Memorandum on Conditions for Phantom Sale
(October 29, 1968)
This memorandum from Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
Paul Warnke to Secretary of Defense Clark Clifford explores
whether or not the U.S. has the ability to attach political
strings to the shipment of F-4s it is about to sell Israel. It also discusses the Cold
War political ramifications of Israel becoming a nuclear
superpower.
SUBJECT
F-4 Negotiations with Israel
As you know, the first negotiating
session on the sale of F-4s to Israel is tomorrow, 30
October. Assistant Secretary Hart has been delegated
Mr. Rusk's responsibility for carrying out these negotiations
with Ambassador Rabin of Israel.
The threshold issue is whether our
negotiators have authority to impose any political conditions
on the sale of the F-4s or whether all that is to be
negotiated are the technical details. The second is,
assuming that conditions can be imposed, what these
should be. Preliminary discussions between the President
and Foreign Minister Abba Eban and Secretary Rusk with
Eban have focused on Israeli adherence to the Non-Proliferation
Treaty.
As to the first issue we feel that
the President's direction to open negotiations does
not mean that we must agree to provide the Phantoms
unconditionally The oral messages conveyed from Prime
Minister Eshkol and other Israeli officials are to the
effect that they understand the sale of Phantoms to
be unconnected to the issue of the Non-Proliferation
Treaty or any other political question. In our view,
we should not accept this position and should instead
make clear at the outset of negotiations that the sale
of the Phantoms will be contingent upon our satisfaction
with Israeli assurances on matters affecting our own
national security. Authority for our negotiators to
take this position should be obtained from the President.
Reports we have as to the President's
discussions with Prime Minister Eshkol the first of
this year show that the President agreed only to keep
the sale of Phantoms to Israel under review and to put
ourselves in a position where, if an affirmative decision
were to be made by the end of the year, we could begin
to supply Phantoms in quantities of two or three per
month beginning January of 1970. The announcement of
October 9th that we would begin to negotiate with Israel
on this sale did not constitute an undertaking to consummate
the transaction unconditionally.
Even more important, any agreement
with a foreign government is subject to modification
in accordance with developments affecting the security
of the United States. [3 lines of source text not
declassified]. This possession of a nuclear missile
by Israel would be of no value to that country unless
the fact were known to its Arab neighbors. If this fact
were to become known, there is every likelihood that
the UAR and possibly other Arab countries would request
and receive Soviet nuclear missiles stationed on their
soil under Soviet control. At a minimum, this development
would lead to increased Soviet penetration and influence
among the Arab countries and the complete polarization
of the area. The responsibility for Israel's nuclear
weapons would generally be charged to us, particularly
after the sale of Phantoms has made us virtually Israel's
only major source of arms supply.
For the future, the consequences of
nuclear weapons in the Middle East could be calamitous.
There can be no assurance that Israel's possession of
strategic missiles would deter the Arab states, particularly
if they have Soviet nuclear missiles as an offset. We
must at least contemplate the possibility that, faced
with a massive Arab attack, Israel might launch a pre-emptive
nuclear strike. A retaliatory attack, however limited,
would destroy Israel and face us with totally unacceptable
alternatives. The first of these, a nuclear strike by
the United States, is almost unthinkable. If directed
against the Soviet Union, it would lead inexorably to
all-out nuclear war. If directed against an Arab state,
it would virtually compel Soviet retaliation against
U.S. territory, particularly in view of the fact that
Israel would have been the first to resort to nuclear
arms.
On the other hand, the inability of
the United States to respond to the destruction of Israel
by Soviet missiles would damage incalculably our world
position and our foreign policy objectives. We would
have shown ourselves powerless to protect or even avenge
a country for which we have been the principal sponsor
and champion. I doubt that the West Germans could retain
any confidence in our nuclear deterrent. Their most
likely recourse would be an accommodation with the Soviet
Union. NATO would cease to exist as an effective body.
In the light of these possibilities,
I believe that we must use every available means to
get assurances from Israel well beyond their signature
on the NPT. These assurances, upon which sale of the
F-4s should be expressly conditioned, would include
their written agreement:
1. Not to test or deploy those strategic
missiles now in Israel without our advance knowledge
or consent;
2. Not to manufacture or otherwise
acquire strategic missiles or nuclear weapons without
our advance knowledge or consent,
3. To permit semi-annual inspection
of specified sites in Israel and to provide full information
on any program. designed to achieve a nuclear weapon
capability; and
4. To sign and ratify 'he Nuclear
Non-Proliferation Treaty.1
For illustrative purposes, a proposed
exchange of correspondence between the President and
the Prime Minister is attached.
Paul C. Wamke
1Harold Saunders sent a memorandum
on October 29 to Wait Rostow warning him that Israeli
Air Force Commander General Hod was about to arrive in
Washington expecting to discuss the purchase of Phantom
aircraft with Defense officials and Defense was taking
the position that it was not prepared to discuss the aircraft
until the United States received assurances from Israel
concerning the Non-Proliferation Treaty. Saunders noted
the unlikelihood of such assurances. "So we may have a
situation where General Hod is here but can't talk to
anyone." (Johnson Library, National Security File, Country
File, Israel, Vol. X, Cables and Memos, 6/68-11/68)
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 20, Arab-Israeli Dispute
1967-1968. DC: GPO,
2001. |