Israeli PM Eshkol Letter Explaining
Israeli Views on Peace
(April 30, 1968)
This letter from Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol to
President Johnson was transmitted by Israeli Ambassador Yitzhak Rabin to Secretary of State Rusk. It outlines the threat of terrorism to Israel. It also
explains the conflicting interests influencing King
Hussein's view toward Israel, as well as how Egyptian
leader Gamal Nasser's hostility undermines the Jordanian
leader's interest in reaching an agreement with Israel.
Dear Mr. President:
On receiving your letter of April 6,
I gave Ambassador Barbour a full explanation of my views
on both of the subjects you raised. The activities of
terrorist organizations, openly encouraged by Arab Governments,
present grave problems for our security. It is axiomatic
that the solution does not and cannot lie in giving
them free rein or impassively suffering their assaults
on life, limb and property in Israel. No government
could ever be expected to accept such a course. We are
adopting various methods to cope with this terrorist
campaign, bearing in mind the considerations which you
have explained to me. We are also doing our best to
secure international understanding of our dilemma and
of the motives and necessities which govern our response.
In the last resort our responsibility for the lives
and security of our people must be overriding.
In response to your message of April
6, I acted promptly to reassure Jordan in connection
with Ambassador Jarring's efforts. My impression is
that King Hussein is aware of our attitude on this matter,
but is inhibited by Nasser from moving ahead. The fact
is that Ambassador Jarring's conference proposal for
meetings with our government was accepted by Israel,
rejected by the U.A.R. and has not been, accepted by
Jordan.
The critical state of the Jarring Mission
is thus due to Cairo's attitude. We have made every
reasonable attempt to promote a negotiated settlement.
We offered a broad agenda for discussion. We agreed
negotiate on all the matters included in the Security
Council Resolution within the framework of the establishment
of a permanent peace. We stated that the boundaries
are negotiable in peace talks. We accepted procedure
suggested by Ambassador Jarring in the hope that his
presidency of a peace conference would give assurance
to the U.A.R. and Jordan and ensure an equitable procedure
as well as an agreed neutral venue. Nasser's response
was to reject all these openings, to insist on our commitment
to return to the June 4 situation, for which there is
no international authority whatever, and to reiterate
that he wished to 'implement' a Security Council resolution
while rejecting its central principles-namely, peace,
agreement and recognition. His public utterances as
well as the views conveyed to Ambassador Jarring make
it clear that he is not seeking an honorable and peaceful
settlement with Israel.
On April 23, Ambassador Jarring told
Foreign Minister Eban that by 'implementation' the U.A.R.
means unconditional withdrawal of Israel forces in the
first place to the June 4 lines. This is the very proposal
which you, Mr. President, through your official spokesman,
have described as a prescription for the renewal of
hostilities. Nasser's attitude is dictated by the negative
principles of the Khartoum Conference: no peace, no
agreement, no recognition. His policy is thus to refuse
all progress towards peace, to accumulate armed strength,
and to bide his time until he is in a position to renew
his aggression which he unsuccessfully organized in
1967. This policy is totally opposed to that which you,
Mr. President, proposed on June 19, 1967. So long as
the U.A.R. policy is so sharply contrary to yours and
ours, I doubt if any formulation can bridge the gap.
There has to be a will for peace, and the test for such
a will is readiness to negotiate.
The question which we are now exploring
is whether Jordan is willing, on its own account, to
discuss a settlement with us. We are energetically seeking
to clarify and promote this prospect. I do not know
yet if it is a realistic one. I have myself had several
talks with Palestine Arab leaders who wish Jordan to
take a positive step. We are also trying every means
including the good offices of Ambassador Jarring to
bring about meaningful negotiations which, as Secretary
Rusk wrote to Minister Eban on February 13, are the
crux of our problem. Despite disappointment, it is important
that Ambassador Jarring remain available in the coming
weeks while efforts are under way to clarify the possibility
of a Jordan-Israel negotiation. King Hussein seems to
be oscillating between two pressures-that of Cairo and
the terrorist movements which desire to escalate the
present tension, and that of his own objective interests-
He has not always acted in his own true interests, as
we all learned last June.
The central cause of the deadlock created
by Cairo is Nasser's intention to launch a successful
war as soon as he is ready. So long as he believes this,
he will not allow any peaceful process to mature. It
follows that our principal aim should be to diminish
his belief in the Prospect of Israel becoming weak.
We come back to the fact that the balance of strength
in the coming months is the critical issue. Is it not
matter for further action and concern? This issue is
immediate. It is
Nasser's conviction that he is in the
process of overtaking Israel armed preparedness that
leads him to refuse negotiation and to work for the
frustration of the Jarring Mission. As we survey the
Middle Eastern scene, we cannot forget for a moment
the threat to Israel's very existence which developed
overnight last May and June against all the prevailing
estimates at the time that Nasser would not and could
not raise the tension in the area for some years.
The matter which we discussed in your
home in Texas last January has thus become very acute.
When we spoke of the Phantom aircraft, you said that
you would make a decision on the matter, one way or
the other, during the course of 1968, in the light of
developments, if necessary, even within the next few
months. At the same time, you requested a review of
the requirements for the training of personnel an( information
on the latest date on which you could make a decision
to supply Israel with Phantoms and for Israel to be
in a position to them in January 1970.
On the broad Middle Eastern level,
you told me that you were investigating Nasser's posture
and situation, the Soviet role, and French policy on
the supply of 50 Mirage aircraft ordered by us.
I hear that these three questions have
now been clarified with disturbing results. Nasser has
refused peace and opted for war preparations, with his
eyes fixed on a growing decline in Israel's deterrent
power. The Soviet Union has rejected all approaches
designed to induce restraint in arms supplies to Arab
states. The U.S.S.R. is certainly not promoting attitudes
of peace. The French Government, to our deep regret,
has made it clear that we have no reason to expect delivery
of the Mirage aircraft. Moreover, they have lately decided
to supply Iraq with 50 Mirage aircraft. In these circumstances,
Nasser's policy of using peace and preparing for a new
round of war derives a certain rationality from the
concrete prospect of a changing balance in strength.
The postponement of a United States decision on the
Phantoms now becomes very grave. The decision is vital
on logistical grounds, but it is even more urgent for
political and psychological reasons which affect the
immediate prospect of a peaceful accommodation.
May I submit, Mr. President, that it
is vital your decision be made now. May I urge that
the 50 Phantoms be supplied from the middle of 1969,
and not from the beginning of 1970, in batches of 8
to 10 a month and not of 4 to 5 a month. Training arrangements
should be replanned accordingly. We wish to avoid another
war just as ardently as we wanted and tried to avoid
the last one. If we are to succeed, our deterrents must
be credible, and if deterrence fails, our strength must
be adequate. An American decision of this kind, far
from disrupting any attempts at peacemaking, would by
demonstrating the futility of further war, give the
peace effort the stimulus which it is now objectively
lacking. I do not believe that we shall get peace unless
we move to foreclose the other alternatives.
Mr. President, I write to you on the
eve of Israel's 20th anniversary. Israel came into being
against the background of the destruction of a third
of our people at the hands of the Nazis. In the twenty
years of its existence, it had to fight three wars for
its survival. Throughout this period only the maintenance
of the minimum arms balance has saved it from destruction.
I appeal to you on behalf of my people to grant us the
weapons necessary to prevent further war and to encourage
the process towards peace which though it tarries will--with
God's help--surely come.
In conclusion, Mr. President, may I
send you my fervent wishes for the success of your statesmanlike
effort to bring an honorable peace to Southeast Asia
and to the world. History will salute your efforts and
bless your toil.
Yours sincerely,
Levi Eshkol
Prime Minister
Jerusalem
30 April 1968
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 20, Arab-Israeli Dispute
1967-1968. DC: GPO,
2001. |