Rostow Urges President Johnson to Pressure
Israel
(January 5, 1968)
This memo from Under Secretary
for Political Affairs Walt Rostow to President
Johnson encourages the President to pressure
Israel to be more flexible in peace talks
when he meets with Israeli Prime Minister Levi
Eshkol.
SUBJECT:
The Issues for Eshkol
You are so fully immersed in this problem
that I need not go into detail, but I do want to found
up for you in capsule form where we stand on each major
point you will be discussing. I am attaching a one-page
checklist of these points, an interpretation of Eshkol's
political position and Secretary Rusk's comprehensive
memos.1
1. The main issue
— peace. The real issue between
us is that the Israelis think the Arabs
will come around if they just sit tight
and we think the Israelis may have to
go more than half way to get the Arabs
to negotiate. We can't dictate Israeli
tactics, and we may not even know of
some secret contacts. But we must be
assured that the Israelis aren't going
to sit themselves tight right into a
"fortress Israel" that we would not want
to be tied to. In this context, Eshkol
may ask you what kind of support he can
count on from the US if he gambles territorial
security for an uncertain peace deal
with the Arabs.
One point we haven't
discussed with you recently is our willingness
to facilitate Arab-Israeli contacts anywhere
it makes sense. We don't want to get
in the middle, but we think it would
be worth offering to help if we can be
useful.
2. Israeli moves toward peace.
When we say the Israelis shouldn't just sit tight we
have in mind specifically their: proposing a refugee
settlement that would include compensation and some
repatriation; offering Hussein some accommodation in
Jerusalem; letting refugees from the June war back onto
the West Bank; evacuating Tiran Island which is Saudi
territory; and avoiding further actions that convince
the Arabs they're just consolidating their conquests.
1A briefing
book prepared in the Department of State including memoranda
dealing with all of the issues anticipated in the discussions
between President Johnson and Prime Minister Eshkol
was sent to the White House on January 5 under a covering
memorandum from Rusk, which incorporated suggested talking
points. The interpretation of Eshkol's political position
was in a January 5 memorandum from Saunders and John
Foster to Rostow. All of these documents, including
the checklist, are ibid. There is also a full set of
the briefing materials in National Archives and Records
Administration, RG 59, S/S Files: Lot 70 D 418, PM Eshkol
Visit, Briefing Books I and 11.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 20, Arab-Israeli Dispute
1967-1968. DC: GPO,
2001. |