SECRET SECTION 1 OF 4 JIDDA 1248

EXDIS

DEPT PASS CAIRO, BAGHDAD

E.O. 116521 XGNS-3

TAGS: PINS, XF

SUBJ: CAMPAIGN AGAINST TERRORISM: SAUDI ROLE

REF: STATE 51643

SUMMARY: EFFORTS TO MANIPULATE OUR RELATIONS WITH SAUDIS IN ORDER OPPSE TERRORIST THREAT SHOULD FOCUS ON (A) COOPERATION PUBLIC SECURITY SPHERES WHERE WE BELIEVE SOMETHING OF REAL VALUE CAN BE ACCOMPLISHED, AND (B) IN POLITICAL DIALOGUE AIMED AT HIGHLIGHTING FEDAYEEN THREAT AND DIMINISHING THEIR RESPECTABILITY. IN LATTER AREA, HOWEVER, WE MUST EXPECT SAUDIS ASSUME THEIR CUSTOMARY CAUTIOUS POSTURE, AVOIDING POSITIONS THAT COULD LEAD TO CONFRONTATION WITH FEDAYEEN OR STIMULATE ACTIVE HOSTILITY OF RADICAL ARAB STATES. UNFORTUNATELY SAUDIS WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE REGARD SOME MINIMAL LEVELS OF SUPPORT TO FATAH AS KIND OF "INSURANCE PREMIUM", THOUGH DISENCHANTMENT WITH FATAH IS IN MANY RESPECTS REAL, AND FINANCIAL AND
OTHER FORMS OF ASSISTANCE HAVE FALLEN TO FRACTION OF WHAT
THEY WERE IN FORMER YEARS. ACCORDINGLY, WE INTEND TO CONTINUE
PATIENT EDUCATIONAL PROCESS SEEKING REINFORCE GROWING
DISTUSSION WITH FATAH. AT SAME TIME, WE SHARE COLLEAGUES' VIEWS ON INDISPENSIBILITY GETTING AT ROOT CAUSE: CONTINUANCE OF ARAB-ISRAEL DISPUTE. PUBLICLY, SAUDIS HAVE ABJURED
USE OF OIL AS POLITICAL WEAPON, BUT THERE ARE INSISTENT
PRESSURES ON THEM TO DO OTHERWISE. WE SUGGEST CONSIDERATION
OF STEPS WHICH CAN OFFSET PRESENT OVERWHELMING PROM
ISRAEL APPEARANCE OF US POLICY IN ARAB EYES.

WE AGREE US NEEDS
STRENGTHEN POSITION OF MODERATE PALESTINIANS; PERHAPS WITH
GREATER ATTENTION TO PLAGUE OF REFUGEES AND BY EXAMINING
MEANS PROVIDING PALESTINIANS WITH RESPECTABLE POLITICAL
ENTITY AND POLITICAL PERSONALITY OF THEIR OWN. END SUMMARY.

1. AN ASSESSMENT OF HOW WE CAN MANIPULATE OUR RELATIONS:
WHICH SAUDI ARABIA TO BRING ABOUT SOME ABATEMENT OF TERRORIST THREAT DIVIDES ITSELF FAIRLY EVIDENTLY INTO TWO
BROAD TOPICS: (A) COOPERATION
APPREHENSION OF DANGEROUS PERSONAGES;
(B) DIALOGUE ON POLITICAL LEVEL INTENDED BRING WEIGHT OF
SAUDI INFLUENCE AND THAT OF KING FAISAL PERSONALLY TO
DISCOURAGE TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

2. WITH REGARD TO FIRST CATEGORY, SAUDI ATTITUDES REVEAL:
FERTILE SPHERE FOR COOPERATION. ASIDE FROM RECENT TAPLINE
SABOTAGE ON SAUDI TERRITORY AND RUPTURE OF ARAMCO PIPING
SOME DISTANCE INLAND FEW WEEKS AGO, SAUDIS HAVE BEEN FOR
PAST THREE YEARS BLISSFULLY IMMUNE FROM DISRUPTIVE IMPACT
OF BOMBINGS, ASSASSINATIONS AND OTHER TURMOIL WHICH HAS
GRIPPED JORDAN, LEBANON, AND EVEN OCCASIONALLY KUWAIT. SAUDIS
ARE DESPERATELY ANXIOUS PRESERVE THIS HAPPY STATE OF
AFFAIRS. URGENT HOPE THAT WOLF WILL STAY AWAY FROM THEIR
DOOR HAS EVEN MADE SAUDIS BLIND TO FACT THAT THEY TOO
WERE ONE OF BSO'S TARGETS IN KHARTOUM. COMMENTS HERE HAVE
REVEALED ALMOST NO SPONTANEOUS RECOGNITION OF THIS FACT.
SAUDI SECURITY SERVICES ARE HARDLY PARAGONS OF MODERNITY, BUT THEY HAVE SOME FACTORS GOING FOR THEM. WE IN PROCESS OF PREPARING ASSESSMENT ROLE AND FUTURE POTENTIAL OF PALESTINIANS IN SAUDI ARABIA (ESTIMATED AROUND 30,000). OUR PRELIMINARY ESTIMATE IS THIS COMMUNITY COWED AND UNEASY, AWARE THAT SIGNIFICANT TERRORIST DISTURBANCE COULD EASILY RESULT IN COUPLE OF THOUSAND OF THEM FINDING THEMSELVES IN JAIL WITHIN TWO OR THREE DAYS. FATAH HAS NO OVERT OPERATING OFFICES IN SAUDI ARABIA. SUSPICION DIRECTED TOWARD THEM, AND RELATIVE ISOLATION OF PALESTINIANS HERE TENDS REDUCE NUMBERS WHO WOULD BE INCLINED ‘HARBOUR OR ASSIST RSO TEAM.’ ONE SENIOR SAUDI HAS REMARKED TO US, WITH PERHAPS A BIT TOO MUCH CONFIDENCE, THAT KHARTOUM INCIDENT MOST UNLIKELY OCCUR HERE SINCE WITHOUT DOUBT ASSASSINS’ HEADS WOULD ROLL (LITERALLY) WITHIN FEW DAYS AFTER EVENT. DRACONIAN SAUDI-STYLE JUSTICE HAS IT STRENGTHS.

NOTE BY OC/IT: NOT PASSED CAIRO, BAGHDAD.
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ACTION 55-25

INFO UCT-01 ADP-00 /326 W

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F 2715.3/2 MAH 73
FM AMBASSAD JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3566
INFO AMBASSAD AMMAN
AMBASSAD BEIRUT
AMBASSAD KHARTOUM
AMBASSAD KUWAIT
AMBASSAD LONDON
AMBASSAD TEL AVIV
AMBASSAD TIPOULI
AMBASSAD SANAA

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2. OUR AID/OPS MISSISS (INTERNAL SECURITY ADVISERS) IN RIYADH IS REMARKABLY WELL PLACED ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST SAUDIS UNDERTAKE PERHAPS MOST USEFUL TASK THEY CAN PURSUE IN COMBATTING TERRORISM: DENIAL OF SAUDI TERRITORY TO BSD ACTIVISTS. WE WILL HAVE ONGOING OPPORTUNITIES BUILD UP SAUDI SURVEILLANCE CAPABILITIES (INCLUDING, HOPEFULLY, IMPROVING ITS TARGETING). FOR EXAMPLE, DEPUTY MINISTER INTERIOR MOHAMMED BIN ZARA WILL BE IN US FOR SEVERAL WEEKS ORIENTATION TOUR BEGINNING ABOUT APRIL 1 UNDER AID/OPS SPONSORSHIP AND LATTER WILL SOON ALSO BE HOSTING SIX TOP QUALITY, YOUNG, ENGLISH-SPEAKING SAUDI SECURITY OFFICERS FOR COURSES IN BOMB DISPOSAL AND OTHER ANTI-

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TECHNIQUES. WE INFORMED BIN ZARA LOOKING FOR IMMIGRATION CONTROL ADVISER. HIS VISIT SHOULD PROVIDE OPPORTUNITY REVIEW SAUDI TERRORIST CONTROL TECHNIQUES, AND, WITHOUT DRIVING POINTS HOME TOO HARD, SUGGEST MEANS FOR IMPROVEMENT WITH WHICH WE MIGHT PERHAPS ASSIST. WE ALSO IN PROCESS IMPROVING QUALITY OF ADVISERS FOR COAST GUARD/FRONTIER FORCE. OBVIOUSLY WE CANNOT BE TOO SANGUIINE...
About prospects sealing long Saudi frontiers or establishing fully effective controls at points of entry, but we have at least considerable Saudi desire for USG assistance and for advice on wide range these preventive endeavors.

5. Before reviewing problem of Fedayeen terror in Saudi-US bilateral terms, we would like reinforce feelings expressed by neighboring colleagues that there is probably no real cure for terrorist disease other than getting at underlying causes: Arab-Israeli dispute. We may be tempted regard present situation as kind of pax judaica which, like pax Romana of centuries past, seems represent triumph of highly organized, motivated and intelligent minority over surrounding majority in Eastern Mediterranean. In that sense it is not perhaps an unusual historical phenomenon. Judging from stand-pat statements emanating now from Israeli leaders, this state of affairs is viewed by some of them with considerable satisfaction.

6. But to us and Arabs such "pax" seems hardly as enduring and satisfactory as it may to our Israeli friends. Dragon's teeth, such as terrorism, keep sprouting up all around the edges. We know that "no peace, no war" is still fraught with risks for US, if not for Israeli, interests. We have felt reassured by various Saudi public statements abjuring use of petroleum as political weapon and by affirmations of Saudi sense of responsibility for making its oil available to Western users. But it might be a mistake to regard these affirmations as having indefinite durability. We know there are insistent pressures on Saudi Arabia from other Arab states to examine more intensively how oil could be brought to bear to influence Western, and particularly US, attitudes on Arab-Israel issue, and there is evidence of similar pressure from Fedayeen quarters as well.

7. Important conviction affecting Arab outlook on every phase of problem is mounting Arab feeling, quite unintended perhaps on our part, that single over-riding USG interest in Middle East is support of Israel. As we have seen in re-1332 B37, Arabs have reached stage where they give instant credence to "announcements" from whatever source describing...
INCREASED US ASSISTANCE FOR ISRAEL.

AS USUAL, STATEMENT OF PROBLEM IS EASIER THAN FORMULATION
OF SOLUTION. YET WE WONDER IF THERE IS NOT SOMETHING WE
CAN DO TO BALANCE THE SEEMING PRO-ISRAELI CAST OF OUR PRESENT
POLICY BY EFFORTS TO CONVINCE ARABS WE ARE WELL DISPOSED
TOWARD THEM ALSO. SAUDIS, AT LEAST, ARE ALMOST PATHETICALLY
PAPER FOR SIGNS THAT USG SUPPORTS SOME ASPECTS OF ARAB SIDE
OF CASE. FRIENDLY RECEPTION GIVEN HERE TO OUR RECENT PUBLIC
STATEMENT ON STATUS OF JERUSALEM IS SIGNIFICANT CASE IN
POINT (JIDDA 0318).

WE SHARE FULLY KUWAIT’S VIEW (KUWAIT 0929) SUGGESTING
USG SHOULD TAKE CLOSER LOOK AT ITS RELATIONS WITH MODERATE
PALESTINIANS. WE NOT FULLY UP TO DATE HERE ON USG POLICY
TOWARD UNRWA, BUT IT IS OUR IMPRESSION WE HAVE IN RECENT
YEARS DEVOTED MUCH EFFORT TO IMPRESSING CLEARLY ON OTHER
STATES NOTION THAT THEY MUST NOW ASSUME INCREASING PERCENT-
AGE OF UNRWA’S FINANCIAL BURDEN. EVEN WITH PRESENT TIGHT-
NESS OF AID FUNDS, WE WONDER IF IT WOULD NOT BE POSSIBLE
SOMEHOW DEMONSTRATE MORE POSITIVE CONCERN FOR PALESTINIAN
REFUGEE PLIGHT. CONGRESS SEEMS RESPOND WELL TO HUMANITARIAN
PLEAS FOR ASSISTING INSTITUTE MILLIONS IN BANGLADESH OR
OPPRESSED JEWS IN SOVIET UNION. IS THERE ANY WAY PLIGHT OF
PALESTINIANS MIGHT AGAIN BE MADE MORE VIVID TO OUR LEG-
ISLATORS EVEN THOUGH IT INVOLES DIFFICULT TASK SEPARATING
TERRORIST IMAGE FROM THAT OF PALESTINIANS AS WHOLE?

NOTE BY OC/T1 NOT PASSED CAIRO, BAGHDAD.
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INFO AMBASSAY JINNA

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AMBASSAY BEIRUT

AMBASSAY KHARTOUM

AMBASSAY LONDON

AMBASSAY TEL AVIV

AMBASSAY TRIPOLI

AMBASSAY SANAA

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DEPT PASS CAIRO, BAGHDAD

10. ULTIMATELY WE MUST SEEK TO ISOLATE AND UNDERMINE TERRORISMS AND COMMANDOS BY ESTABLISHING ANOTHER, MORE STABLE AND RESPECTABLE PALESTINIAN POLITICAL ENTITY AND POLITICAL PERSONALITY -- AN OBJECTIVE THAT CAN PERHAPPS BE ACHIEVED IN ONE OF FORMS PROPOSED BY KING HUSSEIN AND BY DRAWING ON PALESTINIAN LEADERSHIP FROM EAST JORDAN, THE WEST BANK AND GAZA. IF IT BECAME ESTABLISHED IN A RECOGNIZED POLITICAL FRAMEWORK OF THEIR OWN, MODERATE PALESTINIANS COULD SOON REPUDIATE AND UNDERMINE BOTH THE PEACE AND THE THREAT OF EIDAYEEN.

11. IF SAG PREPARED TO cooperate quietly but broadly political collaboration is obviously a more complex issue. SAUDI POLICY IN WORLD AS WELL AS ARAB AFFAIRS FOLLOWED WELL ESTABLISHED PRINCIPLES AND GUIDELINES. CURRENTLY SAUDI FRIENDSHIP FOR US AND THEIR ANTI-COMMUNISM ARE STRONG AND CONSISTENT. THEY DO NOT ASSURE US OF THEIR FRIENDSHIP PRIVATELY AND NEXT

By [REDACTED] NARA, Date 8/26/78

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E.O. 12958, as amended, Sect 3.5

Title: [REDACTED]

Date: 8/1/99

NARA, Date 8/1/99

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12. Yet in many respects and aside from Islamic affairs, Saudis are still fundamentally timorous, aware that their friendship for us, or which they depend heavily to strengthen them against radical threats from South Yemen and Iraq, leaves them in highly vulnerable position vis-a-vis many of their Arab brethren to extent that they might with few missteps become prime target of such Arab radicals as Algeria, Libya, Iraq and Syria.

13. Following these principles Saudis have tended manage their relations with Fatah and other militant Palestinian groups in gingerly fashion. In immediate post-67 years Saudi Gov't public endorsement of Palestinian commandos matched enthusiasm of other Arab states. Similarly decline in Saudi support has tended follow that of other Arab Gov'ts as movement became steadily more fragmented, less effective, and more discredited. Payroll levies for "Palestinian Martyrs Fund" have almost ceased, and present posture is far cry from days when posters lined city walls urging contributions and fuel support for liberation groups. Disenchantment is real. King has lost patience with Palestinian factionalism and is deeply disturbed by Khartoum type terrorism.

14. However, Saudi attitudes towards Fatah will, we think.
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CONTINUE TO BE INFLUENCED FUNDAMENTALLY BY TYPICAL CAST OF SAUDI THINKING DESCRIBED ABOVE. PAYMENTS TO FATAH WILL PROBABLY CONTINUE AT LEVELS CAREFULLY AIMED AT KEEPING IN FORCE PRESENT "INSURANCE POLICY" AGAINST INSTIGATION OF TERRORISM AND SABOTAGE WITHIN SAUDI BORDERS. PERHAPS WE SHOULD KEEP IN MIND THAT THE MORE WE WARN AGAINST GROWING IDENTITY OF FATAH AND BROS, THE MORE WE RISK STRENGTHENING SAUDI CONVICTION THAT SOME MINIMAL LEVEL OF INSURANCE PREMUMS MUST BE MAINTAINED. INSURANCE POLICY HAS HAD INCIDENTAL BENEFITS FOR US TOO: I.E., VITAL OIL INSTALLATIONS HAVE BEEN IMMUNE FROM SERIOUS DISRUPTIONS, OFFICIAL US PERSONNEL AND PREMISES (SUCH AS OUR FAR-FLUNG MILITARY MISSION LOCATED AT FOUR MAJOR SITES) HAVE BEEN FREE EVEN OF ANY SIGNS OF INTIMIDATION.

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ACTION SS-25
INFO UTC-21 ADP-39 SS0-80 1026 W
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R 271539Z MAR 73 4FG
FM AMBASSAD JIDDA
TO SECSTATE WASHDC 3568
INFO AMBASS ADAMAN
AMBASSAD BEIRUT
AMBASSAD KHARTOUM
AMBASSAD KUWAIT
AMBASSAD LONDON 3536
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15. ON BALANCE, HOWEVER, WE STRONGLY FAVOR CONTINUED STEADY
DIAGNOSIS KEEPING SAUDIS FULLY REMINDED close 350-FATAH
LINKS, LONG-RANGE DANGERS OF EXPANSION IN TERRORIST SCOPE
AND IN GENERAL DOING WHAT WE CAN TO ASSURE FATAH ASSUMES
DISHONEST IMAGE IN SAUDI MINDS. IN THIS WAY WE CAN HOPE
MINIMIZE IMPACT SUCH SWEET-TALKING OPERATORS AS ARU WISHAM
(JIDDA 121A), WHO WAS QUITE APPARENTLY FIRST EMISSARY IN-
TENDED BEGIN REHABILITATION FATAH REPUTATION AND CONVINCE
KING WHAT HE WOULD APPARENTLY LIKE BELIEVE, I.E., THAT THERE
ARE STILL WITHIN ORGANIZATION GOOD AND BAD ELEMENTS AND THAT
SAL CAN REASONABLY HOPE MAKE INFLUENCE IF FORMER PREDOMINANT
ONGOING EDUCATIONAL PROCESS WE HAVE IN MIND IS BEST SERVED
THROUGH REITERATED LOW-PITCH DISCUSSIONS WITH KEY OFFICIALS,
RATHER THAN REPEATED FORMAL DEMARCHES. PROPOSED TACTIC
REQUIRES STEADY SUPPLY OF INCIRMINATING INTELLIGENCE TENDING
PROVE FATAH'S CLOSE INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORIST ACTIVITIES.

16. BY SUCH TACTICS WE CAN HOPE AT LEAST ASSURE THERE IS
GROWING DISENCHANTMENT WITH FATAH AND NO INCREASE IN

NOT TO BE REPRODUCED WITHOUT THE AUTHORIZATION OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

[Line 01 24/06]
[28/10]
SAUDI SUPPORT FOR IT. IT IS UNREALISTIC, HOWEVER, HOPE SAUDIS WHO IN CRUCIAL MIDDLE EAST AFFAIRS ARE CHORNEE FOLLOWERS AND NOT LEADERS, WILL SUDDENLY ASSUME DRAMATIC NEW POSTURE CUT FATIH OFF FOREVER WITHOUT CON AND FOLLOW JORDAN IN MAKING EMPHATIC PUBLIC CONDEMNATIONS. WE MAY BE CONVINCED OURSELVES THAT RADICALISM- TERRORISM CAN INCREASE ITS SWAY AMONG ARABS TO POINT WHERE CONSERVATIVE REGIMES LIKE SAG COULD, AS JORDAN DID, FACE SERIOUS THREAT. WE FEAR, HOWEVER, THAT INGRAINED HABITS OF MIND DESCRIBED ABOVE MAKE IT MOST UNLIKELY SAG WILL, UNLESS AND UNTIL ITS SURVIVAL IS CLEARLY AT STAKE ENTER LISTS TO ADMINISTER ALL OUT DEFEAT TO TERRORISM AND FATAH.

THACHER

NOTE BY DC/IT NOT PASSED CAIRO, BAGHDAD.