Harman Reviews Issues Relating to Nuclear Weapons
& the Johnston Plan
(February 24, 1961)
This memorandum deals with the U.S.'s discussion
of the Middle East's security capabilities, and future Israeli and Arab
expansion.
SUBJECT
Ambassador Harman's Call on February 16
I enclose for your approval prior to distribution,
a memorandum reporting the conversation between you and Israel Ambassador
Avraham Harman at your office on February 16./2/
In accordance with the interest which you expressed
following the meeting, there follows Department comment pertinent to
some of the points raised by Ambassador Harman:
1. Ambassador Harman suggested that the Soviet MIG-19,
which he believes the UAR is now receiving, is greatly superior to the
best fighter plane the Israelis now have, the French "Super-Mystere".
(It is the Department's understanding that the "Super-Mystere"
is virtually on a par with the MIG-19, although the latter may have
points of superiority under some circumstances. According to the Department's
information, the French "Mirage", which the French have agreed
to supply to the Israelis, is much superior to the MIG-19. A performance
table for the three aircraft, MIG-19, "Super-Mystere", and
"Mirage", is enclosed for your information.)/3/
2. Ambassador Harman stated that the United States
Government declined to furnish a ground-to-air missile, the "Hawk",
but assured the Israelis that the decision could be reconsidered if
new factors emerged.
(The United States declined because of its reluctance
to have a weapon of this sophistication introduced into the Middle East,
inevitably producing a dangerous new element in the never-ending pursuit
of better arms. United States "willingness" to reconsider
was expressed by heavily pressed United States officials, who stressed
that the inference was not to be drawn that reconsideration would change
the United States position. A copy of the paper on which the decision
to decline to furnish the "Hawk" was based is enclosed for
your information./4/ The Department regards these judgments as still
valid.)
3. The Israel Ambassador said the United States, although
unable to finance Israel's arms procurement, would take it into account
in considering Israel's applications in the several categories of aid.
(The Department's position has consistently been that
Israel's applications for aid and loans must be justified on economic
grounds. We have carefully refrained from affirming the Israelis' proposition
that an expanded Israel military burden will produce an expanded program
of United States aid and loans to Israel. It has been stressed that
a country's security expenditures are only one facet of many studied
in determining its eligibility for assistance.)
4. Ambassador Harman expressed unhappiness with the
manner in which Israel's nuclear development came to the public's attention.
(A project of such significance was bound to become
public knowledge sooner or later. It had already been under way for
perhaps two years. Our Government endeavored to keep the matter secret
while waiting for Israel's official explanation, but was forced to comment
when the story "broke" in rather sensational terms in the
British press. There is considerable justification for the Israel contention
that they were compelled to maintain tight security for fear of Arab
harassment of the project. A number of Congressional leaders remain
unhappy that the Israelis kept a development of this importance secret
from the United States in a period when they were operating on a basis
of special confidence to press highly sensitive requests for arms and
economic assistance.)
5. The Israel Minister, Mordechai Gazit, suggested
that in its essentials the Johnston Plan for the Jordan Valley could
be reduced to allotting the Jordan River to Israel and its tributary,
the Yarmuk, to the Kingdom of Jordan.
(According to the Johnston Plan, Israel would be obliged
to deliver to the Kingdom of Jordan 100 million cubic meters of Jordan
River water, about 15-20% of the utilizable total flow of the Jordan
River. Furthermore, the Kingdom of Jordan would realize its full expectations
from the Yarmuk only if some of that tributary's spring flood waters
were trapped and stored in Lake Tiberias, which is completely under
Israel's control. It was because of such obligations between the riparians
that the Johnston Plan provided for an international water master. While
the Kingdom of Jordan might realize up to 85% of its needs from the
Yarmuk, providing a storage dam were built at Maqarin upstream, Jordan's
fair share, as calculated under the Johnston Plan, can be fully realized
only by physical concessions from Israel.)
Walter J. Stoessel, Jr./5/
/1/Source: Department of State, Central Files, 784A.5-MSP/2-2461.
Secret. Drafted by Hamilton and cleared by Strong and Meyer.
/2/Document 12. A copy of the memorandum of conversation
is attached to the source text.
/3/Not printed; the other attachments are filed with
the original of this memorandum in the Kennedy Library, National Security
Files, Country Series, Israel, 2/61.
/4/The document, entitled "Considerations Bearing
on Israel's Request for Hawk Missiles," is the same as the body
of a memorandum from Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern and
South Asian Affairs Jones to Under Secretary of State for Political
Affairs Merchant, dated July 7, 1960; see Foreign Relations, 1958-1960,
vol. XIII, pp. 344-349.
/5/Printed from a copy that bears this typed signature
above which are unidentified handwritten initials.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963, V.
XVIII. |