

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NWO 96957
By STP NARA Date 7/16/02

6925191

TOP SECRET/NODIS

MEMORANDUM

June 30, 1969

EYES ONLY FOR: INR/RNA - Mr. Austin
J/PM - Mr. Lehmann
OSD/ISA - Mr. Schwartz
NEA/IAI - Mr. Atherton
CIA - Mr. Norman Smith

NODIS REVIEW
Cat. A - Caption removed;
transferred to O/FADRC
Cat. B - Transferred to O/FADRC
with additional access
controlled by S/S
Cat. C - Caption and custody
retained by S/S
Reviewed by: Elijah Kelly Jr.
Date: 9/86 19

SUBJECT: Review Group Consideration of Response to NSBM/AS
June 26, 1969

Present at Review Group Meeting:

- Dr. Kissinger
The Under Secretary of State, Mr. Richardson
General McConnell (JCS)
The Under Secretary of Defense, Mr. Packard
General Gushman (CIA)
Mr. Saunders
Rodger P. Davies

Dr. Kissinger noted that the possibility of the President taking the nuclear issue up with Prime Minister Meir at an early date was ruled out because a visit by Mrs. Meir could not be scheduled during July. The task before us now was to determine what we want from the Israelis in relation to pressures we are willing to apply and to draw up an appropriate course of action.

Mr. Richardson said there was substantial agreement among the agencies as to what we want. There were significant differences as to the degree of pressures we were ready to apply, whether the threat of pressures should be implicit or explicit, whether we should seek inspection rights to ensure Israeli compliance with any assurances given, and whether we should seek to roll back or merely "freeze" Israel's missile program.

Mr. Packard said that if Israel signs the NPT and gives appropriate assurances on not deploying nuclear weapons, we could live with a secret research and development program. Missiles, however, are a special problem. Once deployed, the world would be convinced that Israel had

DEF 12 ISR

TOP SECRET/NODIS
GROUP 1

Excluded from automatic downgrading
and declassification

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969057

By SPJ NARA Date 7/16/02

TOP SECRET/NODIS

-2-

nuclear warheads. It just didn't make sense to have a highly expensive missile that would land somewhere within a half-mile of the target to carry only "five hundred pounds" (sic) of high explosive. (Re-entry weight of MD-620 warhead is 2,200 pounds.)

Dr. Kissinger said that if asked, the Israelis could reply that their decision to develop missiles might seem a stupid decision but it was their decision. They might even offer to let us inspect warheads - keeping their nuclear warheads hidden, of course. Mr. Davies noted that the Israelis might ascribe considerable weight to the propaganda warfare aspects of having deployed an effective surface-to-surface missile.

Mr. Richardson said it was now possible to list our objectives in both the nuclear weapons and missile fields. Insofar as the nuclear aspects of the problem go, there seemed general agreement that:

- (a) we should seek Israel's adherence to the NPT;
- (b) we should seek private, bilateral assurances that Israel would not deploy or test nuclear explosive devices;
- (c) we should seek to create circumstances in which Israel would not "announce" a nuclear capability and would maintain secrecy on its research and development activity; and
- (d) we should gain Israel's agreement not to carry forward any further development in the weapons field.

Insofar as the missile program is concerned, there was less than full agreement that we should seek Israel's agreement to dismantle the program; Israeli agreement not to deploy missiles it produced but to keep them hidden might be easier to obtain and not completely inconsistent with U.S. interests. (General Cushman here noted that Israel had eleven missiles and would have between 25-30 by the end of 1970, ten, reportedly, with nuclear warheads.)

Mr. Richardson said we should begin our talks with the Israelis on this issue as soon as possible. Tying these to the NPT would give us a good public posture if the Israelis leaked. (Dr. Kissinger noted that adherence to the NPT by Israel would not be meaningful since the treaty does not go into effect until some forty or more

TOP SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED

Authority NND 969057

By SP/NARA Date 7/16/02

TOP SECRET/NODIS

-3-

ratifications are deposited and only one state has so far ratified.)

Mr. Richardson said we could go ahead without making any threats; we could make our point by tying our new discussions to the negotiations between Ambassador Rabin and Mr. Wamke of October, 1968 and Israel's current efforts to advance the delivery date for Phantoms to August. We could raise with the Israelis information on sophisticated weapons development in Israel that disturbed us, seek assurances, and, if these were not forthcoming, make clear that this would give us pause. How far we in fact are prepared to go in using pressures cannot be determined until we have had these talks with the Israelis.

Mr. Packard said he thought relating the talks to the F-4 deliveries was sound; he agreed that we must resume the dialogue before we make any decisions as to how much pressure we will apply. Our talks should clearly give the signal that we are in dead earnest and prepared to re-examine such things as military supply arrangements.

Dr. Kissinger said we should avoid direct confrontation with Israel as well as public knowledge of Israeli nuclear activities. We should also determine whether we are going to ask for a demolition of the systems or merely hidden storage and whether we should insist on inspection rights. He noted that if we forced Israel to "roll back" programs Israelis felt essential for security, we would be putting ourselves into a situation where Israel could well demand that we provide compensation.

Mr. Richardson noted general agreement that we go slightly beyond the NEA recommended position. We would not indicate what we might do if Israel refuses to give us assurances; we would, however, relate the discussion to Israel's request for accelerated delivery of the F-4's and indicate that this might have to be reconsidered unless the loose ends from the Rabin-Wamke exchanges are pulled together.

Mr. Packard said we should seek Israel's agreement to sign the NPT and private assurances that Israel will not "develop, deploy or test nuclear weapons." We should not go beyond these limited objectives but should agree that we are prepared to go pretty far in order to gain these. We should also get on record our grave concern at the implications of Israel's missile program.

General McConnell said he thought our demarche should be tied to the Rabin-Wamke discussions, that we should get Israel's assurances

TOP SECRET/NODIS

DECLASSIFIED
Authority NND 969057
By STP NARA Date 7/16/02

TOP SECRET/NO DIS

that she would not deploy strategic nuclear weapons, and that we should not deliver the F-4's until we get a satisfactory response.

There was some discussion of whether in light of belief that Israel had developed nuclear weapons, we could now seek to get agreement from Israel that it would not develop a nuclear explosive device. The consensus was that we should, that this would serve to force Israel to "hide" its programs, and that this would limit any aspect of collusion.

It was decided that Mr. Saunders would prepare a summary of the "issues" paper for the President's consideration and that the Ad-Hoc Working Group chaired by Mr. Sisco would prepare a scenario including talking points, clear these within the government, and forward them to be considered by the President along with the issues summary.