Letter on Israeli Policy Regarding Dimona Reactor
(January 19, 1961)
This letter outlines the
Israeli policy pertaining to the Dimona
reactor, and demonstrates their willingness
to relay information relating to its development
and future plans.
Dear Mr. Ramey: At the conclusion of the closed hearing
on December 9, 1960, Representative Durham requested Mr. Farley to inform
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy of subsequent information received
concerning the Israeli atomic energy program. Mr. Farley subsequently
advised the Committee staff that, at the first meeting between Secretary
Herter and the Israeli Ambassador later on December 9, the Ambassador
disclaimed any detailed knowledge of the reactor installation near Dimona.
Our inquiries of the Israeli Government and also of the French Government
have been pressed since that time. In accordance with the Committee's
request and Mr. Farley's telephone conversation with Mr. Conway on January
13, the enclosed summary of the information obtained is submitted for
the information of the Committee. Also attached for your convenience
is a compilation of public statements./2/ Responsible officers of the
Department of State will be available to discuss this information with
the Committee if desired.
The official statements which the Israeli and French
Governments have now given us are unequivocal as to the non-military
character of the Israeli program and French assistance to it. We do
not anticipate that these Governments will provide us with significant
additional information in the near future. You will note, however, that
we have been given formal assurance that visitors from the United States
or another friendly country will be received when the present intense
public interest in the question has subsided. We believe that this will
be very helpful in providing first-hand reassurance, and we intend to
follow up this offer at an early date.
Any possibility of proliferation of nuclear weapons--particularly
in the Middle East--obviously is a matter of grave concern to the Department.
We shall continue to follow this matter closely. We do not believe,
however, that extended public speculation regarding the Israeli atomic
energy program will advance the interests of the United States, and
we have taken and will continue to take any feasible measures to damp
down speculation on this matter and in particular to avoid giving occasion
for renewed suspicions and possible undesirable reactions in the Arab
world. We believe that persistent but quiet diplomatic approaches are
most likely to be productive.
The continued cooperation of the Joint Committee in
avoiding public comment is most helpful in this regard.
Sincerely yours,
William B. Macomber, Jr./3/
Enclosure/4/
Washington, January 17, 1961.
Summary of Additional Recent Information on
Israeli Atomic Energy Program
1. We have been assured categorically at the highest
level of the Israeli Government that Israel has no plans for the production
of atomic weapons.
2. We have been assured that there is no third reactor in either the
construction or planning stage. Israel hopes to have a power reactor
in due course, perhaps in ten years but possibly no sooner than fifteen
years.
3. We have been assured that Israel will be glad to
receive visits by scientists from friendly countries at the Dimona reactor
when public interest has quieted down. In particular, a scientist from
the United States will be welcome as early as possible on this condition.
4. We have been given responsible assurances by the
French that the French-Israeli cooperation program is limited to the
24 megawatt research reactor, that the French will supply all the uranium
for this reactor, that the plutonium produced in the reactor will all
be returned to France, that adequate arrangements have been agreed upon
to assure the exclusively peaceful use of the reactor, and that resident
French inspectors or periodic inspection visits will be accepted. The
French assured us that they do not want to be associated with any Israeli
nuclear weapons program, that they have urged public assurances of peaceful
intention by the Israelis, and that they support our efforts to this
same end.
5. Specific information on the Dimona reactor is the
following:
a. The reactor will go critical in about three to four
years and is now in the second year of construction.
b. There is no plutonium now in Israel and plutonium
from the reactor will, as a condition attached to purchase of uranium
abroad, return to the supplying country.
c. Israel is producing only experimental quantities
of heavy water and of uranium from phosphate.
d. No power generation is to be attempted in connection
with the Dimona reactor, which is intended to provide general experience
and know-how as well as a more effective research tool.
e. The stack visible in ground photographs is a water
tower for this water-cooled reactor.
f. The incoming 100 KVA power lines are explained by
the fact that the reactor installation serves as a distribution point
not only for the reactor complex but for phosphate mining operations
and a potash plant in the area.
g. In addition to the reactor the complex will include
a hot laboratory, cold laboratory, waste disposal plant, a facility
for rods, offices including library services, and a medical unit.
h. The reactor and ancillary facilities are expected
to cost $34 million of which $17.8 million would be foreign exchange.
The reactor itself is expected to cost $15.4 million of which $10 million
would be foreign exchange.
6. The secrecy initially attached to the reactor arose
from the fears of participating foreign companies over the prospect
of Arab boycott.
7. While Israel accepts the general principle of international
safeguards to assure the peaceful use of atomic energy, it believes
also in equality; thus it does not propose to open the Dimona reactor
to international inspection until such inspection applies to comparable
reactors everywhere.
/1/Source: Department of
State, Central Files, 884A.1901/1-1961. Secret.
Drafted by Farley (S/AE) on January 17 and
cleared by Meyer (NEA/NE) and Schnee (H).
Copies of the letter and its enclosures were
sent to the Atomic Energy Commission and
the Central Intelligence Agency.
/2/Attached but not printed.
/3/Printed from a copy that
indicates Macomber signed the original.
/4/Secret.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1961-1963: Near East, 1962-1963, V.
XVIII. |