At earliest opportunity you should inform Eshkol President gratified at GOI agreement schedule Dimona visit.

USG naturally unhappy at Israeli postponement to January 30, but can accept this date so long as it thoroughly understood that inspection can be effectively comprehensive to meet our needs. Since Dimona now operating over 12 months inspection requirements more complex than last time. At minimum must include following:

1. Visiting team will require whatever time necessary (minimum estimate two days) complete observations at site with full access to reactor and all other facilities in order verify nature all such facilities, their production capacity and their present utilization.

2. Team should have opportunity review operating records reactor and any facilities either at site or elsewhere in which irradiated or unirradiated reactor fuel is stored, fabricated or processed, perform physical inventory and make independent
measurements as may be necessary to verify production of reactor since previous visit. This more detailed inspection necessary to account for production.

3. Team also should have opportunity verify location and use any plutonium or other fissionable material produced in reactor.

4. . . .
Thorough inspection outlined above which corresponds to US bilateral and IAEA requirements minimum necessary permit President at later date reassure others on peaceful nature Israel's nuclear activities.

FYI: Visits to date have fallen considerably short normal safeguard requirements and at best accomplished only determination nature facilities at site and productive capacity at time of visit. AEC and intelligence community agree above more thorough inspection imperative.

We regret earlier date for inspection not set. Embassy's excellent reporting of developments on Israel's domestic scene has helped explain Eshkol's attitude. We appreciate difficulties and distractions he faces, but do not believe secret Dimona inspection would significantly affect his party's election prospects. Decision permit six-monthly Dimona inspections originally taken by Ben-Gurion and reconfirmed by Eshkol, presumably after full Cabinet discussion. Deputy Defense Minister Peres also involved in decision. Thus, XX difficult believe "hard liners" in cabinet could oppose Eshkol on decision in which they and Ben-Gurion participated.

Embassy's reporting suggests that with approach elections domestic pressures likely increase rather than lessen. Thus, inspection earlier than January 30 would appear decrease risk adverse domestic political repercussions.

Our....
Our inability fathom Eshkol's arguments for delay naturally
heightens our security fears. Eshkol's remark that "we cannot
build nuclear weapon in two months" not reassuring in light estimate
US experts that if Israel decided to produce weapon following January
1964 inspection, it could produce enough plutonium for one or two
nuclear devices by the end of 1965.

USG of course would not presume to suggest to Eshkol best
timing of inspection politically. We hope however he will not invoke
domestic political problems as pretext for further delays. Given
other indications suggesting that Israel may be engaged in development
weapon, further efforts delay inspection would bring into question
Israel's good faith. END FYI.

END

ACTING

Bali.
EXDIS

Embtel 660

At earliest opportunity you should inform Eshkol President gratified at GOI agreement schedule Dimona visit, the end January 30. Since Dimona now operating over 12 months inspection requirements more complex than last time. At minimum must include following:

1. Visiting team will require whatever time necessary (minimum estimate two days) complete observations at site with full access to reactor and all other facilities in order verify nature of all such facilities, their production capacity and their present utilization.

2. Team should have opportunity review operating records reactor and any facilities either at site or elsewhere in which irradiated or unirradiated reactor fuel is stored, fabricated or processed, perform physical inventory and make independent measurements as may be necessary to verify production of reactor since previous visit. This more detailed inspection necessary to account for production.

3. Team also should have opportunity verify location and use any plutonium or other fissionable material produced in reactor.

4....