Report on Johnson-Peres
Meeting
(April 4, 1963)
This is a telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in Israel
reporting the Johnson-Peres meeting and exchanging view on the Near East.
1. There are major changes
afoot which affect Near East area and Israel.
Primary among these are recent setbacks to
Soviets and corresponding improvement in
US position in area; Arab unity moves which
show Nasserism still popular but far from
all-pervasive; breakup of simplified Monrovia-vs-Casablanca
groupings in Africa with attendant emergence
of conflicting Pan-African and Pan-Islamic
tendencies which Nasser will try exploit; "augmentation
of military hardware" in Near East where
Nasser already has or is acquiring air-to-air,
ship-to-shore, ground-to-air, and ground-to-ground
missile capacities which add to his self-confidence
and against which countermeasures lacking.
2. One change which not inimical Israel's interest is increased US
influence and prestige.
3. Israel sees this as ideal time for USG to use this newly-increased
influence to oppose "Arab belligerency", i.e., to make it
clear that transgressions of the Arab-Israel territorial status quo
would be directly countered by US military strength. Every effort should
be made bring about direct Israel-UAR negotiations, which are prerequisite
of any area peace. In such moves, USG would find Israel a "willing
partner" as Israel has no ambitions running counter present territorial
status quo. USG "too reluctant" in pushing Nasser in this
direction. He needs US more than vice versa and US influence now at
all-time high. Situation may not be so propitious five years hence.
4. In immediate terms, Israel would like see US efforts bent toward
maintenance of status quo in Jordan and reforms within House of Saud.
US aid should not be so focused on Nasser.
5. In long run, overthrow of Hussein and Saud-Faisal unavoidable. Former
is courageous and generally acts wisely. However, he has too many senior
officers plotting against him. Israel doing what it can prolong his
tenure, with what it regards as useful effect on Nasser, by including
overthrow in Jordan among three situations it has publicly proclaimed
might be regarded as causes for unilateral Israel action (other two
being interference re Aqaba transit and Jordan waters). USG can help
by continuing assist Hussein identify his enemies and encourage his
measures popularize himself. This regard, appointment of Prime Minister
Samir Rifai has already improved Hussein's popular image somewhat.
6. GOI has "definite information" UAR used gas as weapon
in Yemen.
In course of conversation Deputy Under Secretary Johnson:
1. Doubted UAR missile development will have much military significance
for considerable time to come.
2. Said USG deeply opposed introduction of nuclear weapons capability
in area.
3. Said USG considers it important work for strengthened UNTSO operation.
(Peres replied Israel has almost built-in resistance to UNTSO operations
and cannot agree there anything UNTSO does which US could not do better
by direct exercise of "good offices".)
Ball
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
2000. |