Memorandum on Situation in Jordan
(April 30, 1963)
This is a memorandum from Robert W. Komer of the
National Security Council Staff to the President's Special Assistant
for National Security Affairs (Bundy) commenting on the situation in Jordan and Israeli reactions
to it.
McGB--
Though anything could still happen, it begins to look
as though immediacy of Jordan problem receding a bit. Both Hussein and
Macomber are a bit more relaxed (Amman 503), and Nasser says (Cairo
1870) what's all the excitement about. We've also tried to cool down
the Iraqis (Baghdad 709).
In fact I'm beginning to think that the immediate problem
is less Jordan than Israel's obvious effort to take advantage of current
tensions to push us into deeds or words which will bolster its security,
regardless of the effect on our position with the Arabs. BG's emphasis
on the 17 April UAR Declaration, Harman's statement that Israel wants
us to take formal action to get UAR to renounce it, and all the flak
about moving to the West Bank suggest that the Israelis want either
to commit us publicly on their side or to get strong private reassurances
from us (e.g. joint planning, security commitment).
If Arab unity is really on the upgrade (and this is
still moot) we're unquestionably going to have to do something along
these lines. But if at all possible, we must make sure that in return
for such assurances, we get some constraints on Israel as well. We cannot
commit ourselves to Israel's defense without making sure that we haven't
given it a blank check.
Since BG's letter makes clear that Israel regards itself
as still militarily superior to the Arabs, there is no immediate threat
to Israel's security. Nor is it as open and shut as Bob McNamara put
it last Saturday that the West Bank of the Jordan is Israel's logical
military frontier (Mike latched on to this like a shot). The West Bank
is such a cul-de-sac that Israel could pinch it off in 24 hours; ergo,
no sensible Arab commander is going to put many forces in such a noose
(Jordanians don't now).
The real threat to Israel's security lies in UAR acquisition
of guided missiles and nuclear weapons over next several years. Nasser
will undoubtedly go this route so long as Israel seems to be doing the
same. We must break this vicious circle (unless we're willing to settle
for a balance of terror in the area). Therefore I'd argue against our
giving new assurances to Israel without tying them to movement on arms
issue. Am working with State on just such a proposal.
For above and other reasons let's think twice before
reiterating old Tripartite Declaration before we have to do so. It amounts
to a security declaration, but in a form which annoys Arabs and won't
satisfy Israelis. Moreover, if it is read as guaranteeing present armistice
lines, it might just lead Nasser to think if he ran a coup in Jordan
we'd do a Suez by keeping Israel from the West Bank.
Finally, Israel's patent attempt to embrace Hussein
(and lead publicly that we too have done so) is so much a kiss of death
to the brave young king as to raise suspicions Israelis want him to
fall so they could take West Bank. BG's letter and other efforts to
warn us may just amount to laying the groundwork for such a move, especially
now while half of Nasser's army is locked up in Yemen.
All this suggests we should (1) stay loose; (2) minimize
public statements in favor of quiet diplomacy; (3) do some active contingency
planning; but (4) avoid being spooked prematurely into actions which
we might later regret.
Bob K.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963,
V. XVIII. DC: GPO,
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