Joint Chiefs Say Israel Does Not Need Military Aid
(February 2, 1967)
This memorandum explains the Joint Chiefs of Staff position that
Israel does not need and should not receive military aid from the United
States.
SUBJECT
Military Equipment for Israel (U)
1. (S) Reference is made to a memorandum by the Deputy Assistant Secretary
of Defense (ISA), dated 20 January 1967, subject as above, which requested
the views of the Joint Chiefs of Staff on an Israeli request for military
assistance on a grant aid basis.
2. (S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff do not consider that grant military
aid to Israel is justified by the internal or external threat. In addition,
neither the need for insuring Israel's pro-Western orientation nor Israel's
economic condition justify such aid. Provision of grant aid to Israel
would not be in consonance with established MAP policy and would be
contrary to US interests in the Middle East. For additional information
on the adverse effects of a grant aid program, see Appendix A./2/
/2/Neither Appendix A nor B is printed. Appendix A, unsigned and undated,
is entitled "Advisability of Grant Aid/Sales to Israel."
3. (S) Israel's present military forces are capable of defending successfully
against any individual or collective Arab attack; currently programmed
arms shipments to Jordan and expected deliveries to other Arab states
do not affect this capability materially. Israel's superior offensive
and defensive capabilities would be improved by acquisition of 200 modern
armored personnel carriers, but this improvement is not needed at the
present or in the next three to five years to insure Israel's security.
4. (S) Aside from the basic questions of grant aid and Israel's security
needs, providing armored personnel carriers to Israel in CY 1967 would
either delay programmed deployments to Southeast Asia, further degrade
our CONUS position, or require diversion from existing commitments to
other countries. Moreover, a US agreement to sell additional major items
of military equipment to Israel is not advisable since it would:
a. Negate the effect of the US warning to Israel in the wake of its
recent attack on Jordan.
b. Aggravate the current unstable internal situation in Jordan.
c. Serve to establish further the United States as the primary supplier
of military equipment to Israel.
d. Provoke adverse Arab reactions.
e. Further contribute to the Arab-Israel arms race with the United
States supplying both contestants.
5. (S) M-113A1 APCs are also produced in Italy under the US/Italian
coproduction project; however, sale to Israel from this source is considered
inadvisable for the reasons given above, since the Italian-produced
model is outwardly identical to the US M-113A1.
6. (S) Suitable substitutes for the M-113A1 armored personnel carrier
are available in Europe as noted in Appendix B; however, the Joint Chiefs
of Staff recommend that the United States discourage Israel from procuring
any additional armored personnel carriers.
For the Joint Chiefs of Staff:
Earle G. Wheeler
Chairman
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Source: Washington National Records Center, RG 330, OSD Files: FRC
72 A 2468, Israel 091.3 MAP. Secret. A stamped notation on the memorandum
indicates that it was seen by McNamara.
Sources: Foreign
Relations of the United States, 1964-1968, V. 18, Arab-Israeli
Dispute 1964-1967. DC: GPO,
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