO WHERE THEY WERE. RABIN SAID THAT FEELING IN ISRAEL WAS IF THERE WERE GROUPS LIKE THIS IN ARAB WORLD, WHO COULD GUARANTEE TO ISRAEL ONCE THERE WAS POLITICAL SETTLEMENT, THAT ISRAEL WOULD NOT BE IN WORSE POSITION? AT PRESENT ARAB OPTIONS WERE LIMITED BECAUSE OF MILITARY POSITIONS ISRAEL HELD BUT IMAGINE IF THERE WERE TERRORIST INCIDENTS LIKE THIS AFTER AN INTERIM AGREEMENT, WHAT WOULD HAPPEN? PEOPLE WOULD TURN TO EACH OTHER AND ASK, WHAT LESSONS CAN WE DRAW? THIS WAS SETBACK TO HOPES AROUSED BY RUSSIAN PULL OUT THAT MORE OPTIONS MIGHT BE OPENED UP.

15. SECRETARY SAID IT WAS OBVIOUS THIS WAS NOT TIME TO MAKE DEFINITIVE ANALYSIS BECAUSE WE WERE TOO CLOSE TO EVENTS. IN ANY EVENT, ONE COULD NOT TALK OF PEACE INITIATIVES NOW. WE WOULD NOT DO IT. IN THIS CASE, PEOPLE WOULD SAY MUNICH IS WAY TO DO IT. SECRETARY HOPED WORLD REACTION WOULD CAUSE ARAB GOVERNMENT TO SAY TO THEIR PEOPLES WORLD OPINION WAS OPPOSED TO TERRORISM. SECRETARY NOTED MUNICH WOULD LIKELY WEAKEN SADAT'S HAND IN UN. WE HOPED MUNICH WOULD NOT BE SETBACK TO CAUSE OF PEACE IN LONG RUN AND THAT, IN FACT, IT WOULD HELP. BUT RABIN MIGHT BE RIGHT. RABIN SAID ISRAEL WOULD BE CAREFUL NOT TO TALK ABOUT NEW INITIATIVES.

16. AFTER BRIEF EXCHANGE REGARDING FUNERAL ARRANGEMENTS IN ISRAEL, THERE WAS FURTHER DISCUSSION OF ADVANTAGES FOR TERRORISTS IN CANCELLATION OF GAMES. AMBASSADOR BARBOUR OBSERVED GAMES IN FACT WERE INNOCENT PARTY IN THIS ATROCITY. SECRETARY NOTED THAT TERRORISTS MIGHT CALL CANCELLATION OF GAMES A VICTORY. DEAN SAID THAT ALMOST ANYTHING THAT MIGHT BE DONE WOULD BE EXPLOITED BY THEM. NOW TERRORIST SUPPORTERS WERE CLAIMING THAT FACT GAMES WERE NOT STOPPED MEANT WORLD WAS NOT ON SIDE OF ISRAEL.

17. SECRETARY ASKED IF RABIN KNEW WHERE TERRORISTS HAD BEEN BASED. RABIN REPLIED IN NEGATIVE, COMMENTING THIS WAS PROBLEM IN WHICH SECURITY SERVICES COULD HAVE DONE BETTER. RABIN SAID HE DID NOT HAVE ANY REAL REPORT ON INCIDENT. HE NOTED PRIME MINISTER'S STATEMENT OF APPRECIATION THAT FRG HAD TAKEN ALL MEASURES TO CONTROL SITUATION, INCLUDING USE OF FORCE. SECRETARY REMARKED THAT PRESIDENT AWARE OF THIS STATEMENT AND REGARDED IT AS STATESMANLIKE.

18. IT WAS AGREED THAT IN HIS COMMENTS TO PRESS, RABIN WOULD, IF ASKED, EXPRESS GOI POSITION AS HE HAD PUT IT TO SECRETARY RE ENDING OF GAMES, WOULD NOTE DISCUSSION HAD BEEN ABOUT MEASURES TO INCREASE SECURITY AND SAY THAT BOTH SIDES AGREED STAY IN CLOSE TOUCH AND ENCOURAGE OTHERS TO ENHANCE SECURITY PRECAUTIONS.

19. DECLASSIFICATION: GDS. ROGERS

**Circular Telegram 164986 From the Department of State of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom and Other Posts, Washington, September 9, 1972, 2334Z**

**In a personal message to ambassadors, Rogers said that Nixon had charged him with the responsibility to mobilize the international community to take action to combat terrorism and directed them to approach host governments in an attempt to persuade the Arabs to disassociate themselves from terrorists.**

1. THE PRESIDENT HAS CHARGED ME WITH RESPONSIBILITY FOR U.S. EFFORTS TO MOBILIZE THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY TO TAKE ACTION TO COMBAT TERRORISM IN THE WAKE OF THE MUNICH TRAGEDY. WE BELIEVE THAT AS PART OF OUR EFFORTS, IT WOULD BE WORTHWHILE TO TRY TO GET ARAB STATES WHICH IMPLICITLY OR EXPLICITLY CONDONE TERRORISM TO SEE THEMSELVES AS OTHERS SEE THEM' WE ARE ATTEMPTING TO CONVEY OUR VIEWS ON THIS SCORE TO ARAB STATES WITH WHICH WE HAVE INFLUENCE. INASMUCH AS SUCH U.S. EFFORTS ARE HAMPERED, HOWEVER, BY ARAB PERCEPTION OF U.S. AS A SUPPORTER OF ISRAEL, WE BELIEVE OTHER CAPITALS, SUCH AS ACTION ADDRESSEES, WHICH WE SEE AS SHARING OUR AIM OF COMBATTING TERRORISM, MAY BE IN BETTER POSITION THAN WE TO CONVINCE ARAB FRIENDS THAT CONDONING OR MAINTAINING AMBIVALENT ATTITUDE TOWARD TERRORISM IS AGAINST ARABS' BEST INTERESTS.

2. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE APPROACH HOST GOVERNMENTS AT HIGHEST APPROPRIATE LEVEL FOR PURPOSE OF SUGGESTING THAT THESE GOVERNMENTS TRY TO FIND WAYS TO GET ACROSS TO ARABS THE NEGATIVE EFFECTS THAT SUPPORT OF OR FAILURE TO DISASSOCIATE SELVES FROM TERRORISM HAVE ON ARAB IMAGE AND REAL INTERESTS. IN ADDITION TO EXPLAINING PURPOSE OF THIS EXERCISE ALONG ABOVE LINES, YOU MAY PRESENT FOLLOWING ARGUMENTS FOR POSSIBLE USE BY HOST GOVERNMENTS IN MAKING CASE AGAINST TERRORISM WITH ARABS. (A) MUNICH TRAGEDY HAS ONCE AGAIN BROUGHT HOME LESSON THAT TERRORISM WORKS AGAINST BEST ARAB INTERESTS. IN OUR JUDGMENT, ARAB IMAGE IN WORLD PUBLIC OPINION, NOT JUST AMERICAN OPINION, HAS BEEN BADLY TARNISHED. DESPITE FACT THAT MOST RESPONSIBLE ARABS PRIVATELY RECOGNIZE NEGATIVE IMPACT OF TERRORISM ON ARAB INTERESTS, THEIR FAILURE, BY AND LARGE, TO DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM TERRORIST ACTS PLACES EVEN THESE RESPONSIBLE ELEMENTS IN ROLE OF SUPPORTERS OF TERRORISM IN EYES OF WORLD. POSITION TAKEN BY SOME ARAB GOVERNMENTS THAT THEY HAVE NO CONNECTION WITH TERRORIST ACTS IS SIMPLY NOT CREDIBLE TO INTERNATIONAL OPINION, INASMUCH AS TERRORISTS CARRY ARAB PASSPORTS, OPERATE FROM ARAB COUNTRIES, BROADCAST AND PRINT THEIR VIEWS FROM ARAB CAPITALS, ETC. MOREOVER, FAILURE TO EXERT MORE CONTROL RENDERS POLICIES OF ARAB GOVERNMENTS PRISONER TO SITUATION CREATED BY TERRORISTS.

(B) PROSPECTS FOR JUST AND LASTING MIDDLE EAST PEACE HAVE BEEN SERIOUSLY UNDERMINED BY TERRORISM. SUCH ACTS AS MUNICH MURDERS HAVE IN FACT MARKEDLY RAISED TENSIONS IN MIDDLE EAST. AS LONG AS TERRORIST WAR IS INFLICTED ON ISRAEL, ISRAELIS, AS MUCH AS WE MAY WISH IT WERE OTHERWISE, WILL INEVITABLY WAGE COUNTER-WAR, AS WITNESS RECENT RETALIATORY RAIDS AGAINST FEDAYEEN INSTALLATIONS IN LEBANON AND SYRIA. AREA SITUATION CAN QUICKLY BECOME VERY DANGEROUS UNDER SUCH CIRCUMSTANCES. FURTHERMORE, ARAB DIPLOMATIC EFFORTS AT UN AND IN OTHER INTERNATIONAL FORUMS IN FAVOR OF PEACEFUL RESOLUTION OF ARAB ISRAELI CONFLICT LOSE CREDIBILITY WHEN ARABS AT SAME TIME ARE SEEN AS PROMOTING, TACITLY OR EXPLICITLY, INDISCRIMINATE VIOLENCE.

(C) WHILE WE RECOGNIZE SOME ARAB GOVERNMENTS WILL CONTINUE TO FEEL THEY CANNOT CONDEMN TERRORISTS PUBLICLY, WE WOULD HOPE THEY COULD AT LEAST DISASSOCIATE THEMSELVES FROM THE TERRORISTS BY DENYING LATTER MEANS AND OPPORTUNITIES OF OPERATING FROM TERRITORY OF ARAB STATES IN QUESTION. ALTHOUGH DECISION TO DO SO MIGHT INVOLVE STRAINS, NET RESULT WOULD WORK GREATLY TO ARAB ADVANTAGE BY IMPROVING ARAB PUBLIC IMAGE, INCREASING CHANCES FOR ULTIMATE PEACE, AND ENHANCING SECURITY OF ARAB STATES.

3. YOU SHOULD POINT OUT BLACK SEPTEMBER ORGANIZATION (BSO) HAS CLAIMED CREDIT NOT ONLY FOR MUNICH MASSACRE BUT ALSO FOR MURDER OF JORDANIAN PRIME MINISTER WASFI TELL IN CAIRO IN NOVEMBER 1971, ATTEMPTED MURDER OF JORDANIAN AMBASSADOR TO U.K. ZAID RIFAI IN DECEMBER 1971, HIJACKING OF SABENA JETLINER TO TEL AVIV IN MAY 1972, AND BLOWING UP OF OIL STORAGE TANKS IN TRIESTE IN AUGUST 1972. OUR INFORMATION INDICATES THAT BSO HAS CLANDESTINE LINKS WITH FATAH. YASIR ARAFAT, HEAD OF PALESTINE LIBERATION ORGANIZATION (THE OVERALL UMBRELLA ORGANIZATION) AND FATAH (MAIN COMPONENT OF PLO), WAS QUOTED AFTER MUNICH MASSACRE AS EMPHASIZING UNITY OF ALL FEDAYEEN ACTION, THUS LENDING CREDENCE TO INDICATIONS OF LINKAGE OF BSO TO FATAH. IT IS THUS NOT CREDIBLE TO MAKE DISTINCTION, AS TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS AND CERTAIN ARAB GOVERNMENTS SOMETIMES TRY TO DO, BETWEEN "RESPECTABLE" FEDAYEEN ORGANIZATIONS AND THOSE ENGAGING IN INDISCRIMINATE TERRORISM. WE THEREFORE HOPE THAT GOVERNMENTS WILL EXPRESS PUBLICLY THEIR CONDEMNATION NOT ONLY OF BSO BUT OF FEDAYEEN TERRORISM IN GENERAL AND AT THE SAME TIME CALL PUBLICLY ON STATES HARBORING OR SUPPORTING TERRORISTS TO CEASE THIS SUPPORT. YOU SHOULD ALSO POINT OUT THAT SILENCE ON PART OF GOVERNMENTS WOULD CONTRIBUTE TO PERPETUATION OF MYTH THAT THERE IS NO CONNECTION BETWEEN "RESPECTABLE" FEDAYEEN AND THOSE PRACTICING TERRORISM.

4. DECLASSIFICATION: GDS. YY

ADDITIONAL ACTION ADDRESSEES:

SOFIA, WARSAW, STOCKHOLM, BERN, DJAKARTA, KUALA LUMPUR, RABAT, TUNIS, ANKARA, ATHENS,  
KHARTOUM, KINSHASA, DAKAR, LUSAKA, DAR ES SALAAM, NEW DELHI, TEHRAN, PANAMA CITY, BUENOS  
AIRES, MEXICO CITY, BRASILIA, CARACAS, BOGOTA, LIMA, ASUNCION, GEORGETOWN, KINGSTON, PORT OF  
SPAIN, JERUSALEM



**Telegram 167911 From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations, September 14, 1972, 1941Z**

**Ambassador Bush was directed to transmit a letter to Secretary-General Waldheim from Secretary Rogers expressing continued U.S. interest in the problem of terrorism.**

9/14/72  
IMMEDIATE  
USUN NEW YORK  
FOR BUSH

L. [SIC] YOU ARE REQUESTED TO TRANSMIT THE FOLLOWING LETTER FROM SECRETARY ROGERS TO SECRETARY GENERAL WALDHEIM. ITS PRINCIPAL PURPOSE IS TO SHOW THE CONTINUING U.S. INTEREST IN THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISM AND OUR INTENTION TO PLAY A CONSTRUCTIVE ROLE WITHIN THE CONTEXT OF THE WALDHEIM ITEM. WE WOULD LIKE VERY MUCH FOR THIS LETTER TO BE MADE PUBLIC BY YOU. HOWEVER, WE ARE AWARE OF THE CONSIDERATIONS THAT YOU HAVE OUTLINED, INCLUDING WALDHEIM'S OWN VIEWS, WHICH MIGHT MAKE IT UNDESIRABLE FOR THIS LETTER TO BE MADE PUBLIC. THEREFORE, YOU SHOULD ASK WALDHEIM, EMPHASIZING HOWEVER OUR PREFERENCE FOR MAKING THE LETTER PUBLIC. IF, OF COURSE, HE HAS STRONG OBJECTIONS, THEN LETTER WOULD REMAIN IN THE PRIVATE DOMAIN AND WE WOULD DEFER TO HIS VIEWS. HOWEVER, WE WOULD WANT TO BE SURE THAT HE FEELS STRONGLY ON THIS MATTER BECAUSE IF WALDHEIM IS MORE OR LESS RELAXED AND PUTS HIS VIEWS MORE OR LESS IN TERMS OF QTE PREFERENCE UNQTE, OUR PREFERENCE IS THAT IT BE MADE PUBLIC.

2. QTE: DEAR MR. SECRETARY GENERAL: THE UNITED STATES WELCOMES YOUR INITIATIVE IN REQUESTING THE INCLUSION IN THE AGENDA OF THE 27TH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY OF AN ITEM OF AN IMPORTANT AND URGENT CHARACTER ENTITLED "MEASURES TO PREVENT TERRORISM AND OTHER FORMS OF VIOLENCE WHICH ENDANGER OR TAKE INNOCENT HUMAN LIVES OR JEOPARDIZE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS." THE TRAGIC SPREAD OF TERRORIST VIOLENCE MOST RECENTLY EVIDENCED BY THE CRIMINAL ATTACKS AT THE OLYMPIC GAMES IN MUNICH CAN ONLY BE HALTED IF ALL MEMBERS OF THE UNITED NATIONS TAKE EFFECTIVE ACTION TO FULFILL THEIR OBLIGATIONS UNDER INTERNATIONAL LAW TO PREVENT THEIR TERRITORY FROM BEING USED BY TERRORIST GROUPS TO ORGANIZE AND PLAN VIOLENT ACTS AGAINST OTHER STATES OR THEIR NATIONALS. INTERNATIONAL LAW HAS LONG RECOGNIZED AN OBLIGATION OF STATES NOT TO ASSIST, FINANCE OR TOLERATE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARD THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME OF ANOTHER STATE OR TOWARD FOMENTING CIVIL STRIFE IN ANOTHER STATE. MOST RECENTLY, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY DECLARED IN THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS (G.A. RES. 2625(XXV)), ADOPTED ON OCTOBER 24, 1970 THAT:

'EVERY STATE HAS THE DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM ORGANIZING, INSTIGATING, ASSISTING OR PARTICIPATING IN ACTS OF CIVIL STRIFE OR TERRORIST ACTS IN ANOTHER STATE OR ACQUIESCING IN ORGANIZED ACTIVITIES WITHIN ITS TERRITORY DIRECTED TOWARDS THE COMMISSION OF SUCH ACTS, WHEN THE ACTS REFERRED TO...INVOLVE A THREAT OR USE OF FORCE....

'ALSO, NO STATE SHALL ORGANIZE, ASSIST, FOMENT, FINANCE, INCITE OR TOLERATE SUBVERSIVE, TERRORIST OR ARMED ACTIVITIES DIRECTED TOWARDS THE VIOLENT OVERTHROW OF THE REGIME OF ANOTHER STATE, OR INTERFERE IN CIVIL STRIFE IN ANOTHER STATE.'

THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY'S UNANIMOUS REAFFIRMATION OF THESE LEGAL PRINCIPLES CONSTITUTES AN IMPORTANT STATEMENT OF THE CHARTER OBLIGATIONS OF MEMBER STATES. FULL IMPLEMENTATION OF THESE PRINCIPLES BY ALL MEMBERS IS VITAL FOR THE MAINTENANCE OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY AND IN PROMOTING AND ENCOURAGING RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS.

IT IS ALSO IMPORTANT THAT STATES TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO APPREHEND AND PUNISH INDIVIDUALS WHO HAVE COMMITTED ACTS OF TERRORISM AGAINST INNOCENT PERSONS. AS AN IMMEDIATE FIRST STEP THE UNITED STATES HOPES THAT AS MANY GOVERNMENTS AS POSSIBLE WILL BECOME PARTIES TO EXISTING CONVENTIONS DEALING WITH CRIMES AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION AND WILL EXPEDITE EFFORTS TO ENFORCE THE INTER-NATIONALLY ENDORSED PRINCIPLES OF THESE CONVENTIONS. SIMILARLY, THE UNITED STATES BELIEVES THAT THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY SHOULD GIVE PRIORITY ATTENTION TO THE DRAFT ARTICLES PREPARED BY THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION ON THE PREVENTION AND PUNISHMENT OF CRIMES AGAINST DIPLOMATIC AGENTS AND OTHER INTERNATIONALLY PROTECTED PERSONS WITH A VIEW TO THE ADOPTION OF A NEW INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THIS SUBJECT AT THE EARLIEST POSSIBLE TIME.

THE UNITED NATIONS CAN PERFORM A GREAT SERVICE BY RECOMMENDING MEASURES TO FULLY IMPLEMENT EXISTING INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST INNOCENT PERSONS

AND BY DEVELOPING EFFECTIVE MEASURES FOR THE PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS AGAINST TERRORIST VIOLENCE.

AGAIN, MR. SECRETARY GENERAL MAY I ASSURE YOU OF OUR DESIRE TO COOPERATE FULLY WITH YOU IN YOUR VERY TIMELY AND CONSTRUCTIVE INITIATIVE.

SINCERELY, WILLIAM P. ROGERS UNQTE

**Telegram 169556 From the Department of State to the Mission at the United Nations, September 15, 1972, 2354Z**

**The Department discussed its strategy on handling terrorism issues at the UN General Assembly.**

9/15/72

ROUTINE USUN NEW YORK

ROUTINE ADDIS ABABA, ANKARA, ATHENS, BONN, BRUSSELS, EC BRUSSELS, COPENHAGEN, LISBON, LONDON, LUXEMBOURG, OSLO

SUBJECT: HANDLING OF TERRORISM IN UNGA

REF: USUN 3167 AND 3256

1. DEPT HAS NOT REACHED FINAL POSITION ON CONTENT OF RES WE HOPE TO EMERGE FROM UNGA DEBATE ON TERRORISM BUT IN GENERAL WE PLAN FOR RES TO FOCUS ON AS CONCRETE STEPS AS ARE FEASIBLE, SUCH AS URGING RATIFICATION OF THREE CONVENTIONS ON CIVIL AVIATION SAFETY, COOPERATION IN DRAFTING OF ENFORCEMENT CONVENTION UNDERPINNING THOSE CONVENTIONS, CALLING FOR STATES NOT TO ENCOURAGE OR GIVE SANCTUARY TO TERRORISTS BUT TO TAKE NECESSARY MEASURES TO DETER OR PUNISH THEM. WE HAVE GIVEN EXTENSIVE CONSIDERATION TO PROSPECT OF CONVENTION ON TERRORISM BUT HAVE NOT YET REACHED FIRM CONCLUSION ON HOW THIS ASPECT SHOULD BE HANDLED.

2. WE FULLY SHARE SYG'S DESIRE TO TAKE ADVANTAGE OF PRESENT INTERNATIONAL MOOD DEPLORING RECENT TERRORIST ACTS. WE BELIEVE THAT WE MUST DO ALL POSSIBLE TO BUILD MOMENTUM WITHIN ASSEMBLY TO TRANSLATE THIS GENERAL ATTITUDE INTO SPECIFIC DESIRABLE ACTIONS. IN OUR VIEW BEST WAY TO STIMULATE DELEGATES TO A WILL TO ACT IS TO AIR PROBLEM IN ALL ITS ASPECTS IN COURSE OF GENERAL DEBATE AND TO OBTAIN MAXIMUM ATTENTION TO SUBJECT AT VERY OPENING OF UNGA. SECRETARY'S SPEECH WILL BE DIRECTED TOWARD THIS PURPOSE AND AS YOU KNOW WE ARE URGING OTHER FOREIGN MINISTERS AND REPRESENTATIVES TO HIGHLIGHT PROBLEM OF TERRORISM AND CALL FOR ASSEMBLY ACTION TO COPE WITH IT. INITIAL INDICATIONS ARE THAT NUMBER OF OTHER SPEAKERS IN GENERAL DEBATE WILL BE DOING SO. FOLLOWING THIS FULL AIRING IN GENERAL DEBATE WE SEE ADVANTAGE IN GENERAL COMMITTEE HAVING REFERRED ITEM DIRECTLY TO SIXTH COMMITTEE FOR ACTION. WE WOULD NOT SEE ADVANTAGE IN HAVING PLENARY TAKE UP SUBSTANCE OF ISSUE PRIOR TO COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION, AS LENGTHY DEBATE IN THAT FORUM WOULD BE MOST LIKELY TO DELAY CONSIDERATION OF SUBSTANCE AND DO LITTLE IF ANYTHING NOT ACCOMPLISHED IN GENERAL DEBATE TO IMPROVE CHANCE OF OBTAINING OPTIMUM RESOLUTION.

3. IN ADDITION WE WISH TO HAVE SIXTH COMMITTEE ACT AS EXPEDITIOUSLY AS POSSIBLE ON REPORT OF ILC WHICH CONTAINS ILC DRAFT ARTICLES ON PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS, WHICH SCHEDULED TO BE FIRST ITEM ON AGENDA. THESE ARTICLES ARE IN RELATIVELY GOOD SHAPE AND CONSTITUTE SIGNIFICANT SUBSTANTIVE STEP FORWARD IN MEASURES AGAINST BROAD PROBLEM OF TERRORISM. HOWEVER, WE DO NOT WISH TWO ITEMS TO BE INTERMINGLED AS ILC REPORT STANDS MUCH BETTER CHANCE OF QUICK POSITIVE ACTION IF EXPLICIT CONNECTION BETWEEN TWO ISSUES IS AVOIDED. WE HOPE THAT DRAFT ARTICLES ON PROTECTION OF DIPLOMATS WILL LEAD TO EARLIEST POSSIBLE CONVENTION AND HOPE FOR GA RESOLUTION WHICH WOULD CONVENE A CONFERENCE PRIOR TO 28TH UNGA WITH STATES REQUESTED TO SUBMIT THEIR WRITTEN OBSERVATIONS ON DRAFT ARTICLES PRIOR TO CONFERENCE. USUN IS REQUESTED TO INQUIRE OF SECRETARIAT IF DATES ARE AVAILABLE FOR SCHEDULING THREE WEEK CONFERENCE. AN EARLY WEO MEETING TO CONSIDER BEST TACTICS ON THIS ITEM WOULD SEEM DESIRABLE.

4. YOU SHOULD SEEK EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY TO CONVEY ABOVE VIEWS TO SYG STRESSING OUR CONVICTION THAT ALLOCATION OF ITEM ON TERRORISM TO PLENARY PRIOR TO SIXTH COMMITTEE CONSIDERATION WOULD NOT BE ADVANTAGEOUS AND URGING TACTICAL APPROACH WHICH WOULD GET ITEM REFERRED PROMPTLY TO SIXTH COMMITTEE FOR ITS ACTION ON RESOLUTION. YOU SHOULD ASSURE SYG WE ARE MAKING EVERY EFFORT TO INDUCE EXTENSIVE ATTENTION TO THIS ITEM IN GENERAL DEBATE SPEECHES OF OTHERS. GDS YY

INFO: OTTAWA, PARIS, REYKJAVIK, ROME, NATO, THE HAGUE, STOCKHOLM, BERN, WELLINGTON, CANBERRA, TOKYO

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington,  
September 18, 1972**

**Rogers provided the President with an initial report on current measures to combat terrorism and proposals for the future.**

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
September 18, 1972  
MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Measures to Combat Terrorism

I want to give you an initial report on the steps we have already taken, and some idea of what we have in mind for the future, pursuant to your directive to me to initiate international and domestic actions to combat terrorism.

Your strong statement the morning after the Munich tragedy and the follow-on actions we have taken with other Governments have had a considerable impact in imparting a sense of urgency on this question throughout the world community. Our veto of the one-sided Security Council Resolution on Sunday and George Bush's forceful remarks in the Council have clearly signaled the seriousness of our concern and our determination to convince others that the time has come to get tough in the fight against terrorism. We intend to keep up the momentum we have generated and are now considering our strategy on this question at the forthcoming UNGA, where we expect terrorism to be a priority item.

I have established two special committees in the Department of State under Deputy Secretary Irwin, one to stimulate and coordinate international actions against terrorism chaired by Assistant Secretary Sisco, and the second to protect foreign persons and property in the United States headed, in Deputy Under Secretary Macomber's absence this week, by Acting Deputy Under Secretary Donelan. The following is a summary of the more important specific actions we have taken and are contemplating:

#### Domestic

1. Immediately after the September 5 Munich incident and the killing of the Israeli hostages, we asked the Executive Protective Service to provide increased protection for Israeli, Arab, German and Soviet diplomatic and consular establishments against attacks by the JDL or other groups. In response to Mayor Lindsay's request to you for federal assistance, 40 Secret Service and EPS officers were made available to man 23 fixed posts in the city. Security during the UN General Assembly in New York will pose a special problem, to which we will give priority consideration.
2. We have taken steps to screen more closely visa applications of potential terrorists.
3. We are looking into ways to tighten controls over foreign groups and organizations in the United States which have ties to movements advocating or practicing political terrorism; e.g., the Palestine Liberation Office in New York, and groups of Arab and Iranian students in this country.

#### International

4. September 6-7 we initiated consultations with Ambassadors and Charges of nearly 50 countries in Washington to solicit any ideas which their governments might have on ways to tackle the problem of political terrorism.
5. We have approached some 42 governments urging them to get across to the Arab governments that the latter cannot evade responsibility for acts of fedayeen terrorism so long as they do not take steps to deny support and facilities to them. We have also made known our views on this point directly to certain Arab governments.
6. Paralleling these approaches we sent a circular to all diplomatic posts instructing our Chiefs of Mission to deliver a personal letter from me to the Foreign Ministers and Secretaries September 11 stressing the need for more effective international action to prevent terrorist acts. I also urged that they join us in encouraging as many governments as possible to become parties to existing international conventions in dealing with criminal interference with civil aviation and to expedite efforts to enforce the principles of these conventions. Finally, I made it very clear that we are prepared to join in the most effective inter-national action which other governments are willing to undertake.
7. Secretary General Waldheim has moved rapidly to include the issue of terrorism on the agenda for the forthcoming United Nations General Assembly. I will be sending him a message shortly expressing our appreciation for the attention which he has directed to this pressing problem and assuring him of our readiness to cooperate fully to obtain effective international action against political terrorism.
8. To stress the importance which we attach to this problem, I intend in my opening address to the General Assembly to emphasize the need for early international action to come to grips with the problem of terrorism. I am also urging other Foreign Ministers and other heads of delegation to focus on this subject in their speeches.

9. The Legal Adviser has contacted several nongovernmental organizations in the field of international law and protection of human rights to enlist their assistance in contributing ideas and in possibly adopting statements or resolutions deploring the spread of terrorism and calling on governments to fulfill their international obligations to prevent terrorism and to punish terrorists. Charles Rhyne of the World Peace Through Law Center, Whitney Debevoise of the International Commission of Jurists, and John Carey of the International League for the Rights of Man all expressed a willingness to help, and we are sending them draft resolutions for their consideration. The International Law Association (Cecil Olmstead) and the American Society of International Law (Stephen Schwebel) are also possibilities which we will contact in this regard.

10. Our delegation to the Interpol General Assembly in Frankfurt September 19-27, which will be headed by Assistant Secretary of the Treasury Rossides, will make a major effort to get the Assembly to focus on terrorism as an international police problem. Specifically, we will seek to obtain Interpol Assembly endorsement of a resolution agreeing to use of existing Interpol machinery and services for this purpose.

11. We have set up an ad hoc interagency committee to coordinate intelligence data regarding terrorist organizations and their activities and to improve exchanges of such information with other governments.

12. We have also noted Senate Resolution 358 and House Resolution 1106, both passed unanimously, which resolved that "all means be sought by which the civilized world may cut off from contact with civilized mankind any peoples or any nation giving sanctuary, support, sympathy, aid, or comfort to acts of murder and barbarism such as those at Munich". We are looking closely to see what steps might appropriately be taken in conformity with the views expressed in Congress. However, the idea of a boycott of certain countries poses a number of serious questions which must be carefully considered before reaching any decisions. Meanwhile, we are drafting a suggested "sense of the Congress" resolution which would re-enforce the kinds of action the Executive Branch is pursuing.

13. Finally, we are urging the Senate to complete action on HR-15883, an Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests. This bill, as amended, would make it possible to extend the facilities of the Executive Protective Service not only to foreign officials in the United States on official business but also to official guests such as the Israeli Philharmonic Orchestra which will commence a tour of this country later this month.

We are keeping in particularly close touch with the Israelis with regard both to (a) the measures we have already undertaken and have in mind to protect Israeli installations and personnel in this country, and (b) our efforts in the international field. They have expressed their satisfaction with these steps and appreciation for the Administration's determination to protect Israeli personnel and installations in the United States.

I will be giving you progress reports from time to time as our plans develop and as progress toward combatting terrorism is achieved.

William P. Rogers



**Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington,  
September 21, 1972**

**Rogers informed the President of international measures taken to combat terrorism.**

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON  
September 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Measures to Combat Terrorism

In my report to you on September 18, I advised of the initiatives taken or placed in train with foreign governments, our posts abroad, and with intelligence enforcement agencies of the Executive Branch.

High level consultations were undertaken with foreign government representatives here and abroad and with the Secretary General of the United Nations. Discussions were held here with Ambassadors and Charges of nearly 50 countries on ways to tackle the problem of political terrorism; abroad we have approached some 42 governments urging them to get across to Arab governments that the latter cannot evade responsibility for acts of fedayeen terrorists; and I have sent personal letters through our Chiefs of Mission to over one hundred Foreign Ministers, stressing the need for more effective international action and urging widest support for international conventions relating to hijacking. In my opening address to the UNCA, I will emphasize the need for early international action to come to grips with the problem of terrorism. I have urged foreign ministers and other heads of delegations to focus on this subject in their speeches and a large number have indicated that they will do so.

We have proposed an initiative at the INTERPOL General Assembly now meeting in Frankfurt, Germany, to urge the Assembly to focus on terrorism as an international police problem. Present indications are that the Assembly will agree to a resolution on committing INTERPOL resources.

On the domestic side, we have taken coordinative action with the intelligence and enforcement agencies of the Executive Branch. Meeting regularly with these agencies (FBI, CIA, INS, NSA, Customs, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Secret Service and Treasury), we have reviewed the flow of intelligence from overseas to the domestic agencies, and to local police jurisdictions, and the existing mechanisms for prompt and efficient exchange and follow-up of all possible leads. All these organizations are giving the highest priority to the problem before us. The next meeting of this group is scheduled for 10 a.m., September 26, 1972.

Our posts abroad have been instructed to intensify the examination of all Arab visa applicants, and a system has been initiated under which the names of all such applicants will be screened against the records of CIA, FBI, INS, and the U.S. Secret Service prior to the issuance of the visa. The INS is furnishing the FBI with the names and locations of all Arab students currently in the United States.

As a result of past terrorist actions against our personnel overseas, detailed defensive plans against kidnapping and terrorism had been developed. All overseas posts have been alerted to activate these plans. These posts have also been alerted to the threat that explosive letters might be mailed to U.S. installations worldwide and were instructed to implement screening procedures. Descriptions of known types of explosive letters and packages are being furnished all posts.

As I reported earlier, the Executive Protective Service and the local police jurisdictions are providing increased protection to Israeli, Arab, German and Soviet diplomatic establishments throughout the United States. The Secret Service has assumed responsibility for the personal protection of certain distinguished foreign visitors (such as Israeli Foreign Minister Eban, Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, Jordanian Foreign Minister Zayd, Jordanian Crown Prince Hassan, Yemen Prime Minister Al-Aini, Israeli Finance Minister Sapir) coming to the UNGA, as well as to the International Monetary Fund meeting to be held in Washington, September 25-29.

All enforcement agencies, Federal and local, have been advised of the several foreign performing arts groups currently touring the United States, and local jurisdictions have been requested to provide police protection.

I will keep you advised of further developments.

William P. Rogers

**Information Memorandum From Assistant Secretary of State, International Organization Affairs (De Palma) and Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and South Asian Affairs (Sisco) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, September, 21, 1972**

**De Palma and Sisco briefed Rogers on the Department's scenario for handling the terrorism item at the UN General Assembly.**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM

SEP 21 1972

To: The Secretary  
From: IO - Samuel De Palma  
NEA - Joseph J. Sisco

Scenario for Handling Terrorism Item at the General Assembly

Our objective at the General Assembly will be to stimulate intensive international concern over the problem of international terrorism and to seek as much concrete action as we are able to obtain. We have in mind circulating a resolution which would (a) urge ratification of the three existing conventions dealing with offenses against civil aviation, (b) call for urgent ICAO drafting of and a plenipotentiary conference on an enforcement convention underpinning these conventions before the end of the year, (c) urge states not to aid or give sanctuary to terrorists but to take necessary measures to deter or punish them (d) ask that a plenipotentiary conference be held in early 1973 to consider adoption of a convention against terrorism, a draft of which we will have circulated, and (e) urge members to address the political problems which may provide a pretext for terrorist acts (draft text of resolution is at Tab A).

The International Law Commission has prepared draft articles of a convention on the prevention and punishment of crimes against diplomatic agents. These draft articles are in the ILC report which we will want to have taken up as the first item in the Sixth Committee in order that the committee can act on the report outside the context of its debate on terrorism which is bound to create sharp controversy. We will ask that the Sixth Committee complete a convention based on these articles and that this Assembly adopt and open it for signature.

The Assembly will be initially seized with the item on terrorism when the General Committee meets September 21. We will seek to obtain a recommendation that the item be referred promptly to the Sixth Committee where we will push for urgent action. The Assembly debate on the General Committee report is limited and we would anticipate sufficient support to have the item inscribed and assigned as recommended by the General Committee on or about September 22.

Your speech on September 25 will launch the effort to stress the urgency of the problem and elicit public expressions of concern and support. Initial responses to your letter have, in general, been encouraging and we will be continuing in the corridors our efforts to have others speak out on the issue. We would plan for you to use the occasions of your lunches with the Latin Americans and African representatives, and selected bilateral discussions to urge your colleagues to include stress on the problem of terrorism in their addresses (see Tab B for more detailed suggestions), and to support General Assembly action along the lines of our draft resolution. The ten Foreign Ministers of the European Community have already issued a statement expressing their concern and their intent to concert their positions on the subject at the UN. We would expect further support from Latin American and possibly some Asian or African representatives. There seems little doubt that the subject will receive a full airing in the course of the general debate.

Our major parliamentary problem will be to prevent the formation of a solid African front against the item as an expression of solidarity with the Arabs and on the grounds that it will be used against national liberation movements. The item will also give rise to a far-ranging debate, covering the Middle East and possibly Vietnam, and the final resolution may well include some language distasteful to us. Efforts may be made to have a general debate on the item in plenary, prior to its allocation to a committee, in order to provide a larger forum for such a political debate.

Sixth Committee consideration of the item would probably take place in late October. There will be extended debate in the committee but we would hope to have a resolution reported out for vote in the General Assembly by early December.

Attachments:

Tab A - Draft Resolution  
Tab B - Secretary's Bilaterals and Terrorism

**Information Memorandum From the Legal Adviser of the Department of State (Stevenson) to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington, September 22, 1972**

**Stevenson described the new draft convention for prevention of terrorism to be circulated by the United States at the United Nations.**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
INFORMATION MEMORANDUM  
September 22, 1972

TO: The Secretary  
FROM: L - John R. Stevenson,

Draft Convention For the Prevention and Punishment of Certain Acts of International Terrorism

The new Draft Terrorism Convention is intended to deal with the dangerous recent trend to internationalize terrorism and civil violence as evidenced in the recent Munich tragedy. The central mechanism of the convention is to single out acts of political violence which occur both outside the State of nationality of the perpetrator and outside the State against which the act is directed. In addition, to be covered an act is required to be directed against civilians rather than members of the Armed Forces of a State in the course of military hostilities.

The Convention is narrowly drawn and would exclude civil violence in which a national is acting against his own government within the territory of his State. In addition it would exclude acts of violence which take place in the State against which the acts are directed. The purpose of limiting the Convention in this fashion is to try to single out the recent internationalization of violent acts committed abroad, and to increase the chances for agreement.

Within the scope of covered acts the Convention then declares that anyone who unlawfully kills, causes serious bodily harm or kidnaps another person commits an offense of international significance. States Party to the Convention would be required to extend their jurisdiction over such offenses, make such offenses crimes punishable by severe penalties, and to extradite or prosecute alleged offenders found in their territory. The machinery for extradition and prosecution basically follows the Montreal Hijacking and ILC Protection of Diplomats machinery.

COVERED ACTS WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

- (1) The Munich Tragedy and any other case of a Palestinian attack on Israeli citizens abroad,
- (2) The assassination of the Foreign Minister of Jordan in Egypt,
- (3) The recent mailings of explosive devices to Israeli diplomats,
- (4) The Croatian hijacking in Switzerland (though the hijacking Conventions would take precedence).

ACTS NOT COVERED WOULD INCLUDE THE FOLLOWING:

- (1) The Lod Airport attack,
- (2) Palestinian attacks on Israel if committed within Israel,
- (3) Attacks by liberation groups in Southern Africa within the territory of the State attacked,
- (4) Acts by or against members of the Armed Forces of a State in the course of military hostilities.

We have this afternoon given copies of the new Draft Convention to IO, AF, and NEA.

Attachment:  
DRAFT CONVENTION

**Telegram 174121 From the Department of State to the Embassy in Ceylon,  
Washington, September 22, 1972, 2335Z**

**The Department of State instructed key posts to explain to host governments that a vote against inscription of the terrorism item on the UNGA agenda would be a vote against the Secretary-General and would weaken the United Nations.**





7. TIMING OF GA VOTES IS ALWAYS UNCERTAIN. YOU SHOULD THEREFORE NOT BE DETERRED FROM DEMARCHE BY BELIEF THAT IT MAY BE TOO LATE.

GDS YY

**Telegram 3421 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, September 22, 1972, 2311Z**

**Ambassador Bush reported that inscription of Secretary-General Waldheim's terrorism item would likely fail.**

22231 1Z SEP 72 FM USMISSION USUN NY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC PRIORITY 3473  
USUN 3421

SUBJ: PRELIMINARY COMMENT ON GENERAL COMMITTEE ACTION ON TERRORISM ITEM  
REF: USUN 3412

1. AS REPORTED REFTTEL, SYG'S EFFORTS AT COMPROMISE SEPT 21 AND EARLY SEPT 22 DID NOT BEAR FRUIT. AS UN COMMUNITY GATHERED IN GC CHAMBER MID-MORNING, SUPPORTERS OF SYG'S INITIATIVE HAD LITTLE CONFIDENCE THAT INITIATIVE COULD BE INSCRIBED IN RESPECTABLE FORM. UK AND FRANCE WERE GETTING COLD FEET; AMB BUSH SPOKE TO THEM REPEATEDLY. HOWEVER, EFFORTS AT COMPROMISE HAD SO HEARTENED ARAB-AFRICAN GROUP THAT THEY OVERPLAYED THEIR HAND. IN PARTICULAR, AFRICAN SPOKESMAN, WHO HAD ALREADY PUSHED FOR "COMPROMISE" THAT WOULD HAVE SENT ITEM TO BARELY HONORABLE BURIAL IN AD HOC COMMITTEE WITH NO RESPONSIBILITY TO TAKE MEANINGFUL ACTION WITHIN SPECIFIED TIME-FRAME, BEGAN TO THREATEN SYG AND PRO-ITEMS MEMBERS THAT INSCRIPTION OF ITEM WOULD DIVIDE UN MEMBERSHIP INTO TWO HOSTILE CAMPS FOR INDEFINITE FUTURE.

2. IN THIS SITUATION INFORMAL CAUCUSES ON FLOOR WERE ARENA OF CRITICAL CONSULTATIONS. TO US AND WESTERN EUROPEAN DELS IT SEEMED CLEAR THAT UN WAS AT LEAST MOMENTARILY IN SERIOUS CRISIS. CHOICE SEEMED TO LIE BETWEEN CAVING TO ARAB-AFRICAN EFFORTS TO EMASCULATE ITEM AND CHANGING OUTRIGHT DEFEAT ON INSCRIPTION. EITHER COURSE COULD HAVE RESULTED IN HUMILIATING EXPERIENCE FOR SYG AND UN.

3. IN CONSULTATIONS WITH KEY WE DELS AND WITH SECRETARIAT, AMB BUSH TOOK LINE THAT COMPROMISE WITH OPPONENTS OF ITEM WOULD MERELY GENERATE INCREASINGLY INTOLERABLE PRESSURES ON WESTERN COMMUNITY IN UN. IN RESPONSE TO THIS LOGIC AND TO HIS OWN RESENTMENT OF ARAB-AFRICAN ASSAULTS ON PRESTIGE OF HIS OFFICE, SYG NOT ONLY ABANDONED FURTHER EFFORTS AT COMPROMISE BUT WITHDREW CONCESSIONS ALREADY OFFERED. SYG EXPLAINED TO GENERAL COMMITTEE HIS EXHAUSTIVE EFFORTS TO FIND SOLUTION THAT COULD BE SUPPORTED BY ALL MEMBERS; HE BELIEVED HE HAD DONE ALL HE COULD AND HAD NO FURTHER PROPOSAL TO MAKE. WITH DIGNITY AND IN RESOLUTE TONES, SYG SAID HE WOULD NOT WITHDRAW.

4. CAMPAIGN OF PRO-ITEM ELEMENTS TO RETRIEVE SITUATION IMMEDIATELY GAINED CONSIDERABLE MOMENTUM. WITH US AND WES INCLUDING FRANCE STRONGLY COMMITTED, CAMPAIGN TOOK ON SOMETIMES EXPLICIT SAVE-THE-UN CHARACTER. CRITICAL FACTORS INCLUDED STAUNCHNESS OF LA MEMBERS OF GC, PRC INABILITY TO MOUNT FAST LOBBYING EFFORT, EQUIVOCAL POSITION OF SOVIET UNION (WHICH DID NOT LOBBY AND ULTIMATELY ABSTAINED), ENCOURAGING STATESMANSHIP OF INDIVIDUAL DELS INCLUDING RWANDA AND CYPRUS AS REPORTED REFTTEL, AMB BUSH MADE STRONG SPEECH IN SUPPORT OF INSCRIPTION.

5. OUTCOME OF GC VOTE SOMEWHAT STRENGTHENED PROSPECT THAT GA PLENARY WILL UPHOLD COMMITTEE RECOMMENDATIONS. WE CONTINUE TO FEEL, HOWEVER, THAT MAXIMUM EFFORT IS REQUIRED TO SEND ITEM TO SIXTH COMMITTEE WITH MANDATE THAT WILL HOLD OUT SOME PROMISE OF FURTHER FORWARD MOTION. ARABS AND AFS CAN BE EXPECTED TO MAKE LAST DITCH EFFORT IN PLENARY.

GDS BUSH

**Telegram 174571 From the Department of State to the Consulate in Montreal,  
September 25, 1972, 1736Z**

**Extracts from Secretary of State Rogers' remarks before the UN General  
Assembly setting out steps to counter international terrorism.**

9/25/72  
PRIORITY MONTREAL  
FOR USREP ICAO

SUBJECT: PROPOSED ICAO ENFORCEMENT CONVENTION

PORTION OF SECRETARY ROGER'S STATEMENT BEFORE UNGA SETTING OUT STEPS NOW REQUIRED TO COUNTER INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM FOLLOWS:

"TWO YEARS AGO, BEFORE THE PROBLEM HAD REACHED ITS PRESENT DIMENSIONS, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY TOOK THE FIRST STEP --THE STEP THAT MUST GUIDE US NOW. IN THE DECLARATION ON FRIENDLY RELATIONS AMONG STATES, WHICH SO STRONGLY RE-AFFIRMED THE RIGHT OF SELF-DETERMINATION, THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY ALSO UNANIMOUSLY DECLARED THAT EACH NATION HAS A DUTY TO REFRAIN FROM ASSISTING OR IN ANY WAY PARTICIPATING IN TERRORIST ACTS IN ANOTHER STATE OR ACQUIESCING IN ORGANIZED ACTIVITIES WITHIN ITS TERRITORY DIRECTED TOWARDS THE COMMISSION OF SUCH ACTS. THE TIME HAS COME TO MAKE THAT OBLIGATION, WHICH THIS GENERAL ASSEMBLY SOLEMNLY UNDERTOOK, MORE SPECIFIC AND MEANINGFUL.

IN THE PAST TWO YEARS, THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY HAS TAKEN CERTAIN STEPS IN THE FIELD OF HIJACKING. CONVENTIONS HAVE BEEN CONCLUDED PRESCRIBING SEVERE PENALTIES FOR THE HIJACKING AND SABOTAGE OF AIRCRAFT AND REQUIRING STATES TO EXTRADITE OR PROSECUTE HIJACKERS AND SABOTEURS. WE URGE ALL STATES WHICH HAVE NOT RATIFIED THESE CONVENTIONS TO DO SO. WE ARE NOW FACED WITH AN URGENT NEED TO DETER AND PUNISH INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF VIOLENCE NOT ONLY IN THE AIR BUT THROUGHOUT OUR SOCIETIES. THE UNITED STATES URGES THAT THIS ASSEMBLY ACT -- AND ACT AT ONCE -- TO MEET THIS CHALLENGE.

FIRST, THE DRAFT TREATY TO PROSECUTE OR EXTRADITE THOSE WHO ATTACK OR KIDNAP DIPLOMATS OR OFFICIALS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS OR INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS SHOULD BE COMPLETED AND OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AT THIS SESSION OF THE ASSEMBLY. THE DRAFT ARTICLES ARE ALREADY BEFORE THIS ASSEMBLY IN DOCUMENT A/8710.

SECOND, A TREATY PROVIDING FOR SUSPENSION OF ALL AIR SERVICE TO COUNTRIES WHICH FAIL TO PUNISH OR EXTRADITE HIJACKERS OR SABOTEURS OF CIVIL AIRCRAFT SHOULD BE PROMPTLY COMPLETED AND OPENED FOR SIGNATURE. A NATION WHICH IS A HAVEN FOR HIJACKERS SHOULD BE OUTLAWED BY THE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. A DRAFT OF A TREATY TO DO THIS HAS ALREADY BEEN CONSIDERED BY A SUBCOMMITTEE OF THE CIVIL AVIATION ORGANIZATION. TO ACHIEVE EARLY ACTION THE PROCESS OF DELIBERATION SHOULD BE ACCELERATED AND A DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE TO COMPLETE THE TREATY SHOULD BE CALLED WITHOUT DELAY.

THIRD, A NEW TREATY ON THE EXPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM SHOULD BE CONCLUDED AND OPENED FOR SIGNATURE AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. IT SHOULD INCLUDE UNIVERSAL CONDEMNATION OF AND REQUIRE THE PROSECUTION OR EXTRADITION OF PERSONS WHO KILL, SERIOUSLY INJURE, OR KIDNAP INNOCENT CIVILIANS IN A FOREIGN STATE FOR THE PURPOSE OF HARMING OR FORCING CONCESSIONS FROM A STATE OR FROM AN INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION. TO COMPLETE SUCH A TREATY A DIPLOMATIC CONFERENCE SHOULD BE CONVENED AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT IS TODAY CIRCULATING A FIRST DRAFT OF A TREATY. WE URGE ALL GOVERNMENTS TO GIVE IT THEIR EARNEST ATTENTION.

WE HAVE ALSO EMBODIED THESE VARIOUS PROPOSALS IN A DRAFT RESOLUTION, WHICH WE SUBMITTED TO THE SECRETARIAT FOR DISTRIBUTION THIS MORNING." YY

**Memorandum From President Nixon to Heads of Departments and Agencies,  
Washington, September 25, 1972**

**The President directed the establishment of a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism to be chaired by Secretary of State Rogers.**

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
September 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR HEADS OF DEPARTMENTS AND AGENCIES

SUBJECT: Action to Combat Terrorism

As I stated in the attached memorandum to the Secretary of State, I have today directed the establishment of a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, to be chaired by Secretary Rogers. I consider it to be of the utmost importance that we move urgently and efficiently to attack this worldwide problem.

This Committee will consider the most effective means by which to prevent terrorism here and abroad, and it will also take the lead in establishing procedures to ensure that our Government can take appropriate action in response to terrorist acts swiftly and effectively. In this regard, Secretary Rogers will be in touch with other governments and international organizations.

I expect that you will be fully responsive to the requests of the Secretary of State and assist him in every way in his efforts to coordinate government-wide actions against terrorism.

**Memorandum From President Nixon to Secretary of State Rogers, Washington,  
September 25, 1972**

**The President described the membership of the Cabinet Committee to Combat  
Terrorism and set the scope of its activities.**



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
September 25, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE

SUBJECT: Action to Combat Terrorism

Your report to me on the measures that are being taken to combat terrorism indicates that we are moving effectively against the problem of thwarting acts of terrorism both here and abroad. The two committees you have set up to cope with this major problem are making commendable progress toward this end.

Because of the great importance and urgency I attach to dealing with the worldwide problem of terrorism, which encompasses diplomatic, intelligence, and law enforcement functions, I am hereby establishing a Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism.

The Cabinet Committee will be chaired by the Secretary of State and will comprise  
The Secretary of State  
The Secretary of Defense  
The Attorney General  
The Secretary of Transportation  
The United States Ambassador to the United Nations  
The Director of Central Intelligence  
The Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs  
The Assistant to the President for Domestic Affairs  
The Acting Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation

and such others as the Chairman may consider necessary.

The Cabinet Committee will be supported by a Working Group comprised of personally designated senior representatives of the members of the Committee, chaired by the designee of the Secretary of State.

The Committee will consider the most effective means by which to prevent terrorism here and abroad, and it will also take the lead in establishing procedures to ensure that our government can take appropriate action in response to acts of terrorism swiftly and effectively. The Secretary of State will be in touch with other governments and international organizations toward this goal.

Federal officers and Federal departments and agencies are to cooperate fully with the Cabinet Committee in carrying out its functions under this directive, and they shall comply with the policies, guidelines, standards, and procedures prescribed by the Cabinet Committee.

More specifically, the Cabinet Committee shall:

- (1) Coordinate, among the government agencies, ongoing activity for the prevention of terrorism. This will include such activities as the collection of intelligence worldwide and the physical protection U.S. personnel and installations abroad and foreign diplomats, and diplomatic installations in the United States.
- (2) Evaluate all such programs and activities and where necessary recommend methods for their effective implementation.
- (3) Devise procedures for reacting swiftly and effectively to acts of terrorism that occur.
- (4) Make recommendations to the Director of the Office of Management and Budget concerning proposed funding of such programs; and
- (5) Report to the President, from time to time, concerning the foregoing.

**Memorandum From the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs  
(Kissinger) to President Nixon, Washington, September 29, 1972**

**Kissinger answered the President's query about attacks on U.S. businesses overseas in a 3-page memorandum that summarized a longer CIA memorandum on the topic.**

MEMORANDUM  
THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
INFORMATION

September 29, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: HENRY A. KISSINGER

SUBJECT: Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Companies

In response to your request of September 18, 1972 regarding the morning brief item (Tab B) on terrorist attacks against four private U.S. companies in Mexico, CIA has submitted a memorandum (Tab A) assessing those incidents and others throughout the world.

CIA notes that in most instances the bombings of U.S. firms, like those in Mexico, are the work of local dissident groups that are essentially motivated by the internal politics of their own country. The violence directed at American businesses in various parts of the world is not part of a campaign against U.S. firms as such, but rather a result of political conflict in which these companies are identified with the establishment or with policies opposed by the dissident groups. In many cases, the violence is part of the generational phenomenon with disaffected, ultranationalist youth striking out at the local "establishment" and its ties to "U.S. economic imperialism" and in other cases, the violence stems from anti-Vietnam war groups.

Those responsible for the violence have, at most, only loose, occasional links with terrorist groups elsewhere and do not appear to be involved in an international conspiracy against American firms.

-- An important exception to the above is the alliance of Arab terrorist organizations that have conducted operations across national borders in the Mideast and in Western Europe.

Looking at terrorist incidents area by area, the CIA memorandum notes that:

-- In Mexico, the bombings of U.S.-owned businesses on 14-15 September were the first such incidents in recent memory. There is no evidence that the explosions were part of any broad plan. On the same night that the U.S. companies were hit, bombs exploded at the offices of a government financial institution and at a nearby Mexican-owned clothing store. Because these incidents came 48 hours before Mexico's Independence Day celebration, they probably were set off by dissident elements to embarrass President Echeverria.

-- In Argentina, U.S. businesses have been frequent targets of terrorist attacks in recent years. The most serious came in June 1969 during Governor Rockefeller's fact-finding trip to Buenos Aires. The bombings on that occasion were professional and well coordinated and all involved supermarkets at least partially owned by Rockefeller financial interests. Since 1969 there have been several incidents involving U.S. businesses but never on the scale of the supermarket bombings. In fact, other foreign businesses -- FIAT and certain British firms -- have suffered as much as U.S. companies.

-- In Venezuela, urban terrorism and rural guerrilla activity resumed in May and June 1972 after a long hiatus. U.S. Government installations and private U.S. business interests were hit, although much of the violence was aimed at the Caldera government. [less than 1 line not declassified] expect terrorist activities to increase between now and the Venezuelan Presidential election in December 1973.

-- Elsewhere in Latin America, attacks against U.S. businesses have been sporadic and those that have occurred were often related to political or labor strife in the host country.

-- When bombings or robberies against U.S. firms are carried out by terrorists, the perpetrators are usually left-wing extremists who have broken away from more orthodox communist movements.

-- In the Middle East, there is no doubt that fedayeen groups have carried out coordinated attacks against U.S. business firms and the likelihood is for increased terrorist actions against both official and private U.S. interests over the next several months in light of the Arab guerrilla's belief that the Black September Organization's Munich operation was a success.

-- In Western Europe, incidents aimed at U.S. business firms and at government property apparently are the work of anti-Vietnam war groups. The unexploded bombs which were found in the Paris offices of Pan American Airways and Trans World Airlines in May of this year were linked to anti-war groups as were a series of attacks against U.S. commercial enterprises in Milan on June 3, 1972. Other incidents against American firms in Spain, West Germany and the Netherlands this year were also the work of anti-war demonstrators.

-- In Asia and Africa what little anti-U. S. violence has occurred has usually been directed at U.S. official installations rather than at U.S. businesses. The occasional small-scale violence that has been focused on U.S. companies in some African countries has been spontaneous and looks more like vandalism than the result of planning by extremist groups.

In sum, except for the Arab terrorists and anti-war groups, attacks against U.S. business firms in the rest of the world appear to be random events, resulting from local dissident activities. There is no available evidence that extremist groups in Latin America, for example, have planned to conduct coordinated operations against U.S. businesses. We can expect to see the fedayeen organizations, however, attempt to expand their connections with other terrorist groups, especially in the Mideast and Western Europe. Even so, it is unlikely, in CIA's view, that such contacts will result in a formal international network of terrorist organizations.

## CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

26 September 1972

MEMORANDUM No. 2073/72

### Terrorism Against US Business Firms Abroad

In recent years US business firms overseas have been frequent targets for terrorist attacks in a number of Latin American countries. Attacks against American firms have also occurred on occasion in the Mideast and Western Europe. Companies such as Coca-Cola, Pan American Airways, and IBM are used as convenient symbols of "foreign aggression" and "imperialism" by extremists who resort to acts of violence for a variety of reasons. The trend toward nationalistic policies in much of the world probably has added impetus to those who seek to victimize US companies. The proliferation of American-owned businesses in many countries means that US firms are often easily accessible.

In most instances the bombings of US firms, like those in Mexico earlier this month, are the work of local dissident groups that are essentially motivated by the internal politics of their own country. In some cases, particularly in Western Europe, the attacks against US firms are expressions of anti-Vietnam War sentiments. The violence directed at American business is not part of a campaign against US firms as such, but rather a result of political conflict in which these companies are identified with the establishment or with policies opposed by nationalistic dissident groups. Those responsible for the violence have at most only loose, occasional links with terrorist groups elsewhere and do not appear to be involved in an international conspiracy. An important exception is the alliance of Arab terrorist organizations that have conducted operations across national borders in the Mideast and in Western Europe.

Arab terrorist groups, buoyed by the publicity received from the guerrilla operation at Munich during the Olympic Games, may well attempt to step up their activities over the next several months. If so, US firms and official installations, particularly in Western Europe and the Mideast, would probably come under attack. The fedayeen have discussed such plans from time to time.

Sporadic bombings and other forms of violence carried out against American companies are also likely in several Latin American countries, but no coordinated plan of attack against these firms is foreseen.

## LATIN AMERICA

### MEXICO

The bombings of US-owned businesses on 14-15 September were the first directed against American companies in Mexico in recent memory. Although there have been sporadic attacks, including bombings, against US consulates and other US Government-affiliated installations in past years, none has been serious or part of an organized terrorist campaign. Similarly, there is no evidence that the recent explosions are part of any broad plan. Because they came 48 hours before Mexico's Independence Day celebration, they no doubt were set off by dissident elements to embarrass President Echeverria. Terrorist incidents designed to disrupt national holidays and celebrations and thus achieve maximum publicity have occurred in recent years.

The bombs were exploded at the offices of IBM and Ford Motor Co. in Mexico City, Pepsi-Cola and Coca-Cola in Morelia, and at another Coca-Cola office in Guadalajara. With the exception of the IBM building, where two bombs damaged intricate electronic equipment at the company's most important computer center in Latin America, only minor damage was reported. Mexican public buildings have also been targets. On the night the US companies were hit, bombs exploded at the offices of a government financial institution in the center of Mexico City and at a nearby Mexican-owned clothing store. On 4 September a bomb was exploded near the entrance to the Secretariat of Finance, which is housed in the National Palace.

No group has claimed responsibility for these bombings. Suspects have been detained, and they may be linked to an extreme leftist peasant-labor guerrilla group that Mexican security officials believe was responsible for exploding a bomb at the National Palace earlier this month, just before the President's state of the nation address.

[1 line not declassified] members of this group have long been planning terrorist acts against interests of the Mexican "upper-class," which they consider the "exploiters." No US companies were singled out in their plans.

Several other guerrilla/terrorist organizations have appeared in Mexico in the last two years. Many of them have pulled off kidnappings and bank robberies that have created a nagging security problem for the government. Any one of these groups or a radical student organization could have been behind the ex-plosions. The dissidents believe the Mexican revolution has run out of steam and that the Mexican "establishment" perpetuates the status quo behind a facade of representative political democracy. US businesses are seen not only as part and parcel of this "establishment," but also as representing "economic imperialism," and are thus a natural target for the radical groups. Despite stepped-up efforts by Mexican security forces, sporadic terrorist activity will probably continue.

## ARGENTINA

US businesses have been frequent targets of terrorist attacks in recent years. The most serious incident came in June 1969 during Governor Rockefeller's fact-finding trip to Buenos Aires. The bombings on that occasion were professional and well coordinated; all involved supermarkets at least partially owned by Rockefeller financial interests. This outburst appears to have been primarily an expression of Argentine nationalism and was probably carried out by an established terrorist group to gain maximum publicity.

Since 1969 there have been several incidents involving US businesses, but never on the scale of the supermarket bombings. Leftist terrorism has been on the upsurge, however, with the well-publicized objective of ridding Argentina of "imperialist monopolies." In fact, other foreign businesses--FIAT of Italy and certain British firms--have suffered as much as US companies.

"Anti-imperialism" has become the watchword of leftists in general, but there is no evidence of an organized campaign against US businesses. Some incidents can be attributed to organized terrorist groups, but others were staged by unorganized pro-testers who were simply presented with a target and an opportunity. In all cases, the attacks on US businesses were the direct outgrowth of strictly Argentine problems and developments. Security forces have made great strides in containing terrorism in general and attacks against US installations, in particular. There have been no attacks in recent weeks.

## VENEZUELA

During the past decade, US businesses and installations have frequently been targets for Venezuela's several active terrorist and guerrilla organizations. The peak of this activity was reached during the mid-60s, when leftist groups attempted to undermine Venezuela's democratic government. The success of the Christian Democratic government's "pacification" campaign since 1968 has resulted in the assimilation of most of the dissidents into the country's political life. The entire Marxist left is now functioning legally and generally eschews violence. Some die-hard insurgents, however, are still active in small rag-tag bands, and they attract some disenchanted youth.

After a long hiatus, urban terrorism and rural guerrilla activity resumed in May and June 1972. Much of the violence was aimed at the Caldera government, but US government installations and private US business interests were also hit. The First National City Bank of New York, International Telephone and Telegraph, Mercke-Sharpe-Dohme Pharmaceuticals, the Caracas Hilton, and the Rockefeller supermarket chain were special targets of the terrorists. An upsurge in telephone harassment, including anonymous bomb threats, was also reported by US businesses.

Terrorist activities have run the gamut from kidnaping and bombings to bank robberies and petty crimes; they appear to spring as much from domestic protests as from opposition to US influence. The attacks are intended to bolster the morale of the terrorists in the face of increasingly effective government counterinsurgency operations; to raise money for terrorist causes; to embarrass the government and create an atmosphere of political instability; and finally to win over

more moderate leftists and nationalists by striking out at what they believe to be symbols of US economic exploitation and domination.

Venezuela has experienced an upsurge of nationalism over the last couple of years, and much of it is directed at the US. Given this climate and the high visibility of some \$2.7 billion in US private investments in the country, it is surprising that more attacks have not been directed against US interests, particularly petroleum pipelines that are extremely vulnerable to sabotage. For the past several months the Caldera government has had to contend with repeated student demonstrations and violence in the major urban centers. Much of the disruption probably is directed by leftist extremists, but US businesses have experienced little violence.

[1 line of text not declassified] expect terrorist activities to increase between now and the presidential election in December 1973. An expected close presidential race, the introduction into the campaign of nationalistic issues, and a volatile student population could create an atmosphere lending itself to exploitation by terrorist groups. The Venezuelan Government is aware of the dangers, and its security agencies have prepared contingency plans to counter any threats that arise.

#### OTHER

Elsewhere in Latin America, attacks against US businesses have been insignificant and sporadic. Those that have occurred were often related to political or labor strife in the host country. In late 1971, for example, sabotage at Colombia's Barrancabermeja refinery, partially owned by Texaco-Gulf, came during a prolonged and bitter strike at this installation.

Student demonstrations and riots have frequently caused damage to US-owned property, but in many cases the targets were not pre-selected but simply happened to be in the path of march. There is no discernible pattern or direction to such attacks, and host country businesses also suffer.

When bombing or robberies against US firms are planned and carried out by terrorists, the perpetrators are usually left-wing extremists who have broken away from more orthodox Communist movements. In many instances, the violence is part of the generational phenomenon, with disaffected, ultranationalistic youth striking out at the local "establishment" and its ties to "US economic imperialism." In Uruguay the Tupamaro organization burned the General Motors plant in 1969 around the time of Governor Rockefeller's visit to Montevideo. In April and May 1970, an International Harvester warehouse and several other US-franchised firms, including a branch of First National City Bank, Squibb Laboratories, and the distributor for Phillip Morris cigarettes, were bombed. In most of these instances, however, damage was light.

Such attacks are a means of raising morale and acquiring funds and publicity. A raid on a US firm or subsidiary guarantees instantaneous and international attention while a similar act against a local business would go almost unnoticed outside the host country.

It is worth noting that the pro-Castro terrorists in Guatemala, the most persistent of the Hemisphere's insurgents, have devoted little attention to US businesses. During the past decade, however, they have assassinated three members of the US diplomatic mission, including an ambassador, kidnaped another, and attacked US Government property. Other terrorist organizations in Latin America have also attacked US embassies, consulates, binational centers, and USIS offices, while allowing substantial US private investments to go relatively unmolested.

#### THE MIDEAST

During the past few years fedayeen groups have carried out several terrorist operations against US business firms in the Mideast. Other operations aimed at US businesses have been planned, but for various reasons have not been implemented. In some cases disclosure of the plans to local security services probably led to preventive measures that frustrated the terrorist plans.

Most of the incidents that occurred involved sabotage of the oil pipeline owned by the Arabian-American Oil Company; there have been five instances of sabotage since early 1971, usually in Jordan. Other incidents include the blowing up of a hijacked Pan American 747 in Cairo in September 1970 and of a Trans World Airlines 707 in Jordan that had been hijacked at the same time. In November of last year, four explosions reportedly hit the Intercontinental Hotel in Amman, which is managed by US personnel and at one time had some US backing. In January 1972 facilities of the Kuwait Oil Company, which is partially US-owned, were damaged by a bomb blast.

Other bombing attacks against US-owned oil operations in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf states were planned by the fedayeen. In 1970, for example, the fedayeen attempted to mine a US oil tanker in Lebanon. US officials and private citizens in Jordan and Lebanon have been specifically cited as targets in Arab terrorist plans.

From the Arab guerrillas' point of view, the Munich operations against the Israeli Olympic teams was a success and encouraged them to persist in employing terrorist tactics. The Munich incident dramatized the Palestinian cause. It also demonstrated the lengths to which the Arab terrorists will go. There have been numerous reports of fedayeen terrorist plans during the past few weeks, including one report that the Fatah's Black September Organization had added US embassies throughout the world to its list of targets. Although the Black September Organization has been responsible for most of the recent Arab terrorist activity, including the Munich attack, rival fedayeen groups may also attempt to draw public attention by conducting dramatic operations. Thus the likelihood has increased that terrorist actions will be carried out against both official and private US interests over the next several months.

## WESTERN EUROPE

During May of this year, unexploded bombs were found in the Paris offices of Pan American Airways and Trans World Airlines. These incidents were probably linked to attacks made at the same time against official US facilities in France. In late 1971 [less than 1 line not declassified] one anti-war group in Paris had compiled a list of American firms and subsidiaries in preparation for a "campaign" of unspecified nature against the firms' alleged involvement in Vietnam.

In Milan, Italy, a series of attacks was carried out against US commercial enterprises on 3 June 1972. Five bombs were exploded next to buildings occupied by American firms--the Honeywell-Italia offices in the central city, the Honeywell plant and computer facilities on the outskirts of Milan, a Bank of America branch office, and the IBM office. In none of the incidents was the damage extensive. Leaflets left at the scene indicated that the attacks were the work of local anti-war groups. The bombings appear to have been a one-time protest; no other incidents have occurred since then.

Only two incidents directed against US business firms in Spain have been reported in the past few years. In May of this year the Pan American Airways office in Barcelona was slightly damaged during a "lightning raid" by some 300 youths shouting anti-war slogans. In May 1970 student marchers caused minor damage to the Sears Roebuck store in Barcelona during demonstrations against US activities in Cambodia. In the Netherlands, only one serious attack against a US business firm has occurred in recent years--in May 1970 when Dutch anti-war demonstrators fire-bombed the Honeywell building in Amsterdam. At the same time, First National City Bank, Pan American Airways, and several other US businesses had the walls of their buildings painted with anti-American slogans and received bomb threats. Bomb threats were received by several US companies this summer, but no explosives were found. Similar minor incidents have occurred in West Germany during recent years. Usually the perpetrators were leftist students or other radicals engaged in anti-war marches or other demonstrations.

## ELSEWHERE

In the Far East and Africa there has been no evidence of involvement by anti-American elements in organized terrorist attacks against US business. What little anti-US violence has occurred has usually been directed at US official installations. Thus far it has not been within the modus operandi of those anti-US groups that exist in Japan and other Far East countries to use bombs. Harassment activities occur, of course, but the violence that accompanies these activities is generally relatively mild, involving rock-throwing or fist-fighting. The occasional small-scale violence that has been focused on US companies in some African countries has apparently been spontaneous and probably vandalism rather than the result of planning by extremist groups.

In the Soviet Union and other Communist Eastern European countries, any activity directed against US interests would almost automatically be government-sponsored or controlled. In the past there have been occasional officially staged or condoned demonstrations around US embassies in some of these countries, but no physical attacks against US business. One exception occurred in Yugoslavia in 1970, when small groups of extremist students engaged in a spontaneous demonstration against the US presence in Southeast Asia. Yugoslavia is the only Eastern European country that has a terrorist problem. The ustashi--remnants of World War II Croatian fascists--have carried out attacks against Yugoslav installations at home and abroad over the past 18 months, but thus far have not attacked US facilities. Since most of their financial support comes from emigres in the US, it seems unlikely that the ustashi would jeopardize this source of funds by attacking US firms or official installations.

## INTERNATIONAL LINKS AMONG TERRORIST GROUPS

The bombings and other acts of violence carried out against American firms overseas have been local phenomena rather than part of any international conspiracy. There is no available evidence that extremist groups in Latin America have planned to conduct coordinated operations against US businesses. Nor does there appear to be any close relationship between Arab terrorist organizations and Latin American extremists who have attacked US companies in Latin America. The sole exception is the fedayeen organizations, which collaborate closely.

It seems likely that the fedayeen organizations, especially the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, will attempt to expand their present limited connections with other terrorist groups. The main effort at expansion probably will come in the Mideast and Western Europe and, to a much lesser degree, in Latin America. It is unlikely, however, that these contacts will result in a formal international network of terrorist organizations in the foreseeable future.



**Memorandum From the Executive Secretary of the Department of State (Eliot) to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 21, 1972**

**The Department reported on a setback to U.S.-supported terrorism items at the UN General Assembly.**

DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
Washington, DC. 20520  
October 21, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. HENRY A. KISSINGER  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Terrorism Items in the United Nations General Assembly

Our efforts to obtain urgent action on one of the items related to terrorism at the United Nations General Assembly received a setback October 20. The First Committee voted (54-40 (US) with 20 abstentions) a Czechoslovak-sponsored amendment which would have draft articles on the protection of diplomats referred to the 28th (1973) Assembly "with a view to the final elaboration of such a Convention by the General Assembly." There is some slight consolation in a Soviet expression of readiness to work with us to improve the resolution in the plenary by placing added emphasis on the need to conclude a convention at the 28th session.

We had been pressing a Canadian draft which would have convened a plenipotentiary conference in early 1973 to adopt a convention. Arab opponents of any action on terrorism issues had pushed two resolutions (Mauritania and Mexico) which would have buried the issue.

The key element in our setback was the inability of the United States and co-sponsors of the Canadian resolution to achieve any significant support among the Africans and Asians. A "compromise" amendment which would have called for a plenipotentiary conference in August was put forward by the Afghans and the Yugoslavs. In spite of our backing, this effort fell apart: when supporters of the Mauritania and Mexican amendments withdrew their amendments, threw their weight behind the Czechoslovak amendment, and induced the Yugoslavs and, to a lesser extent, the Afghans not to press their "compromise."

We will now concentrate our efforts on mustering support for a resolution which would advance the prospects of a convention on terrorism. we have concluded that the optimum tactic is to seek approval of a working group which would work on the text of a draft convention for action by the 28th (1973) Assembly and agree to a second working group which would meet the Arab insistence that the underlying causes of terrorism be "studied."

Theodore L. Eliot, Jr.  
Executive Secretary

**Memorandum From Fernando Rondon and Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, October 25, 1972**

**NSC staffers updated Kissinger on the status of the Terrorism Convention and the Convention on the Protection of Diplomats at the United Nations.**

MEMORANDUM  
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
October 25, 1972  
INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR HENRY KISSINGER

FROM:  
F. E. Rondon  
R. T. Kennedy

SUBJECT: Terrorism: United Nations Action

The memorandum from State at Tab A informs you of UN General Assembly action on two draft conventions: one on terrorism, the other on the protection of diplomats.

#### 1. Terrorism Convention

About November 1, the General Assembly is expected to take up Secretary General Waldheim's agenda item on terrorism. It is State's hope that a resolution will be adopted instructing a UN working group to come up with a draft convention on terrorism for action by next year's General Assembly. As presently conceived, the Convention on Terrorism would punish or extradite those who commit specified acts of terrorism, i.e., murder, kidnapping, when those acts are committed--

- outside the terrorist's state of nationality;
- outside the territory of the state at which the terror is directed, i. e., the Munich Olympic murders;
- within the territory of the state at which the terror is directed but against third country nationals, i. e., the Lod Airport killings.

In other words, the treaty would seek to circumscribe the export of politically motivated terrorism but not "domestic" terrorist acts committed in countries where, for example, "wars of liberation" are taking place.

There appears to be only a 50-50 chance for favorable UN action on this item. As on all terrorist items, the Arabs and Africans are the principal stumbling blocks. However, State hopes to get by the Arabs by proposing that a second UN working group also look at the root causes of terrorism, an action the Arabs want as a means to discuss the Palestinian situation. This would allow the first group to concentrate exclusively on drafting a treaty.

#### 2. Convention on Protection of Diplomats

In his speech to the Assembly of September 25, Secretary Rogers urged completion this year of a draft treaty providing for the prosecution or extradition of those who attack or kidnap diplomats. Notwithstanding the plea, on October 20, the UN's Legal Committee opted instead to refer the matter to next year's Assembly. Any earlier consideration was blocked by the Arabs and Africans.

The President is signing the Montreal Sabotage Convention this week. It requires extradition or prosecution of anyone who endangers the safe flight of aircraft by damaging the aircraft or by damaging air navigation facilities. In connection with that signing, the President will issue a statement referring to the two Conventions discussed above which are now before the UN and urging prompt action on them by the UN.

Attachment  
Tab A - Memorandum from State (Eliot to Kissinger), October 21.

**Memorandum From Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, November 1, 1972**

**Kennedy brought Kissinger up-to-date on all anti-terrorism action taken since the President's directive of September 25th.**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
INFORMATION  
November 1, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD T. KENNEDY

SUBJECT: Status of USG Actions Against Terrorism

This memo will bring you up to date on action taken since the Presidential September 25th directive to mount an all-out campaign against politically motivated international terrorism. In addition to the Cabinet Committee chaired by Secretary Rogers and its supporting Working Group headed by Armin Meyer, three other interagency action groups are refining plans to protect against, or react quickly to, acts of terrorism.

-- All of our diplomatic missions abroad have been given detailed guidance on how to protect our personnel and missions from terrorist acts.

-- Jurisdictional responsibilities within the USG are being worked out so that government agencies can respond quickly, effectively, and in full cooperation should an act of terrorism occur in the U.S.

The FBI will play the predominant role in immediately assuming responsibility. 75 FBI agents recently met at Quantico to review methods for forestalling and reacting to acts of terrorism,

-- Procedures have been devised to give foreign diplomats and special guests added protection while in the United States. The recently passed H.R. 15883 makes acts of terrorism against foreign diplomats and specified guests a federal offense, thereby strengthening the Government's hand to deal with such acts.

10-day transit visas have been suspended and visa applicants are very carefully screened against lists of known or suspected terrorists. Several have been spotted by this process and kept out of the country.

-- Intelligence collection--in cooperation with other governments--has increased dramatically and has been instrumental in anticipating and forestalling acts of terrorism.

-- Contingency plans are being developed and improved, in consultation with foreign governments, for meeting acts of terrorism:

U.S. Government agencies have developed practical procedures to be informed immediately and coordinate immediately in a swift response to acts of terrorism involving the USG here and abroad.

State has been in touch with foreign Embassies (including those of Israel, West Germany, and Jordan) vulnerable to terrorist attack to plan how our governments can react quickly together should acts of terrorism occur.

There are areas where progress has been disappointing:

-- The response in the UN to our efforts against terrorism has generally been poor due to the opposition of the Arab states and the African states which oppose any action that will inhibit African liberation movements.

-- Also, little progress has been made in devising workable sanctions against states which do not cooperate in checking terrorism, although there is a possibility that ICAO, now meeting, can develop machinery for air boycotts against non-cooperating states.

Secretary Rogers will shortly report to the President on the Cabinet Committee's programs and progress. Though the Senior Working Group has met six times, the Cabinet Committee has met only once in a kick-off session.

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington,  
November 7, 1972**

**Rogers recounted for the President both domestic and international  
counterterrorism actions undertaken by the United States.**

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

November 7, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

Subject: Actions to Combat International Terrorism

In the six weeks since your creation of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism much has been accomplished in the areas of coordinating intelligence, establishing precautionary measures, developing contingency plans, seeking congressional support, and securing international cooperation. Much remains to be done, and will be done, but substantial progress has been made.

Coordinating Intelligence

Mindful that prior information is the most effective defense against international terrorism, we have:

- Alerted all foreign reporting posts of the urgency our government attaches to combatting terrorism and urged them to give high priority to collecting and reporting terrorist intelligence.
- Established a procedure- for evaluating the increased flow of information and providing regular reports to the Committee.
- Arranged the installation of secure teletypes between the Immigration and Naturalization Service and all involved agencies, thus speeding the flow of information.

Precautionary Measures. Visa, immigration and customs procedures have been tightened, as have been measures for protecting likely targets for terrorist attacks. We have:

- Suspended at least until January 1, 1973, the regulation allowing transit through the United States without visa. This suspension applies to every traveller on a non-discriminatory basis. In the past, approximately 600,000 visitors per year were allowed to spend up to 10 days crossing the United States without prior approval or screening. This loophole has been closed.
- Screened over 6,500 visa applications of individuals not personally and favorably known by our embassy personnel abroad. Of these applications: 4 have been refused entry to the United States including a known leader of an international terrorist organization, and 14 others are under study at this time for possible refusal.
- Temporarily increased the coverage of the Secret Service and Executive Protective Service to include: 15 additional foreign dignitaries; 15 additional fixed posts at Washington diplomatic missions; 23 additional UN missions in New York City.
- Together the Secret Service and EPS have, through overtime and cancelled leave, provided augmented protection equivalent to the service of 525 additional men.
- Alerted all post offices and likely targets of the increased letter bomb activities. Of the more than 80 letter bombs known to have been mailed inter-nationally, 6 have been intercepted in the United States by alert customs and postal employees and citizens. None have caused injury except one which exploded prematurely while being examined by a suspicious postal clerk.

Contingency Planning. If in spite of all our efforts an act of international terrorism should occur within the United States, we are preparing to deal with it as swiftly and as effectively as possible. We have:

- Agreed that whenever federal jurisdiction exists the FBI will be fully responsible for responding to international terrorist acts perpetrated in the United States. All federal Departments and Agencies have indicated their readiness to assist in every appropriate way. Mechanics for prompt response to requests for equipment and men to operate such equipment are being worked out. Should troops be necessary, your authority would be required and obtained in accordance with the Memorandum of Understanding between Justice and Defense (April 29, 1969) for the use of troops in an insurrection.



-- Appointed an Emergency Watch Group which, along with the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee, will be immediately assembled at the Department of State to provide guidance, coordinate action, and communicate with foreign governments which may be involved.

-- Initiated discussions with selected diplomatic missions in Washington to plan specific responses to terroristic threats.

-- Developed detailed contingency plans for responding to terrorist acts against United States diplomatic missions or installations abroad.

Congressional Support. The Cabinet Committee has fully supported the actions by Congress which have strengthened federal authority for dealing with terrorism, including:

-- Senate advice and consent. to ratification of the Montreal Convention to protect civil aviation from sabotage and other acts of violence and destruction.

-- Congressional enactment of PL 92-539 making federal offenses of certain crimes against an additional 140,000 foreign officials and official guests who were not covered previously.

-- To provide guidance for the effective implementation of PL 92-539, the FBI has brought together 50 of its senior agents from throughout the country. Meanwhile, the implications of this new law are being brought to the attention of all responsible authorities at the federal, state and local levels.

International Action. The United States has continued to press for international conventions, including those on the protection of diplomats, and effective enforcement of existing treaties designed to assure safety in civil aviation and to prevent the spread of international terrorism. At the United Nations, Ambassador Bush and I have discussed these subjects with many foreign ministers and, although there is continuing reluctance on the part of some nations to support our stand, we will continue to press for swift and vigorous international action. Meanwhile, at an International Civil Aviation Organization Council meeting on November 1 a resolution was passed by a 17 to 1 vote providing for the convening of a world diplomatic conference on air security August 21-September 11, 1973.

Future Work. While much has been accomplished by the Cabinet Committee, combating terrorism is a continuing campaign. We shall keep you informed of our progress.

William P. Rogers

**Letter From Secretary of State Rogers to Attorney General Kleindienst,  
Washington, November 13, 1972**

**Rogers asked Kleindienst how the U.S. Government could prevent terrorist violence by Yugoslav émigré groups operating in the United States and asked Kleindienst to investigate these types of activities.**

THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

November 13, 1972

Dear Dick:

My purpose is to ask your views on how this Government can be most effective in combatting and preventing the promotion and practice of terrorist violence by Yugoslav emigre groups within the United States, to encourage your continued efforts to counter such activities, and to ask you to undertake a new investigation of these activities.

We want to be sure that the United States is doing everything possible to prevent the use of our country as a staging ground for terrorism, both to assure our continued good relations with Yugoslavia and to meet the urgent objectives set in the President's directive establishing the Cabinet committee to Combat Terrorism on September 25.

We have always been concerned about the dangers of terrorist activities by such emigre groups within the United States, but the recent escalation of emigre terrorism worldwide has heightened our concern. Yugoslav emigre groups have been responsible for the assassination of the Yugoslav ambassador in Stockholm in January 1971; for the bombing of a Yugoslav passenger aircraft on an international flight in January 1972, killing all but one of the passengers and crew; for the hijacking of a Swedish airliner to Madrid in September, 1972; for the infiltration into Yugoslavia of an armed band of 19 men in June 1972 and for the ensuing deaths of 13 members of the Yugoslav police and army; and for numerous other acts of violence and killing, particularly in the Federal Republic of Germany and inside Yugoslavia.

As you know, and as I'm sure Ambassador Granfil indicated in your recent meeting, the Yugoslav Government is concerned that these attacks have been supported and sometimes instigated from within the United States. It has also expressed reservations about the adequacy of our efforts to prevent this. On August 21, the Yugoslav Government submitted a detailed memorandum expressing its particular concerns about specific individuals and groups within the United States whose activities it regards as threatening.

While this memorandum may not substantiate that violations of U.S. law have occurred, I strongly feel that it requires us to place a high priority on investigation and other appropriate action to assure that the United States is not being used as a base for terrorism. I would, therefore, appreciate your undertaking further investigation and study of such activities to determine if United States laws are being violated by Yugoslav emigres, or whether additional legislation might be desirable. For example, if it appears that funds raised here are being channeled into terrorism abroad, we might wish to consider legislation to prohibit this.

We hope that you can let us have your views as soon as possible about these problems. It would be helpful to us initially if we could inform the Yugoslav Government that the Department of Justice has the activities of Yugoslav emigre groups under investigation.

With best personal regards, Sincerely yours,

William P. Rogers

Enclosure: Yugoslav Memorandum of August 21, 1972.

**Memorandum From Richard Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the President's Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger), Washington, December 1, 1972**

**The memorandum summarized the CIA's assessment of the terrorist threat to U.S. business enterprises overseas.**

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
INFORMATION  
December 1, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR: MR. KISSINGER

FROM: RICHARD T. KENNEDY

SUBJECT: The Terrorist Threat to United States Business Interests Abroad

To assist the Cabinet Committee on Terrorism, CIA has assessed the terrorist threat to U.S. business enterprises overseas. The principal conclusions, summarized below, are of interest:

-- While terrorist attacks have been a persistent problem for a decade, at worst they have been a minor problem in most countries.

-- U.S. official installations overseas continue to be subjected to harassment and attack more frequently than U.S. private interests.

-- The most dangerous immediate threat to U.S. business abroad now stems from Arab extremists seeking the destruction of firms they regard either as symbols of U.S. "imperialism" or as sources of significant support to Israel.

-- Once the war in Vietnam is concluded, terrorist groups may direct their energies -- hitherto spent on anti-war activities -- against symbols of U.S. economic imperialism.

-- Indications are that no sharp global upsurge of attacks against U.S. private interests abroad is at hand.

-- There is no evidence of an international terrorist conspiracy specifically directed against U.S. business interests although various international terrorist groups cooperate on specific actions.

Area by area, the threat to our business interests is:

-- Western Europe: Despite the substantial U.S. investment in West European countries, physical attack on American companies have not been numerous or significant.

-- Middle East and Africa: Very little terrorism in this region has so far been directed against U.S. firms despite the proximity of the nations of the area to the Arab-Israeli conflict. However, our oil installations are vulnerable and rumors persist that they will be targets for terrorist acts.

-- Western Hemisphere: Violence against U.S. firms is declining, but --depending on local political issues -- could return to earlier higher levels or become more troublesome than in the past.

-- Far East: In no country of this area is terrorist activity against our business establishment great, although local political events could lead to some increase of violence. In Hong Kong, Singapore, and Tokyo, the security atmosphere is now congenial to American firms.

In short, while greater terrorist activity against U.S. business establishments is likely in some countries or regions -- depending on the local political situation -- we have no reason to expect at this time a general increase worldwide of such activity.

**Memorandum From Secretary of State Rogers to President Nixon, Washington,  
December 11, 1972**

**Rogers reported that the UN's Legal Committee had voted to support a  
"disappointingly weak" resolution on terrorism.**

December 11, 1972

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT - Evening Report

Terrorism Item in UN General Assembly - The UN's Legal Committee today approved a disappointingly weak resolution on terrorism 76-34(US) with 16 abstentions. The resolution sponsored by a group of "non-aligned" countries expresses "deep concern over increasing acts of violence which endanger or take innocent human lives" but only asks nations to submit proposals for further action to the UN Secretary-General by June 1, 1973, and creates an ad hoc committee to study them.

We supported the Italian draft which would have asked the International Law Commission to draw up a draft convention on international terrorism for adoption by the time of the next General Assembly.

The Legal Committee's action will be seen as a rebuff to U.S. efforts, after the Munich tragedy, to obtain UN action against terrorism. Ambassador Bennett had reiterated our strong belief that the United Nations should be up to the task of acting constructively on this urgent problem affecting so many nations and areas of the world. Nonetheless despite extensive efforts to find a compromise, we were unable to surmount African concern that action against terrorism would impinge on national liberation movements.

William P. Rogers

**Telegram 5526 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Mission to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, New York, December 13, 1972, 0052Z**  
**Text of the terrorism item as adopted by the UN General Assembly.**



FM USMISSION USUN NEW YORK  
TO USMISSION NATO IMMEDIATE  
INFO SECSTATE

SUBJ: TERRORISM REF USNATO 5341

1. TEXT AS ADOPTED SET FORTH BELOW. THERE WERE NO LAST MINUTE AMENDMENTS.

2. VOTING LINE UP CONTAINED USUN 5495 3. BEGIN TEXT:

QTE THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY,

DEEPLY PERTURBED OVER ACTS OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WHICH ARE OCCURRING WITH INCREASING FREQUENCY AND WHICH TAKE A TOLL OF INNOCENT HUMAN LIVES.

RECOGNIZING THE IMPORTANCE OF INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION IN DEVISING MEASURES TO EFFECTIVELY PREVENT THEIR OCCURRENCE AND OF STUDYING THEIR UNDERLYING CAUSES WITH A VIEW TO FINDING JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE.

RECALLING THE DECLARATION ON PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW CONCERNING FRIENDLY RELATIONS AND CO-OPERATION AMONG STATES IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS.

1. EXPRESSES DEEP CONCERN OVER INCREASING ACTS OF VIOLENCE WHICH ENDANGER OR TAKE INNOCENT HUMAN LIVES OR JEOPARDIZE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS;

2. URGES STATES TO DEVOTE THEIR IMMEDIATE ATTENTION TO FINDING JUST AND PEACEFUL SOLUTIONS TO THE UNDERLYING CAUSES WHICH GIVE RISE TO SUCH ACTS OF VIOLENCE;

3. REAFFIRMS THE INALIENABLE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE OF ALL PEOPLES UNDER COLONIAL AND RACIST REGIMES AND OTHER FORMS OF ALIEN DOMINATION AND UPHOLDS THE LEGITIMACY OF THEIR STRUGGLE, IN PARTICULAR THE STRUGGLE OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS, IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PURPOSES AND PRINCIPLES OF THE CHARTER AND THE RELEVANT

RESOLUTIONS OF THE ORGANS OF THE UNITED NATIONS;

4. CONDEMNS THE CONTINUATION OF REPRESSIVE AND TERRORIST ACTS BY COLONIAL RACIST AND ALIEN REGIMES IN DENYING PEOPLES THEIR LEGITIMATE RIGHT TO SELF-DETERMINATION AND INDEPENDENCE AND OTHER HUMAN RIGHTS AND FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS;

5. INVITES STATES TO BECOME PARTIES TO THE EXISTING INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS WHICH RELATE TO VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE PROBLEM OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM;

6. INVITES STATES TO TAKE ALL APPROPRIATE MEASURES AT THE NATIONAL LEVEL, WITH A VIEW TO THE SPEEDY AND FINAL ELIMINATION OF THE PROBLEM, BEARING IN MIND THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 3;

7. INVITES STATES TO CONSIDER THE SUBJECT MATTER URGENTLY AND SUBMIT OBSERVATIONS TO THE SECRETARY-GENERAL BY 1 JUNE 1973, INCLUDING CONCRETE PROPOSALS FOR FINDING AN EFFECTIVE SOLUTION TO THE PROBLEM;

8. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY GENERAL TO TRANSMIT AN ANALYTICAL STUDY OF THE OBSERVATIONS OF STATES UNDER PARAGRAPH 7 TO THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO BE ESTABLISHED UNDER PARAGRAPH 9;

9. DECIDES TO ESTABLISH AN AD HOC COMMITTEE CONSISTING OF 40 MEMBERS TO BE APPOINTED BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY, BEARING IN MIND THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUITABLE GEOGRAPHICAL REPRESENTATION;

10. REQUESTS THE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO CONSIDER THE OBSERVATIONS OF STATES UNDER PARAGRAPH 7 AND SUBMIT ITS REPORT WITH RECOMMENDATIONS FOR POSSIBLE COOPERATION FOR THE SPEEDY ELIMINATION OF THE PROBLEM, BEARING IN MIND THE PROVISIONS OF PARAGRAPH 3, TO THE TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY.

11. REQUESTS THE SECRETARY-GENERAL TO PROVIDE THE AD HOC COMMITTEE WITH THE NECESSARY FACILITIES AND SERVICES; 12. DECIDES TO INCLUDE THE ITEM IN THE PROVISIONAL AGENDA OF THE TWENTY-EIGHTH SESSION OF THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY. UNQTE.

BUSH

**Telegram 5582 From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State, New York, December 15, 1972, 0221Z**

**Ambassador Bush explained how Arab pressure on Africans and Third World discontent with Western nations led to a weak and ineffectual UN resolution on terrorism.**

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FM USMISSION USUN NY  
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 5960

DEPT PASS ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS

SUBJ: LEGAL COMMITTEE - TERRORISM ITEM

SUMMARY: FROM BEGINNING THE ATTITUDE OF AFRICANS WAS FUNDAMENTAL TO PROSPECTS OF FAVORABLE VOTE FOR MEANINGFUL ACTION ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM. ARABS SUCCESSFUL IN CONVINCING AFRICANS THEY HAD SOMETHING TO FEAR FROM EXERCISE FROM POINT OF VIEW OF NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS. OUR EFFORTS TO CONVINCING THE AFRICANS TO CONTRARY UNAVAILING AND NON-ALIGNED SOLIDARITY CARRIED THE DAY AGAINST ANY MEANINGFUL EXPRESSIONS OF COMMUNITY VIEWS ON INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM OR STEPS TO CARRY THE MATTER FORWARD. US ACTION IN TABLING CONVENTION AND RESOLUTION ON FIRST DAY WAS GENERALLY CONSIDERED ABRUPT AND IMPETUOUS. ISRAELI ACTIONS TO HEAT UP EXERCISE IN SIXTH COMMITTEE, AND FAILURE OF DELEGATIONS SUCH AS FRANCE, SWEDEN AND THE USSR TO STAND FIRM WERE CONTRIBUTING FACTORS TO THE FINAL RESULT. THE FINAL RESULT WAS A WEAK EXPRESSION OF COMMUNITY ATTITUDES TOWARD INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND A MACHINERY FOR FUTURE WORK WHICH IS GEARED FOR LITTLE OR NO PROGRESS AND MAY CAUSE ACTUAL HARM THROUGH REDIRECTION AND EMPHASIS ON SOUTHERN AFRICAN PROBLEMS.

1. SECRETARY-GENERAL ACTED PROPERLY IN BRINGING MATTER OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM BEFORE UNGA. HE DID SO IN AFTERMATH OF MUNICH WHICH MADE HYPER-SENSITIVE ARABS REACT ON SUSPICION THAT MATTER AIMED SOLELY AT THEM. HAD HE WAITED UNTIL NEXT YEAR TO ACT ARGUMENT WOULD PROBABLY HAVE BEEN MADE THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO APPALLING INCIDENT OF MUNICH MAGNITUDE IN RECENT MONTHS THEREFORE WHY THE WORRY. MISTAKE SYG MADE WAS HIS FAILURE TO CONSULT WITH ANY DELEGATIONS, PARTICULARLY AFRICAN, BEFORE HE MOVED.
2. AS SOON AS ITEM TABLED ARABS VERY EFFECTIVELY PLAYED UPON AFRICAN SENSITIVITIES REGARDING LIBERATION MOVEMENTS IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. ALTHOUGH SYG, US, AND OTHERS MADE CLEAR THEY WERE NOT TALKING ABOUT ACTIVITIES OF INDIVIDUALS FIGHTING FOR SELF-DETERMINATION IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, AFRICAN FEARS ONCE AROUSED WERE NEVER QUIETED.
3. WHETHER ITEM COULD HAVE BEEN INSCRIBED BY PLENARY WITHOUT THE RED-HERRING AMENDMENT PROPOSED BY BAROODY IS DIFFICULT TO SAY, BUT IT WOULD HAVE BEEN A CLOSE QUESTION. BAROODY'S AMENDMENT WAS ADOPTED WITH STRONG AFRICAN SUPPORT. ONCE IT WAS ADOPTED THE ENTIRE FOCUS OF THE ITEM WAS ALL BUT FATALLY DISTORTED.
4. THE NEXT BLOW TO THE ITEM WAS THE US EFFORT TO EXERCISE CONSTRUCTIVE LEADERSHIP. WE HAD A DRAFT RESOLUTION AND DRAFT CONVENTION WHICH WE RIGHTLY BELIEVED DEMONSTRATED THAT IT WAS POSSIBLE TO TAKE MEANINGFUL ACTION WITHOUT JEOPARDIZING THE ACTIVITIES OF AFRICAN FREEDOM FIGHTERS. OUR TABLING OF THE RESOLUTION AND THE CONVENTION BEFORE THE SIXTH COMMITTEE HAD EVEN BEGUN DISCUSSING ITS ORDER OF WORK VIOLATED NORMAL PROCEDURES AND WAS IN FACT COUNTERPRODUCTIVE. AT NO TIME DID WE ATTRACT ANY SUPPORT BY OUR ACTION IN TABLING THIS MATERIAL AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SESSION ALTHOUGH INDIVIDUAL MEMBERS OF AFRICAN AND ASIAN DELEGATIONS ADMITTED OUR APPROACH WAS BASICALLY SOUND.
5. OUR EFFORTS PRIOR TO THE DISCUSSION OF THE ITEM TO SEPARATE THE AFRICANS FROM THE ARABS WHO CLEARLY WISHED TO TAKE NO ACTION WERE UNAVAILING. WHEN THE DISCUSSION OF THE ITEM BEGAN IN THE SIXTH COMMITTEE SUCH CHANCES FOR SUCCESS AS REMAINED WERE DIMINISHED BY THE APPROACH TAKEN BY AMB. TEKOAH (ISRAEL). HIS FLAMBOYANT STATEMENT HELPED TURN WHAT HAD BEEN ON THE WHOLE THE BEGINNINGS OF A RESPONSIBLE DISCUSSION OF THE QUESTION IN PART INTO A HEATED POLITICAL CONTROVERSY AS TO WHO DID WHAT TO WHOM AND WHEN IN THE MIDDLE EAST.
6. ALTHOUGH WE CONTINUED TO TRY AND EXPLAIN TO THE AFRICANS WHY THEY HAD NOTHING TO FEAR FROM THE ITEM AND STRESSED OUR WILLINGNESS TO ACCEPT REASONABLE LANGUAGE ON SELF-DETERMINATION WE WERE NEVER ABLE TO MAKE ANY SIGNIFICANT INROADS. HAD WE NOT HAD THE 25 PERCENT PROBLEM TO WORK ON WITH GREATER PRIORITY, WE WOULD HAVE BEEN ABLE TO MAKE STILL GREATER EFFORTS WITH THIRD WORLD COUNTRIES BUT IT IS DOUBTFUL WHETHER THE OUTCOME WOULD HAVE BEEN SUBSTANTIALLY DIFFERENT.

7. WE HAD THE ASSISTANCE OF A NUMBER OF WESTERN DELEGATIONS IN SEEKING TO WORK OUT A VIABLE APPROACH TO THE PROBLEM. THE ITALIAN PROPOSAL WAS NOT AN IDEAL VEHICLE AS DRAFTED, BUT IT NEVERTHELESS REPRESENTED A RESPONSIBLE EFFORT ON THE PART OF A NUMBER OF SERIOUS STATES WITH BROAD GEOGRAPHIC REPRESENTATION EXCEPT FOR AFRICA TO FIND A WAY. THE AFRICANS DECLINED TO PARTICIPATE IN THE ITALIAN EFFORT TO PRODUCE A TEXT AS THEY SHIED AWAY FROM PARTICIPATING IN THE EFFORTS OF MEMBERS OF THE LEGAL COMMITTEE SUCH AS GONZALEZ-GALVEZ (MEXICO). GONZALEZ-GALVEZ IS AN EXPERIENCED NEGOTIATOR AND COMPROMISER OF SOME STATURE WITHIN THE LEGAL COMMUNITY. WE CONVENED MEETINGS OF ALL GROUPS IN AN EFFORT TO FIND A MIDDLEWAY. THE AFRICANS REFUSED TO TAKE PART IN THIS EFFORT AND IN THE FACE OF AFRICAN ABSENCE DELEGATIONS SUCH AS INDIA AND YUGOSLAVIA WITH AMBITIONS TO LEAD THE THIRD WORLD REFUSED TO CONTINUE THE EFFORT. IT WAS FELLOWSHIP RATHER THAN LEADERSHIP.

8. LAST MINUTE EFFORTS BY STAVROPOULOS (UN LEGAL COUNSEL) TO CONVENE MEETINGS WERE LIKEWISE UNPRODUCTIVE BECAUSE NONALIGNED GROUP HAD BECOME HOSTAGE OF ARAB INTERESTS LED BY ALGERIA. NO MEMBER NON-ALIGNED GROUP EVIDENCED ANY WILLINGNESS AT THESE MEETINGS CONSIDER MIDDLE-GROUND PROPOSALS ONCE ALGERIA TURNED THEM DOWN. WE CONCENTRATED OUR MAIN EFFORTS IN THIS GROUP ON FINDING SOME MACHINERY FOR FUTURE WORK ON THE PROBLEM WHICH COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO PRODUCE A DRAFT CONVENTION FOR THE 28TH GA. THE ARABS FORCED THE AFRICANS TO REJECT EVEN INCLUSION OF THE CONCEPT OF "INTERNATIONAL LEGAL MEASURES" IN THE MANDATE OF A SINGLE AD HOC COMMITTEE TO BE ESTABLISHED. IT IS POSSIBLE ONE COULD GET PLENARY TO VOTE SUCH LANGUAGE INTO THE RESOLUTION, BUT IT IS HIGHLY IMPROBABLE IT WOULD SIGNIFICANTLY AFFECT THE COURSE OF THE COMMITTEE'S WORK. CORRIDOR EFFORTS TO STRENGTHEN EXPRESSION OF THE COMMUNITY'S REACTION TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM WERE LIKEWISE UNAVAILING. SOME FORM OF CONDEMNATION MIGHT BE FORCED INTO THE RESOLUTION AT THE LAST MOMENT BUT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE CAREFULLY CIRCUMSCRIBED (PROS AND CONS OF SUCH AN EFFORT DISCUSSED SEPTEL.)

9. REPEATED EFFORTS AT ALL LEVELS TO SEPARATE AFRICANS FROM ARABS TOTALLY UNAVAILING. INDIVIDUALLY AND COLLECTIVELY A NUMBER OF AFRICAN STATES INDICATED UNHAPPINESS WITH POSITION INTO WHICH ARABS WERE DRIVING THEM BUT THEY WERE SIMPLY UNWILLING TO PARTICIPATE IN ANY EFFORT OR TAKE ANY MEASURES TO SEPARATE THEMSELVES FROM THE ARABS. THE EXTENT OF THE PRESSURE THE ARABS WERE ABLE TO BRING WAS DEMONSTRATED BY THE REFUSAL OF THE KHMER REP DELEGATES TO VOTE ON THE RESOLUTION BECAUSE THEY HAD BEEN THREATENED WITH ARAB AND AFRICAN REPRISALS ON GKR CREDENTIALS AT 28TH GA IF THEY VOTED FOR ANYTHING BUT NON-ALIGNED RESOLUTION. THREATS TO OTHER WAVERING DELEGATIONS WERE REPORTED. THE AFRICANS WOULD NEITHER INITIATE NOR PARTICIPATE IN THE PREPARATION OF ANY LANGUAGE WHICH THE ARABS INDICATED WAS UNACCEPTABLE.

10. THE SOVIETS TALKED STRONG AT THE OUTSET ABOUT WORKING WITH US FOR A CONSTRUCTIVE RESULT BUT LOST THEIR NERVE AND CAPITULATED TO THE NON-ALIGNED WHEN THE GOING GOT ROUGH AND IT BECAME CLEAR THE ARABS WOULD BE SERIOUSLY DISPLEASED BY CONTINUED SOVIET PRESSURE. THE SOVIETS WERE RUDELY REBUFFED BY ALGERIA AND OTHERS AND LOST CONSIDERABLE DIGNITY IN THEIR FRANTIC EFFORTS TO END UP ON THE WINNING SIDE. THE CHINESE SAT IT OUT, SAID LITTLE AND VOTED WITH THE WINNING SIDE. THEIR SYMPATHIES WITH THE ARABS WERE NEVER IN DOUBT. THE FRENCH TOOK A CYNICAL ATTITUDE TOWARD THE EXERCISE AND WERE NEVER A SIGNIFICANT FACTOR; THE EXTENT OF THEIR CONTRIBUTION WAS TO WEAKEN WESTERN EFFORTS BY THEIR OBVIOUS LACK OF CONCERN. THE MAJORITY OF THE LATIN AMERICAN GROUP WAS HELPFUL BUT NOT IN AN ORGANIZED OR EFFECTIVE MANNER.

11. THE MALAISE WHICH LED TO THIS UNSATISFACTORY RESULT INVOLVED EFFECTIVE ARAB PRESSURES COMBINED WITH THIRD WORLD UNHAPPINESS WITH WESTERN POSITIONS ON A NUMBER OF OTHER ISSUES AND GENERAL MISTRUST OF WESTERN MOTIVES. THE EFFECT WAS TO PRODUCE A PARANOID PREOCCUPATION WITH NON-ALIGNED SOLIDARITY KEYED TO THE LOWEST POSSIBLE DENOMINATOR OF THE GROUP, IE THE POSITION OF THE EXTREME ARABS SUCH AS ALGERIA AND IRAQ. THE GROUP SYSTEM PRODUCED A RESULT IN WHICH THE WHOLE WAS LESS THAN THE SUM OF THE PARTS. GDS.

BUSH

NOTE BY OC/T: NOT PASSED ALL DIPLOMATIC POSTS

**Telegram 227601 From the Department of State to the Mission to the United Nations, December 16, 1972, 1825Z**

**The Department agreed with reluctance that the U.S. delegation should participate on the terrorism committee required by the UNGA terrorism resolution.**

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NATO FOR BOYD  
SUBJECT: UNGA - TERRORISM

1. DEPARTMENT RELUCTANTLY AGREES THAT WE SHOULD PARTICIPATE ON TERRORISM COMMITTEE. GIVEN TEXT OF RES AND ITS PARLIAMENTARY HISTORY WE ARE NOT SANGUINE THAT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL POSSIBILITY THAT COMMITTEE WILL PRODUCE MEANINGFUL REPORT OR EVEN THAT WE WILL BE ABLE TO HAVE APPRECIABLE INFLUENCE ON ITS CONTENT. HOWEVER, WE FEAR NON-PARTICIPATION MIGHT BE MISCONSTRUED AS DECLINE IN US INTEREST IN PROBLEM AND CONSIDER THIS ASPECT DETERMINING.

2. IN COMMUNICATING OUR DECISION TO PARTICIPATE TO WEO GROUP, JAPAN AND LIKE-MINDED LA'S YOU SHOULD STRESS OUR DISAPPOINTMENT OVER LACK OF ANY CLEAR MULTILATERAL EXPRESSION OF DEEP INTERNATIONAL CONCERN OVER PROBLEM OF TERRORISM AND OF DETERMINATION TO ACT IN COOPERATION AGAINST IT. YOU SHOULD EXPLORE WITH THEM THEIR ATTITUDE TOWARD POSSIBILITY OF SEPARATE STATEMENT OR DECLARATION AT APPROPRIATE TIME BY LIKE-MINDED COUNTRIES WHICH WOULD CLEARLY INDICATE A JOINT WILL TO ACT ON THIS PROBLEM REGARDLESS OF THE INABILITY OF THE UN AND THE COMMITTEE TO MOVE CONSTRUCTIVELY.

GDS YY